

THE COMMUNITY OF PORTUGUESE SPEAKING COUNTRIES ORGANIZATION:
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AS A SECURITY ENHANCEMENT
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

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by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE COMMUNITY OF PORTUGUESE SPEAKING COUNTRIES ORGANIZATION:
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AS A SECURITY ENHANCEMENT
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, by Major Jose Carlos Pinto Mimoso,
146 pages.

The current wide-ranging and complex relations in the international environment demand a comprehensive approach to challenges in world security. Regional organizations play a decisive role in the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. This is especially important in Africa given the many enduring problems that affect this continent.

Considering that security is a basic condition for development and prosperity, this study aims to assess the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) organization's ability to promote stability in its African member states and the CPLP's aptitude to help resolve a crisis situation and return to stability.

The research concluded that the CPLP is an intergovernmental organization capable of enhancing the security of its African country members. Even without an organizational defined policy towards defense and security, CPLP developed a Defense Cooperation Protocol that defined the overarching goals to promote defense cooperation among the CPLP members and defined a defense structure for the organization. The Community also demonstrated its capabilities through the political and diplomatic dialogue concerning the stability in its African country members. This commitment allowed the Community to play an important role in addressing crisis situations within its members and led to the international community recognizing these actions.

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ACRONYMS

APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARO	African Regional Organizations
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CHOD	Chief of Defense
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
CPX	Command Post Exercise
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GIC-GB	International Contact Group for Guinea-Bissau
IGO	Intergovernmental Organizations
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MISSANG	Angolan Technical and Military Assistance Mission in Guinea-Bissau
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SWOT	Strengths/Weaknesses/Opportunities/Threats
UN	United Nations
UNOGBIS	UN Peace Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

After the Cold War, the international security environment was characterized by the overall reduction in conflicts between states. The concept that democracy and stability promote a peaceful environment is commonly accepted as a truism in the international community. Rudolph Rommel and several other renowned authors claim that democracies don't wage war against each other.¹ However, the number of internal conflicts inside individual states has increased because failed or fragile states create favorable conditions to develop civil wars and violent conflicts, which can become a threat to international stability.

In regions such as the African continent the end of the Cold War led to the decline in foreign aid and allowed a wave of democratization. These phenomena and the unsolved problems from the decolonization process led to an unprecedented level of internal conflicts in several African countries.²

The 9/11 terrorist attacks are considered a major landmark that shaped the nature of current security concerns. The post 9/11 security setting is also characterized by a wide variety of non-conventional dangers that can come from national or transnational actors

¹Rudolph Rommel, *Conflict Helix: Principles and Practices of Interpersonal, Social, and International Conflict and Cooperation* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 4.

²Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "Charts and Graphs," Active Conflicts 1946-2010, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/ (accessed 25 April 2012).

such as violent extremist organizations, organized crime, illegal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian disasters.

The economic decline and poverty in Africa, as well as conflicts related to the control of natural resources, also caused internal state conflicts. This environment led some African states to be characterized by a lack of accountability, absence of political transparency, border issues caused by the artificial boundaries set by colonial empires, corruption, poor governance, centralization and bureaucracy. The inability to establish self-sustaining governments to respond to the basic needs of populations led to serious conflicts that caused severe humanitarian crises. In some cases the international community, usually through the United Nations (UN), was forced to administer the normal responsibilities of the local sovereign governments.³

The crisis in some African states causes a wide variety of threats such as proliferation of militias and armed groups, proliferation of violent extremist organizations, coastal piracy, arms smuggling, and the increasing flow of refugees. These realities contribute to destabilizing Africa and impact international stability.

In the face of instability, African states should be able to exercise their sovereignty in a responsible way to address their own internal problems before they become conflicts. Promoting sustainable development and respect for human rights are methods that should promote stability. However, the problems are so wide and complex

³United Nations, General Assembly, “Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,” 18 July 2003, http://www.un.org/esa/africa/reports_2004/A_59_285_eng.pdf (accessed 25 April 2012).

that the international community has remained involved in supporting many African nations.

Facing the inability to respond properly to the increasing number of conflicts, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued “An Agenda for Peace” in 1992, appealing to the Chapter VIII-Regional Arrangements of the UN Charter.⁴ Boutros-Ghali was trying to increase the involvement of regional organizations in order to maintain peace and achieve international security. The Agenda for Peace focused on Chapter VIII organizations due to their knowledge and understanding of the root causes and nature of the conflicts. Since this point, African regional security organization political leaders began to focus on cooperation to achieve stability and enduring peace. African Regional Organizations (ARO) began to realize that they could have a decisive role to control insecurity and prevent the spread of violence and armed conflict in Africa. Some ARO began to take part in the cooperation for regional peace and security, not only through diplomatic initiatives but also by conducting peace support operations.

The UN General Assembly issued the Millennium Declaration in 2000, from which resulted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), along with a timetable for action and measurable indicators that both recipient states and donors have agreed to accomplish. The MDG reflect an international commitment to the poorest countries. These actions can be understood as the minimum conditions for stability and international peace focusing on “a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity,

⁴United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping,” 17 June 1992, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> (accessed 25 April 2012).

equality and equity at the global level” giving a decisive role to international cooperation in order to solve international problems.⁵

Considering the causes of conflict in Africa that were previously presented, progress on the MGDs are a suitable way to prevent crisis, since conflict prevention is deeply related to sustainable development, and this correlation will be addressed in the definition of terms.

In 2001, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report on conflict prevention, stressed the importance of “changing the UN from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.”⁶ This would imply a preventative strategy from the international community. This attitude requires a comprehensive approach to the root causes of instability, in cooperation with national and regional actors. A successful preventive strategy depends on the cooperation of many international actors and the UN is not the only suitable actor. For that reason, individual states, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, and other civil society actors have very important roles to play.

This reality led the individual states and intergovernmental organizations (IGO) to cooperate in security matters. Concepts such as “cooperative” and “collective” security became more common, demonstrating shared responsibilities and concerns among the

⁵United Nations, General Assembly, “United Nations Millennium Declaration,” 8 September 2000, <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm> (accessed 25 April 2012).

⁶Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, “Summary of Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Report on Prevention of armed conflict,” 2001, <http://www.wilpfinternational.org/publications/2001unprevention.htm> (accessed 26 April 2012).

international actors. These concepts brought new challenges and different ways to meet the interests of the states and several other existing intergovernmental organizations.⁷

Answering the demands of the international community, African leaders came up with two major initiatives. The first was to establish the African Union (AU) in 1999 to replace the Organization of African Unity. The second was the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001.⁸ Both initiatives have cooperation for peace and security as their primary goals. Additionally, the African regional organizations, ECOWAS, SADC, ECCAS, Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Arab Maghreb Union, reorganized their structures in order to contribute to African security and development. The AU and ARO together formed the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by forging formal institutional relationships and structures.⁹

Considering the increasing involvement of the AU, ARO and African countries in working to solve their own problems, it is also appropriate to study the role that external IGOs can have on the security environment in Africa.

Problem Statement

The present wide-ranging and complex relations in the international environment demand a comprehensive approach to challenges in world security. Regional

⁷William Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, (1994); reprinted in the US Army Command and General Staff College, C200 Book of readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 2012), 77.

⁸NEPAD, "History," <http://www.nepad.org/history> (accessed 27 April 2012).

⁹African Union, "AU in a Nutshell," <http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell> (accessed 27 April 2012).

organizations play a decisive role in the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. This is especially important in Africa given the many enduring problems and long standing conflicts.

The end state of this study is to give an assessment of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) organization's ability to promote stability in its African member states and the CPLP's aptitude to help resolve a crisis situation and return to stability. Considering that security is a basic condition for development and prosperity, this study aims to analyze the CPLP strengths as a security enhancement IGO to its African country member states, and propose objectives and capabilities for the organization to achieve its strategic end states.

Because of the relationship between security and development, the establishment of a sustainable peace in Africa will depend on the African states finding the balance between regional security and development. In this process the AU, ARO, and IGOs will play decisive roles as organizations that must be able to enhance development, physical security, and other threats that can lead to instability.

The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP)

The intention to create a community that would bring together the countries that shared a common cultural heritage and Portuguese as the official language was a long-term aspiration of several Portuguese speaking countries. This intent goes back to the creation of the Portuguese Language International Institute in 1989 under the sponsorship of Brazilian President José Sarney. The Institute was created as a result of the first

reunion that gathered all of the Heads of States and Government from the Portuguese speaking countries in Brasília.¹⁰

However, progress toward cooperation beyond cultural and language issues would not begin until the 1990s when the implications from the end of the Cold War in the international security environment gave a great impetus to the establishment of the CPLP. In February 1994, a Permanent Coordination Group was created to set the basis for drafting a constitutive charter and ruling orders for the new organization. On 17 July 1996, the CPLP Constitutive Charter was formally ratified by the Heads of State and Government of Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe. East Timor joined the organization on 31 July 2002 during the IV CPLP conference held in Brasília.¹¹

Article 1 of the Constitutive Charter establishes the CPLP as a “privileged multilateral forum to extend mutual friendship, political and diplomatic coordination, and cooperation among its members.” Article 3 of the Constitutive Charter defines the three main objectives of CPLP. The first objective addresses the intent to develop political and diplomatic coordination among its members in international relations, and in particular, increasing the participation of Portuguese-speaking countries in international organizations. The second objective is cooperation in a variety of domains including

¹⁰Instituto Internacional da Lingua Portuguesa [Portuguese Language International Institute], “Breve Apresentação” [Brief presentation], <http://www.iilp.org.cv/index.php/o-iilp/breve-apresentacao> (accessed 22 June 2012).

¹¹CPLP, “Histórico-Como surgiu?” [History-how was it created], <http://www.cplp.org/id-45.aspx> (accessed 22 June 2012).

education, health, science and technology, defense,¹² agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public security, culture, sports and media. The third objective is the implementation of projects to promote and disseminate the Portuguese language, in particular through the International Portuguese Language Institute.¹³

The Constitutive Charter also defined several overarching CPLP principles which include the primacy of peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights and social justice. The most relevant CPLP principles to this thesis are the promotion of development and of mutually advantageous cooperation.¹⁴

The CPLP has six main bodies that comprise its main organizational structure. These bodies are the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Ministers Council, the Permanent Coordination Standing Committee, the Executive Secretariat, the Ministerial Sectorial Meetings, and the Focal Points Cooperation Meeting.¹⁵

The Conference of Heads of State and Government is composed of the top leaders of the eight country members and is the highest deliberative body of the organization that defines the policy and strategy for the organization, including the policy and strategies for security and defense matters. Its meetings are scheduled every two years or when

¹²The Defense cooperation domain was not part of the CPLP initial constitutive charter. This area of cooperation was formally included in 2002 at the IV Summit of Heads of State and Government when it was approved an amendment to the Article 3 of the Constitutive Charter to include Defense cooperation.

¹³CPLP, “Estatutos da CPLP” [CPLP status], 17 July 2006, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=49> (accessed 22 June 2012).

¹⁴CPLP, “Objectivos da CPLP” [CPLP goals], 17 July 1996, <http://www.cplp.org/id-46.aspx> (accessed 22 June 2012).

¹⁵CPLP, “Órgãos da CPLP” [CPLP bodies], <http://www.cplp.org/id-89.aspx> (accessed 22 June 2012).

requested by two thirds of the member states. As with all of the deliberative bodies in CPLP, the decisions are always taken by consensus.¹⁶ This thesis will analyze the final declarations of the Conference of Heads of State and Government as they relate to security enhancement for African member states.

Issues of diplomacy and coordination are deliberated by the Ministers Council that consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations of the eight country members. It meets once a year or when requested by two thirds of the member states. This council elects among its members a chairman on a rotating basis for a one year term.¹⁷

The defense ministers from the CPLP member states meet and they concentrate on issues related to collaboration and cooperation in the defense sector.¹⁸ This thesis will thoroughly analyze the decisions and declarations from the Defense Ministers Meetings.

The CPLP Defense Architecture

As it was addressed previously, although it was not officially part of the organization's initial Constitutive Charter, the concern with security and defense issues existed since the CPLP's inception. Two years after its creation, the first meeting of CPLP National Defense Ministers occurred in Lisbon in 1998.¹⁹

¹⁶In accordance with Article 23 of CPLP charter.

¹⁷CPLP, "Estatutos da CPLP."

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹CPLP, "I Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Lisboa" [National Defense Ministers meeting], 21 July 1998, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 1 August 2012).

During the fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government held in 2002, an amendment to Article 3 of the CPLP Constitutive Charter formally included defense among all the cooperation goals for the organization.²⁰

An outcome of the seventh National Defense Ministers meeting in 2004 was the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol that would govern defense cooperation among CPLP members.²¹ The protocol was formally adopted and approved in 2006.²² The overarching goal of the Defense Cooperation Protocol is to promote defense cooperation among the CPLP members. The three specific goals of the Defense Cooperation Protocol in Article 2 are to create a common platform to share knowledge in military defense subjects; promote a common defense and military cooperation policy; and contribute to developing the internal capabilities of CPLP member states armed forces.

Article 4 contains the eight fundamental elements of the Defense Cooperation Protocol. The first element is to ensure the solidarity among member states in situations of disaster or aggression, in accordance of the internal legislation of each member and UN norms. Promoting national awareness about the importance of the role of armed forces in defense of the nation is the second element. The third element is promoting the exchange of information, the interchange of experiences and methodologies, and the

²⁰The other cooperation goals are: education, health, science and technology, agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public security, culture, sports and media.

²¹CPLP, “VI Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de São Tomé” [Declaration on São Tomé, National Defense Ministers meeting], 28 May 2003, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 1 August 2012).

²²CPLP, “Acordos Intra CPLP” [CPLP intra agreements], <http://www.cplp.org/id-391.aspx> (accessed 1 August 2012).

adoption of confidence-building measures between the armed forces of the CPLP countries in order to contribute to strengthening stability in the regions of CPLP country members. The fourth element implements the Integrated Exchange Program of Military Education in order to enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational procedures between the armed forces of member countries. Continuation of the FELINO combined and joint exercises among the armed forces of the CPLP member states is the fifth element that is designed to improve the interoperability of CPLP military forces. The fifth element also involves training units to be employed in peace support operations and humanitarian assistance under UN auspices, while respecting the national legislative decision of each CPLP member. The sixth element seeks synergies for the reinforcement of the control and surveillance of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of the CPLP countries through employment of joint naval and air assets. The seventh element involve organizing CPLP military medicine meetings and other events of techno-military and military-scientific nature as may be approved by the organization. Finally, the eighth element discusses organizing the CPLP military sports games.

Article 5 of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol defines six bodies to manage defense issues. These bodies and meetings are National Defense Ministers meetings, Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) meetings, National Defense Policy Directors meetings, Directors of the Military Intelligence Services meetings,²³ Centers for Strategic Analysis, and a Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs.

The purpose of the National Defense Ministers meetings is to assess the progress of the defense sector of member states, analyze the international security environment,

²³This committee has never held a meeting.

and evaluate the regional political-military implications for CPLP members. Also discussed are subjects related to the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol and the proposals from the CHOD meeting are analyzed. The meetings are held annually and the chair rotates among the host country for each meeting.²⁴

The CHOD meeting precedes the National Defense Ministers meeting which focuses on assessing the progress of defense issues in the member states, approving and submitting military proposals to the National Defense Ministers, and planning the FELINO exercises.²⁵

In 2008, a new series of meetings was initiated for the CPLP National Defense Policy Directors which occur prior of the National Defense Ministers meeting. Its principal focus is to prepare for the National Defense Ministers meeting. Beyond the series of annual meetings among civilian and military leaders, the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol also created two permanent organizations, the Center for Strategic Analysis and a Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs. Since the first National Defense Ministers meeting in 1998, the need for a CPLP Center for Strategic Analysis was identified. Draft proposals for its structure were presented during the 2000 Defense Ministers meeting and the concept was formally approved during the fifth National Defense Ministers meeting in 2002. The Center for Strategic Analysis consists of a main permanent structure in Maputo, Mozambique and there are separate national permanent detachments located in each CPLP country. This network of Strategic Analysis Centers is chartered to study and disseminate information about CPLP interests, objectives and

²⁴“CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol,” Article 7.

²⁵Ibid., Article 8.

actions. The main goal of the Center for Strategic Analysis is to promote the study of strategic issues of common interest which inform CPLP decisions in various international fora and monitor developments in the international community. Each year the CPLP designates a main theme to study in the area of defense and security and the final results of the study are then presented in a meeting or a seminar.²⁶

The Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs was approved as part of the second National Defense Ministers meetings in May 1999. Based in Lisbon, the Secretariat includes a permanent cadre as well as representatives from the offices of the Defense Minister and CHOD from each member nation. The Secretariat's mission is to study and propose specific measures to implement multilateral military cooperation among CPLP country members. The Secretariat has a minimum permanent core within the Portuguese National Defense Ministry and meets in its full constitution with representatives of each Defense Minister and CHOD twice each year in Lisbon.²⁷

Thesis Statement

The characteristics of the CPLP provide this IGO a unique set of capabilities to be a security enhancement organization to its African member states based on the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol.²⁸

The CPLP is an IGO, founded on 17 July 1996, and is considered a multilateral forum to expand mutual friendship and cooperation among its member states.²⁹ Although

²⁶Ibid., Article 11.

²⁷Ibid., Article 12.

²⁸Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

defense and security were not part of CPLP initial Constitutive Charter, after two years of existence, the importance of these subjects was recognized by the member states. In 1998 the initial guidelines concerning defense and security for the organization were ratified. This study will assess the capabilities of CPLP as security enhancement organization to its African members.

Primary Research Question

This thesis will be focused to answer the Primary Question: Is the CPLP an intergovernmental organization capable of enhancing the security of its African country members in the future?

Secondary Research Questions

To address the Primary Question the Secondary Questions that need to be answered are:

1. What have the CPLP actions been to enhance security for its African country members?
2. How is the CPLP organized to enhance security for African country members?
3. What are the ends, ways and means of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol?
4. What is the CPLP relationship and interaction with the intergovernmental, regional and sub-regional organizations within the CPLP African member's area of interest?

²⁹Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

5. What are the capabilities and limitations of the CPLP to assist enhancing security for African country members?

Assumptions

The assumptions made to conduct this study were:

1. Defense cooperation and security enhancement will continue to evolve and remain as an important objective of the CPLP;
2. The CPLP will mediate internal crisis involving its African country members;
3. CPLP African country members will continue to face security problems as a consequence of regional instability, absence of political transparency, lack of accountability, corruption, and poor governance;
4. The CPLP will cooperate with relevant AROs in a crisis situation.

Definition of Terms

The concept of security is usually related with development and is commonly understood as an important aspect in solving problems associated with failed or fragile states. In this work, one of the most important terms that must be defined is security so that it is possible to understand how the CPLP can become a security enhancement organization.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan issued the report “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All” in September 2005.³⁰ In this report Kofi Annan considers that “we will not enjoy development without security, we

³⁰United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” 21 March 2005, <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm> (accessed 28 April 2012).

will not enjoy security without development.” This report also mentions the importance of having “agile and effective regional and global intergovernmental institutions to mobilize and coordinate collective action” in order to contribute to development and security. In 2011, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon addressed the Security Council and emphasized the linkage between security and development. He stated that “peace, security and development are interdependent. Evidence abounds. Nine of the ten countries with the lowest Human Development Indicators have experienced conflict in the last 20 years.”³¹

Considering the relationship between security and development, the UN and other IGOs currently involved in Africa are mainly concerned with sustainable development. This effort embraces the intent to eradicate poverty, disease and mainly support for good governance. However, with the proliferation of regional conflicts, security issues have dominated and development has been stymied.

