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Entre a aliança e a adversidade.
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Na segunda metade do século XVII, durante o reinado de Luís XIV, assistiu-se ao investimento e desenvolvimento do porto de Brest como a principal base naval no Atlântico para a Marinha francesa. A sua posição geográfica, bem como as características físicas do território, permitia-lhe constituir-se como base de projeção para uma eventual invasão das ilhas britânicas, mas também como ponto de apoio logístico para uma força naval permanente, capaz de ameaçar o comércio marítimo britânico.
No século XVIII, com a Guerra da Sucessão Espanhola, e sobretudo durante a denominada Guerra dos Sete Anos, o bloqueio naval de Brest constituiu-se como um dos principais pilares da estratégia naval britânica, forçando os navios franceses a manterem-se no porto, permitindo à Royal Navy a iniciativa e o uso do mar, essenciais para garantir a segurança das ilhas britânicas, da navegação e do comércio marítimo. Com o rebentar da guerra contra a França Revolucionária, em 1793, o bloqueio de Brest e o controlo da navegação no canal da Mancha e mares adjacentes às ilhas britânicas voltou a ser uma prioridade para a Royal Navy. A Coroa Portuguesa foi então chamada a colaborar com a Grã-Bretanha, no quadro da aliança luso-britânica, sendo solicitado o reforço das forças navais britânicas no Mediterrâneo, sob o comando do Almirante Hood. Por iniciativa e insistência do seu Ministro da Marinha, D. Martinho de Melo e Castro, a Coroa Portuguesa entendeu que a futura esquadra de auxílio, a
ser constituída pelas principais unidades navais da Armada Portuguesa, deveria antes atuar no Atlântico, bloqueando os portos franceses como Brest e Rochefort, de onde poderiam sair os navios que colocariam em risco o litoral continental português, ilhas atlânticas e, sobretudo, os portos do Brasil, como havia sucedido nos dois anteriores grandes conflitos daquele século. A partir de meados de 1793, até ao início de 1795, os navios portugueses da chamada Esquadra de Auxílio a Inglaterra, ou simplesmente Esquadra do Canal, foram sujeitos às maiores provações, resultantes da constante variação de ventos e frequentes tempestades, obrigando a procurar proteção nos portos e fundeadouros da costa sudoeste britânica. Mas, também aqui encontravam frequentes ameaças, pois fortes correntes, baixios e outros perigos, ou simplesmente o erro ao falhar a correta aproximação a terra, acabavam por provocar a perda de navios por encalhe e naufrágio, como sucedeu com a fragata portuguesa São Rafael, em 31 de agosto de 1794, nos baixios à entrada do Solent, o canal da Ilha de Wight. Com a presente comunicação pretende-se identificar os principais desafios que a navegação no canal da Mancha representava para os navios da esquadra portuguesa, bem como caracterizar a sua ação e opções tomadas de acordo com os mesmos.
During the second half of the seventeenth century, under the reign of Louis XIV, considerable investment was made in the development of the port of Brest, which emerged as the French Navy's principal Atlantic naval base. Its geographical position, together with the physical characteristics of the surrounding territory, made it an ideal platform for the projection of a potential invasion of the British Isles, while simultaneously serving as a logistical base for a permanent naval force capable of threatening British maritime trade. During the eighteenth century, particularly throughout the War of the Spanish Succession and, above all, the Seven Years' War, the naval blockade of Brest became one of the cornerstones of British naval strategy. By confining the French fleet to port, it enabled the Royal Navy to retain the strategic initiative and command of the sea, both of which were essential for safeguarding the British Isles, maritime navigation, and overseas commerce. With the outbreak of the war against Revolutionary France in 1793, the blockade of Brest and the control of navigation in the English Channel and the waters surrounding the British Isles once again became priorities for the Royal Navy. Within the framework of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, the Portuguese Crown was called upon to support Great Britain by reinforcing the British naval forces operating in the Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Hood. However, at the initiative and insistence of its Secretary of State for the Navy and Overseas Dominions, D. Martinho de Melo e Castro, the Portuguese government maintained that the proposed assistance fleet—comprising some of the principal warships of the Portuguese Navy—should instead operate in the Atlantic. Its mission would be to blockade the French ports of Brest and Rochefort, from which enemy vessels could threaten the Portuguese mainland coast, the Atlantic islands, and, above all, the ports of Brazil, as had occurred during the two previous major conflicts of the eighteenth century. From mid-1793 until the beginning of 1795, the vessels of the so-called Portuguese Fleet in assistance to Great Britain, also known simply as the Channel Fleet in Portuguese documents, endured severe hardships resulting from constantly shifting winds and frequent storms, which repeatedly forced them to seek shelter in the ports and anchorages of the south-western coast of Britain. Yet these offered no guarantee of safety. Strong tidal currents, shoals, and other navigational hazards—or simply errors in making landfall frequently resulted in ships being stranded or wrecked. Such was the case of the Portuguese frigate São Rafael, which was lost on 31 August 1794 after running aground on the shoals at the entrance to the Solent, off the Isle of Wight. The present paper seeks to identify the principal navigational challenges that the English Channel posed to the ships of the Portuguese fleet, while also examining the Fleet's operations and the decisions taken in response to those challenges.
During the second half of the seventeenth century, under the reign of Louis XIV, considerable investment was made in the development of the port of Brest, which emerged as the French Navy's principal Atlantic naval base. Its geographical position, together with the physical characteristics of the surrounding territory, made it an ideal platform for the projection of a potential invasion of the British Isles, while simultaneously serving as a logistical base for a permanent naval force capable of threatening British maritime trade. During the eighteenth century, particularly throughout the War of the Spanish Succession and, above all, the Seven Years' War, the naval blockade of Brest became one of the cornerstones of British naval strategy. By confining the French fleet to port, it enabled the Royal Navy to retain the strategic initiative and command of the sea, both of which were essential for safeguarding the British Isles, maritime navigation, and overseas commerce. With the outbreak of the war against Revolutionary France in 1793, the blockade of Brest and the control of navigation in the English Channel and the waters surrounding the British Isles once again became priorities for the Royal Navy. Within the framework of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, the Portuguese Crown was called upon to support Great Britain by reinforcing the British naval forces operating in the Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Hood. However, at the initiative and insistence of its Secretary of State for the Navy and Overseas Dominions, D. Martinho de Melo e Castro, the Portuguese government maintained that the proposed assistance fleet—comprising some of the principal warships of the Portuguese Navy—should instead operate in the Atlantic. Its mission would be to blockade the French ports of Brest and Rochefort, from which enemy vessels could threaten the Portuguese mainland coast, the Atlantic islands, and, above all, the ports of Brazil, as had occurred during the two previous major conflicts of the eighteenth century. From mid-1793 until the beginning of 1795, the vessels of the so-called Portuguese Fleet in assistance to Great Britain, also known simply as the Channel Fleet in Portuguese documents, endured severe hardships resulting from constantly shifting winds and frequent storms, which repeatedly forced them to seek shelter in the ports and anchorages of the south-western coast of Britain. Yet these offered no guarantee of safety. Strong tidal currents, shoals, and other navigational hazards—or simply errors in making landfall frequently resulted in ships being stranded or wrecked. Such was the case of the Portuguese frigate São Rafael, which was lost on 31 August 1794 after running aground on the shoals at the entrance to the Solent, off the Isle of Wight. The present paper seeks to identify the principal navigational challenges that the English Channel posed to the ships of the Portuguese fleet, while also examining the Fleet's operations and the decisions taken in response to those challenges.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Porto de Brest Armada Portuguesa Fragata portuguesa São Rafael Canal da Mancha Portuguese Navy