

Sport Tourism, Terrorism & Psychoanalysis: A Reflection on Contemporary Events from Heysel Park to the 2016 Olympics



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Sport tourism is a profitable industry and a key factor for branding, with safety being an intangible asset considered by tourists when selecting a destination. Sport events imply a great deal of perceived risk, and Psychoanalysis has been developing an increasing interest in group phenomena, for psychoanalytic concepts are a very helpful tool to think about these issues. This empirical study focuses on major sport events' threats (from Heysel Park in 1985 to the 2016 Olympics in Rio) and on how police forces and destinations keep on improving skills to welcome fans, avoid chaos, and reinforce the host country's international image. 'Swifter, Higher, Stronger' is now the motto of sport event's organisers, athletes, fans and residents joined in an ethical coalition against Fear.

Introduction

Cohen & Cohen (2012) defend the last quarter of a century has been characterised by *"dramatic historical events, major technological innovations and (...) social and cultural changes in both the Western and the non-Western parts of the world"* (p.1). Never as before has one travelled further, faster, and with lower costs, yet the hegemony of the West towards other destinations led to the rise of violence and terrorist threats, and civilians tend to be the weakest link. As Larsen (2011) recalls,

Holmberg (2002) underlined that in line with the general *Zeitgeist*, the most salient risk in contemporary tourism is terrorism. Sönmez & Graefe (1998) found evidence to support the allegation that risk perception directly influences tourists' choice of international destinations. (pp.216-217)

Terrorists are politically motivated guided by what Richardson labelled as “*The Three Rs: Revenge, Renown and Reaction*”. (quoted in Zawadzki *et al*, 2015, p.111)

This empirical study focuses on sport events’ threats (from Heysel Park in 1985 to the 2016 Olympics in Rio) and on how police forces and destinations have been improving skills to welcome fans, avoid chaos, allow free mobility during the spectacles, reinforce national bonds, defend cultural diversity, ensure safety, and update the international perception of the host country. Although the authors admit this study is too Europe/Football-oriented, as Spaiij (2013) refers,

“Security and risk management technologies at football matches are characterised by a high degree of internationalization and Europeanization. Counter-hooliganism police cooperation networks have been on the increase ever since the 1985 European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sport Events. (...) National Football Information Points and other units in different European countries cooperate in the collection, analysis and dissemination of information” [at a world-wide level]. (p.176)

Two chapters with inner sections shall be found: first, a theoretical framework on interwoven concepts like sport tourism and events, risk perception and terrorism, psychoanalysis, groups and violence; then, a reflection on major sport events from Heysel Park to 2016. Final remarks and sources consulted complete this study. Without further delay let the *Opening Ceremony* for this analysis on Sport Tourism’s management begin. As Schimmel (2012) announces,

“Congratulations local citizens! Your city has just won the right to host the next major sport event! The eyes of the world will be upon you. Here come the athletes, the tourists, the sponsors, and the media. Here come the city beautification, the children’s cultural events, fan festivals, and volunteers’ rallies. Oh, and you can also expect to be surveilled, digitally scanned, corralled, barricaded, patteddown, have your city permanently reconfigured and militarised, your traffic patterns altered, and your domestic legal structures ignored. Enjoy the games!” (p.20)

1. Theoretical Concerns on Sport Tourism, Terrorism and Psychoanalysis

1.1. Sport Tourism, brand image and risk management

Despite the difficulty to define *Sport* and *Tourism*, scholars agree both concepts may be combined “*for the development and promotion of a destination, whether through the amount of activities and purposely-built venues, or through the complementary tourist offer they may represent*” (Carvalho, 2014, p. 126). Gammon & Robinson (2003) list 5 reasons for the growing link between Sport and Tourism: (1) the increased attention bestowed to major sport events (like the Olympics, World cups and Euro championships); (2) a greater awareness of sport’s health benefits; (3) the strengthening of economic and diplomatic bonds between regions and countries; (4) the all-year round availability of sporting activities; (5) and the global mobility based on technology. (p.21)

Sport Tourism is presented by George & Swart (2012) as a profitable industry and a pivotal factor for destination branding, and “[d]espite the global recession, the desire to travel for many people remains high”. (p.204). As Kim *et al* sustained, “*The hosting of a mega-event offers an increase in employment, tourism, spending, and media coverage*” (quoted in George & Swart, 2012, p.202), which leads to other topics: destination branding and risk management. *Events* motivate the formulation of marketing strategies by destinations and assist in fostering identities, bearing impacts in economic and positioning terms; as Getz (2008) defends, “*Events have increasingly been produced, bid and fostered for strategic reasons, the dominant one being economic development*” (p.422), focusing on competitiveness, return of investment, sustainability, and risk.

Safety and *Security* may seem synonyms, but while the former is an emotional construction of the Self, the latter requires a legal framework that encompasses travel and the services provided, or an every-day activity (Almeida, 2013, p.7). As Fussey & Coaffe (2012) recall, “*In order to host sporting mega-events, candidate cities and nations are required to provide significant assurances of their ability to host a safe and secure spectacle*” (pp.273-274). George & Swart (2012) recall that “*in the consumer behaviour literature [risk is defined] as an individual’s perception towards uncertainty and an exposure to the possibility of loss or injury*” (Richter quoted in, p.206). And if travellers assess the degree of perceived risk associated to a destination, “*Making tourists feel safe and secure before and during a holiday is becoming increasingly important for international destination competitiveness, since tourists usually consider*

several alternatives" (*Idem*, p.206). Risk influences the choice of destination, the length of stay, the possibility of return, and the visitor's involvement in the word-of-mouth process. Toohey & Taylor (2008) sustain terrorists gamble on fear at mega-events (Ericson & Doyle quoted, p.457), on the global uncertainty in this Post-modern world of fluid narratives of existence. But stadia are also sites of endurance, once visitors, fans and natives dare to defy the perpetrators' delusion of victory by attending upcoming shows. Like George & Swart (2012) defend the reaction towards the unexpected derives from the tourist's travel habits, since "*experienced travellers [are] (...) less risk perceptive specifically when considering health and terrorism*" (p. 208), once positive experiences shall prevail.