Consequently, IGOs and the AROs are developing strategies to accomplish objectives related with reinforcing states’ capacities that will contribute to greater security and regional stability. According to Article 5 of the CPLP Constitutive Charter, one of the principles of the organization is to promote development and “foster cooperation among its members in order to promote democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights.” One example of progress was the CPLP “Declaration on the Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Contributions” issued during the VI Summit held in Bissau in 2006. In this declaration the CPLP Heads

³¹United Nations, Statements of the Secretary-General, “Interlink ages between Peace, Security and Development,” 11 February 2011, <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=5086> (accessed 7 July 2012).

of State agreed to cooperate on achieving UN MDGs and improving the Human Development index of member states in order to support human development efforts and strengthen capacities.³²

On the African continent, the AU and AROs realized that they could perform an important role to provide security in Africa. Accordingly, some AROs began to take part in regional peace and security cooperation.

On 28 February 2004, the Heads of State and Government of Member States of the AU issued the solemn declaration named the Common African Defense and Security Policy. The AU Constitutive Act bases African security on “the fundamental link and symbiotic relationship that exists between security, stability, human security, development and cooperation, in a manner that allows each to reinforce the other.”³³

The interrelationship between security and development is not a new concept. The former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wrote in 1968 that “security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it.”³⁴ Robert McNamara also asserted that “security means

³²CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Declaração sobre os Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio: Desafios e Contribuição da CPLP” [Declaration on the millennium development goals: CPLP challenges and contributions], 17 July 2006, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=162> (accessed 15 September 2012).

³³African Union, “Solemn declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy,” 28 February 2004, <http://www.au.int/pages/maritime/documents/solemn-declaration> (accessed 28 April 2012).

³⁴Robert McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 149.

development and without it there can be no security.”³⁵ This statement shows how thoughts and opinions of that time are essentially the same in today’s environment.

Limitations

The published works related to the CPLP used in the literature review are mostly based on CPLP official documents that are available on the organization’s web site, on a book published by the CPLP to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the organization, and one book that address the evolution of military cooperation within the CPLP. In the literature review it is not presented the CHODs meetings final declarations because they are not available in the CPLP web site. All of these documents are written in Portuguese and the English translation of these documents may sometimes not be the most appropriate and can influence the accuracy of some expressions.

The results of the investigation can be biased because they are based on CPLP official information and because of the author’s nationality could unconsciously influence analysis and conclusions. Every effort is made to avoid such bias.

Scope and Delimitations

CPLP African country members will continue to face security problem as a consequence of regional instability, absence of political transparency, lack of accountability, and poor governance. This reality can create an internal crisis in any CPLP African country member that can lead to civil war.

³⁵Ibid., 149.

This study it is limited to the analysis of the CPLP African country members and the main intergovernmental organizations that play an important role in the security of these countries, the AU, AROs and UN.

This study will not try to analyze the root causes of a possible instability in the CPLP African country members.

Due to time and space constraints the strategic analysis of CPLP as a security enhancement intergovernmental organization is focused only on defense cooperation and security elements in Article 3 of the CPLP Constitutive Charter and the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol.

Significance of the Study

CPLP African country members presently have difficult internal security environments. The most critical at the moment is Guinea-Bissau which is at risk of civil war in the wake of the 12 April 2012 military coup.

After 16 years of existence, the CPLP has played an important role and has become a contributor to the Africa peace and security environment. It is relevant to analyze the CPLP strategy and ends, way and means and assess if it is an IGO capable of enhancing the security of African country members in the future.

Chapter Outline

This chapter provides the background to understand the African security context and the importance of intergovernmental organizations in solving them. The introduction presents CPLP objectives, defense architecture and why analysis of the CPLP as a

security enhancement organization for African country members is important. This chapter also presents the research questions, delimitations and significance of the study.

Chapter 2, “Literature Review,” is mainly based on CPLP official documents issued after the head of states and defense ministers meetings and two books that address CPLP military cooperation, as well as CPLP activities to enhance security for African members of the CPLP. This chapter also includes a case study of the CPLP intervention in Guinea-Bissau. This intervention focused on the 1998 crisis military coup and discusses the crisis in Guinea-Bissau that began with another military coup in April, 2012. The history of CPLP actions in Guinea-Bissau reflects the organization’s ability to enhance security in an African member. Chapter 2 also presents the role and the relations between the regional and sub-regional organizations (AU, ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC)³⁶ and the UN that play important security roles in Africa. The study of these organizations’ strategic approach to security in Africa will provide the information to understand the interaction between these organizations and CPLP.

Chapter 3, “Research Methodology,” presents the strategic Ends/Means/Ways assessment methodology that will be used to analyze the CPLP organization and perform the strategic assessment of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol.

Chapter 4, “Findings and Analysis,” answers the thesis research questions. These answers are based in the data analysis collected in chapter 2, the ends/ways/means methodology and the Guinea Bissau case study findings. In this chapter are also assessed the CPLP capabilities and limitations as security enhancement organization.

³⁶AU-African Union, ECCAS- Economic Community of Central African States, ECOWAS-Economic Community Of West African States, SADC-Southern African Development Community.

Chapter 5, “Conclusions and Recommendations,” completes the thesis with an interpretation of the findings of the research. Concluding this thesis are recommendations for further studies, and for the CPLP strategic security policy in order to achieve enduring influence as a security enhancement organization to its African country members.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the security problems many African nations endure and introduced the CPLP organization’s structure and goals related to enhancing security of the CPLP African country members. The next chapter presents the Literature Review to address CPLP action to enhance security for its African members. Additionally, the role and the relationships among the regional and sub-regional organizations and intergovernmental organizations that participate in African security are explained.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Each IGO, whether global or regional, and regardless of its objectives, plays a decisive role contributing to strengthening peace. Another important achievement is the development of relationships between people from different cultural backgrounds that also contributes to peace and security among states. The current problems that are facing the international community have a global dimension. The states and the different regional organizations have complementary role to solve conflicts that can arise. In this globalized strategic environment CPLP country members belong to a variety of IGOs.

Official CPLP documents issued after the Heads of State and Government Summits and National Defense Ministers meetings and the two books that address CPLP military cooperation are examined in this chapter. This chapter also presents a case study of the CPLP intervention in Guinea-Bissau crises in 1998 and the current reaction of the organization to face the coup of 12 April 2012.

Considering our delimitations, this study is limited to the regional analysis of the CPLP African country members and the main IGO that play an important role in the security of these countries. According to this, the chapter ends presenting the relations between CPLP and the IGO and regional organizations that play a security role in Africa.

CPLP

In the CPLP Constitutive Declaration, the Heads of State and Government agreed to “reiterate the commitment of strengthening the ties of solidarity and cooperation that

united them, combining efforts to promote economic and social development of their peoples.”³⁷ It is important to highlight that cooperation on security and defense was not explicitly included in the initial CPLP Constitutive Charter. However, as an indication of the importance of defense and security, the CPLP Defense Ministers began meeting as a group in 1998 and the CPLP CHODs began meeting the following year. Defense and security cooperation were formally added to the Constitutive Charter as a result of the IV Summit of Heads of State and Government in 2002.³⁸

It is possible to understand the evolution of defense and security issues within CPLP through the examination of the final declarations of the Heads of State and Government Summits from 1996 to 2012.³⁹

The dynamics of the CPLP are also reflected in the various agreements, arrangements and protocols that have been signed in recent years. Presently, the relationships between the various countries inside and outside the Community and several IGOs provide the organization with resources and approaches to achieve objectives. The CPLP has ratified more than 40 agreements that range from cultural topics to defense and security matters. It is important to highlight that CPLP has formal

³⁷CPLP, “Declaração Constitutiva da CPLP” [CPLP constitutive declaration], 17 July 1996, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=157> (accessed 1 August 2012).

³⁸CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “IV Conferência de Brasília” [Brazilian summit], 1 August 2002, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=160> (accessed 20 August 2012).

³⁹I Summit Lisbon/Portugal on 1996, II Summit Praia/Cape Verde on 1998, III Summit Maputo/Mozambique on 2000, IV Summit Brasília/Brazil on 2002, V Summit São Tomé/ São Tomé e Príncipe on 2004, VI Summit Bissau/Guinea-Bissau on 2006, VII Summit Lisbon/Portugal on 2008, VIII Summit Luanda/Angola on 2010, IX Summit Maputo/Mozambique on 2012.

agreements between the UN and most of its agencies and signed a memorandum of understanding with European Union (EU) in 2007.⁴⁰ While CPLP has not established any formal agreement with the AU or any of the AROs, the organization has worked closely with these organizations in several occasions. Additionally, in numerous final declarations, from the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the intention to formalize these relations under a memorandum of understanding has been a consistent theme.⁴¹

CPLP Heads of State and Government Summits

During the first Heads of State and Government Summit, held in Lisbon in 1996, the CPLP Constitutive Charter was developed and the final declarations were related to Portuguese language and culture and did not include security and defense topics.⁴²

At the second Summit held in Cape Verde in 1998, security issues were mainly focused on internal instability in Guinea-Bissau. The heads of state officially deliberated to support this member country by taking diplomatic actions in order to solve the conflict through peaceful means and negotiation. In order to resolve the conflict in Guinea-Bissau, the CPLP established a Contact Group that was headed by the Foreign Minister

⁴⁰CPLP, “Acordos, Protocolos e Convénios” [Agreements, protocols, and convenience], <http://www.cplp.org/id-52.aspx> (accessed 22 June 2012).

⁴¹CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “VII, VIII and IX Conferências CPLP” [CPLP summits], <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=163> (accessed 8 September 2012).

⁴²CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “I Conferência de Lisboa” [Lisbon summit], 17 July 1996, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=157> (accessed 19 August 2012).

of Cape Verde and included the other CPLP Foreign Ministers. The Contact Group had the mission to support stability and peace building in Guinea-Bissau.⁴³

This action towards Guinea-Bissau would become an example for the CPLP's future approach by using mainly diplomacy with its country members in Africa and later in East Timor (2000 and 2006). Diplomacy became the most effective means of bringing peace and stability to the most unstable countries. As part of crisis management in Africa, the CPLP started to coordinate and work closely with the Organization of African Unity and ECOWAS. These CPLP initiatives within the security and defense areas represented a strong commitment to dialogue and interaction with African organizations and with the UN that were consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.⁴⁴

According to Luís Bernardino and José Santos Leal, in 1999 the Foreign Ministers Council approved a significant milestone for the security goals of the CPLP which was the establishment of an electoral observer mission in East Timor. This was the first CPLP electoral observation mission under the UN that provided significant international visibility to the organization and provided the basis for several other similar missions that the CPLP would accomplish in the future.⁴⁵

In 2000, the CPLP Heads of States and Government Summit stressed the role played by the CPLP Contact Group in the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of

⁴³CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, "II Conferência da Praia" [Praia summit], 17 July 1998, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=158> (accessed 19 August 2012).

⁴⁴Luís Bernardino and José Santos Leal, *A Arquitetura de Segurança e Defesa da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (1996-2011)* [CPCL safety and defence architecture], (Lisboa, PRT: IDN, 2011), 26.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 27.

order in Guinea-Bissau. Discussion at this Summit also mentioned the Community's participation in the popular referendum for the East Timorese independence and the electoral observation mission conducted in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. A major outcome of the 2000 Summit in Maputo was the statement on "cooperation, development and democracy in the era of globalization", which established several new areas of CPLP cooperation that included peace and security. The CPLP emphasized the intention to deepen "the political and diplomatic coordination in the fields of peace."⁴⁶

The outcome of the 2000 Summit was a strong indicator of the emerging need to formally include security in the CPLP Charter. This would be an important institutional step to officially recognize the importance of peace and security as goals of the organization. This reality would allow the CPLP to undertake other ambitions and assume new responsibilities related to security for the organization's country members as well as regional and global issues.⁴⁷

The CPLP formally included defense cooperation in Article 3 of the CPLP Constitutive Charter as a result of the 2002 Heads of State and Government Summit. The 2002 Summit held in Brasilia also highlighted the participation of the Community in the process that led to the independence of East Timor, which formally joined the CPLP during the summit. This new member announced the presence of the Community in the Asia-Pacific region. During this period the CPLP participated as observer missions in the

⁴⁶CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, "III Conferência de Maputo" [Maputo summit], 17 July 2000, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=159> (accessed 19 August 2012).

⁴⁷Bernardino and Leal, 27.

elections conducted by the UN in East Timor (2001 and 2002) and observed São Tomé e Príncipe (2002) elections.⁴⁸

During the 2002 Summit several declarations were ratified. The most important to this thesis was the “Declaration about Peace in Angola” that stressed CPLP support for the efforts taken by the Angolan Government that led to the establishment of peace in the country.⁴⁹

Also approved was the “declaration about CPLP contribution to fight terrorism”⁵⁰ that recognized the vital role of UN in strengthening the international cooperation to fight terrorism, highlighting the importance of coordination between states and regional and international organizations to fight this threat. CPLP member states also agreed to reiterate their support to the UN Security Council resolutions related to threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.⁵¹

The 2002 summit also ratified the “declaration on peace, development and future of the CPLP” that recognized the importance of the AU and the adoption of the NEPAD. The CPLP declared its understanding that development is essential for the preservation

⁴⁸CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “IV Conferência de Brasília.”

⁴⁹CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Declaração sobre a paz em Angola” [CPLP declaration on Angola peace agreement], 1 August 2002, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=160> (accessed 20 August 2012).

⁵⁰CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Declaração sobre a contribuição da CPLP para o combate ao Terrorismo” [CPLP declaration on its contribution to fight terrorism], 1 August 2002, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=160> (accessed 20 August 2012).

⁵¹UN Security Council Resolution 1269 October 1999 (On the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security) and UN Security Council Resolution 1368 and 1373 from September 2001 (Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts).

and consolidation of peace in the member states as well as for the promotion of democracy, guaranteeing the rule of law and promoting human rights. In order to achieve these goals, the member states reaffirmed the importance of cooperation among CPLP members.⁵²

The 2002 adoption of the “declaration on peace, development and future of the CPLP” symbolizes the moment when all CPLP countries recognized the role of the AU as the preferred partner on the path to security and sustainable development in Africa. It also recognized the adoption of NEPAD as the specific mechanism to support development in the five African CPLP country members.⁵³

The 2004 Summit of Heads of States and Government was significant due to successful outcome of earlier initiatives related to Guinea-Bissau and additional steps to advance diplomacy and cooperation. CPLP country members reaffirmed the importance of strengthening the UN, implementing Security Council resolutions, and recognizing the importance of diplomacy as a means of maintaining peace and international security. In this sense, the CPLP expressed its determination to deepen preventive cooperation between country members, intending to exchange information and experience in fighting organized crime activities potentially related to terrorism and its funding.⁵⁴

⁵²CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Declaração sobre paz e desenvolvimento e o futuro da CPLP” [CPLP declaration on future peace and development], 1 August 2002, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=160> (accessed 20 August 2012).

⁵³Bernardino and Leal, 28.

⁵⁴CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “V Conferência de São Tomé.”

During the 2004 Summit a resolution related to establishing peace and security in Guinea-Bissau stressed the role of the President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, who was serving as the Chairman of the AU at the time. The resolution also recognized the importance of cooperation among the CPLP, the UN Security Council, ECOWAS and the EU in order to establish peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau.⁵⁵ In the case of Guinea-Bissau, CPLP support led to the legislative elections that took place in March 2004 to resolve internal political problems. During this period, the CPLP also conducted electoral observer missions in Mozambique (2003) and in Guinea-Bissau (2004). The CPLP also recognized that it was able to reach a diplomatic solution to support the normalization of constitutional order in São Tomé and Príncipe.⁵⁶

According to Luís Bernardino and José Santos Leal in the context of preventive diplomacy, the resolution of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau and the CPLP mission headed by Ramos Horta, as special envoy of the CPLP to promote peace and social policy in this country, is a good example of the types of missions that the CPLP may undertake in Africa. This includes missions not only within the Portuguese speaking countries, but also in other countries working with the AU and the other African Sub-Regional Organizations.⁵⁷

⁵⁵CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Resolução sobre a República da Guiné-Bissau” [CPLP resolution on Guiné-Bissau], 27 July 2004, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=161> (accessed 3 September 2012).

⁵⁶CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “V Conferência de São Tomé” [São Tomé summit], 27 July 2004, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=161> (accessed 3 September 2012).

⁵⁷Bernardino and Leal, 29.

Additional progress was achieved during the 2006 Heads of State and Government Summit as the CPLP member states agreed to cooperate in order to achieve the UN MDGs. The CPLP members also reaffirmed their commitment to respect and develop democratic principles, rule of law, human rights and social justice. Recognizing the importance of these principles was intended to set conditions for peace and security in the all regions where member states reside. The Heads of State and Government remarked on the outstanding advances of the CPLP as a worthy international actor, as well as the importance of strengthening relationships with the United Nations and its Agencies, and establishing partnerships with Regional and Sub-regional Organizations within CPLP country member's sphere of influence.⁵⁸

Additional electoral observer missions in Mozambique (2004), Guinea-Bissau (2005) and in São Tomé and Príncipe (2006) were conducted by the CPLP which reflects the growth of democratic institutions in CPLP member countries.

The 2008 Heads of State and Government Summit held in Lisbon stressed the need for the CPLP to continue to take actions to boost its international image and reinforcing its relations with the UN and its specialized agencies. The CPLP signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU that established a partnership with the regional and sub-regional organizations to which its member states belong. Within this framework, the CPLP Heads of State and Government stated the intention to establish

⁵⁸CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “VI Conferência de Bissau” [Bissau summit], 17 July 2006, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=162> (accessed 8 September 2012).

memorandums of understanding with the AU, the International Organization of the Francophonie, the Council of Europe, the Community of Democracies, and ECOWAS.⁵⁹

The 2008 summit also recognized the progress of the International Contact Group for Guinea-Bissau (GIC-GB), of which the CPLP was a founding member. The GIC-GB provided the framework for assistance to Guinea-Bissau and its areas of focus are political, socio-economic, diplomatic and security sector reform.⁶⁰

Finally, the Summit recognized the creation of the Center of Excellence in East Timor devoted to training for peacekeeping operations. This is a concrete and positive step toward developing a capability from Article IV of the Defense Cooperation Protocol which called for training units to be employed in peace support operations.⁶¹

The 2010 Heads of State and Government Summit held in Luanda, Angola stressed the importance of strengthening relations with the UN and establishing partnerships with the regional and sub-regional organizations to which its member states

⁵⁹CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “VII Conferência de Lisboa” [Lisboa summit], 25 July 2008, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=163> (accessed 8 September 2012).

⁶⁰The first GIC-GB meeting was held in New York on 2006, on the sidelines of the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly. Besides the CPLP countries the Group is constituted by Spain, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. In this Group are also represented several international organizations like UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In CPLP, Livro 12 Anos, “Construindo a Comunidade” [12th anniversary book, building the community], July 2008, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=104> (accessed 29 September 2012).

⁶¹CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “VII Conferência de Lisboa” [Liboa summit], 25 July 2008, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=163> (accessed 8 September 2012).

belonged. There was renewed emphasis on establishing memorandums of understanding with the AU and ECOWAS.⁶²

Again, CPLP member states reaffirmed the support of the Guinea-Bissau authorities to maintain the political dialogue with international partners to continue defense and security sector reforms. In this sense, it was considered crucial that the CPLP should maintain its participation in the activities taken by the international community. To this end, the CPLP resolved to strengthen coordination among the key organizations that included the GIC-GB in Bissau, ECOWAS, the UN Peace Building Commission,⁶³ and the Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Guinea-Bissau.⁶⁴

The leaders at the 2010 Summit also recognized the “Strategy of the CPLP for the Oceans,”⁶⁵ which provides an integrated vision for the sustainable development of ocean areas under the country members’ jurisdictions. This strategy was approved during the first Meeting of CPLP Ministers for Maritime Affairs.

