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Abstract(s)
Compreender o desfasamento originado pela atividade civil-militar e seus efeitos é um
contributo essencial para a prática da estratégia. Partindo da análise de casos de valor
intrínseco para esta investigação, avalia-se a prática da estratégia para provar que o
desfasamento entre política e estratégia resulta do facto de a guerra, como variável
dependente da política, assumir variações imprevisíveis resultantes daquela relação e da sua
natureza, que obriga a que a estratégia, como variável interveniente e como atividade
resultante das relações civis-militares, seja orientada ao sucesso. Este argumento segue três
hipóteses explicativas a desenvolver no trabalho: (1) a natureza da guerra influencia a
natureza e a eficácia da estratégia, porque os atores envolvidos na ação política e na
estratégia atuam num ambiente de imprevisibilidade; (2) a estabilidade e a coerência da
relação entre política e guerra, materializada na prática da estratégia, obriga a considerar que
a razão da estratégia é o sucesso; (3) a eficácia das relações civis-militares é determinante
para diminuir as tensões naturais entre a ação política e a ação militar. Conclui-se que a
estratégia, como resultado do domínio das relações civis-militares, segue as dinâmicas da
complexa relação entre política e guerra.
Understanding the lag caused by civil-military activity and its effects on strategy is essential to its practice. By analysing cases of intrinsic value, this research proves a mismatch between politics and strategy resulting from the fact that war, as a dependent variable of politics, assumes unpredictable variations resulting from that relationship and its nature, which compels to define strategy as a theory of success, since it is the intervening variable and activity resulting from civil-military relations. This argument follows three explanatory hypotheses: (1) the ontology of war influences the nature and the effectiveness of strategy because the actors involved in political action and strategy act in an environment of unpredictability; (2) the stability and coherence of the relationship between politics and war, materialised in the practice of strategy, forces us to consider why strategy is the theory of success; (3) The efficacy of civil-military relations is crucial to reducing the natural tensions between political action and military action. We concluded that the strategy, because of the dominance of civil-military relations, follows the dynamics of the complex relationship between politics and war.
Understanding the lag caused by civil-military activity and its effects on strategy is essential to its practice. By analysing cases of intrinsic value, this research proves a mismatch between politics and strategy resulting from the fact that war, as a dependent variable of politics, assumes unpredictable variations resulting from that relationship and its nature, which compels to define strategy as a theory of success, since it is the intervening variable and activity resulting from civil-military relations. This argument follows three explanatory hypotheses: (1) the ontology of war influences the nature and the effectiveness of strategy because the actors involved in political action and strategy act in an environment of unpredictability; (2) the stability and coherence of the relationship between politics and war, materialised in the practice of strategy, forces us to consider why strategy is the theory of success; (3) The efficacy of civil-military relations is crucial to reducing the natural tensions between political action and military action. We concluded that the strategy, because of the dominance of civil-military relations, follows the dynamics of the complex relationship between politics and war.
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Keywords
Guerra Política Estratégia militar Relações civis-militares War Politics Military strategy Civil-military relations