The reflection on Sport tourism and Risk management requires a 3rd vortex to complete the contemporary trinity juggled by destinations, governments and police forces: the intrusion of technology. However, it too assists in the promotion of the destination's assets, the increase of mobility of millions every hour, and the power-play of Terror and counter-terrorism.

1.2. Terrorism, Destinations and Security

As Giulianotti & Klauser (2012) defend "'terror', 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are terms that carry enormous political loading and rarely generate agreement on their definitions. (...) The term 'terror' first emerged in Western political discourse during the revolutionary French government's 'Reign of Terror' (1793-1795)" (p.308). Another definition is suggested by Spaaij (2016) when writing that

"Terrorism is defined (...) as the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims. (...) The deliberate target of civilians is what distinguishes a terrorist act from other forms of political violence in which, for instance, military units are targeted" (p. 2)

Korstanje & Clayton (2012) distinguish 'Systematic terrorism' from its 'Random' counterpart: the former seeks specific demands over territorial autonomy ideals (like the IRA's or ETA's attacks), while the latter is more complex, unpredictable and massive. As the scholars mention, "*random terrorism (as practiced by al-Qaeda) is usually aimed at the destabilization or destruction of the existing political, religious or ideological order, and seeks maximum destruction in terms of killing and property damage*" (p.9). By targeting civilians its actions reveal the State's weakness to protect its nationals and spreads panic in its unpredictability. Tarlow (2011) explores the

66 terrorists mind-set by presenting their advantages over the adversaries: (1) the need for publicity; (2) the element of surprise; (3) the acceptance of Self-sacrifice; (4) the prevalence of economies' ruins over sheer killings; (5) the notion of violence as a legitimate means to recover what they believe was/should again be theirs; (6) and the manifold fields of action available to their treacherous creativity. (p.3)

Many sources consulted refer 9/11 (11th September 2001) and the terrorist attacks in America as a crucial date for contemporary violence, but it is what Crelinsten dubbed as "*September 12 thinking*" (quoted in Spaaij, 2016, p.2) and the strategies to prevent/overcome tragedy that one shall dwell ahead, bearing in mind the word 'civilians' encompasses local people (the host community) and visitors alike. Tourism is a fragile activity, since it relies on the destinations' tangible and intangible assets to happen, and on the latter one recalls Maslow's psychological model, where *Safety* is only second to *Physiological needs*. Tarlow (2011) reminds us how hard it is to analyse this activity and its risks, because

"There is no one standard on predictable risk to the tourism industry. Instead, tourism risks are ever changing and vary from one locale to another. Tourism risks may be acts of violence, acts of nature, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, or health issues such as a pandemic. Even these are not cut-clean delineations". (p.4)

Korstanje's & Clayton's (2012) analysis on *Terrorism and Tourism* systemises the common grounds of both practices; as one reads, on a 1st approach:

"tourism and terrorism reflect deeply conflicting world views. Tourism involves freedom of movement and travel, and is a fairly effective way of disseminating cultural ideas and practices. Terrorist movements have various permutations of religious, nationalist and ethnic motives, but many of them are concerned to resist what they perceive to be oppression by others and the imposition of foreign rule or culture, and some (...) reject the western lifestyle on which most contemporary tourism is based". (p.10)

Paradoxically, both investigators recall the privileged backgrounds and Western education granted to the travelled-masterminds that lead terrorist groups, whose "*ambivalence and frustration of feeling ashamed by a more technologically advanced and progressive culture can explain, in part, the (...) rage and violence (...) focused on tourists, as the most accessible and visible representatives of the foreign intrusion*" (19). To avoid/overcome tragedy, destinations resort to theoretical models suggested by

academics, private and public stakeholders, police authorities and security forces, thus formulating strategies for crisis or tourism risk management. *Crisis management* ranges from preservation to containment and redesign, with Tarlow writing about *Travel Surety* as a full package to convey by host countries, in order to appease visitors' doubts; as As Paraskevas & Arendell (2007) indicate,

“He borrows the word “surety” from the insurance industry and defines “travel surety” as a lowering of the probability that a negative event will occur, without promising perfection. He argues that this is the point where security, safety, economics and a location’s reputation [i.e. brand image] converge”. (quoted, p.1563)

On a second, deeper approach, tourism and terrorism share what Korstanje & Clayton (2012) describe as “commonalities” (p.11): (1) the technological prowess of an ever-globalised planet; and (2) the effectiveness of Media management. Faster and affordable means of transport alongside the success of the Internet and its social channels assist tourists to travel far and wide, but also serve to deploy terrorist agents, recruit new members, and promote autocratic ideals on a quest for fear-spreading. Even domestic terrorists resort to those means. As the creativity of perpetrators redefines venues to maximise rates of effectiveness Peter, Poulston & Losekoot (2014) sustain that areas like airports [or stadia] may make way for hotels, which they qualify as “softer targets” (p.258), so hoteliers must protect staff and guests. Again detail planning acts as the stepping stone for prevention or containment of risk, not only on a regular basis, but especially while preparing the hosting of international events, namely sport events. As Hassan (2012) refers:

“Particularly at major international events, the level of attention, detailed planning and expenditure required to adequately secure some of sport’s ‘showcase’ events is beginning to attract the attention of those who question the value of hosting tournaments like the FIFA World Cup or the Summer Olympic Games in the first place”. (p.256)

Due to its Media coverage, massive attendance and ecumenical ideals major sport events are targets for terrorist acts, which is why Taylor & Toohey (2007) detach the militarisation of facilities and other urban areas where police and security officials apply crowd control or persuasion techniques (p.100). Crisis managers now deal with king-like budgets to invest in security and counter-terrorism that range: (1) from individual body search to passport control; (2) from camera surveillance across

68 stadia, airports and urban perimeters to crowd control; (3) and to the exchange of intelligence and training with transnational organisations like Europol, Interpol, FBI, among others.