⁶²CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “VIII Conferência de Luanda” [Luanda summit], 23 July 2010, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=2267> (accessed 8 September 2012).

⁶³The countries that are currently on the UN Peace Building Commission are: Burundi; Sierra Leone; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia; and, Central African Republic. United Nations, “UN Peace Building Commission,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/> (accessed 29 September 2012).

⁶⁴United Nations, “UN Peace Building Commission Guinea-Bissau,” http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/doc_guinea-bissau.shtml (accessed 29 September 2012).

⁶⁵This strategy refers the intention to address issues related with the proper management of marine resources in order to allow sustainable development, regarding environmental, social and economic concerns. This document does not address specific issues related with security and defense cooperation.

During the last Heads of State and Government Summit, held in 2012, the community once again stated the commitment to conflict resolution through peaceful means, stressing the importance of preventive diplomacy and mediation to achieve peace. The leaders also emphasized that CPLP members share the opinion that the international community must be rigorous in its efforts to value, seek and exhaust all peaceful and diplomatic means available to protect populations under the threat of violence, according to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.⁶⁶

The Guinea-Bissau coup that occurred in April of 2012 dominated discussion of defense and security matters at the 2012 Summit. The CPLP members stated their support and the need to monitor the internal situation in order to stabilize the political and institutional situation. The CPLP strongly regretted the interruption of defense and security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau, which hampered the process of establishing a lasting peace, stability and development of the country. This included the interruption of the bilateral military-technical cooperation between Angola and Guinea-Bissau that led to the establishment of the Angolan Technical and Military Assistance Mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG).

The severity of the 2012 situation in Guinea-Bissau led the CPLP to issue a formal “Statement on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau”. The Community reiterated that the CPLP only recognize Guinea-Bissau authorities who have constitutional and democratic legitimacy and expressed support for the restoration of legitimate power. Finally, the CPLP expressed the partnership, endorsed by the UN, that includes the AU, ECOWAS,

⁶⁶CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit. “IX Conferência de Maputo” [Maputo summit], 20 July 2012, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=316&Action=1&NewsId=2193&M=NewsV2&PID=304> (accessed 29 September 2012).

the EU, and the CPLP is essential to promote conditions that will contribute to internal pacification and stabilization of Guinea-Bissau.⁶⁷

In summary, each CPLP Heads of State and Government Summit addressed issues related to defense and security except for the very first meeting in 1996. Defense and security issues were important themes at subsequent meetings even before defense and security were formally included in CPLP Constitutive Charter. During each Summit, leaders usually discussed their internal security situations and concerns. In almost every meeting, internal instability in Guinea-Bissau proved the most problematic and persistent challenge facing the CPLP. The CPLP also participated in electoral observer missions in all African member state elections since 2000. Since the inclusion of defense and security into the Charter, the CPLP has taken an active role in resolving internal issues related to member states such as Guinea-Bissau as well as external threats to members such as East Timor. The organization has also worked to define a security policy by approving the Defense Cooperation Protocol and has worked to develop formal relationships with organizations, such as the UN and EU and worked closely with the AU and relevant AROs without formal agreements. As time has progressed, the CPLP has worked to formalize the security enhancement aspects of the organization as well as sought more formal relationships with other like-minded IGOs.

⁶⁷CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Declaração sobre a Situação na Guiné-Bissau” [CPLP declaration on Guiné-Bissau situation], 19 July 2012, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=316&Action=1&NewsId=2193&M=NewsV2&PID=304> (accessed 8 September 2012).

CPLP Defense Ministers Meetings

The CPLP Defense Ministers Meetings constitute the decision-making entity for defense and security matters. These meetings provide a forum for discussion and exchange of privileged information about the concerns related to security issues in the member states. The Defense Ministers meetings have been held annually since 1998, except for 2007. This section of the literature review will analyze the final declarations of the 13 Defense Minister meetings to understand the evolution of CPLP defense and security cooperation.

The first CPLP National Defense Ministers meeting was held in Lisbon in 1998.⁶⁸ The final declaration expressed concern with the political and military situations in Guinea-Bissau and Angola. In this initial meeting, the Ministers recognized the importance of the bilateral military cooperation between Portugal and the Portuguese speaking African countries and discussed starting a new era of multilateral military cooperation among the CPLP country members. Another outcome from the meeting was the identification of new areas of multilateral CPLP defense cooperation. One initiative discussed was developing common methods to prepare and train military units to participate in humanitarian and peace keeping operations. Another area of cooperation included creating combined military schools for CPLP country members. Finally, the Defense Ministers discussed creating a Strategic Analysis Center that would be chartered

⁶⁸Brazil attended this meeting as an observer, represented by the Brazilian ambassador in Portugal.

to establish a greater awareness and better understanding of the importance of defense and security and would be staffed with representatives from all country members.⁶⁹

In 1999, the CPLP National Defense Ministers held their second meeting in Cape Verde and the final declaration included statements expressing concern with the political and military situations in Angola and Guinea-Bissau.⁷⁰ The Ministers also announced that existing bilateral military cooperation would be replaced by CPLP multilateral military cooperation, with the intent of enhancing the military capabilities of CPLP members. Additionally, the Defense ministers recognized the inaugural CHOD meeting and the importance of that forum to CPLP defense and security. Another major initiative was the creation of the CPLP Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs to study and propose specific measures to implement CPLP multilateral military cooperation. The Secretariat was based in Lisbon with representatives of each CPLP CHOD, with Brazil as an observer member.⁷¹

The Secretariat's initial organizational format was in line with the low volume of CPLP multilateral defense cooperation activities. The Secretariat held their first session in 2000 and through 2012 there have been a total of 25 meetings, indicating a growing contribution to CPLP defense and security cooperation. According to Luís Bernardino

⁶⁹CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “I Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Lisboa.”

⁷⁰Brazil attended this meeting as an observer, represented by the Brazilian ambassador in Cape Verde.

⁷¹CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “II Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração da Praia” [Praia declaration], 25 May 1999, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 8 September 2012).

and José Santos Leal, the Permanent Secretariat for Defense Affairs could be more valuable to the CPLP if they had sufficient personnel to match the expanding workload.⁷²

Therefore, this second meeting of CPLP National Defense Ministers in 1999 established the concepts of multilateral defense cooperation and training, the role of CHOD meetings, and the Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs prior to defense cooperation being formally included in the CPLP Constitutive Charter.

During the third meeting organized in Luanda, Angola in 2000, Brazil decided to become a permanent member of the CPLP National Defense Ministers forum.⁷³ The Defense Ministers again expressed concern about the political and military situations in Guinea-Bissau and Angola. A major topic of discussion was the floods and humanitarian crisis that devastated Mozambique in 2000 along with the multilateral support provided by the CPLP members and an expression of the willingness to continue their support.⁷⁴

The Defense Ministers also agreed to submit an amendment to the CPLP Constitutive Charter to formally include defense cooperation for approval by the Conference of Heads of State and Government.

Another important action at the Luanda meeting was the decision to begin the FELINO series of annual CPLP multilateral military exercises with the main goal to train a CPLP force capable of operating across the range of the military operations including

⁷²Bernardino and Leal, 47.

⁷³Brazilian Defense Minister was represented by its national CHOD.

⁷⁴CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “III Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Luanda” [Luanda declaration], 23 May 2000, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 8 September 2012).

peace support operations and special operations.⁷⁵ The CPLP Chiefs of Defense developed the FELINO program as a major initiative from their first meeting held in May 1999.

The FELINO program represents an example of a CPLP defense and security concept being implemented and is a sign of institutional growth and progress. These exercises meet the goal of creating interoperability among the CPLP armed forces so they could operate together or in support of an international or regional organization in peace and security operations.⁷⁶

The 2001 National Defense Ministers meeting held in Brasília began with a normal discussion about the political and military situation in each country and then highlighted the importance of the FELINO exercises to prepare military units to participate in peacekeeping operations. The major decisions taken in 2001 were specific programs to advance CPLP defense and security cooperation. The first was to approve gradual implementation of the Strategic Analysis Center that was first proposed in 1998 and the second was a new policy to exchange students and faculty within CPLP military educational institutions. This education policy had three main goals which were: preparing units for deployment; teaching common doctrine and procedures within the CPLP; and promoting the exchange of education and training personnel to learn from the other members.⁷⁷

⁷⁵Nicole Guardiola, *10 anos da CPLP* (Lisboa, PRT: Europress, 2007), 91.

⁷⁶Bernardino and Leal, 50.

⁷⁷CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “IV Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Brasília” [Brasília declaration], 21 May 2001, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 8 September 2012).

The 2002 CPLP National Defense Ministers meeting welcomed the National Defense Minister from East Timor as a new member, discussed the political and military situation for each member and resolved to reinforce defense and military cooperation in order to face the challenges presented by the strategic environment.⁷⁸

The Defense Ministers made progress on past initiatives to advance multilateral CPLP defense and security cooperation. The Ministers approved the first plan to exchange military students and faculty beginning in 2004. They also established a policy for FELINO exercises that would alternate annually between a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and a Field Training Exercise (FTX) with the refined goal of preparing units for multilateral operations under UN resolutions for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.⁷⁹ Also approved was the Medical Military Summit that would build on two previous bilateral meetings between Portugal and Brazil.

The charter for the Strategic Analysis Center was approved during this meeting in 2002 bringing that organization closer to opening and operating since it was first proposed in 1998. According to the opinion of Luís Bernardino and José Santos Leal, although the Strategic Analysis Center is potentially a great tool for the analysis and dissemination of strategic information concerning security subjects, this institution has not been able to fill that role. These authors also believe much more should be done to connect the Strategic Analysis Center with the academic and scientific communities in

⁷⁸CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “V Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Lisboa” [Lisboa declaration], 27 May 2002, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 8 September 2012).

⁷⁹After 2002 the special operations training concept dropped out of the FELINO exercises.

order to perform a broader role in the CPLP beyond defense and security. Their belief is this Center should be multidisciplinary, transnational and above all a much more active and dynamic player in the CPLP.⁸⁰

The 2003 National Defense Ministers meeting was held in São Tomé and after the usual analysis of the political and military situation of the country members a significant decision was reached to develop a program to assist CPLP members with surveillance to help control their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. The Ministers emphasized the FELINO exercises as an important program for enhancing interoperability among CPLP armed forces and broke new ground when they agreed to develop the capability to share strategic information about threats facing each member. Tied to this decision was the first subject for the Strategic Analysis Center to study which was “The Role of CPLP in the Prevention and Management of Regional Crises.”⁸¹

The intended focus of this first official Strategic Analysis Center study was the political, military, economic and social issues that characterize the multidisciplinary fight against terrorism. The concern about the root causes of terrorism led the Ministers to agree with the need to deepen the exchange of strategic information in order to address threats. While the Ministers agreed there were not any specific terrorist threats against their members, they resolved to be ready to face threats and agreed that an attack against one member would result in a unified response.⁸²

⁸⁰Bernardino and Leal, 48.

⁸¹CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “VI Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de São Tomé.”

⁸²Ibid.

The Strategic Analysis Center organized seminars related to the study. The conclusions drawn from the study included consensus about the importance of adequate government organizational structures as necessary to establish conditions for sustainable development that ultimately leads to enhanced security. As a direct result of the study, the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol was formulated and this represented one of the most important institutional milestones for defense cooperation in the Community.⁸³

The 2004 National Defense Ministers meeting included examining the analysis and conclusions from the “The Role of CPLP in the Prevention and Management of Regional Crises” Strategic Analysis Center study assigned in 2003.⁸⁴

The main decision taken in 2004 meeting was identifying the need to ratify the draft CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol. Formally adopting the protocol would officially implement defense and security cooperation programs such as the FELINO exercises and control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. This action would also institutionalize a new initiative to promote the exchange of strategic information among CPLP national military intelligence agencies as an early warning mechanism to prevent crisis. This initiative was added to the draft Defense Cooperation Protocol and the Directors of the Military Intelligence Services Meeting structure was adopted; however this body has yet to formally meet.⁸⁵

⁸³Bernardino and Leal, 30.

⁸⁴CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “VII Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Bissau” [Bissau declaration], 1 June 2004, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 15 September 2012).

⁸⁵Bernardino and Leal, 52.

The 2005 National Defense Ministers meeting focused on the agreement of the details regarding to the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol and sending the draft to the Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs for refinement before submission for its approval.⁸⁶

The 2006 National Defense Ministers meeting was dominated by the Ministers ratifying the Protocol.⁸⁷ The body pronounced that the CPLP adopted an important tool that contributes to defense cooperation and the reinforcement of the Community's international credibility.⁸⁸

There was a break in meetings in 2007 scheduled in East Timor and the Defense Ministers reconvened in 2008 in Díli where the Ministers declared the defense portfolio as the example for all other CPLP areas of cooperation principally due to the structure provided by the now ratified Defense Cooperation Protocol and the effectiveness of the Permanent Secretariat of Defense. The Defense Ministers also mentioned their intention to make maritime monitoring and surveillance assistance for CPLP members a priority.⁸⁹

⁸⁶CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “VIII Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Maputo” [Maputo declaration], 28 October 2005, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 15 September 2012).

⁸⁷The CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol was addressed in Chapter 1 under “The CPLP Defense Architecture.”

⁸⁸CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “IX Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração da Praia” [Praia declaration], 15 September 2006, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 15 September 2012).

⁸⁹CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “X Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Díli” [Díli declaration], 17 May 2008, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 15 September 2012).

The major issue discussed at the 2009 National Defense Ministers meeting was the assassination of the Guinea-Bissau CHOD, which the Ministers condemned. The Guinea-Bissau Defense Minister also discussed the security situation highlighting the efforts of the Guinean authorities to seek a lasting solution in order to restore constitutional order and to transform the armed forces into a pillar of democracy that adheres to the rule of law. The declaration also highlighted the commitment of the CPLP, ECOWAS, the EU, and the UN Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau to develop an Action Plan to address the situation in Guinea-Bissau.⁹⁰

The main development from the 2010 National Defense Ministers meeting was the approval of the memorandum of understanding for the Centers of Excellence for training trainers in peace support operations.⁹¹ The main objective of these Centers of Excellence is to ensure the control, management and implementation of the integrated training process, in order to optimize resources, harmonize principles, concepts and doctrine through multilateral training. The first Center was established in 2011 in Angola.⁹²

The 2011 National Defense Ministers meeting was held in Sal, Cape Verde. The final declaration of this meeting had an extensive analysis of the situation in each country

⁹⁰CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “XI Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Luanda” [Luanda declaration], 1 March 2009, <http://www.cplp.org/id-387.aspx> (accessed 15 September 2012).

⁹¹CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “XII Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Brasília” [Brasília declaration], 11 November 2010, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=145&PID=6503&M=NewsV2&Action=1&NewsId=1534¤tPage=2> (accessed 15 September 2012).

⁹²Bernardino and Leal, 46.

as well as an individual assessment of the roles the CPLP could play in defense and security cooperation. The final declaration included decisions related to implement the training Centers of Excellence.⁹³

According to Bernardino and Leal, this was considered the most important National Defense Ministers meeting because it significantly operationalized the Defense Cooperation Protocol and the Centers of Excellence by advancing the training of trainers in peace support operations concept. These actions are vital for the evolution of defense cooperation because it represents a concept that resulted in a capability that could be employed within or outside the CPLP.⁹⁴

Case Study: CPLP Intervention in Guinea-Bissau

Since its independence in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has experienced several political and military disorders. In June 1998, two years after the CPLP was founded, a military mutiny resulted in a civil war that led to the removal of the Country's President, Nino Vieira. A transitional government turned over power to an opposition leader, Kumba Yala after he was elected president in transparent polling in February 2000. In September 2003, Yala was thrown out by the military in a nonviolent coup and Henrique Rosa was appointed as interim president. In 2005 Nino Vieira was elected, however he was assassinated in March 2009. After an emergency election held in June 2009 to replace the murdered president, Bacai Sanha was elected as the new Guinea-Bissau Head of State,

⁹³CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, "XIII Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração do Sal" [Sal declaration], 29 November 2011, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=145&PID=6503&M=NewsV2&Action=1&NewsId=1801¤tPage=1> (accessed 15 September 2012).

⁹⁴Bernardino and Leal, 46.

although he died abruptly in January 2012. On 12 April 2012, a military coup stopped the constitutional electoral process to replace the deceased President and currently the country is headed by an unelected president supported by the military junta in agreement with ECOWAS mediators.⁹⁵ Guinea-Bissau has been a CPLP country member with the largest number of internal crises and instability and suffers from underdevelopment as a result. This reality has been a major challenge for the Community since its founding. The CPLP has consistently developed efforts to solve Guinea-Bissau's problems in cooperation with a broad number of IGO.⁹⁶ The efforts of the CPLP and IGO are discussed in the following paragraphs.

In July 1998, one month after the military mutiny that led to a civil war and the removal of the Guinea-Bissau President Nino Vieira, the CPLP held its Conference Heads of State and Government Summit in Cape Verde where it decided to establish a Contact Group headed by the Foreign Minister of Cape Verde and included the other CPLP Foreign Ministers and established the goal to contribute to the peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau.⁹⁷

On 26 July 1998, the CPLP Contact Group reached agreement between the opposing forces that resulted in the Government of Guinea-Bissau, and the self-proclaimed military junta signing a memorandum of understanding. The agreement

⁹⁵CIA, World Fact Book, "Introduction Guinea-Bissau," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pu.html> (accessed 29 September 2012).

⁹⁶CPLP, Revista edição no. 1 [Magazine edition no. 1], "Guiné-Bissau-CPLP-CEDEAO," September 2012, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=104> (accessed 29 September 2012).

⁹⁷CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, "II Conferência da Praia."

included an immediate truce, deployment of a peacekeeping force preferably from Portuguese-speaking countries. Following this agreement, ECOWAS welcomed the ceasefire agreement forged by the CPLP Contact Group and expressed its readiness to cooperate with the CPLP and to support any other initiatives that would contribute to ECOWAS objectives in Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS reaffirmed its leading role in resolving the crisis in Guinea-Bissau and underscored the need to support regional and African initiatives to ensure peace and security.⁹⁸

ECOWAS and the CPLP combined their mediation efforts in several meetings that produced a revised ceasefire agreement that was transmitted to the UN Security Council by Cape Verde and Côte d'Ivoire on 1 September 1998. Despite the agreements, the opposing forces in the Guinea-Bissau civil war resumed fighting, which led to the continuation of the joint ECOWAS and CPLP mediation efforts. On 1 November 1998, during the ECOWAS summit the Abuja Agreement was ratified and the opposing parties agreed again to reaffirm a ceasefire. They also agreed with the deployment of an ECOWAS peacekeeping force known as the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force that would separate the warring parties and guarantee free access to humanitarian organizations to support the affected civilian population. The opposing parties also agreed that general and presidential elections would be held not later than March 1999. Those elections would be observed by ECOWAS, CPLP and the international community.⁹⁹

⁹⁸United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1998* (New York: UN Publications, 2001), 152.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 153.

