Repository logo
 
Publication

Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance

dc.contributor.authorAwad, Ghina
dc.contributor.authorGhanem, Mohamed Gaber
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-07T18:04:01Z
dc.date.available2023-07-07T18:04:01Z
dc.date.issued2023-07-07
dc.description.abstractThis study explores the different attributes of audit committees and boards of directors' effect on firm performance. Mainly the board’s size and independence and the audit committee’s employment, size, independence, financial experience, and frequency of meetings. This paper also talks about resource dependency theory which considers that. Non-independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. On the contrary, agency theory suggests that the more independent the board is, the better the performance. Many accounting scandals and worldwide failures in corporate governance have occurred in the past few decades, affecting stakeholders and taking a heavy toll on national and global economies. After many infamous corporates, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which acted to heighten the responsibilities of the board of directors in corporations, promotes fairness to both shareholders and stakeholders alike by enforcing listed companies to employ independent, knowledgeable, and proactive audit committees and directors and ultimately set the utmost importance on the protection of investors and stakeholders. Taking a sample of 96 companies, the results show that a more extensive and independent board positively affects business results, and the same applies to the implementation of an audit committee. However, our results found no link between the different characteristics of audit committees with firm performance. The findings above give us insight into how companies’ governance operates.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.citationAwad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463pt_PT
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463pt_PT
dc.identifier.issn2542-4750
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.publisherIADITI Editionspt_PT
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.djfm-journal.com/article/board-of-directors-audit-committee-and-firms-performance-13463pt_PT
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/pt_PT
dc.subjectBoard of directorspt_PT
dc.subjectAudit committeept_PT
dc.subjectAgency theorypt_PT
dc.subjectResource dependency theorypt_PT
dc.titleBoard of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performancept_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlacePortugalpt_PT
oaire.citation.issue1pt_PT
oaire.citation.titleDutch Journal of Finance and Managementpt_PT
oaire.citation.volume6pt_PT
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
board-of-directors-audit-committee-and-firms-performance-13463.pdf
Size:
1.21 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.85 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: