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Authors
Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
The beginning of the 90’s saw the last great conflict of the 20th century. A coalition of a few
dozens of countries led by the United States faced Iraq in a war noticeable by a long period of
battle-field preparation and a short period of key operations.
At the start of this new millennium we witnessed another conflict with practically the same
players: United States, United Kingdom and Iraq. Yet, the planning and execution of the
operations was substantially different from the first.
The present paper endeavours to draw an analysis of the planning and execution of
Operations “Desert Storm” and “Iraqi Freedom”, aiming to identify several possible
distinguishing factors which might allow us to get some lessons learned. This examination will
focus on target identification at several levels, the scrutiny of the campaign’s operational
planning, recognizing the command and control structure, studying the conflict in its different
components and the importance of technology in the execution of the operations.
Therefore, after an introduction where the goal of the research is defined, the study’s
significance justified and the adopted methodology, layout and content presented, the first
chapter is devoted to scrutinising the Gulf War of 1991. Then, the second chapter examines the
2003 Gulf War by the same parameters of the first conflict. Subsequently, the third chapter
proposes the answer to the main question and related issues, as well as the confirmation or
rejection of the raised theories. And in the fourth and last chapter, lessons learned are drawn
from the comparative analysis of the two conflicts.
Description
Keywords
Guerra do Iraque Operações Militares Iraqi Freedom Desert Storm