During the period of political transition, the CPLP established a representative office in Bissau to coordinate with UN agencies, ECOWAS and civil society. The office was closed after the presidential elections in 1999.¹⁰⁰

After 1999 the unstable situation of Guinea-Bissau remained one of the major concerns of CPLP due to the constant attention given the situation during Heads of State and Government Summits.¹⁰¹

From those Heads of State and Government Summits it is important to highlight the 2004 Summit in which were recognized the importance of cooperation among the CPLP, the UN Security Council, ECOWAS and the EU in order to establish peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau. In this Summit it was also stressed the CPLP support to the legislative elections that took place in March 2004.¹⁰²

However, despite these concerns, the CPLP did not successfully develop any significant programs for Guinea-Bissau until 2006. That year the GIC-GB was established with the CPLP as one of the key founding members.¹⁰³ The first GIC-GB meeting was held on the sidelines of the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly. The Contact Group's mission is based on four elements –political, socio-economic, and

¹⁰⁰Nicole Guardiola (Lisboa, PRT: Europress, 2007), 82.

¹⁰¹CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “IV, V, VI, VIII and IX Conferências CPLP,” <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=163> (accessed 8 September 2012).

¹⁰²CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Resolução sobre a República da Guiné-Bissau.”

¹⁰³GIC-GB membership includes CPLP countries and Spain, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. In this Group are also represented several international organizations like UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa, World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

diplomatic and security sector reform—within the framework of the assistance provided to Guinea-Bissau. The existence of this group is justified by the urgency of creating an international framework for monitoring and supporting initiatives to enable Guinea-Bissau authorities to promote good governance and raise funds for the necessary development programs.¹⁰⁴ The diplomatic actions of the GIC-GB led to the inclusion of Guinea-Bissau in the group of countries supported by the UN Peace Building Commission in 2008.¹⁰⁵ This mechanism allows the CPLP, the GIC-GB, and the UN Peace Building Commission of Guinea-Bissau¹⁰⁶ to integrate their efforts to help resolve the problems in Guinea-Bissau.¹⁰⁷

In August 2010, following the CPLP Heads of State and Government Summit, the Angolan president organized a meeting with the CPLP and ECOWAS to discuss several options, including a robust participation of Angola, acting under CPLP authority, in support of Guinea-Bissau military reform.¹⁰⁸ This initial meeting led to a new framework of cooperation between the CPLP and ECOWAS and the approval of a road map of priorities for reform of the Defense and Security Sector in Guinea-Bissau. The road map

¹⁰⁴CPLP, *Livro 12 Anos*, “Construindo a Comunidade.”

¹⁰⁵The countries that are currently on the UN Peace Building Commission are: Burundi; Sierra Leone; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia; and, Central African Republic. United Nations, UN Peace Building Commission, “Countries currently on the PBC,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/> (accessed 29 September 2012).

¹⁰⁶United Nations, UN Peace Building Commission, “Guinea-Bissau,” http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/doc_guinea-bissau.shtml (accessed 29 September 2012).

¹⁰⁷CPLP, *Livro 12 Anos*, “Construindo a Comunidade.”

¹⁰⁸CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “VIII Conferência de Luanda.”

included the establishment of the Angolan MISSANG that was deployed on March 2011. The CPLP then shifted its focus to diplomatic efforts to complete the memorandum of understanding between Guinea-Bissau-ECOWAS-CPLP for implementation of the roadmap with an agreement that had political and international legitimacy.¹⁰⁹

When everything seemed to be on track the military coup of April 2012 prevented the continuation of the work and caused the withdrawal of the MISSANG which was replaced in May 2012 by a contingent of the ECOWAS Standby Force constituted with troops drawn from Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo and Senegal. This ECOWAS contingent was deployed to facilitate the withdrawal of the Angolan force and to assist in securing a transitional process and undertake preparations for the immediate implementation of the road map for the Defense and Security Sector Reform.¹¹⁰

Two days after the military coup of 12 April 2012, the CPLP Ministers Council held an emergency meeting to discuss the problem in Guinea-Bissau. It is important to stress that the military coup occurred in the beginning of the second round of the presidential election campaign. The first round of the electoral process had been considered transparent and fair by the international community. The Foreign Ministers Council declared to the Guinean people and the international community that the only authorities recognized by the CPLP in Guinea-Bissau would be those resulting from a constitutional process. They rejected any government announced after the military coup. The Ministers Council declared their intention to not lose the gains from the MISSANG and considered the possibility of deploying an intervention force to Guinea-Bissau. This

¹⁰⁹CPLP, Revista edição no. 1, “Guiné-Bissau-CPLP-CEDEAO.”

¹¹⁰ECOWAS, Press Release, “ECOWAS to send troops to Guinea-Bissau.”

potential force would require a UN Security Council mandate in order to ensure the defense of peace and security and should be in partnership with ECOWAS, AU and EU. The objective of the intervention force would be to assure constitutional order in the country, protect the legitimate authorities, and to allow the conclusion of the electoral process.¹¹¹

The July 2012, the CPLP Heads of State and Government Summit issued another formal “Statement on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau.” The Community reiterated they would only recognize authorities that have constitutional and democratic legitimacy and expressed CPLP support for the restoration of legitimate power.¹¹²

CPLP has continually stressed the need to rigorously respect the decisions of the UN and the AU Constitutive Act regarding access to power by unconstitutional means. For CPLP any other approach to deal with the current situation in Guinea-Bissau would be a challenge to the authority of the UN Security Council and an obvious violation of the principles of the AU and ECOWAS. With this background, the CPLP has reiterated the support for the request of the legitimate government of Guinea-Bissau to establish a comprehensive stabilization force, endorsed by the UN Security Council, with a contingent constituted with representatives from ECOWAS, the CPLP and the AU. The CPLP also reaffirmed the urgency of completing defense and security sector reforms in

¹¹¹CPLP, Ministers Council meeting, “VIII Reunião extraordinária do Conselho de Ministros” [Extraordinary ministers council meeting], 14 April 2012, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=156> (accessed 29 September 2012).

¹¹²CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “IX Conferência de Maputo” [Maputo summit], 20 July 2012, <http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=316&Action=1&NewsId=2193&M=NewsV2&PID=304> (accessed 29 September 2012).

Guinea-Bissau and combating the likely source of instability in West Africa, drug trafficking in West Africa.¹¹³

African Union

The AU was officially constituted in July 2000 after a series of four summits¹¹⁴ and is the successor organization to the Organization of African Unity.¹¹⁵ The African Union is constituted by 53 African countries, including CPLP members Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Morocco is the only country on the African Continent that is not a member of the AU.

An important principle contained in the AU Constitutive Act allows intervention in the internal affairs of member states under certain conditions. Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act states the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”¹¹⁶ AU members collectively ceded some sovereignty over their citizens if governments either do not have the capacity or will to protect their populations from the egregious conditions specified in the Constitutive Act.

¹¹³CPLP, Revista edição no. 1, “Guiné-Bissau-CPLP-CEDEAO.”

¹¹⁴1999-The Sirte Extraordinary Session, decided to establish an AU. 2000-The Lome Summit, adopted the Constitutive Act of the Union. 2001-The Lusaka Summit, drew the road map for the implementation of AU. 2002-The Durban Summit, launched the AU and organized the 1st Assembly of the Heads of States of the AU.

¹¹⁵African Union, “African Union in a nutshell,” <http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell> (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹¹⁶African Union, “Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act,” 11 July 2000, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.pdf (accessed 23 June 2012).

While the Constitutive Act defined criteria for the AU to react to a security crisis, the AU developed a proactive approach to development that would lead to better security. The AU adopted the NEPAD program in 2001. This program was designed by African leaders to pursue new priorities and approaches to the political and socio-economic transformation of Africa. NEPAD's objectives are to enhance Africa's growth, development and participation in the global economy.¹¹⁷

While the NEPAD program connects the concepts of security and development, in 2001 the AU did not have organizational structures to address security matters. However, in 2003, the Constitutive Act of the AU was amended to create the Peace and Security Council (PSC).¹¹⁸

In the following year the AU adopted the Common African Defense and Security Policy¹¹⁹ in order to ensure "Africa's common defense and security interests and goals, especially as set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU, are safeguarded in the face of common threats to the continent as a whole."¹²⁰ Together the PSC and the Common African Defense and Security Policy are the two pillars of the

¹¹⁷NEPAD, "About New Partnership for Africa's Development," <http://www.nepad.org/> (accessed 16 September 2012).

¹¹⁸African Union, "Peace and Security Council," <http://www.au.int/en/organs/psc> (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹¹⁹African Union, AU the Peace and Security Agenda, "Common African Defence and Security Policy," http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/African_Defence_Policy.htm (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹²⁰African Union, Common African Defence and Security Policy, "Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy," 28 February 2004, http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/2ND%20EX%20ASSEMBLY/Declaration%20on%20a%20Comm.Af%20Def%20Sec.pdf (accessed 23 June 2012).

APSA. The PSC has a leading role in prevention, management and conflict resolution in Africa¹²¹ and is the link between the continental level and AROs. The PSC is “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate a timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”¹²²

The PSC is a body comprised of 15 Member States, elected on a rotational basis and ensuring equity representing the five regions of Africa. It is a permanent body which meets at three levels: Heads of State and Government; Ministers; and Ambassadors (Article 5 and 8 of the PSC Protocol), with decisions taken by a two thirds majority.¹²³

It is also through the PSC that the linkage with other peace and security organizations is assured, in particular the UN and its agencies. For issues concerning employment of military forces, the PSC is supported by the Military Committee, constituted by the Chiefs of Staff or their representatives of the countries that are part of the PSC. The PSC is supported by the AU Commission (which is the body responsible for the implementation and monitoring of its decisions) and includes the Panel of the

¹²¹African Union, “AU Peace and Security Department,” <http://au.int/en/dp/ps/psd> (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹²²African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, “Article 2 of Establishment, Nature and Structure of PSC,” 9 July 2002, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹²³African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, “Article 5 Composition and Article 8 Procedure of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC of the AU,” 9 July 2002, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf (accessed 23 June 2012).

Wise, the Peace Fund, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the African Standby Force (ASF).

The Panel of the Wise, according to Article 11 of the PSC Protocol, is constituted by five African personalities from different sectors of society, which are recognized as having greatly contributed to peace, security and development of Africa. It is expected that they support the efforts of the PSC, contributing to conflict prevention through diplomatic initiatives in the early stages of a conflict.

The Peace Fund is a mechanism created to financially support activities in the area of peace and security. It is established with funds from the budget of the AU, and from external donors such as the EU.

The CEWS, according to Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, is intended to be a system that allows the prediction and prevention of conflicts through timely information that is provided to the PSC about potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa. There is an early warning center at the AU level named the Situation Room. Each ARO is chartered to have a corresponding monitoring center linked to the AU Situation Room. Currently the CEWS structure is not fully operational due to a variety of internal disagreements and budgetary problems.¹²⁴

¹²⁴African Union, African Peace and Security Architecture-2010 Assessment Study, “The Continental Early Warning System,” November 2010, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20African%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Architecture.pdf> (accessed 23 June 2012).

Article 13 of the PSC protocol established the ASF, that was designed to have a strength of 15,000 consisting of five brigades provided by five AROs¹²⁵ (AMU, EAC ECCAS, ECOWAS, and SADC).¹²⁶

This structure was designed to have an operational force that will allow the AU to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, including the ability to conduct Peace Support Operations, and was intended to be fully operational by June 2010. Despite all efforts that were made by the African countries, the ARO, and the international community, this goal was not reached, and ASF implementation varies by region.

The different degrees of implementation of the APSA are due to the different levels of integration and cooperation between the countries in a region as well as the inadequate levels of human and financial resources available. In accordance to the main objective of this study it is important to focus the analysis in SADC that includes Angola and Mozambique, ECCAS that includes Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe, and ECOWAS that includes Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. These three AROs are discussed following the discussion of the AU later in this chapter.

The AU formally recognized the role of the CPLP in Guinea-Bissau. The AU PSC, on its 318th meeting on 17 April 2012, strongly condemned the coup d'état that took place in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April 2012 and endorsed the statements made by

¹²⁵AMU-Arab Maghreb Union, EAC-East African Community, ECCAS-Economic Community of Central African States, ECOWAS-Economic Community Of West African States, and SADC-Southern African Development Community.

¹²⁶African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, "Article 13 African Standby Force," 9 July 2002, [http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace% 20and% 20security.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf) (accessed 23 June 2012).

ECOWAS and the CPLP regarding Guinea-Bissau. The PSC suspended Guinea-Bissau from all AU activities until the restoration of constitutional order. The AU called on its partners, particularly the UN, the EU, the CPLP and bilateral partners, to support measures to force the perpetrators of the coup d'état to return constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. Finally, the "PSC said it would continue to consult with ECOWAS, the CPLP, the UN and other partners to continue the work previously underway to reform the Guinea-Bissau defense and security sector and consider possible deployment of an international stabilization operation."¹²⁷

During its 327th meeting on 14 July 2012, the AU PSC encouraged ECOWAS to pursue its efforts, in close coordination with the other relevant international actors, notably the CPLP, the AU, the UN and the EU towards the implementation of the decisions relating to the return to constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau.¹²⁸

Currently, the CPLP does not have a formal relationship or agreement with the AU, however the CPLP Heads of State and Government recognize the importance of establishing a Memorandum of Understanding with the AU and establishing partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations to which its member states belong.¹²⁹

¹²⁷African Union, PSC, "Communiqué of AU PSC on its 318th meeting," 17 April 2012, <http://au.int/en/dp/ps/> (accessed 16 September 2012).

¹²⁸African Union, PSC, "Communiqué of AU PSC on its 327th meeting," 14 July 2012, <http://au.int/en/dp/ps/> (accessed 16 September 2012).

¹²⁹CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, "VII, VIII and IX Conferências CPLP."

African Peace and Security Architecture

In an MMAS titled African Peace and Security Architecture: A Strategic Analysis, Major Luis Carlos Falcão Escorrega of the Portuguese Army studied the elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture and concluded that the APSA was a viable strategy for the threats facing Africa.

The study found the APSA ends that were established would meet the goal of continental peace and security and help achieve development as a result. The APSA does a good job of focusing on the internal threats facing Africa such as conflict within a state, conflicts between states and post conflict resolution. Additionally, the APSA establishes mechanisms for African countries to have good defense and security cooperation programs the build capacity, relationships and interoperability. A shortfall identified was the ends are more focused on the internal threats than the external threats facing African such as maritime and cyber security threats.¹³⁰

Escorrega examined the ways and means of the APSA through the diplomatic, informational, military and economic aspects of the APSA. In the diplomatic realm the PSC, the AU Commission and the Panel of the Wise were discussed and found to be good mechanisms for preventative diplomacy and mediation to resolve conflicts especially considering they were designed to meet the needs of Africa. Areas where the diplomatic instrument could improve include developing a mediation structure within the APSA to be more effective versus relying on less-structured mediation efforts. The

¹³⁰Luis Carlos F. Escorrega, “African Peace and Security Architecture: A Strategic Analysis” (Master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2011), 77-74.

shortfalls with the PSC and the Panel of the Wise include having the political will to intervene as well as financial and human resource limitations.¹³¹

In evaluating the military components of the APSA, the key component is the ASF, organized by each of the five AROs providing a brigade-sized force to implement the decisions of the PSC. The ASF implementation is uneven among the African regional organizations and shortfalls included numerous problems with lack of resources, staffing, doctrine and interoperability. The solution to these problems lies with each regional organization making a commitment to develop their ASF.

The informational component of the APSA focuses on internal threats to African Peace and Security instead of external threats. The primary mechanism used is the CEWS. Development of an effective CEWS is hampered by resource shortages at the continental and regional levels as well as a lack willingness to share sensitive information necessary for the system to be effective.

The economic elements of the APSA include the contributions of member states to the Peace Fund as well as sanctions that can be enforced should the AU deem necessary. The AU still relies on donors external to the continent to fund many of the programs under the APSA and member states are generally behind in their contributions. There are real questions whether the AU has the capacity and the political will to impose and collect on sanctions should by the imposed and enforced.

Overall, the study found the APSA is a strategy that can address the main threats to African with more ability to deal with the internal threats compared to the external threats. The other main problems with the APSA are through implementation that are

¹³¹Ibid., 76-77.

primarily issues related to the political will of AU members and the African regional organizations developing their contributions to the security architecture.¹³²

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The SADC was established in 1992 which was a modification of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference established in 1980. It consists of 15 countries¹³³ and its mission is “to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good governance, and durable peace and security.”¹³⁴

In 1996, SADC created the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation with the general objective to be responsible for peace and security in the organization’s region of responsibility.¹³⁵ SADC ratified three main documents that define its conduct. The first is the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, which outlines the policies and strategic lines for SADC programs, including objectives, activities and long-term priorities.¹³⁶ The second is the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ which

¹³²Ibid., 82-84.

¹³³Angola; Botswana; Democratic Republic of Congo; Lesotho; Malawi; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Seychelles; South Africa; Swaziland; Tanzania; Zambia; Zimbabwe. Madagascar was also a member that is currently suspended.

¹³⁴SADC, “About SADC,” <http://www.sadc.int/english/about-sadc/> (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹³⁵SADC, “Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation,” 14 August 2001, <http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/157> (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹³⁶SADC, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, “The SADC Framework for Integration,” 2010, <http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/104> (accessed 23 June 2012).

provides general guidelines, and objectives to address and mitigate the major defense and security vulnerabilities.¹³⁷ The last document is the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections that focuses on the development of democratic institutions and good practices to encourage the observance of universal human rights.¹³⁸

However, despite the creation of structures and the approval of the plans, SADC has proved unable to intervene in some crises in which its member states were involved. The Angolan civil war, the Zimbabwean crisis and the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict all divided its country members hampering the organization to assume a credible role in the provision of peace and stability in the SADC region. Lack of resources caused a delay in implementing the region's contribution to the AU CEWS.¹³⁹ On the other hand, the SADC Brigade (South Brig) is one of the most advanced of the ASF brigades due to peace support operations training centers in Zimbabwe and Botswana.¹⁴⁰

Currently, the CPLP does not have a formal relationship or agreement with SADC. However SADC recognizes Portuguese as one of its official languages, and as it

¹³⁷SADC, Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, "Introduction," 5 August 2004, <http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/116> (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹³⁸SADC, Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, "Introduction," 26 September 2008, <http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/117> (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹³⁹SADC, Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, "Background," May 2009, <http://www.sadc.int/rptc/index/browse/page/422> (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹⁴⁰SADC, Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, "Peace for a Common Future," May 2009, <http://www.sadc.int/rptc/index/browse/page/422> (accessed 23 June 2012).

was mentioned before, the CPLP members that belong to the organization are Angola and Mozambique.¹⁴¹

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

The ECCAS was established in 1983 and it consists of 10 country members in Central Africa.¹⁴² The mission of the ECCAS is to promote cooperation and self-sustained development of “industry, transport and communications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, trade, customs, monetary and financial issues, human resources, tourism, education, culture, science and technology and the movement of people.”¹⁴³

This organization established a Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa in 2005 to address issues related to the APSA. It also had the objective to create an Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa and a Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) in order to respond to humanitarian crises or threats to peace and security.¹⁴⁴ Due to financial and human resource limitations, these capabilities are not yet fully developed.

¹⁴¹SADC, “About SADC.”

¹⁴²Angola; Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Equatorial Guinea; Gabon; Republic of the Congo; and São Tomé and Príncipe.

¹⁴³ECCAS, “Présentation de la CEEAC,” http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=2 (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹⁴⁴African Union, ECCAS, “History and Background,” <http://www.au.int/en/recs/eccas> (accessed 23 June 2012).

Currently, the CPLP does not have a formal relation or agreement with ECCAS. However, two CPLP members, Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe, belong to the organization.¹⁴⁵

Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS was established in 1975 and is constituted by 15 countries.¹⁴⁶ The organization's mission is to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters.¹⁴⁷ The Community also aims to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its people, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.¹⁴⁸

ECOWAS is one of the ARO that has implemented APSA structures. In 1999, it established the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. In 2001, the country members signed the

¹⁴⁵SADC, "About SADC."