But what if things go wrong? How will tourists react? Yachiam *et al* listed the 3 dimensions of tourist behaviour depend on “*cultural aspects, personal experience, and the cost of avoiding the risk*”, while Pizam & Fleischer defend that when not repeated destinations recover from the attacks in 6 to 12 months (quoted in Araña & León, 2008, p.311). A more optimistic view is conveyed by Korajlic & Kesetovic (2011), who claim “*the impact of terrorist attacks on tourists last an average of two months*” (p.84), although the recollection remains a lasting one. Mansfeld defends countries affected “*should maintain a constant flow of comprehensive information about its levels of security and safety as a travel destination*” (quoted in *Idem*, p.85), and the myriad of Media channels play a vital role in the appeasing of future visitors world-wide. Sport attendants, tourists and host communities in general are proud resisters against barbarity, as one recently witnessed after Paris’ November 2015 attacks, since French and visitors rebelled by singing together for Peace, laying flowers to honour the victims and maintaining their routine, proving civilians must too fight terrorism, and that homage to *Freedom against Fear* was repeated in March 2016 in Brussels. And they/we were ready to withstand anything that could happen in the 2016 summer during the Euro in France and the Olympics in Rio (besides the Zika virus). Taylor & Toohey (2007) praise this mental resilience by stating that “*Mega sport events have been labelled as sites of resistance, with attendees showing defiance and resistance to the possibility of violence through their mere presence at the sporting fixture*”. (p.101)

1.3. Psychoanalysis, Groups and Violence

Psychoanalysis has been a therapeutic technique applied on the individual treatment of psychological problems, and also the most complete theory trying to establish the laws that allow us to understand how the human mind works. The analysis of groups and of the individual insertion into groups has been the object of investigation for the psychoanalytic community and that framework may be applied on the understanding of violence linked to hooliganism and terrorism. In his 1922 book *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Sigmund Freud characterised as *Group Psychology*’s object of study the observation of the individual as the member of a race, nation, profession, among others, or as part of a crowd that organize themselves, in a particular time, for a specific situation (p.3). The author asks himself on how a group in-

fluences so decisively the individual mind and on how it alters its functioning; resorting to Gustave Le Bon's 1855 *Psychologie des Foules*¹, Freud (1922) wrote:

“Le Bon thinks that the particular acquirements of individual become obliterated in a group, and in this way their distinctiveness vanishes. The racial unconscious emerges; what is heterogeneous is submerged in what is homogeneous. We may say that the mental superstructure, the development of which in individuals shows such dissimilarities, is removed, and that the unconscious foundations, which are similar in everyone, stand exposed to view”. (p.9)

According to Freud, Le Bon identified triple traces revealed by individuals when inserted into a group. Those characteristics are: (1) a sense of *Invincibility* through strength in numbers (what allows them to give in into primal instincts, that would be under control when they are alone); (2) *Contagion* (a phenomenon under which all feeling and act is contagious, and the individual sacrifices personal interest for the greater good of the collective); and (3) *Suggestibility* (which according to Freud, Contagion is none other than an effect of). Freud quoted Le Bon to illustrate the power of suggestion and its hypnotic quality:

“We see, then, that the disappearance of the conscious personality, the predominance of the unconscious personality, the turning by means of suggestion and contagion of feelings and ideas in a identical direction, the tendency to immediately, transform the suggested ideas into acts; (...) He is no longer himself, but has become an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will”. (p.12)

The central ideas on Le Bon's theory are that when joining a group, the individual suffers a collective inhibition of intellectual abilities, and increases the affections and emotional exchange. However, the author also assumed that the group may too conduct a contrary influence by raising the ethical principles on its members' minds. (*Idem*, p.127)

Alongside these two researchers, Wilfred Bion (1970), one of the finest and progressive 20th-century psychoanalysts, agreed with Freud and retained the idea that *Group Psychology* is the expression of individual psychology only revealed when each one joins a group (pp.121-122). Bion's concepts derived from his experiences with groups, and he understood that mental activity might be directed towards constructive goals, or submerged into unconscious levels, with certain emotions and group

¹ Where he compared the descriptions of the groups he theorised to primitive societies and to children.

70 bonds holding it prisoner. The author suggested the term *Work Group* to describe the cooperative mental activity involved in the task that the group consciously undertakes. Thus, the concept *Work Group* refers not to the people who constitute the group, but rather to the mental activity in which they are engaged. They have a scientific approach, observing themselves, containing and speaking about feelings instead of splitting them off. (Symington & Symington, 1999, p.150)

Bion criticizes Freud's position when he does not consider that Le Bon's description was unfair towards groups, with his argument that "*Groups have never thirsted after truth. They demand illusions, and cannot do without them*" (Freud, 1922, pp.19-20). Bion defends that groups succeed in the long run, and he assigns a big weight to the *Work Group*, despite the influence of *Basic Assumptions* (B.A.). The latter are a powerful emotional force that finds its roots in group members, what results in a cohesion effect. When one basic assumption is present in the group, the other two are absent. All in all, the three types are: (1) *Dependency*; (2) *Fight-Flight*; and (3) *Pairing*. In the *Dependency* B.A. the group needs to seek a charismatic leader as a means to attain protection, safety, material and spiritual nourishment, since "*The bonds with the leader have the tendency to acquire a symbiotic or parasitic nature, turned into an illusory world*"² (Zimmerman, 1995, p.74). In the B.A. of *Fight-Flight* paranoid anxieties dominate the group's unconscious, leading it to what we commonly refer as the fear of being chased. Thus, the group is very defensive and it *fights*, rejecting any new situation or psychological obstacle, or *escapes* it, thus creating an external enemy, which is now identified as the source of all evil, so that its members must stick together. This group seeks for a leader with paranoid and tyrant-like qualities. In the B.A. of *Pairing*, there is a common expectation that one of the group's couples shall bear a child, a *Messiah* that will redeem all. This messianic hope may be embodied in a person, ideal or event that will save everyone and make the hardships disappear. This kind of mental activity in a group leads its members to use manic defences and to seek a leader with mystical and messianic qualities. According to Bion, both Church and Army are institutions human created firm on the *Basic Assumptions* of *Dependency* and *Fight-Flight*, as a means to serve their own coherent/organised purposes.