¹⁴⁶Benin; Burkina Faso; Cape Verde; Ivory Coast; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia; Mali; Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; Sierra Leone; and, Togo.

¹⁴⁷ECOWAS, Discover ECOWAS, "ECOWAS in Brief," http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=about_a&lang=en (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹⁴⁸ECOWAS, Discover ECOWAS, "Treaty of ECOWAS," 24 July 1993, <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en> (accessed 23 June 2012).

supplementary protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and more recently in 2008 ratified the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework.¹⁴⁹

ECOWAS is the ARO with the most Peace Support Operations experience. The ECOWAS Standby Force is a Brigade of 6,500 soldiers with a 14 day notice-to-move, instead of the 30 days required by AU.¹⁵⁰ The ECOWAS has deployed military forces on the following peace keeping missions: Liberia from 1991-1998 and 2003; Sierra Leone in 1997 -1999; Guinea-Bissau from 1998-1999 and 2012; and in the Ivory Coast from 2003-2004.¹⁵¹

The unstable situation in Guinea-Bissau over the last decade demonstrated ECOWAS and CPLP cooperation. One of the most important outcomes of this combined work is the road map of priorities for effective implementation reforms to the Defense and Security Sector in Guinea-Bissau. The roadmap was jointly prepared by ECOWAS and the CPLP during rounds of meetings held in Bissau in 2010. This document provides for the implementation of priority and quick-impact programs in the defense and security sector which would help galvanize the overall reforms in the future. Both ECOWAS and

¹⁴⁹ECOWAS, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, “Introduction,” 16 January 2008, http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹⁵⁰ECOWAS, Standby Force online, “L’Action de la CEDEAO” [CEDEAO action], 2008, http://www.ecowas.int/spot/fr/empabb/2008_05_24_dossier_de_presse_V_5.pdf (accessed 23 June 2012).

¹⁵¹African Union, ECOWAS Profile, “Peace and Security-Related Activities,” <http://www.africa-union.org/Recs/ECOWASProfile.pdf> (accessed 23 June 2012).

the CPLP committed to mobilize the financial and technical resources required for implementation of the roadmap.¹⁵²

On 17 April 2102, the AU PSC requested both organizations to continue the work initiated within the framework of the implementation of the ECOWAS - CPLP Roadmap in order to resolve the situation in Guinea-Bissau in response to the latest coup.¹⁵³

In May of 2012, ECOWAS deployed a contingent of the Standby Force to Guinea-Bissau to facilitate the withdrawal of the Angolan MISSANG. The ECOWAS Standby Force will assist in the transition to constitutional order and implementation of the Roadmap for the Defense and Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau.¹⁵⁴

Currently, the CPLP does not have a formal agreement with ECOWAS whose membership includes CPLP members Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and lists Portuguese as one of its official languages.¹⁵⁵

United Nations

The UN intends in its interventions, policies and strategies to support sustainable development, stability, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. The UN has the right

¹⁵²United Nations, UNIOGBIS, “SRSG calls on Bissau-Guinean authorities to endorse ECOWAS-CPLP road map,” 10 December 2010, <http://mpwiis02-beta13.dfs.un.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=440&mid=2232&ItemID=11183> (accessed 16 September 2012).

¹⁵³African Union, PSC, “Communiqué of AU PSC on its 318th meeting.”

¹⁵⁴ECOWAS, Press Release, “ECOWAS to send troops to Guinea-Bissau,” 27 April 2012, <http://au.int/en/dp/ps/> (accessed 16 September 2012).

¹⁵⁵ECOWAS, Discover ECOWAS, “Treaty of ECOWAS-Article 87 Official and Working Languages,” 24 July 1993, <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en> (accessed 23 June 2012).

and the duty to intervene in the resolution of imbalances in the world, combining the international will to act in order to face situations related to underdevelopment and regional instability.¹⁵⁶

In the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of UN peacekeeping missions, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that “maintaining international peace and security remains a daunting challenge for the UN.”¹⁵⁷ In a January 2008 report named “securing peace and development: the role of the UN in supporting security sector” the Secretary General states the UN “exists to support the maintenance of international peace and security and to assist governments and peoples in building a world in which freedom from fear and want is a reality for all.”¹⁵⁸

The UN interventions to obtain peace and security have a worldwide legitimacy that is provided by the UN Charter. Since 1945 this document has a key role in the relations among the 193 countries that currently are members of the organization. According to Article 1 of the UN charter, the purpose of UN is: “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for

¹⁵⁶United Nations, UN Charter, “Article 1 of the UN charter,” 26 June 1945, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> (accessed 12 June 2012).

¹⁵⁷United Nations, UN Secretary-General, “Statement to Security Council on securing peace and development: the role of the UN in supporting security sector reform,” 12 May 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/speeches/search_full.asp?statID=241 (accessed 12 June 2012).

¹⁵⁸United Nations, UN Secretary-General, “Report: Securing peace and development: the role of the UN in supporting security sector reform,” 23 January 2008, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/659 (accessed 12 June 2012).

the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means.”¹⁵⁹

Since its founding, the UN has conducted fifty-four peacekeeping missions all over the world, twenty-three were in Africa which means almost half of that overall number. Considering the subject of this work it is important to highlight that five of these missions were conducted in CPLP member countries, four in Angola and one in Mozambique. Presently there are seventeen ongoing UN peacekeeping missions. One of them is in a CPLP country, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, and seven are in Africa, however none include a CPLP African country.¹⁶⁰

Initially, the UN was suited to conduct its own missions directed by the organization with the collaboration of military forces from its country members. As the various UN Chapter VIII Regional Organizations have been playing a more significant role, such as the AU since 2002, the UN has been working together with these regional arrangements to conduct peacekeeping missions. This effort is predominantly important in Africa, where there is always the concern for capacity building. By placing regional forces under the UN flag, the hope is that the peacekeepers will enjoy the legitimacy and impartiality that UN’s universal membership often provides, while some of the financial

¹⁵⁹United Nations, UN Charter, “Article 1 of the UN charter,” 26 June 1945, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> (accessed 12 June 2012).

¹⁶⁰United Nations, UN Peacekeeping operations, “Current peacekeeping operations,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml> (accessed 12 June 2012).

and logistical problems of regional peacekeepers can be alleviated through greater burden sharing.¹⁶¹

The UN charter, in its Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements, appeals to regional cooperation as a way to intervene in terms of peacekeeping. As Article 52 states “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”¹⁶²

The CPLP was granted observer status in UN General Assembly in 1999. UN resolution A/RES/54/10 of 18 November 1999 recognized that the purpose of the CPLP as being consistent with the UN, that cooperation would be mutually advantageous, and invited the CPLP to participate in the UN General Assembly as an observer.¹⁶³

For the first time, on February 2004, the CPLP was called to participate in a major meeting of the UN Security Council. The CPLP was called to give its opinion about the Special Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission of Support in East Timor.

¹⁶¹Adekeye Adebajo, *United Nations peacekeeping in Africa after Cold War*, in *Africa in International Politics-External involvement on the continent*, ed. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (London, UK: Routledge, 2004), 209.

¹⁶²United Nations, UN Charter, “Article 52 of the UN charter,” 26 June 1945, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> (accessed 12 June 2012).

¹⁶³United Nations, General Assembly, “Observer status for the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries in the General Assembly A/RES/54/10,” 18 November 1999, <http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/1999/48.pdf> (accessed 16 September 2012).

This represented an historic milestone for the CPLP and new avenues of cooperation with the UN opened as a result.¹⁶⁴

The Community's relations with the UN system have been developed and strengthened through resolutions 59/21 of 8 November 2004 and 61/223 of 20 December 2006, which call on the UN¹⁶⁵ and CPLP to promote coordination and cooperation between the two organizations.¹⁶⁶

The UN Peace Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) works in close cooperation with CPLP, which has a representative in Guinea-Bissau, to develop common strategies to help stabilize the country.¹⁶⁷

Conclusion

Which was presented in literature review was what the CPLP has been doing to provide security for its African members; the Guinea-Bissau case study; and, the role that IGOs and African regional organizations play in Africa. In this chapter was also addressed the relation between the previous IGOs and CPLP. The following chapter presents the research concept and the strategic ends/ways/means analysis methodology used in this thesis.

¹⁶⁴Bernardino and Leal, 29.

¹⁶⁵Presently CPLP has cooperation agreements with several UN agencies, such as: Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UN Human Rights Council; UN Conference on Trade and Development; and, UNAIDS.

¹⁶⁶CPLP, "Acordos, Protocolos e Convénios."

¹⁶⁷United Nations, General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General on Cooperation between the UN and regional and other organizations," 16 August 2006, <http://www.ipu.org/Un-e/a-61-256-e.pdf> (accessed 16 September 2012).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In chapter 1 this investigation started with the problem framing and the research questions statement. To support the research, the following step in chapter two was the presentation of the literature review. The main purpose of the present chapter is to present the research methodology used in this thesis.

To accomplish the previous objective, this chapter specifies the research concept that directed the study and the methodology used to collect data. Another important issue addressed in this chapter is the strategic ends/ways/means assessment methodology, used to analyze the CPLP organization, which will allow evaluating the CPLP capabilities and limitations as a security enhancement organization.

Research Concept

The motivation to conduct this investigation came from the recognition of the important role that regional organizations have in the current conflicts that some African countries are facing. This reality directly affects the African Portuguese speaking countries and gives the CPLP a responsibility to support its African members.

Considering that security and development are interdependent, the aim of this investigation is to evaluate the CPLP's ability to promote stability in its African country members. This objective drove the statement of the investigation's primary question: Is the CPLP an intergovernmental organization capable of enhancing the security of its African country members in the future?

After presenting brief background information about the current African continental strategic environment, the literature review used in the investigation has two perspectives. The first is based on the analysis of the CPLP as an organization capable of enhancing the security of its country members. To analyze this perspective three secondary questions must be answered. The initial question addresses what the CPLP actions have been to enhance security for its African country members. The second is related to how is the CPLP organized to enhance security for African country members. Finally, it is essential to investigate the ends, ways and means of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol.

The second perspective analyzes the role of the main IGO and ARO engaged in Africa and their relation with the CPLP. To address this goal, the secondary question that must be answered is what is the CPLP relationship and interaction with the intergovernmental, regional and sub-regional organizations within the CPLP African member's area of interest.

To finalize the CPLP assessment and allow the suggestion of possible courses of action for the organization, the final secondary question focuses on what are the capabilities and limitations of the CPLP to assist enhancing security for African country members?

Based on information presented in the literature review and the information presented in the Guinea-Bissau case study and the Harry Yarger theoretical concepts of ends/ways/means of a strategy the investigation will answer the primary and secondary questions that were presented previously.

Data Collection

Researchers in social sciences use qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. “Quantitative data is data which can be expressed numerically or classified by some numerical value. Qualitative data is data in the form of descriptive accounts of observation or data which is classified by type.”¹⁶⁸

The quantitative study analyzes a sample of a specific universe, so that through the generalization of the results obtained can be made an estimate of the results in the complete universe. This methodology is also called closed research due to the tools used to collect data, such as interviews and questionnaires. The results obtained can be presented using percentages or statistical formulas. This methodology is preferable to measure opinions, preferences, and behaviors.¹⁶⁹

Mainly used in social sciences, qualitative research tries to describe an event without using statistical methods. These studies are developed through observation in which the researcher tries to understand the phenomenon under investigation from the perspective of the agents involved in that process. From its personal observation the researcher express his interpretation of the event under investigation.¹⁷⁰

This study will use the qualitative research method. With this methodology the focus is to collect, analyze, and interpret data by observing the CPLP’s actions and guiding documents in order to understand how the organization can be a security

¹⁶⁸David Crowther and Geoff Lancaster, *Research Methods* (Oxford, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008), 75.

¹⁶⁹Brian Pratt and Peter Loizos, *Choosing Research Methods* (Oxford, UK: Information Press, 2003), 45.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 47.

enhancement organization. The advantage of this methodology is the ability to give the background of the African security environment and the role that is played by the main IGO, ARO, and the CPLP in this complex situation. Based on a qualitative approach it is possible for the reader to understand the logical conclusions presented in the study.

In order to achieve the aim of the investigation presented in chapter one, all the data presented was collected from primary and secondary sources in a three phase methodology. Initially, official documents were identified and collected, as well as web sites related to the background information about African security and development issues. In a second phase, these documents were screened according to their significance to the study, focusing on the role of CPLP and the other IGO involved in African security. Lastly, all the documents were analyzed focusing on the understanding of how the CPLP can be a security enhancement organization to its African country members.

The primary sources for this qualitative based research include the CPLP official documents and the other IGO official documents and web sites. The secondary sources were collected from books available in the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library, websites and internet articles for the electronic papers.

With the collection of information mainly from primary and also some secondary materials, the thesis evaluates if the CPLP is capable of enhancing the security of its African country members in the future. The qualitative research methods also uses case studies to collect, analyze, and interpret data. The case study research method uses

evidences from observation that investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.¹⁷¹

This thesis includes a case study of the CPLP intervention in Guinea-Bissau. This case study focuses on the CPLP actions starting with the 1998 military coup, then describes actions over the next several decades and includes responses to the April 2012 military coup. The purpose of this case study is to provide a practical example of the CPLP's actions to enhance security in Guinea-Bissau. The case study includes examples of the capabilities and limitations of the CPLP to assist enhancing security in this country. The observations in this case study will provide important information that will help evaluate if the CPLP is capable of enhancing the security of its African country members in the future.

Ends/Ways/Means Methodology

Simply defined, strategy is the calculation of objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and resources (means) within an acceptable level of risk to create more favorable outcomes. According to Yarger “strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success.”¹⁷²

¹⁷¹Robert Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984), 23.

¹⁷²Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 1.

For Yarger, the strategic process is all about how (concept or way) leadership will use the power (resources or means)¹⁷³ available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with state policy.¹⁷⁴ In this process strategy is fundamentally about choices. It reflects a preference for achieving a future end or condition and defines the best way to get there.

It is important to understand that the strategic process should be proactive and preemptive, because only with an accurate assessment of the trends, opportunities and threats it is possible to adopt the appropriate way to achieve the desired goals. In order to succeed at this the strategist must analyze the desired end state in the domestic and external strategic environment to develop appropriate objectives in regard to the desired end state.

According to Yarger's concepts the strategist must understand the interests and endstates of the organization to formulate the appropriate strategy. With the guidance provided by the policy of the organization the strategy aims to achieve a desired result (end) using the adequate the relation of how to use (ways) the available resources (means), in a specific strategic environment that will always contain a level of risk.¹⁷⁵

To Yarger the risk assessment process looks at the strategy in its entire logic between the interdependence among ends, ways, and means. In this assessment process the strategist must question the validity of his strategy through the three aspects of:

¹⁷³The state instruments of power are: political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational.

¹⁷⁴Yarger, 46.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., 113-114.

suitability, to see if the strategy’s execution accomplishes the desired effect: feasibility, to see if the strategy can be accomplished by the means available (regarding the means it is important to highlight that a strategy that is not adequately resourced it is not viable); and acceptability, to see if the effects, as well the ways and means used to achieve those efforts, are justified and acceptable for the organization. To evaluate the logic and risk the strategist should analyze his strategy formulation processes backwards, ensuring the means provided are appropriate to implement the ways used to achieve the envisioned end that will contribute to attain a desired interest.¹⁷⁶

Based on the Yarger theory, figure 1 illustrates the model used for the CPLP strategic analysis.

CPLP Defense and security interests and endstate		
Ends	Ways	Means
Objectives for CPLP as a security enhancement organization.	Concepts for accomplishing the objectives.	Resources available.

Figure 1. Model for CPLP Strategic Analysis

Source: Created by author.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the research methodology that will be followed in the analysis in chapter 4. It was also explained the qualitative approach used to collect data during the research. A significant part of the chapter was dedicated to clarifying the

¹⁷⁶Ibid., 114.

strategic ends/ways/means assessment methodology used to evaluate the CPLP in the following chapters.

The next chapter presents the findings and analysis, answering the research questions. These answers will be based on the information collected in chapter 2, the application of the ends/ways/means methodology used to perform the CPLP strategic analysis, and finally, through the CPLP capabilities and limitations assessment as security enhancement organization.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the research findings in order to answer the primary and secondary research questions that guided this thesis.

The analysis of CPLP approach towards the Defense Cooperation and the Community Defense Cooperation Protocol will answer the first two secondary questions: what have the CPLP actions been to enhance security for its African country members, and how is the CPLP organized to enhance security for African country members?

The use of the Yarger's ends/ways/means methodology will also contribute to answering the previous questions. However, this methodology will mostly answer the third secondary question, analyzing what are the ends, ways and means of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol.

The findings and analysis regarding to the CPLP interaction with IGOs and African Regional Organizations will address the fourth secondary question: "what is the CPLP relationship and interaction with the intergovernmental, regional and sub-regional organizations within the CPLP African member's area of interest?" Finally, the analysis of the CPLP capabilities and limitations will provide an answer for the last secondary question: as a security organization "what are the capabilities and limitations of the CPLP to assist enhancing security for African country members?"

The answer to these questions will indicate whether the CPLP is an intergovernmental organization capable of enhancing the security of its African country members in the future.

CPLP Defense Cooperation

The defense component of CPLP was addressed almost since the beginning of the Community's foundation although, as it was mentioned before, it was not officially stated in the Constitutive Declaration. The cooperation in defense was aroused by the attempt to coordinate positions, embodying some of the CPLP guiding principles to combine efforts to promote economic and social development of their country members.¹⁷⁷

Presently is possible to understand the progress that the Community has made in defense cooperation since its foundation. The first National Defense Ministers Meeting, held in 1998, embodied the informal beginning of the cooperation in this area within the Community. Four years later the CPLP formally included defense cooperation in Article 3 of the CPLP Constitutive charter as a result of the 2002 Heads of State and Government Summit.¹⁷⁸

During the first ten years of official defense cooperation existence, the Community has been gradually developing its defense dimension, creating some tools that allowed consolidation of this area of cooperation of the Community. In these developments it is important to mention some activities related with security that have been developed by the CPLP (see table 1). From these activities it is important to highlight the National Defense Ministers Meetings, the Chiefs of Defense meetings, the National Defense Policy Directors meetings, the Centers for Strategic Analysis, the creation of a Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs, the organization of the Military

¹⁷⁷CPLP, "Declaração Constitutiva da CPLP."

¹⁷⁸CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, "IV Conferência de Brasília."

Exercises FELINO (see table 2) and lastly the signing of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol in 2006.

Another important initiative taken by the organization were the Electoral Observation Missions, initially deployed as part of the UN, to observe the referendum in East Timor. Since then they were deployed to every election held in all the CPLP African members. The credibility and importance of these missions was clearly demonstrated when Zimbabwean government invited the CPLP to send an Electoral Observation Missions to their 2008 elections.¹⁷⁹

	Angola	Brazil	Cape Verde	East Timor	Guinea-Bissau	Mozambique	Portugal	S. T. Príncipe
Conference of Heads of State and Government	2010	2002	1998	-	2006	2000 - 2012	1996 2008	2004
National Defense Ministers meeting	2000 - 2009	2001 2010	2006 1999	2008	2004	2005	1998 2002	2003

Source: Created by author. Based on the CPLP web site summary.

¹⁷⁹CPLP, Missões de Observação Eleitoral National [National electoral observation missions], <http://www.cplp.org/id-172.aspx> (accessed 8 September 2012).

Table 2. FELINO Exercises.				
Year	Country	Type	#Military	
2000	Portugal	LIVEX	Angola-25 Brazil-2 Cape Verde-14 East Timor-0	Guinea-Bissau-9 Mozambique-12 Portugal-58 S. T. Príncipe-4
2001	Portugal	LIVEX	Angola-14 Brazil-2 Cape Verde-14 East Timor-0	Guinea-Bissau-14 Mozambique-12 Portugal-270 S. T. Príncipe-12
2002	Brazil	LIVEX	Angola-2 Brazil-Bn Cape Verde-12 East Timor-0	Guinea-Bissau-12 Mozambique-12 Portugal-13 S. T. Príncipe-12
2003	Mozambique	CPX	Angola-3 Brazil-2 Cape Verde-2 East Timor-1	Guinea-Bissau-2 Mozambique-(?) Portugal-2 S. T. Príncipe-2
2004	Angola	LIVEX	Angola-700 Brazil-2 Cape Verde-22 East Timor-2	Guinea-Bissau-20 Mozambique-20 Portugal-20 S. T. Príncipe-20
2005	Cape Verde	CPX	Angola-3 Brazil-4 Cape Verde-11 East Timor-2	Guinea-Bissau-2 Mozambique-2 Portugal-8 S. T. Príncipe-1
2006	Brazil	LIVEX	Angola-24 Brazil-883 Cape Verde-20 East Timor-0	Guinea-Bissau-20 Mozambique-20 Portugal-22 S. T. Príncipe-23
2007	S. T. and Príncipe	CPX	Angola-3 Brazil-5 Cape Verde-3 East Timor-2	Guinea-Bissau-3 Mozambique-2 Portugal-17 S. T. Príncipe-9
2008	Portugal	LIVEX	Angola-20 Brazil-21 Cape Verde-20 East Timor-21	Guinea-Bissau-21 Mozambique-20 Portugal-341 S. T. Príncipe-20
2009	Mozambique	CPX	Angola-5 Brazil-9 Cape Verde-2 East Timor-2	Guinea-Bissau-0 Mozambique-32 Portugal-14 S. T. Príncipe-2
2010	Angola	LIVEX	850	

Source: Created by author. Figures taken from: Colonel José Manuel C. Lourenço, “Prospective vision of the Portuguese Armed Forces activities within CPLP” (Individual Research Work, Portuguese Joint Command and General Staff College, 2009), Annex A.

CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol

The CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol was an outcome of the seventh National Defense Ministers meeting held in 2004; however it was only approved in 2006. This document's primary goal is to promote defense cooperation among the CPLP members. According to Article 2, the three specific goals of the Defense Cooperation Protocol are to create a common platform to share knowledge in military defense subjects; promote a defense and military common cooperation policy; and contribute to developing the internal capabilities of CPLP member states armed forces. This section traces the origin of the elements of the protocol.¹⁸⁰

In the Protocol's Article 4 are presented the eight fundamental elements of the defense cooperation within the Community. With the analysis of the CPLP National Defense Ministers meetings final declarations it is possible to understand that the protocol is the outcome and the summary of the defense concerns since these meetings started in the organization. The protocol translates into an official document the result of most of the intentions drafted from 1998 to 2006.

The analysis of the CPLP defense structure, defined under Article 5 of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol, also supports that this document was an approach to formally approve the CPLP defense bodies that were already established. All of the components of this structure were mentioned in previous National Defense Ministers or were already implemented before the protocol was ratified.

The National Defense Ministers meetings, have been conducted every year since 1998, two years after the CPLP foundation and long before the official decision to

¹⁸⁰“CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol,” Article 2.

include defense cooperation as an objective of the organization. The other bodies, such as the Chiefs of Defense and the National Defense Policy Directors Meetings, started to be conducted every year since 1999. However, the meetings of the Directors of the Military Intelligence Services that were introduced with the protocol never held a meeting.

The intent to establish a Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs was documented in 1999 during the second National Defense Ministers meeting. This CPLP body was established in 2000 in Lisbon.¹⁸¹

The need to create Centers for Strategic Analysis was identified during the first National Defense Ministers meeting in 1998. The statutes of the Center were approved in 2002 and the Center established in Maputo with delegation in all the other CPLP countries members.¹⁸²

Since the Defense Protocol was adopted, one of the most significant decisions related to the defense structure was the approval, in 2010, of the memorandum of understanding to create the Centers of Excellence for training trainers. These Centers are not part of the defense structure of the Defense Protocol. However, during the first National Defense Ministers Meeting in 1998 the concept to create a combined military school was documented.¹⁸³

The Defense Cooperation Protocol represents an important document to officially define the Defense cooperation approach among CPLP country members. This document

¹⁸¹CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “II Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração da Praia.”

¹⁸²CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “I Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Lisboa.”

¹⁸³Ibid.

represents the official evolution of CPLP in defense cooperation, which began before defense cooperation was added to the Constitutive Charter.

CPLP Strategic Analysis

Applying Yarger's methodology to the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol, it is possible to analyze and assess the policies, end states, ways and means of the CPLP as a security enhancement IGO (summarized in tables 3 and 4). The outcomes taken from this analysis will provide insight into the capabilities and limitations of the CPLP as a security organization capable of enhancing the security of its African country members in the future.

CPLP Defense Policy-End States

As it is acknowledged by the CPLP, the organization does not have a specific policy of defense and security, but the security issues related to its country members and their populations in a wide sense have a direct or indirect influence on all of the organizations areas of intervention.¹⁸⁴

The strategist first of all must understand the interests and end states of the organization in order to formulate the appropriate strategy. This understanding, provided by the policy of the organization, will be decisive to achieve a desired result (end) using the adequate relation of how to use (ways) the available resources (means). An examination of the organization's Constitutive Charter is necessary to conduct the appropriate CPLP strategic analysis as a security enhancement IGO using the Yarger methodology. Considering that interests are desired end states and policy is the

¹⁸⁴Guardiola, 88.

expression of how to achieve the desired end state. The overarching CPLP principles stated in Constitutive Charter are the primacy of peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights and social justice. These ideas collectively serve as the interests and therefore the end states of the CPLP. The Constitutive Charter's Guideline Principals express two important organizational ends. The first is that CPLP members are committed to strengthening the ties of solidarity and cooperation that unite its countries. The second end that appears in the Guideline Principles is that CPLP members combine efforts to promote economic and social development of their peoples. Additionally, due to the relationship between development and security and recognizing the importance of this concept, the CPLP formally added defense cooperation to Article 3 of the CPLP Constitutive Charter in 2002. This action added another important end to the CPLP which is to promote defense cooperation among CPLP country members.¹⁸⁵ This change to the Constitutive Charter originated from a recommendation by the Defense Ministers to the Conference of Heads of State and Government that set in motion a chain of events.¹⁸⁶

After the change to the CPLP Constitutive Charter, the Defense Ministers took a series of actions to develop the Defense Cooperation Protocol between 2003 and 2005. The first study assigned to the Strategic Analysis Center in 2003, and completed in 2004, entitled "The Role of CPLP in the Prevention and Management of Regional Crises" crafted the major elements of the Protocol.¹⁸⁷ In 2005, the Defense Ministers approved

¹⁸⁵CPLP Constitutive Charter.

¹⁸⁶CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, "III Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Luanda."

¹⁸⁷CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, "VII Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Bissau."

the final draft and the Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs was given the task of refining the Defense Cooperation Protocol for submission¹⁸⁸ to the 2006 Defense Ministers Summit, where it was formally adopted.¹⁸⁹

With the end states and ends of the Constitutive Charter related to defense and security identified, as well as the origins of the Defense Cooperation Protocol, the next logical step is to examine the protocol to determine if there are end states identified according to Yarger’s model. Because the Defense Cooperation Protocol was written to implement the change to the Constitutive Charter in 2002, the protocol does not list specific interests and end states and therefore remains subordinate to the Constitutive Charter. The Defense Cooperation Protocol clearly identifies a series of specific objectives (ends) that are discussed in the next section.

Table 3. CPLP Strategic Interests-End States
CPLP Constitutive Charter (Interests, End States)
End state: CPLP countries respect the primacy of peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights and social justice.
End: CPLP members are committed to strengthening the ties of solidarity and cooperation that unite the countries
End: CPLP members combine efforts to promote economic and social development of their peoples.
End: Promote defense cooperation among CPLP country members (defense cooperation added to Article 3 of the Charter)

Source: Created by author.

¹⁸⁸CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “VIII Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Maputo.”

¹⁸⁹CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “IX Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração da Praia.”

Defense Cooperation Protocol-Ends

According to Yarger, in strategy formulation getting the ends (objectives) right matters most, because it is the identification and achievement of the right objectives that creates the strategic effect and the conditions to accomplish the desired interests. Based on Yarger's concepts it is possible to identify the ends (objectives) that explain "what" is to be accomplished in the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol.

Article 2 of the protocol contains two ends. The first is promote a common defense and military cooperation policy and the second is develop the internal capabilities of CPLP member states armed forces.

Article 4 of the Defense Cooperation Protocol contains four ends. These ends are: (1) ensure the solidarity among member states in situations of disaster or aggression; (2) enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational procedures between the armed forces of member countries; (3) improve the interoperability of CPLP military forces; and, (4) seek synergies for control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. With the ends in the Defense Cooperation Protocol identified, ways are examined next.

Defense Cooperation Protocol-Ways

In the Yarger methodology, ways explain how the ends are to be accomplished. They link resources to the ends explaining how an objective will be achieved. The logic of strategy argues that the ways answer the question "how" the objectives will be achieved.

Grounded on the Yarger theoretical concepts it is possible to identify six ways in Articles 2 and 4 of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol. The first way is to create a

common platform to share knowledge in military defense subjects, which is the only way found in Article 2. Article 4 contains the remaining ways. The second way is to promote the exchange of information, and the adoption of confidence-building measures between the armed forces of the CPLP countries. The third way is to promote national awareness about the importance of the role of armed forces in defense of the country members. The fourth way is implementing the Military Education Integrated Exchange Program. The fifth way is to conduct the FELINO exercises and train units to be employed in peace support operations and humanitarian assistance. Finally, the sixth way is conducting combined/joint employment of CPLP naval and air assets.

Defense Cooperation Protocol-Means

In the Yarger methodology, means are the resources used to support the ways. Articles 4 and 5 of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol identify the means available for CPLP defense cooperation. First, from Article 4, the means specified are the Military Education Integrated Exchange Program; the FELINO combined and joint exercises; the CPLP military medicine meetings; the CPLP military sports games; and the Centers of Excellence for training trainers. The entire list of CPLP Defense Structure meetings, contained in Article 5, comprises the balance of the means specified in the Defense Cooperation Protocol.¹⁹⁰

The protocol does not provide or allocate military forces from member countries, however this decision can be made by the Heads of State and Government collectively or

¹⁹⁰The National Defense Ministers meetings, the Chiefs of Defense meetings, the National Defense Policy Directors meetings, the Directors of the Military Intelligence Services meetings, the Centers for Strategic Analysis; and the Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs.

by each country individually. It is reasonable to consider the military means and capabilities that every country member is willing to offer for a particular mission.

Table 4. Defense Cooperation Protocol Ends/Ways/Means		
Ends	Ways	Means
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote a common defense and military cooperation policy (Article 2) • Develop the internal capabilities of CPLP member states armed forces (Article 2) • Ensure solidarity among member states in situations of disaster or aggression (Article 4) • Enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational procedures between the armed forces of member countries (Article 4) • Improve the interoperability of CPLP military forces. (Article 4) • Seek synergies for control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (Article 4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a common platform to share knowledge in military defense subjects (Article 2) • Promote the exchange of information, and the adoption of confidence-building measures between the armed forces of the CPLP countries (Article 4) • Promote national awareness about the importance of the role of armed forces in defense of the country members (Article 4) • Implement the Military Education Integrated Exchange Program (Article 4) • Conduct the FELINO exercises and train units to be employed in peace support operations and humanitarian assistance operations (Article 4) • Conduct combined/joint employment of CPLP naval and air assets (Article 4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPLP Defense Structure and meetings (six bodies) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Defense Ministers ○ Chiefs of Defense ○ National Defense Policy Directors ○ Directors of Military Intelligence ○ Centers for Strategic Analysis ○ Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs • Military Education Integrated Exchange Program • The FELINO combined and joint exercises • The CPLP military medicine meetings • The CPLP military sports games • Centers of Excellence

Source: Created by author.

CPLP Defense Cooperation Ends/Ways/Means Assessment

Considering that strategy provides a logical relationship or proper balance among the ends (objectives) sought, the ways (strategic concepts) used to pursue those ends, and the resources available for the effects sought, table 4 summarizes the elements of the CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol.

Based on the Yarger methodology it is possible to perform an assessment of the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the Defense Protocol with the analyses of interdependence between ends, ways and means based on logical groupings. The Defense Cooperation Protocol does not present logical groupings of ends/ways and means, however in the following section they are grouped logically based on the interaction among the elements within the Defense Cooperation Protocol. (see tables 5-8)

Table 5. CPLP Suitability/Acceptability/Feasibility Assessment		
Ends	Ways	Means
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote a common defense and military cooperation policy (Article 2) • Ensure solidarity among member states in situations of disaster or aggression (Article 4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a common platform to share knowledge in military defense subjects (Article 2) • Promote the exchange of information, and the adoption of confidence-building measures between the armed forces of the CPLP countries (Article 4) • Promote national awareness about the importance of the role of armed forces in defense of the country members (Article 4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPLP Defense Structure and meetings (six bodies) (Article 5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Defense Ministers ○ Chiefs of Defense ○ National Defense Policy Directors ○ Directors of Military Intelligence ○ Centers for Strategic Analysis ○ Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs

Source: Created by author.

Among the ends identified in the Defense Cooperation protocol, “promote a common defense and military cooperation policy” and “ensure solidarity among member states in situations of disaster or aggression” are logically grouped together as the two goals of the Defense Cooperation Protocol. These ends are supported by three ways: (1) Create a common platform to share knowledge in military defense subjects (Article 2),

(2) Promote the exchange of information, and the adoption of confidence-building measures between the armed forces of the CPLP countries (Article 4) and (3) Promote national awareness about the importance of the role of armed forces in defense of the country members (Article 4). The associated means are the CPLP Defense Structure meetings contained in Article 5. This collection of ends, ways and means will be evaluated for suitability, acceptability, and feasibility.

Suitability: The CPLP has a common military and defense cooperation policy supported by the meetings identified in Article 5. These meetings among the CPLP Defense Community are the fora that execute the ways to share knowledge about military subjects and promote the exchange of information and promote confidence building measures. The final declarations from these meetings promote national awareness about the importance of armed forces in the defense of country members.¹⁹¹

In the same manner, the solidarity among member states in situations of disaster and aggression is accomplished due to the structure and content of the Defense meetings. During each Defense Ministers meeting, concerns about the internal situation of each country member are discussed and documented as part of the final declarations. The episodes of upheaval in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe are all examples of the CPLP Defense Community standing together. Other examples include independence for East Timor and the response of CPLP member countries to the floods in Mozambique in 2000. For these reasons it is possible to state that this component is suitable because the CPLP has been accomplishing the desired effect of ensuring solidarity among member states whether they face external or internal threats or a natural

¹⁹¹“CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol,” Article 5.

disaster. However, the Defense Ministers lack the resources to take action in response to these situations and this will be discussed with feasibility.

Acceptability: Given the scope of this collection of ends, ways and means these components of the Defense Cooperation Protocol are considered acceptable. The collection of Defense Meetings, Strategic Analysis Center and Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs were all developed within the Defense Community and codified as part of the Protocol. However, not all elements of this portion of the protocol are operating together. First, the Directors of Military Intelligence were chartered to meet and exchange strategic information in 2004 as an early warning mechanism to prevent crisis and they have never held a meeting.¹⁹²

Another issue is the delay of implementing projects identified by the Defense Ministers. The concept for the Strategic Analysis Center was first discussed in 1998, gradual implementation was approved in 2001, the charter was approved in 2002, and the Center was activated and given their first topic to study in 2003.¹⁹³

Feasibility: These components of the Defense Cooperation Protocol can be considered partially feasible because the CPLP defense structure exists and the bodies are authorized to meet and make limited decisions. These bodies carry out those actions except for the Directors of Military Intelligence Meetings, as discussed above. However, the Defense Ministers do not have the necessary resources to take actions to solve many of the problems they identify during their summits. A prime example were defense sector

¹⁹²Bernardino and Leal, 52.

¹⁹³CPLP, National Defense Ministers meeting, “IV Reunião de Ministros da Defesa, Declaração de Brasília.”

reforms that were in the mandates of the GIC-GB, established by the CPLP and ECOWAS in 2006 and the UN Peace Building Commission for Guinea-Bissau. The Defense Ministers were unable to directly participate in these security sector reforms that were led by ECOWAS and the UN. This is a limitation of the Defense Cooperation Protocol and not a fatal flaw because the Heads of State and Government retain this authority.

Table 6. CPLP Suitability/Acceptability/Feasibility Assessment		
Ends	Ways	Means
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop the internal capabilities of CPLP member states armed forces (Article 2) • Enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational procedures between the armed forces of member countries (Article 4) • Improve the interoperability of CPLP military forces (Article 4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement Military Education Integrated Exchange Program (Article 4) • Conduct the FELINO exercises and train units to be employed in peace support operations and humanitarian assistance operations (Article 4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Military Education Integrated Exchange Program • The FELINO combined and joint exercises • Centers of Excellence • The CPLP military medicine meetings

Source: Created by author.

Table 6 represents the next logical grouping of ends, ways and means from the Defense Cooperation Protocol. The logical grouping of three ends includes the goal to develop the internal capabilities of CPLP member states armed forces from Article 2 combined with the need to enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational procedures between the armed forces of member countries and improve the interoperability of CPLP military forces both from Article 4. These ends are supported by

two ways from Article 4 which are: (1) Implement the Integrated Exchange Program of Military Education and conduct the FELINO exercises and (2) train units to be employed in peace support operations and humanitarian assistance operations. The means associated with these ends and ways are the Military Education Integrated Exchange Program, the FELINO combined and joint exercises, the Centers of Excellence, and the Military Medicine Meetings. This collection of ends, ways and means will now be evaluated for suitability, acceptability, and feasibility.

Suitability: The CPLP has been developing the capabilities of the country member's armed forces through implementation of the Integrated Exchange Program of Military Education and by conducting the FELINO exercises. The Military Education exchange program is especially helpful to the African country members to gain knowledge that can be applied to improve the internal capabilities of their armed forces. The regular schedule of the FELINO exercises helps improve the internal capabilities because these exercises involve all members of the CPLP where they exercise peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations under a UN mandate. The exercises alternate between a battalion command post exercise and battalion field training exercise. Both the Military Education program and the FELINO exercises support the end to enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational forces of member countries due to the interaction of military professionals in educational and operational settings. The same argument holds for improving interoperability because the recurring FELINO exercises bring together units for the member countries to exercise in peacekeeping or humanitarian scenarios under a UN mandate. These components of the Defense

Cooperation Protocol are considered suitable because they can develop internal capabilities, interoperability and enhance standardization.

Acceptability: This collection of ends, ways and means of the Defense Cooperation Protocol are considered acceptable. The FELINO exercises are conducted annually without interruption and they focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations that conform to the Defense Cooperation Protocol. Military exchanges began in 2004 and continue to occur on a regular schedule, so these programs are working well.

The delay in implementing the Centers of Excellence for training experts for peacekeeping operations is notable. The Centers of Excellence concept was first discussed in 1998 during the first National Defense Ministers meeting, however it took until 2010 to get approval for the program and the final decision to open the first center in Angola in 2011. Now that the program is operational it will contribute to enhancing the standardization of doctrine and improve the interoperability of CPLP military forces.