According to us, the main characteristics of hooligan groups are framed by the mental activity as outlined in the B.A. of *Dependency* and *Fight-Flight*. In the 2008 BBC Documentary *Hooligans: No One Likes Us*, we observed how these groups organise

² Free translation by the authors. Original text: "*Os vínculos com o líder tendem a adquirir uma natureza parasitária ou simbiótica, mais voltados para um mundo ilusório*".

themselves into *firms* with specific names, supporting a club and turning the matches into the motive and the moment *to go to battle*. The *enemy* tends to be the rival club's *firm*, but it can be replaced by the Police force available, whenever the direct confrontation is not fully accomplished. The physical confrontation sought after is hinted by invading the rival *firm's* favourite bar, teasing them out in the open, or with their leaders settling the *battlefield* by mobile phone, as a way to escape Police control. The dual aim is clear: (1) to confront, subdue and destroy the opponent; and (2) to feed the sense of belonging and of loyalty when overcoming their fears in the heat of battle. Many hooligans find inside the group the reward to their need of belonging, self-esteem, and an identity reinforcement, that outside the group is underrated. Many are unemployed, or have jobs socially underprivileged. Curiously, on the days of the matches, they don't wear their club's colours, often purchasing expensive brands for that specific occasion.

On the 2005 BBC documentary *Heysel Disaster 1985: Requiem for a Cup Final*, we found that most of the casualties accounted were among Italian fans. In spite of occupying different sections of the stadium, there was a small area where they were together. After a small conflict, the English supporters charged over their rivals, forcing them to flee towards another section of the venue, stomping over and asphyxiating hundreds along the way. Besides the poor distribution of fans, the Police unit placed in that area was old and ill-prepared for aggression. Some Italians who fled across the stadium spread the news on their friends' killings, and the contagion caused the *war* to take over the whole perimeter. All in all, the explanation for the tragic outcome of 1985 was the sum of the mental activities characterised by the B.A. of *Dependency* and *Fight-Flight* present in a group of hooligans, with the power of contagion present in this unstructured group, the bad planning of fans' distribution and the lack of efficient Police response.

Considering Violence & Terrorism, the latter embodies the exact same *Basic Assumptions* in its hatred towards the West (to fight the enemy/*infidel* that does not follow the Islamic guidelines). When referring the 2007 Madrid attacks, Psychoanalyst Carlos Amaral Dias (2009) explains that the suicide-homicide mission is only possible through a fusion with an omnipotent belief. The author finds in Islam's genesis, explanations linked with the original phantoms of religions and Peoples' cultures; he thinks that in both Hebrew and Christian religions there were a passage and a word that did not result from a direct relation to the divine. In Islam God conveyed Mohammed his teachings, which resulted in a religion whose genesis is linked to only one man, and according this scholar there is a latent fundamentalism that emerges in the most conflictive periods of Arab People's history. (pp.98-102).

72 Dias also recalls Osama Bin Laden was one of the 54 children Muhammad Bin Laden bore out of his 11 wives. The father was a highly respected engineer because of a royal palace's construction and was later responsible for the renovation works on the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. As the only Syrian wife's child, Osama was isolated from the siblings, and set aside from his father's attention and approval. Driven by his identification wish, Osama studied engineering. Then, when in 1990 the Saudi Arabian monarch allowed American troops to fight on Saudi soil, Osama reacted against it. Enraged by the *Infidel's* presence in his (father's) holy city he propelled the family to take his side against the *aggression*, but they sustained the King's. Osama felt again the fatherhood's rejection and as Dias (2009) indicates, "*Hidden in some mountain of Afghanistan or elsewhere, Osama probably thinks of himself as the only one who defends his father's work from the infidels. The son of the Syrian continues to act his childhood's secret, and meanwhile in another way, he acts his radical idealization from New York to the Pentagon, from Bali to Bagdad, from Iraq to Madrid*".³ (p.102)

Osama's individual psyche and emotional motivations made him lead a terrorist movement with manifold cultural, social, religious and political implications. Osama, his associates and so many other terrorists recruited across Europe share a determinant *deculturation* process. When dealing with immigrants, the 2nd and 3rd generations are no longer Arab, yet they do not feel integrated in the western civilization. A sum of reasons seems to open a fertile strand for feeding the extremist adherence to religious fundamentalism: (1) the missing roots with their origin culture; (2) the western experience of disintegration; (3) discrimination; (4) the lack of opportunities; and (5) the strong idealisation as sole solution. This adherence emerges as an organised response that carries a narcissistic compensation mechanism.