Feasibility: These components of the Defense Cooperation Protocol can be considered partially feasible. The Military Education Integrated Exchange Program exists and has been implemented between the country members. Although the annual FELINO exercises are an important achievement, the feasibility of this component is questionable because after eleven editions of the exercises, there is no combined military doctrine, standard agreements established, or lessons learned published between the country members in order to improve the interoperability between CPLP military forces. Lack of progress in this area in the past can be traced to a lack of a formal mechanism to develop common doctrine and capture lessons learned that will lead to improved interoperability.

The decision of opening the first Center of Excellence in 2011 will train a cadre and assist with the standardizing of doctrine and developing common operational procedures.

The CPLP military medicine meetings are the seventh element of the Protocol’s Article 4 and they afford the medical community the ability to improve medical interoperability, standardization and doctrine. However, there is not a program to link the results of these meetings to other elements of the protocol which represents a lost opportunity.

Table 7. CPLP Suitability/Acceptability/Feasibility Assessment		
Ends	Ways	Means
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seek synergies for control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct combined/joint employment of CPLP naval and air assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPLP naval and air assets

Source: Created by author.

Article 4 of the Defense Cooperation Protocol includes the end to seek synergies for control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones supported by the way of conducting combined/joint employment of CPLP naval and air assets. The naval means and air assets are included in the “ways.” The concept is divided into the component parts in table 7 and examined for suitability, feasibility and acceptability.

Suitability: As written, the end envisioned seeking synergies for the control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones through the combined/joint employment of CPLP naval and air assets is suitable. Employing CPLP naval and air assets and a joint and combined structure to patrol the territorial waters and

exclusive economic zones of member countries would be an effective concept to exert control over the waters of each of the CPLP country members. Further, this concept fits within the larger picture of defense cooperation among CPLP members.

Acceptability: When written, the collection of ends, way and means met the acceptability test because it appeared in Article 4 the Defense Cooperation Protocol 4 as one of the fundamental elements of defense cooperation after first discussing this subject at the 2003 Defense Ministers meeting. The breakdown occurs because there are not any military resources allocated within the Defense Cooperation Protocol.

Feasibility: Clearly this element of the Defense Cooperation Protocol cannot be considered feasible because the air and naval forces needed to conduct these patrols are not provided and therefore these operations are not being conducted. An overall solid concept cannot be executed due to the lack of resources available within the Defense Cooperation Protocol. This is a missed opportunity that, if resourced properly, could help CPLP African country members a great deal secure their ocean areas with the help of the entire Community.

Table 8. CPLP Suitability/Acceptability/Feasibility assessment		
Ends	Ways	Means
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CPLP military sports games

Source: Created by author.

The eighth and final element from Article 4 of the Defense Cooperation Protocol, the military sports games, is not logically connected to any ends or ways within the protocol and they have never been organized and conducted.

CPLP Interaction with IGO, and African Regional Organizations

CPLP country members are spread across Europe, South America, South East Asia and Africa and each member belongs to their regional IGOs and all are members of the UN. (see figure 2). Brazil, in South America, is a member of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and *Mercado Comum do Sul* (MERCOSUL). East Timor, in South East Asia, is a member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Portugal on continental Europe is a member of the EU and NATO. The focus of the thesis looks to Africa for the five members of the CPLP who are also members of the AU. Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau are members of ECOWAS. Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe are members of ECCAS and Angola and Mozambique are members of the SADC. This diverse membership gives the CPLP an opportunity to integrate their actions across the network of IGOs to which the country members belong.




Figure 2. CPLP Country's IGO Membership

Source: Created by author.

United Nations

The CPLP founding principles in Article 1 of the Constitutive Charter state the organization is a “privileged multilateral forum to extend mutual friendship, political and diplomatic coordination, and cooperation among its members.” The UN General Assembly provided international legitimacy when the CPLP was granted observer status in the UN General Assembly on 18 November 1999. The UN recognized that the purpose of the CPLP is consistent with the UN, that cooperation would be mutually advantageous, and invited the CPLP to participate in the UN General Assembly as an observer.¹⁹⁴

Interaction between the UN and the CPLP has deepened due to the active involvement in issues related to several country members before the UN, which is further evidence of the

¹⁹⁴United Nations, General Assembly, “Observer status for the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries in the General Assembly A/RES/54/10.”

legitimacy of the CPLP. In 2004, the CPLP was invited to give its opinion about the Special Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission of Support in East Timor before the UN Security Council. This represented an historic milestone for the CPLP and new avenues of cooperation with the UN opened as a result.¹⁹⁵ These include agreements with several UN agencies to include the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UN Human Rights Council; UN Conference on Trade and Development; and, UNAIDS.¹⁹⁶

A significant achievement for the CPLP occurred on the sidelines of the 61st UN General Assembly in 2006 that demonstrated the organization was becoming more active in the UN diplomatic community. The CPLP worked to organize and was a founding member of the GIC-GB that included the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, Spain, France, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal a Economic Monetary Union of West Africa, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The GIC-GB was developed to provide a framework to raise funds and coordinate assistance to Guinea-Bissau in the political, socio-economic, diplomatic and security sectors.¹⁹⁷

These diplomatic initiatives led to the inclusion of Guinea-Bissau in the group of countries supported by the UN Peace Building Commission in 2008. This mechanism allows the CPLP, the GIC-GB, and the UN Peace Building Commission of Guinea-Bissau¹⁹⁸ to integrate their efforts to help resolve the problems in Guinea-Bissau.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵Bernardino and Leal, 29.

¹⁹⁶UN Resolutions 59/21 of 8 November 2004 and 61/223 of 20 December 2006.

¹⁹⁷CPLP, Livro 12 Anos, “Construindo a Comunidade.”

¹⁹⁸United Nations, UN Peace Building Commission, “Guinea-Bissau.”

These proactive diplomatic actions by the CPLP in the UN represent significant efforts to help resolve the persistent problems in a troubled member state and signify recognition and legitimacy of the role of the organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

African Union

The CPLP interaction with the AU and its predecessor organization, the Organization for African Unity, has focused on dialog and peaceful approaches to resolving regional issues consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.²⁰⁰ Currently, the CPLP does not have a formal relationship or agreement with the AU, however the CPLP Heads of State and Government recognize the importance of establishing a Memorandum of Understanding with the AU and establishing partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations to which its member states belong.²⁰¹

While there is no formal agreement between the AU and the CPLP, in 2002, the CPLP ratified the “Declaration on peace, development and future of CPLP” that recognized the importance of AU and the adoption of the NEPAD.²⁰² The CPLP recognizes that the AU is the organization they must work with in the areas of security and sustainable development for the five African country members. The CPLP, adopting the NEPAD as the roadmap for sustainable development, is further recognition of the

¹⁹⁹CPLP, Livro 12 Anos, “Construindo a Comunidade.”

²⁰⁰Bernardino and Leal, 26.

²⁰¹CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “VII, VIII and IX Conferências CPLP.”

²⁰²CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Declaração sobre paz e desenvolvimento e o futuro da CPLP.”

leading role of the AU in Africa.²⁰³ These actions are significant because the CPLP does not want to circumvent the AU and African Peace and Security Architecture and wants to work within the established system as a helpful partner for the benefit of the five African CPLP members. Additionally, the CPLP established these policy positions when they formally added Defense Cooperation to the Constitutive Charter.

In the wake of the April 2012 coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau, the AU formally recognized the role of the CPLP. The AU PSC endorsed the statements made by ECOWAS and the CPLP regarding Guinea-Bissau, while issuing a statement condemning the coup and calling for a return to constitutional order on 17 April 2012. Finally, the "PSC said it would continue to consult with ECOWAS, the CPLP, the UN and other partners to continue the work previously underway to reform the Guinea-Bissau defense and security sector and consider possible deployment of an international stabilization operation."²⁰⁴ On 14 July 2012, the PSC encouraged ECOWAS to pursue efforts with the CPLP, the AU, the UN and the EU to work together to return constitutional order to Guinea-Bissau.²⁰⁵

Despite not having a formal agreement with the AU on matters of defense and security, clearly the CPLP and AU recognize the mutual benefit of cooperating. This is particularly apparent in the situation involving Guinea-Bissau. The CPLP wisely adopted a policy of recognizing and working with the AU on security matters related to African CPLP member countries.

²⁰³Bernardino and Leal, 28.

²⁰⁴African Union, PSC, "Communiqué of AU PSC on its 318th meeting."

²⁰⁵African Union, PSC, "Communiqué of AU PSC on its 327th meeting."

African Regional Organization: SADC, ECCAS and ECOWAS

The CPLP does not have formal agreements with any of the ARO that include CPLP African country members. Angola and Mozambique belong to the SADC, which recognizes Portuguese as an official language. CPLP members Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe belong to ECCAS. ECOWAS membership includes CPLP countries Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and Portuguese as one of its official languages. The lack of a formal cooperation agreement has not hindered cooperation, especially between the CPLP and ECOWAS in the case of Guinea-Bissau. The principles adopted by the CPLP, recognizing the role of the APSA as well as the diplomatic approach to cooperate among the concerned international actors, have served the CPLP well in building a strong relationship with ECOWAS.

The interaction with ECOWAS traces back to cooperation in resolving the 1998 civil war and constitutional disorder in Guinea-Bissau. The CPLP Conference Heads of State and Government Summit established a contact group in 1998, headed by the Foreign Minister of Cape Verde, and included the other CPLP Foreign Ministers and established the goal to contribute to the peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau.²⁰⁶ The CPLP Contact Group reached an agreement with the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the military junta that included an immediate truce, deployment of a peacekeeping force, preferably from Portuguese-speaking countries. ECOWAS welcomed the ceasefire agreement and expressed its readiness to cooperate with the CPLP on initiatives that would contribute to ECOWAS objectives in Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS reaffirmed their leading role in resolving the crisis in Guinea-Bissau and reiterated support for regional

²⁰⁶CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “II Conferência da Praia.”

and African initiatives. The ceasefire agreement was presented to the UN Security Council by Cape Verde and Côte d'Ivoire on 1 September 1998.²⁰⁷ The CPLP was successful in forging an agreement that supported regional goals.

Unfortunately, the ceasefire in Guinea-Bissau did not hold and ECOWAS and the CPLP conducted additional mediation to resolve the crisis. A resolution was reached at the 1998 ECOWAS summit in Abuja where the parties agreed to a ceasefire, deployment of an ECOWAS peacekeeping force, and access by humanitarian organizations to provide relief to the civilian population. Part of the agreement also included elections by March 1999 that would include electoral observers from ECOWAS, the CPLP and other international organizations. The CPLP maintained an office in Bissau to coordinate with ECOWAS, the UN and civil society until through the 1999 elections.²⁰⁸ From the early stages of the organization, the CPLP forged strong bonds with ECOWAS in particular to coordinate peaceful resolution of the crisis in Guinea-Bissau.

ECOWAS and the CPLP were founding members of the GIC-BC established in 2006 as they joined with the AU, UN and the EU to coordinate political, socio-economic, and diplomatic and security sector reform for Guinea-Bissau and to raise funds for these programs.²⁰⁹ In 2010, ECOWAS and CPLP cooperatively developed a road map of priorities for Defense and Security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau and committed to

²⁰⁷United Nations (New York: UN Publications, 2001), 152.

²⁰⁸Guardiola, 82.

²⁰⁹CPLP, Livro 12 Anos, "Construindo a Comunidade."

mobilize the financial and technical resources required for implementation of the roadmap.²¹⁰

Recognizing the importance of the CPLP and ECOWAS efforts, the AU PSC requested continued work on the roadmap in the wake of the April 2012 coup as part of the solution to the latest coup.²¹¹ In May of 2012, ECOWAS deployed a Standby Force to Guinea-Bissau to help withdraw the Angolan MISSANG that was in Guinea-Bissau since March 2011, under CPLP authorization to implement security sector reform. The mission of the ECOWAS Standby Force was to assist the transition to constitutional order and implement the Roadmap for the Defense and Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau.²¹²

Clearly, the CPLP and ECOWAS have worked together a great deal, principally to bring security and stability to Guinea-Bissau. The CPLP actions have demonstrated the proper respect for the role of ECOWAS as the ARO that should lead efforts in a crisis and the CPLP has worked to ensure its programs are in concert with a unified effort to assist Guinea-Bissau.

CPLP Capabilities and Limitations as a Security Organization

The main capabilities of the CPLP to assist enhancing security of African members are the organization's diplomatic actions and the defense cooperation structure. The main limitations of the CPLP enhancing security for African country members are its

²¹⁰United Nations, UNIOGBIS, "SRSG calls on Bissau-Guinean authorities to endorse ECOWAS-CPLP road map."

²¹¹African Union, PSC, "Communiqué of AU PSC on its 318th meeting."

²¹²ECOWAS, "ECOWAS to send troops to Guinea-Bissau."

primary focus on diplomatic solutions to problems, focus on multilateral approaches, problems with resources, and authorities within the defense cooperation structure.

CPLP Capabilities to Assist Enhancing Security

The CPLP commitment to contribute to the security and stability of its member states in Africa is best illustrated by the diplomatic nature of the organization, which is consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the founding principles in the CPLP Constitutive Charter as a “privileged multilateral forum to extend mutual friendship, political and diplomatic coordination, and cooperation among its members.” The most significant diplomatic issues the CPLP has been involved with before the UN are East Timor and Guinea-Bissau.²¹³

Consistent with the organization’s founding principles, diplomatic interaction with the UN, AU and AROs has focused on peaceful resolution of conflict, particularly in the case of Guinea-Bissau.²¹⁴ The foundation for successful diplomatic interaction is the recognition by the CPLP of the role of the AU and AROs in Africa and then ensuring the relationships developed and actions taken are consistent.²¹⁵ The diplomatic actions of the CPLP in concert with ECOWAS, the AU and UN serve as a model the organization should focus on in the future.²¹⁶

²¹³United Nations, General Assembly, “Observer status for the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries in the General Assembly A/RES/54/10.”

²¹⁴Bernardino and Leal, 29.

²¹⁵CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Declaração sobre paz e desenvolvimento e o futuro da CPLP.”

²¹⁶Bernardino and Leal, 29.

These diplomatic approaches and the close coordination within the African security architecture led to international recognition of the CPLP as an organization committed to enhancing the security of its African country members. The CPLP and ECOWAS have cooperated on numerous efforts to mediate peaceful solutions to the many instances of upheaval in Guinea-Bissau since 1998. These efforts expanded as the CPLP was a founding member of the GIC-GB in 2006, that included an expanding number of members including the UN, EU and several international financial institutions focused on broad-based reforms and raising the necessary funds to assist Guinea-Bissau. This effort led to broader multilateral efforts to assist Guinea-Bissau through enhanced UN Peace Building Commission supporting for Guinea-Bissau in 2008. ECOWAS and CPLP cooperation in 2010 resulted in a road map to make progress on defense and security and the agreement to deploy an Angolan technical mission.

When the Angolan mission had to withdraw because of the April 2012 coup, ECOWAS and the CPLP cooperated to ensure the safe withdrawal of the Angolan contingent and the deployment of an ECOWAS Standby force in May 2012. The ECOWAS force then assumed the Defense and Security Sector reform mission.²¹⁷ These efforts were recognized and supported by the AU PSC confirming the legitimate roles of the CPLP, along with ECOWAS, and the UN Peace Building Commission Guinea-Bissau.²¹⁸

The instability in Guinea-Bissau has been the greatest challenge to the organization. The CPLP maintained the stance of only recognizing legitimate authorities

²¹⁷ECOWAS, “ECOWAS to send troops to Guinea-Bissau.”

²¹⁸African Union, PSC, “Communiqué of AU PSC on its 318th meeting.”

in Guinea-Bissau, which is consistent with UN and AU principals of ensuring governments have constitutional legitimacy.²¹⁹ The actions of the CPLP demonstrate a commitment to diplomacy and peaceful approaches to solving the instability in Guinea-Bissau while respecting the roles of the UN, the AU and ECOWAS.

Electoral observer missions are another capability the CPLP has demonstrated by conducting electoral observer missions in CPLP states and primarily in Africa since 1999. The first UN electoral mission the CPLP participated in was in East Timor in 1999 which helped confer international legitimacy on CPLP participation in future observer missions. In Africa, the CPLP conducted electoral observer mission in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in 1999.²²⁰ The CPLP participated as election observers in East Timor (2001 and 2002) and observed São Tomé e Príncipe (2002) elections. The CPLP observed elections in Mozambique (2003) and in Guinea-Bissau (2004). Additional electoral observer missions in Mozambique (2004), Guinea-Bissau (2005) and in São Tomé and Príncipe (2006) were conducted by the CPLP which reflects the growth of democratic institutions in CPLP member countries and CPLP diplomatic involvement in that growth.²²¹

The Defense Cooperation Protocol represents the defense and security capabilities of the CPLP. The Defense Cooperation Protocol defines a structure for meetings that are designed to promote a common defense and military cooperation policy and ensure solidarity among member states in situations of disaster or aggression. The meetings

²¹⁹CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “IX Conferência de Maputo.”

²²⁰CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “III Conferência de Maputo.”

²²¹CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “VI Conferência de Bissau.”

identified in Article 5 (Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Defense, National Defense Policy Directors, Directors of Military Intelligence, Centers for Strategic Analysis, Permanent Secretariat of Defense Affairs) ensure CPLP armed forces share knowledge about defense subjects and adopt confidence building measures. The final declarations from the Defense Ministers meetings, Strategic Analysis Center studies and conferences, and the defense cooperation actions taken by the CPLP promote the national awareness about the role of the armed forces. A summary appears in Table 6. The Center for Strategic Analysis was located in Mozambique to place this important capability in Africa. The Directors of Military intelligence not conducting meetings as chartered is an exception to all elements of the protocol working as designed.

The Integrated Exchange Program of Military Education, the FELINO exercises, the Centers of Excellence, and the Military Medicine meetings are capabilities the CPLP has to assist African members with security. These programs help develop the internal capabilities of the CPLP member states armed forces, enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational procedures between the armed forces of member countries, and improve the interoperability of CPLP military forces. A summary appears in table 7. The Integrated Military Education exchange program is especially helpful to the African country members who use education to improve their armed forces and standardize doctrine. The FELINO exercises focus on preparing the CPLP to conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations under a UN mandate and both types of operations are an important security enhancement capability for African country members. The regular schedule of FELINO exercises are designed to improve interoperability as all country members participate and operate together.

The first Center of Excellence that was established in Angola in 2011 is a formal mechanism to improve the current shortfalls with interoperability and standardization of doctrine and places this capability in Africa. The limitations section will discuss the problems with interoperability, doctrine and lessons learned.