As an expression of religious fundamentalism terrorist acts can be seen as a group disease with origins in the individual lack of a well-established identity, leaving an empty space for fulfilment with this ideal, a-critical and psychotic relation to God. In its attempt to establish an *Islamic Totalitarian World*, religious fundamentalism seeks to eliminate differences between societies, destroying the lives of the *impure* and *corrupt* (non-believers), and their monuments, art works, and history, while sport events are the expression of an organised thought from nations and societies where the respect for the differences is accepted, welcomed and celebrated. Globalisation and some socio-political changes are obliterating differences, thus disturbing identities,

³ Free translation by the authors. Original text: "*Provavelmente, resguardado numa qualquer montanha do Afeganistão ou em qualquer outro lado, Ossama pensa-se o único que defende dos "infieis" a obra paterna. O filho da síria continua a agir o seu segredo de infância, enquanto, de outra forma, age a sua idealização radical, de Nova Iorque ao Pentágono, de Bali a Bagdad, do Iraque a Madrid.*"

and the fear caused by the other (and his *Otherness*) opens the path to transform him into an enemy, hence the rise of violence.

Regression and identification are important issues outlined by Varvin (2003, p.233), to explain what happens in groups engaged in these activities. When societies feel threatened you can observe a regressive movement in the mental functioning of the group, with an *idealization* of the *self* and an irrational need to blame an outside enemy, *splitting-off* the bad and weak qualities to others. This regression implies an identification to the group's destiny. Personalities with these dysfunctions reveal early emotional disturbances that only later acceptance into a group led by a charismatic tyrant compensates. As one reads:

“Relações precoces perturbadas que geram um narcisismo deficitário, com manutenção pela vida fora das necessidades narcísicas primárias não transformadas, com idealização primária, dificuldade na construção de ambições e ideais, e ou com defesas grandiosas que facilitam o pensamento clivado, projetivo, sem capacidade para tolerar o conflito e a culpa, com tendência a não discriminar as contradições pois a consciência destas induz o conflito. Assim, ficam criadas as condições para o pensamento fanático, fundamentalista e para a adesão acrítica a líderes que compensem as fragilidades narcísicas”. (Neto & Dinis, 2010, p.8)

In both cases, terrorism and hooliganism retain an underlying need to belong, to fulfil and (re)build an identity and overcome affective oblivion and obtain group recognition through violence.

2. A Reflection on Contemporary Events from Heysel Park to the 2016 Olympics

2.1. Early Remarks

So far the word *Event* has been loosely applied, but Sofield (2003) defends the existence of 6 types: from local to regional and national events, and from international to hallmark and mega events (p.151). The current study now focuses on sport events organised from the mid-1980s to the present-day, starting with a European Champions League final in 1985, skipping to several UEFA competitions (dubbed as *International events* for the periodical organisation and mobile host country), besides

74 referring World Cups and Olympic Games (considered *Mega-events* for the global scope and years of intermission between each initiative).

When in 1896 the Olympic Games were revived by Pierre de Coubertin (whose 1914 flag displays five interlaced rings to recall the continents' and athletes' bonds), the aim was to recover the Ancient philosophy of transnational respect for cultural, religious, political, linguistic and ethnical diversity (IOC, 2005, pp.12-14). The principles included in the *Olympic Charter* are indeed quite similar to Article 1 of the *Global Code of Ethics for Tourism* (UNWTO, 2001, n/p). Bearing in mind sport events' competitive features, Korstanje, Tanzanelli & Clayton (2014) sustain both the Olympics and the World Cup stage a polite display of subliminal conflict between nations (p.487), which actually dates back to Ancient Greece's political guidelines on the Games. These events have also been serving to reformulate the States' international brand image and foster domestic identities. As Houlihan & Giulianotti (2012) exemplify,

“For both Germany (Munich, 1972) and Japan (Tokyo, 1964), hosting the Olympic Games symbolized readmission into the international community after defeat in the Second World War; for South Korea (Seoul, 1988) and China (Beijing, 2008), hosting the Games symbolized their presence as modern industrialized economies, while the hosting of the 1992 Games in Barcelona was promoted as symbolizing Catalan identity as much as democratic post-Franco Spain. The international symbolism of the London 2012 Games (...) [was] also important (...) to project an image of a ‘modern Britain’... open (...), connected (...), creative and dynamic”. (p.704)

Terrorism is a component of contemporary life since the 1968 “*hijacking and bombing of planes first captured the attention of world media and governments*” (Toohey & Taylor, 2008, p.453). Sport events started being targeted in the 1972 Munich Olympics' Israeli hostages' crisis, which led to a larger budget attributed to security during the 1976 Montreal Games (Taylor & Toohey, 2007, p.101). Houlihan & Giulianotti (2012) stress that only the 1972 hostages' crisis and the 1996 bomb explosion in a park during the Atlanta Games have been accomplished, proving how low the number of attacks has been so far (p.705). More frequent is domestic turmoil, like the Free Tibet protests in Beijing 2008, and as Fussey & Coaffee (2012) indicate,

“In contrast to contemporary emphases on violent jihadi extremism, for example, since 1988 terrorist threats to the Games have come from ethno-separatists, state-sponsored proxies, left-wing groups, right-wing extremists, environmentalists, violent jihadi extremists and anarchists”. (p.271)

These scholars recall how technical the propositions of sporting mega-events' organisers need to be, in order to settle IOC's and FIFA's concerns before the hosting of Games or World Cups (p.274). The reassurance encompasses anti-terrorist strategies, updated legislation, and intense surveillance across urban areas, to a point that prior to the 2012 Olympics the British "*police and political authorities referred to hosting the event as 'the greatest security challenge that the UK has faced since the Second World War'*". (Gardham quoted in Giulianotti & Klauser, 2012, pp.316-317).

2.2. Hooliganism & Terrorism, two violent streaks Destinations must handle

On the 29th May 1985 disaster struck the UEFA European Champions final disputed between Liverpool and Juventus at Brussel's Heysel Stadium, when

"A total of 39 people died and 670 people were injured. (...) Afterwards, UEFA decided to banish British football clubs from European cup tournaments for a period of five years (...). Before, hooliganism had been a relatively unknown phenomenon on the European continent". (Mojet, 2005, p.69)

Violence has been embedded in the fabric of English football since the 1870s, but it was mostly after 1950 that repression was hardened to crush the sporting unrest of certain ruffians, which was effective for about twenty years, since in the 1970s Chelsea supporters "*furent les pionniers d'un nouveau mouvement de violence dans les tribunes assises*" (Comeron, 1994, p.200). Alongside the economic turmoil of that decade, the working class man saw in his team's support group and banner the family sense, the social glue he lacked elsewhere, and like the metal band Iron Maiden defined in a 1992 song, each football fan perceives himself as a valiant *Weekend Warrior*. These and other reasons updated crowd control strategies at sport events resorting to "*The zoning and partitioning of supporters into segregated stations (...) [as a] prelude to the introduction of more complex strategies of surveillance and control*" (Giulianotti & Armstrong, 2002, p.234). Steen (2016) establishes the link between hooligans and terrorists by recovering Baudrillard's view of their similar negative connotations, claiming that

"For Baudrillard (...) hooligans are 'no different from terrorists' because they 'carry participation to its tragic limit, while at the same time daring the State to respond with violence, to liquidate them'. In the UK context, such violence was also a

76 *kind of fatalistic response to the Thatcher government's highly provocative, draconian 'state terrorism' against 'unemployed hooligans', striking miners and other citizens" (p.257).*

Heysel's tragedy forced the European Economic Community to take action against sport violence by publishing resolutions to condemn the savagery witnessed, until it finally approved a charter later that same year of 1985. It is known as *The European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sport Events* and its preamble reveals its urgency related to Heysel's *disaster* and the keywords "*democracy, human rights and the rule of law*" (CE, 1985, n/p). Further outbreaks of violence in States like The Netherlands, Germany and Italy forced Europe to devise a strategy that led to the 2001 *Handbook for International Police Cooperation*; yet again it lacked binding power. Only in October 2004 was Sport included in Europe's Constitution in the category of *Education and Youth* with the creation of the European Union, and Mestre (2005) sighed that "*Finally, we have a specific legal basis for sport*". (p.83)

In 1994 the stakes got higher when the USA organised FIFA's World Cup, since Mylavaganam (1998) defends it assisted crime to escalate in different fronts: from match-fixing results to bribery, illegal betting, the return of right-wing expressions, racist remarks linked to the free-circulation of players, counterfeited merchandising, rumours of illegal substance abuse, and high-officials' suspicion of corruption (pp.10-11). On the latter one recalls the shadows hovering over Joseph Blatter and Michel Platini. England hosted Euro 1996 and while Simply Red performed the anthem *We're in this Together* aiming at rescuing the nation's passion for Football and the international opinion on its commitment to a joyful event, police officials interviewed by Potter (1996) soothed the public. After all, not only were the English fans easier to control at home, but also the eight stadia involved were equipped with "*Photophone, a computer-based image system which can send pictures of troublemakers on particular incidents, providing officers with an accurate description of the appearance of any likely offenders*" (p.20). Technological evolution, greater national and international police cooperation, the reinforcement of sport legislation, a new attitude towards fans and crowds, the use of the Media to communicate with the public, the involvement of the host communities, and the cheerful atmosphere that prevailed during those June weeks explain Portugal's Euro 2004's outstanding success. As Gomes (2006) sums up, all these features combined "*focalizaram a imprensa e a atenção dos espectadores no que se passava dentro das quatro linhas, no futebol como espectáculo e festa, em detrimento de questões laterais e acessórias como a violência associada ao futebol*" (pp.355-356).

Prior to the tournament, on an interview to Ash Conner, the Spokesman of the Football Supporters' Federation explained the Portuguese authorities longed to welcome fans as tourists, besides working behind the scenes on other fronts. As one reads:

"The Portuguese police have said that they will welcome supporters as holidaymakers rather than football fans and I honestly believe that will get a better response from the fans. The combination of the banning orders and the consultation between the different agencies – the Home Office, police and fans groups – and the attitude of the Portuguese police are the most important factors". (Herbert, 2004, p.23)

Hoggett & Stott (2010) remind us the strategy worked because *"instead of confronting fans, officers in normal police uniform would patrol areas where crowds were gathered and interact with fans in a friendly manner"* (p.220). The only stain fell on a few of the Algarve's nights, where the militarized force GNR confronted English bullies, proving the country was too ready to adopt a harsher attitude should there be the need. The hosting of Euro 2004 scored a hat-trick by conveying the image: (1) of a contemporary State with quality services, facilities (new stadia included), and technological means; (2) a renewed Self-awareness/identity; and (3) a sense of future reward. As Marivoet (2006) defends,

"The expenses were presented by public authorities as an investment that would yield return not only during the event itself with the attraction of foreign fans, teams and media, but also by promoting the country as a tourist destination throughout the world, which would of course have effects in the medium term". (p.130)

Promotionwise, the scholar recalls empowering deeds like the *Human logo* organised in Lisbon's National Stadium that counted on nearly 35.000 volunteers (and was registered in the *Guinness Book of Records*), the billboards that depicted national monuments and areas of lawn resembling a football pitch, the visual impact of the Opening Ceremony (recovering a caravel and the nation's glorious Age of adventure) that culminated with Nelly Furtado (a Canadian-Portuguese) singing the anthem *Força* (dually meaning 'Strenght' and 'Go for it!'), the Internet campaigns and merchandising prepared, and the flags hanging from every house's windows and balconies. All in all, *"The message of good hospitality (...) [and] the construction of a discourse that appealed to all Portuguese to collaborate in welcoming the foreign fans (...) [made it look like the event was] some kind of national mission"* (*Idem*, p.134). Despite defeat at the final, Portugal was proud of its team, hosting and tournament. An hour