CPLP Limitations to Assist Enhancing Security

The geographical separation of the CPLP country members and their insertion in different regional organizations may present a risk of divergent interests within the Community. Additionally, the individual interests of each member can present a difficult situation because CPLP decisions are based on consensus and reaching a decision on defense and security issues may be a challenge. The five African members of the CPLP are all members of the AU. Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau are members of ECOWAS. Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe are members of ECCAS and Angola and Mozambique are members of the SADC. This diverse membership makes decision making more complex and time consuming because coordination of CPLP policies and actions with the interested nations and organizations is required. As a founding principle, and through past actions, the CPLP has consistently demonstrated it will work within the AU and ARO structure when considering actions that impact member nations. In this case, the not taking unilateral actions is an appropriate policy limitation.²²²

The CPLP has primarily used diplomatic approaches when responding to a crisis situation with an African country member and this is best illustrated by the case of Guinea-Bissau. The Guinea-Bissau situation was an opportunity for the Community to

²²²CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “Declaração sobre paz e desenvolvimento e o futuro da CPLP.”

demonstrate its capabilities to constitute and deploy a peacekeeping force.²²³ The 1998 agreement forged by the CPLP Contact Group to halt the fighting included a provision to deploy a peacekeeping force, preferably from Portuguese speaking countries. However, no such force was deployed and instead the CPLP intensified efforts with ECOWAS to use diplomatic approaches to resolving the 1998 civil war in Guinea Bissau.²²⁴

Since the Abuja agreement was reached in 1998, the CPLP has focused on multilateral diplomacy as a founding member of the GIC-GB in 2006 with ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and others.²²⁵ The same multilateral diplomatic approach helped gain sponsorship for the UN Peace Building Commission for Guinea-Bissau in 2008. These diplomatic efforts did lead to an agreement to deploy the Angolan MISSANG in March of 2011. The MISSANG was sent under CPLP authorization in agreement with ECOWAS to work defense and security sector reforms and is the lone example of a military security enhancement mission conducted by a CPLP member in Guinea-Bissau.²²⁶ The CPLP support for MISSANG as well as a mixed stabilization force from the AU, EOCWAS and the CPLP are signs that intervention to resolve the crisis in Guinea-Bissau may include more than diplomatic approaches in the future.

²²³CPLP, Heads of State and Government Summit, “II Conferência da Praia.”

²²⁴United Nations (New York: UN Publications, 2001), 152.

²²⁵GIC-GB membership includes CPLP countries and Spain, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. In this Group are also represented several international organizations like UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa, World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

²²⁶CPLP, Revista edição no. 1, “Guiné-Bissau-CPLP-CEDEAO.”

Several components of the Defense Cooperation Protocol limit the ability of the CPLP to assist enhancing security of African country members. A limitation within the Defense Cooperation Protocol is defense ministers are not allocated defense and security forces to take action and resolve the problems they identify and discuss. The Heads of State and Government retain authority to raise and deploy forces for a situation similar to Guinea-Bissau. It is important to note the CPLP has yet to deploy a multilateral peacekeeping mission or multilateral security enhancement mission to an African member country.

The Defense Cooperation Protocol contains provisions to train units to be employed in peace support and humanitarian assistance operations primarily by conducting the FELINO exercises. These related elements of the protocol (table 6) are a limitation because the eleven FELINO exercises since 2000 have yet to produce standard doctrine, operational procedures, and comprehensive lessons learned that would lead to better interoperability among CPLP forces. The decision to implement the Center of Excellence in Angola in 2011, with a focus on training the trainers for UN peacekeeping operations, should improve this shortfall over time. A similar limitation exists with the Military Medicine meetings because this program does not integrate lessons learned into the larger exercise and operational programs to prepare units for UN deployments.

The largest limitation in the Defense Cooperation Protocol is the goal to seek synergies for control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones supported by conducting combined/joint employment of CPLP naval and air assets. Table 7 has a summary of these elements. This concept cannot be executed due to the lack of resources available within the Defense Cooperation Protocol. If resourced properly, this

program could help CPLP African country members secure their ocean areas with the help of the entire Community.

To summarize, the main capabilities of the CPLP are the organization's diplomatic actions and the defense cooperation structure. The main limitations of the CPLP are the primary focus on diplomatic solutions to problems, multilateral approaches, lack of resources and authorities within the defense cooperation structure. These limitations reduce the speed, policy options, and effectiveness of some CPLP defense cooperation programs while still allowing the Community to assist enhancing security of African country members.

Conclusion

This chapter presents the research findings that answer the research questions.

The intention to cooperate on security and defense was not mentioned in the Community founding documents and presently the CPLP as an institution does not have a specific policy of defense and security. However, the defense component of the CPLP has been active since the Community was founded.

Political and diplomatic dialogue has been the preferred approach of the Community to manage situations of conflict and instability in its country members. The attempts to solve the Guinea-Bissau problems led the CPLP to establish formal and informal relations with several IGOs that contributed to the increasing international relevance of the Community.

The Community commitment towards defense issues led the National Defense Ministers to develop the Defense Cooperation Protocol, which was officially approved in 2006. This is the Community's main document that addresses the defense issues. Using

the Yarger methodology it is possible to identify the Community defense ends/ways/means and perform a strategic analysis of the CPLP capabilities and shortfalls of this document to contribute to enhancing the security of its members.

After presenting these findings it is reasonable to state that the CPLP is an intergovernmental organization capable of enhancing the security of its African country members in the future. However, the interpretation of the research findings also identified limitations and gaps of the Community's capability to enhance the security of its African members.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The relationship between security and development are essential to establish a sustainable peace in Africa and this can be achieved if the African states can find the balance between regional security and development. In this process the AU, ARO, and IGOs will play decisive roles to enhance security in Africa as an important condition in order to promote development.

The purpose of this study is to give an assessment as to whether the CPLP is an intergovernmental organization capable of enhancing the security of its African country members. This study also aimed to analyze the CPLP's aptitude to help resolve a crisis situation and return to stability in its African country member states. To achieve these goals this thesis evaluated the CPLP's capabilities as a security enhancement IGO and will propose recommendations for the organization in order to enhance the security of its African country members in the future.

After presenting the findings and the analysis of the research, the findings are interpreted in this chapter, focusing on the CPLP characteristics as a security enhancement organization and the Defense Cooperation Protocol. After presenting conclusions on the previous two topics, recommendations are presented addressing the CPLP as a security organization and the Defense Cooperation Protocol, in order to provide suggestions for the Community to be more capable of enhancing the security of its African country members in the future. The thesis ends with suggestions of areas of further study which rose as the investigation took place.

Conclusions

The CPLP was founded as a forum for discussion of common interests within Portuguese speaking countries. Besides promoting the Portuguese language, the main goals of the Community are to extend mutual friendship, promote political and diplomatic coordination, and cooperation among its members. When the Community recognized the relationship between development and security, the organization began to get involved diplomatically in resolving issues of instability in member countries and amended the Constitutive Charter to include defense cooperation. While defense cooperation is an important concept to the CPLP, the organization was not founded with this focus nor is it the essence of the organization.

Among its twelve specific areas for cooperation, defense has been one of the most active areas of cooperation. This commitment led the Community to develop a Defense Cooperation Protocol to define its goals and formally establish a defense cooperation structure.

CPLP Security Enhancement Role

Considering that five of the eight CPLP members are African countries, it is possible to understand the Community's concern with enhancing the security of African country members because of the relationship between development and security.

Assisting African country members with enhancing their security can be accomplished through defense cooperation among the CPLP members and by working with the AU and AROs to assist these nations.

The CPLP has worked hard to integrate their efforts with the AU and AROs when dealing with issues related to African country members. When the CPLP expanded the

scope of the Constitutive Charter in 2002 to include defense cooperation, the organization recognized the importance of the AU and adopted the NEPAD as the common approach to support development for African country members.

Focusing intervention on political and diplomatic dialogue allowed the CPLP to play an important role in coordinating efforts to resolve cases of crisis and instability within its members. The actions of the CPLP have been consistent with their founding principles as a UN Charter Chapter VIII organization by seeking diplomatic approaches with the UN, AU and ARO to seek peaceful resolution of conflict.

The CPLP and ECOWAS have cooperated on numerous efforts to mediate peaceful solutions to the many instances of upheaval in Guinea-Bissau from 1998 to 2012. CPLP efforts related to Guinea-Bissau shows a pattern of persistent cooperation that is recognized by the UN, AU and, in this case, ECOWAS. Despite these initiatives the Community has not been able to solve the problems in this member state.

The CPLP participation in electoral observer missions in CPLP African countries since 1999 is another example of the international community viewing CPLP actions as legitimate and helpful. These actions demonstrate the commitment of the CPLP to the AU principle of constitutional order in each country, to which the Community has held firm especially in the case of Guinea-Bissau. When disaster struck CPLP member Mozambique with massive flooding in 2000, the Community responded with a multilateral approach to this humanitarian crisis which also helped it gain international legitimacy.

The CPLP only has a formal agreement with the UN as an observer in the UN General Assembly and does not have formal agreements with the AU and the regional

organizations that CPLP members belong. These agreements and formal recognition are important steps to help define the CPLP role enhancing security for African member states.

The diplomatic approaches of the CPLP have increased in frequency and intensity in Africa working within the AU structure, which is a real positive. However, the CPLP posture has been reactive to events and has not been proactive in addressing defense and security issues. At each Heads of State and Government meeting, the internal security issues regarding each country member is discussed signaling the importance of the topic. However, the CPLP, AU and UN have not been able to resolve the problems in Guinea-Bissau through primarily diplomatic approaches.

CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol

CPLP Defense Cooperation began informally in 1998 when the Defense Ministers began meeting followed by the Chiefs of Defense and National Defense Policy Directors in subsequent years. As informal defense cooperation evolved, a series of military exercises were approved, the Strategic Analysis Center was opened, and a Permanent Secretariat of Defense was organized.

During this gradual evolution, some decisions were slow and difficult to implement. However, adopting the Defense Cooperation Protocol in 2006 was an important milestone for the organization and is considered the example for all the other areas of CPLP cooperation to follow.

The protocol established the overarching goal to promote defense cooperation among the CPLP members. The analysis of this protocol shows the goals and fundamental elements of the protocol were the ideas and initiatives from the National

Defense Ministers meetings starting in 1998. The defense cooperation structure has been operating for over ten years and this thesis examined the elements of the protocol to understand its structure and evaluate its progress.

The analysis of the Defense Cooperation Protocol identified several shortfalls in the balance between ends, ways, and means. This analysis demonstrated that most of the components of the protocol are suitable and acceptable. However, in most of the instances the lack of appropriate means was considered the main reason to question the feasibility of some components of the Defense Protocol. The implementation of the CPLP Defense Structures and Meetings in Article 5 of the Defense Cooperation Protocol is achieving the desired goals of promoting a common defense and military cooperation policy and ensuring solidarity among member states in situations of disaster or aggression. This structure achieves these goals through meetings that share knowledge about defense and security issues, approve multilateral exercises, and develop the agendas for the Strategic Analysis Centers to study. The constant attention given to instances of instability or crisis that occur among the members does demonstrate solidarity among the members; however the Defense Ministers are not directly allocated resources to resolve the problems they discuss. The national role of the armed forces is promoted through the actions that result from the meetings such as military exercises, Strategic Analysis Center studies and conferences, as well as the declarations issued from the meetings. The only exception to the Defense Cooperation meetings not working as designed are the Directors of Military Intelligence.

The Integrated Military Education Exchange Program, exercise program, the Centers of Excellence and the Military Medicine meetings all contribute to the goals of

developing the internal capabilities of CPLP member's armed forces, enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational procedures and improve interoperability of CPLP military forces. The Military Educational Exchange Programs are excellent at developing relationships, understanding different perspectives, sharing understanding of doctrine and have the greatest benefit for the African country members. The Military Medicine meetings currently develop capabilities within the medical community; however the program is not integrated with the exercise programs.

The purpose behind the FELINO exercise program to prepare forces to conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations under a UN mandate is an important concept that can greatly assist the CPLP to enhance the security of African country members. Those units and headquarters elements that plan and participate in these exercises certainly gain proficiency in the exercise scenarios. However, an annual schedule of exercises since 2000 has not captured comprehensive lessons learned that would lead to improved interoperability and standardized doctrine and operational procedures.

The lack of progress on developing better interoperability, doctrine and operational procedures may begin to change as the first Center of Excellence for training trainers for UN peacekeeping operations was established in Angola in 2011. This is an excellent initiative by the CPLP to develop an important capability that will have a positive impact on all members, especially African members. The Center of Excellence was placed in Angola to ensure security enhancement capabilities are distributed within Africa. A similar decision by the Defense Ministers placed the Strategic Analysis Center in Mozambique in 2003.

The Defense Cooperation Protocol includes an important concept to seek synergies for control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones by conducting combined/joint employment of CPLP naval and air assets. This element of the protocol is not being executed and the main reason is lack of naval and air assets. This is a very sound concept that would benefit the security of African country members a great deal considering that each has significant territorial waters along with their exclusive economic zone that are vulnerable.

From the analysis of the Defense Cooperation Protocol, the main objectives for defense cooperation are: to develop the internal capabilities of CPLP member states armed forces; to strengthen stability in the regions of CPLP country members; to enhance the standardization of doctrine and operational procedures between the armed forces of member countries; improve the interoperability of CPLP military forces; and seek synergies for control and surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. All of these goals are being completely or partially achieved except for the last goal related to territorial waters. The CPLP has built a solid foundation of defense cooperation and by improving on the shortfalls identified, the Community will have more capabilities and capacity to assist African country members.

Recommendations

After analyzing and interpreting results, this study ends with several recommendations for CPLP defense cooperation and the Defense Cooperation Protocol in order to provide suggestions for the Community to achieve of enduring influence as a security enhancement organization to its African country members.

CPLP Security Enhancement Role

The initial recommendation regarding CPLP as security enhancement organization is the need to define a defense cooperation policy. After defining a policy it will be possible to understand the organizational interests and end states that are a starting point for formulating a CPLP defense cooperation strategy. The definition of a defense cooperation strategy will allow the balance of the ends, ways, and means used by the organization to be assessed. If the Community defines a policy and strategy towards defense, the organization will have the ability to proactively work towards developing capabilities to enhance the security of African members as well as non-African members.

Considering that the majority of the CPLP members are from Africa and some of these countries experience most of the security problems, the organization should focus defense cooperation disproportionately towards Africa and the most troubled countries. Focusing its defense and security efforts on the African members that need the most help would also place defense cooperation on a more proactive footing, as well as give the Community a more prominent role in enhancing the security of its African country members in the future.

Consistent with more focus on African country members, the CPLP must establish formal relationships with the AU and AROs to which member countries belong. This is an essential step because the CPLP recognizes the role and responsibility of AU and the AROs with respect to peace and security in Africa. These formal agreements are important to legitimize and ensure a clear understanding of the CPLP's role enhancing security for African member states.

The CPLP commitment to remain diplomatically engaged to resolve problems in Guinea-Bissau by close cooperation with other IGOs is as an excellent opportunity for the Community to reinforce their relevance internationally as an IGO. However, the Community and the many cooperative partners involved must achieve real results and lasting solutions in Guinea-Bissau in order to build legitimacy. The CPLP work with the UN, AU, and ECOWAS must develop, resource, measure and achieve specific goals to resolve the complex situation in Guinea-Bissau in order to demonstrate its commitment and capabilities to enhancing the security of African country members in the future.

Cooperation within the CPLP should take into account the commitments that arise from the member states' integration in its respective regional organizations. The CPLP African members have commitments with the AU and their respective AROs to contribute to the APSA and the African Standby Forces. The CPLP should concentrate security enhancement support to its African members in areas that resolve the shortfalls of those members towards fulfilling their regional APSA obligations. This effort will require the CPLP to tailor military cooperation goals for each member to resolve the APSA shortfalls. The implementation of the Center of Excellence for training trainers in Angola is part of the solution to helping CPLP countries build capacity to fulfill APSA responsibilities. Expanding Center of Excellence attendance to African countries that are not CPLP members would help build a stronger overall capacity in Africa.

The experience of the Community in conflict prevention through political and diplomatic dialogue must continue to be applied to support its African members. However to be able to play an important role in conflict resolution the Community should train a peacekeeping force that can be deployed on short notice under UN authorization in

cooperation with the AU and the respective ARO. The force would also be prepared to respond quickly to a humanitarian assistance mission. This force would provide a fundamental capability to complement the mainly diplomatic approaches already demonstrated in the specific case of Guinea-Bissau.

The CPLP must develop and resource a comprehensive approach to secure the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of their African country members. This area of defense and security cooperation has enormous potential for the Community to assist African members because their armed forces are land centric. In this context, the CPLP should combine air and naval resources to assist in securing these ocean areas. This defense and security concern must be addressed to secure an important resource for sustainable development for the African member states.

In conclusion, the CPLP must continue working with the AU and AROs on African security issues diplomatically; however, they need to work towards achieving results and resolving long standing issues. Developing a defense cooperation policy, establishing formal agreements with the AU and AROs, helping members fulfill APSA responsibilities, and developing a ready peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance capability are the proactive steps the CPLP should undertake, in addition to collectively helping African countries secure their ocean resources. The relationship between the CPLP and the AROs is the best approach to support African members and reinforce the role of the organization in Africa.

CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol

The initial recommendation regarding the CPLP Defense Protocol is defining the defense cooperation interests and end states that are subordinate to the broader CPLP

defense cooperation policy. The next step is to rewrite the Defense Cooperation Protocol using the Yarger methodology to ensure the proper relationship between ends, ways and means is clear. With a clearly written strategy, a comprehensive assessment of suitability, acceptability and feasibility of the reformulated Defense Cooperation Protocol can be made to ensure CPLP Defense Cooperation is sound.

The analysis in chapter 4 demonstrated that some elements of the Defense Cooperation Protocol are not being properly addressed. The following recommendations address the main shortfalls previously identified.

The CPLP Directors of the Military Intelligence Services need to meet as they are authorized under Article 5 of protocol in order to track and forecast possible crisis within the Community. These meetings would be an important mechanism to maintain a proactive stance in the face of problems, as well as promoting confidence building measures among the military forces during the exchange of information.

Another example of the Defense Protocol not being properly executed was addressed in the previous section was the control and surveillance of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of the CPLP countries. The primary solution to resolving this shortfall is allocating to the Defense Ministers the necessary air and naval resources and authority to conduct combined operations to assist member states to secure their ocean areas.

The annual FELINO exercises should be used to train and certify a CPLP force for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations operating under UN authorization. The CPLP should nominate a headquarters structure and identify forces from each country. The FELINO command post exercise would serve as the certification

for the headquarters and the field training exercise would certify the forces from each country. After the FELINO certification, the headquarters and forces would be placed in a standby status until the replacements are certified during the next annual cycle. This concept would create a permanent capability ready to deploy on short notice for a UN peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance mission.

The Military Medicine Meetings should be combined with the FELINO certification exercises to take advantage of medical cooperation and prepare units to conduct UN peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions with a more robust medical capability.

The Centers for Strategic Analysis have delegations in each country that could be more active in conducting studies that look in depth at particular security issues related to that country. These studies should involve civil society and the academic community to develop a broader understanding of the problems and potential solutions.

The Center of Excellence for training trainers should be formally included in the Defense Cooperation Protocol. The defense cooperation structure needs to include a new mechanism to coordinate between FELINO exercises and the Center of Excellence to capture lessons learned in order to develop common operational procedures and improve interoperability. Additionally, the Center of Excellence needs to be chartered and resourced to develop standard doctrine for CPLP peacekeeping missions under UN authorization. Combining the Center of Excellence training mission with doctrine development and capturing lessons learned from exercises will help the CPLP military forces become interoperable and help build a common capacity especially among African members.

The CPLP Defense Cooperation Protocol represents a very important achievement and represents a determination to conduct defense cooperation. Improvements to the Defense Cooperation Protocol will further enhance security of CPLP African members and allow these members to reinforce their contributions to the APSA.

For Further Study

Considering the scope and delimitations of this thesis, other studies could analyze one of the remaining eleven cooperation components of the CPLP to fully address the capabilities and limitations of the organization.

Another important study would be a comparative study of the CPLP and the Commonwealth of Nations or the International Organization of the Francophonie focused on security enhancement of member countries. The analysis of the actions developed from these similar organizations would provide relevant insights to evaluate CPLP actions and future strategic defense approach for the Community.

The analysis and conclusions taken from this research provides important concepts that can be used to rewrite the Defense Cooperation Protocol and develop a CPLP Defense cooperation strategy using the Yarger strategic model.

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