78 after its end thousands of people were still celebrating alongside tourists, and a German fan confessed to a TV network he had never seen anything like it (Ferreira, 2004, p.15). Euro 2004 set the level of expectation for forthcoming sport events pretty high, which is why the organisers of the 2006 World Cup (Germany) and Euro 2008 (Austria-Switzerland) visited Portugal to learn from its success. Praising the event, Christian Mutschler (Swiss organiser) admitted they were slightly frightened with the task of overcoming Lisbon's bet. (Lopes, 2008, p.11)

The 2006 World Cup counted on nearly 300.000 security elements and involved the combined effort of police forces from 12 countries. Atkinson & Young (2012) recover Baudrillard's notion of 'Non-events' (the exaggeration of terrorist acts via media promotion) to recall that prior to each match the terror threat was then revived "*by the detection and arrest of a 'terrorist' in the region*" (p.302), thus legitimising the State's firmer grip over its territory. Major sport events like 2004 and 2008 even resorted to the temporary suspension of Schengen's guidelines on free-circulation as a means to prevent violence through borderline control. Since 2011 the EU has been appealing to each member State's reinforcement of a common legal framework and police cooperation, besides working with non-European countries assisted by Europol and Interpol. Spaaij (2013) defines the football fan as a "*guinea pig for surveillance techniques*" (p.178) like the latest biometric identifiers, mostly due to the impact of this sport, the regularity of tournaments (every two years, when one combines Euro and World Cup initiatives), and each country's national championships and trophies. Football is also one of the many sports disputed at the Olympic Games.

The London 2012 Olympics faced serious concerns in the fields of security, management, hospitality, police cooperation, besides its legacy. On the latter one focuses on the East End's urban regeneration, since Houlihan & Giulianotti (2012) indicate that "*For some researchers, London 2012 regeneration policies serve both to secure and to purify post-industrial urban spaces, in order to attract wealthier consumers and residents*" (p.713). The authors refer notions like the *Glocalization* of the Games' security (with the exchange of a myriad of experiences), the *Securitization* of urban spaces during the event, and the *Security creep* that threatens to remain as an accepted reality after events come to a close (*Idem*, pp.712-716). To sustain the need for greater security budgets and crowd control, Houlihan & Giulianotti recall London faced terrorist attacks on the 7th July 2005, a few hours after the IOC had announced the victory of its candidature, and Baudrillard's 'Non-events' lurk into one's mind.

Sugden (2012) cut through the layers of politeness to reveal what he dubs as a "*process of totalitarian intrusiveness*" (p.415). Recovering the 18th-century philosopher's Bentham's prison design, the *Panopticon*, he referred its surveillance spirit

lives on in the militarisation of the Olympics' security; Sugden also recalls the secret negotiations led by Chinese spies with al-Qaeda representatives in Pakistan to ensure the 2008 Games were not affected by terror, and the innuendo behind one of London 2012 organisers' speech when referring they had to *learn* from the Chinese on how to handle terrorism. Sugden's wake-up call is set while hinting that

"Perhaps it is time we got used to the fact that rather than us watching the Games (...) it is more a case of the Games watching us and once the circus has left the town it is highly like London's 'Superpanopticon' will be one of the 2012 Olympic Games most enduring legacies". (p.426)

But surely the lasting recollection of London 2012 on the Londoners', visitors', and spectator's minds is the Opening Ceremony's surprise with 007 and Queen Elizabeth II parachuting into Wembley, rather than serious issues.

2.3. And what about 2016?

All eyes and lenses faced westwards that Summer considering the Euro in France and the Olympics in Rio, which means the security bars are set high for tourists in general and for sport tourists in particular.

In November 2015 Paris was attacked by Islamist terrorists at a concert venue (*Bataclan*) and at the *Stade de France*, but despite the immediate shock Parisians and visitors refused to give in into fear and soon rallies pro-Freedom and homages to the dead (through flowers, candles and songs) echoed across this and other European cities. Four months later, not only did the police forces cooperate to capture the criminals, but because of these arrests Brussels was to face bombings at its airport and tube. Again, locals, visitors and the whole continent displayed solidarity towards the civilian losses and boldness to deny victory to Fear, much like again cultural landmarks across Europe had Belgium's colours projected on its façades. Due to Brussels' airport limitations, the following week the Friendly match between Belgium and Portugal was to happen, not in King Baudouin Stadium (thus was Heysel Park renamed in 1995) but in Leiria, a few miles away from Lisbon: Fear did not subside over Sport. Both terrorist actions in Central Europe raised aftershocks concerning Tourism and Euro 2016 that were promptly controlled with the Media's assistance. The Internet provides articles authored, for instance, by CNN and French Tourism authorities: the former interviewed a member of the World Travel & Tourism Council who defended other capital cities had soon recovered and so would Paris (Petroff, 2015); the latter

80 compared statistic between Paris' attacks and victims linked to firearms in the USA in 2014 alone, recalling accidents happen even at home, besides answering the question if Paris was a safe place to visit in 2016 with a resounding and repeated 'YES' (About France, 2016). In tune with UEFA's belief, in March the Prime-minister Manuel Valls utterly refused the idea of cancelling Euro 2016 for it would reveal defeat before Terror, since "*A França é um país livre*" (DN, 2016).

After Paris in June, in August Rio plunged into Media attention and there the issues of international terrorism and domestic unrest were more urgent topics. Articles consulted stressed the Brazilian authorities' neglect towards bombings or threats alike: Damasceno (2014) indicated "*the theme of airport security and its relationship with terrorists tends to be underestimated by the authorities*" (p.115), while Condeixa (2015) claimed for preparedness, writing that "*Mechanisms for terrorism prevention in Brazil are quite limited, perhaps because the Brazilian government does not view it as an actual menace*" (p.715). Bitencourt's (2011) study on the *Security Challenges* for the 2016 Games focuses on items previously approached: the law reinforcement on police training and international cooperation, their own actions to clear poor neighbourhoods (*favelas*) out of crime and drugs on behalf of urban regeneration, including tourist attractions and security applied. The author's conciliatory position ensured Rio's experience after the 2007 Pan American Games, underlying that "*the security plan for the 2016 Olympic Games has been approved by the International Olympic Committee*" (p.4).

The world could not predict that after the 2014 economic stability Brazil was soon to simultaneously face: (1) growing unemployment rates and recession; (2) pandemic (the Zika Virus); (3) and political turmoil (with MP's corruption and President Dilma Rousseff's Impeachment process), all in a few months before the Games' Opening Ceremony. These topics were addressed by CNN when on the 5th April 2016 it broadcasted a Paula Newton's piece entitled *Brazil Plagued by Overlapping Crisis*. However, Brazilians are resilient people (surely a legacy of the Portuguese navigators' blood still running in their veins), which led an Economics professor to admit that much like during the 2014 World Cup when many mistakes were made, the people should save the day through Joy, Rio's prevalent intangible asset according to the world's public opinion due to its annual *Carnaval* celebrations (Gomes, 2016, pp.44-45).

Gicquel declared Football as an international language, "*un «espéranto» sportif et culturel, une langue comprise de tous, tout à fois transculturelle et transnationale*" (quoted in Malatesta & Jaccoud, 2002, p.261). How will (Euro & Olympics) 2016 be remembered in security terms? What lessons shall it offer to future sport events? In 2018 Russia shall host the World Cup and thanks to its supporters' poor behaviour in

France (from hooliganism to arrests, from expulsion to return and re-incidentar arrests) one wonders how well have the French authorities prepared their tournament and how will the Russians' misconduct influence the Sport tourists' and general visitors' choice of Russia as a destination in 2018. And will the 2022 World Cup held in Qatar, a country set in the Arabian Peninsula, face the same threats (hooliganism & terrorism) considering it is *per se* an Islamic territory?

Final Remarks

This study focused on Sport Tourism, Terrorism, and Psychoanalysis on major sport events since the 1985 Heysel Park's tragedy to the 2016 Euro in France and Olympics in Rio. Two chapters with several sections dwelled first on a multitude of concepts, and on the then sequence of happenings and measures derived to ensure the security basis of the competitions. Recent literature agrees on two strategies linked to the management of European and World football tournaments: (1) the standardisation of security planning; and (2) the lasting legacy of security on the host population in the post-event period (Sugden's 'Superpanoptican' belief). Regardless of its oppositions, cosmopolitan Tourism and isolationist Terrorism both resort to Technology and the Media, which means Bauman's notion of an ever-fluid world is here to stay. As Korstanje & Clayton (2012) defend,

"Terrorism is, sadly, unlike to disappear. It is more likely that it will evolve into new and more fluid forms, as technology enables new forms of networking around the world, and accelerates the dissemination of evil ideas, as well as good. It is encouraging, however, to see that there are times when entire nations change their course, and choose freedom and democracy over sectarianism and oppression". (p.20)

Due to the unpredictability of terrorist attacks and their manifold categories, on an interview to Manuel Castells he proposed two pathways to fight this plight: (1) effective undercover missions; (2) and proper insertion of Islamic communities into the fabric of Europe's multi-cultural society (Fernandes, 2016, pp.155-156).

In Ancient Greece the Olympic Games drove the authorities to suspend wars. According to us, across time international sport events have been an organised way to give expression to the mental activities described in Bion's concepts of *Basic Assumptions*. As Bion found in groups, those mental activities have an unconscious basis, but when they consciously emerge, Mankind can recognize them and they might

82 be transformed into a *Work Group*. Examples of this idea are organisations like Church and Army, and in Sports one thinks of UEFA, FIFA or the Olympic Movement. When during competitions teams experience through action all those emotions, a symbolic meaning is created, and therefore, thoughts can access the *Thinking Apparatus* (Bion, 1962) and be transformed. In sports, it is possible to *act* the aggressive impulses into a transformed version, and the confrontations with the enemy/adversary's brings victory or defeat but without bloodshed. National heroes or villains are forged through identification, and Peoples can feel joy or sorrow. Portugal's former coach, Luís Filipe Scolari, understood the value of identification, and *Contagion* was accomplished by the visual predominance of the national flag found everywhere. The sight instilled in each individual the love of a group (Portugal and the Portuguese) and its leaders (the Football national team), longing to get the same love back.

The psychoanalytical perspective about individual and group psychology provides us important insights about the unconscious emotions in groups, which can be very useful when facing the challenges cast by the violence perpetrated by hooligans and terrorists. According to Ahktar (2003) terrorism is a multi-determined problem and he identifies three goals, in order to humanize and decrease violence: (1) the increase of the ability to think of the oppressed People; (2) the decrease of their anger; and (3) the creation and increase of the empathy towards oppressors (p.135).

Sport Tourism can be an opportunity to establish new bridges of understanding and empathy towards other cultures. If in its social diversity of different beliefs, ideologies, history and ways of life Mankind persists on rejecting its own failures and difficulties by splitting-off mechanism of defence, then it will continue to repeat and feed the conditions that build up violence. All these problems have individual, social, historic and cultural reasons; however, in this increasingly globalised world we still speak too many *languages*. When we are too close we are blind, but when it is possible to change our perspective, we can *see* so much more:

"As astronauts we have a unique view of our planet looking down from 400 km above. Some things that on Earth we see in the news every day and thus almost tend to accept as a "given", appear very different from our perspective. We do not see any borders from space. We just see a unique planet with a thin, fragile atmosphere, suspended in a vast and hostile darkness. From up here it is crystal clear that on Earth we are one humanity, we eventually all share the same fate" (Gerst⁴, 2014)

⁴ German astronaut.

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