

THE USE OF THE BRAZILIAN ARMY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST NEW THREATS, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING

O EMPREGO DO EXÉRCITO BRASILEIRO NO COMBATE ÀS NOVAS AMEAÇAS, COM ÊNFASE NA LUTA CONTRA O TRÁFICO DE DROGAS

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Abstract

The current military consider the defence of the territory, humanitarian aid and participation in peacekeeping missions to be the priority tasks of its armed forces. Nevertheless, many of them consider the fight against so-called new threats such as terrorism and organized crime, mainly reflected in drug trafficking, to be fundamentally important. It is understood that those new threats jeopardize the security of states. After 1980, Brazil was no longer just an export corridor but became a large consumer of narcotics. As a result, poor communities, especially in Rio de Janeiro, were dominated by gangs and the violence rates increased. Within this framework of social violence, and since the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian Army has been used in law enforcement activities to combat the drug issue, among other threats. However, the use of the armed forces in operations of this nature generates a lot of discussion, not only in Brazil but worldwide. Therefore, it is clear that the problem of drug trafficking in Brazil is an abundant source for academic research. In this sense, this article aims to present the use of the Brazilian Army in the fight against new threats, with emphasis on the fight against drug trafficking. The research tools used were a bibliographical survey and documentary analysis. Our results indicate that the use of the Brazilian Army has had positive outcomes. The Brazilian government has sought to adapt the Brazilian legal framework to use armed forces personnel. Furthermore, the Brazilian Army has sought

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to tailor the training of their troops to carry out ‘police-like’ missions, and have sought to strengthen their presence in the border region, especially in the Amazon region, the scene of many cross-border crimes.

Keywords: Brazilian Army - New Threats - Drug Trafficking

Resumo

Os militares de hoje em dia consideram como tarefas prioritárias de suas forças armadas a defesa do território, a ajuda humanitária e a participação em missões de paz. Não obstante, muitos deles já consideram de fundamental importância a luta contra as chamadas novas ameaças, tais como o terrorismo e o crime organizado, que se materializa, principalmente, no tráfico de drogas. Entende-se que essas novas ameaças passaram a comprometer a própria segurança dos Estados. O Brasil, após 1980, deixou de ser apenas um corredor de exportação e passou a ser, também, um grande consumidor de entorpecentes. Fruto disso, comunidades carentes, principalmente no Rio de Janeiro, foram dominadas por facções criminosas e os índices de violência aumentaram. Dentro desse quadro de violência social, desde o Governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso, o Exército Brasileiro tem sido utilizado em atividades de segurança pública, para combater, dentro outras ameaças, a questão das drogas. No entanto, o uso das Forças Armadas em operações dessa natureza gera muita discussão, não só no Brasil, mas no mundo todo. Assim, vê-se claramente que a problemática do tráfico de drogas no Brasil é uma fonte abundante para a investigação acadêmica. Nesse sentido, o presente artigo tem por objetivo apresentar o emprego do Exército Brasileiro no combate às novas ameaças, com ênfase na luta contra o tráfico de drogas. Os instrumentos de pesquisa utilizados foram a pesquisa bibliográfica e a análise documental. Os resultados coletados indicam que o emprego do Exército Brasileiro tem sido positivo. O Governo Brasileiro tem procurado adequar o arcabouço jurídico brasileiro para empregar os militares das Forças Armadas. Além disso, o Exército Brasileiro tem procurado adequar o treinamento de suas tropas para a execução de missões do “tipo polícia” e tem procurado intensificar sua presença na faixa de fronteira, principalmente na região amazônica, palco de muitos crimes transfronteiriços.

Palavras-Chave: Exército Brasileiro – Novas Ameaças – Tráfico de Drogas

1. Introduction

Historically, States have always found internal and external threats to be a cause for concern. The field of International Security Studies (ISS) emerged from the discussions on how to protect the State against those threats after the Second World War. Although there is no universal definition of that sub-area (BUZAN and HANSEN, 2012), it can be said that

ISS examines the origins, conduct and end of wars, strategy and statism, crisis management, regional security, intelligence and complex security matters.

With regard to South America, there was an upsurge in Security Studies during the post-Cold War. This can be partly explained by the expansion of the field of International Relations, especially after the 1990s. Furthermore, there other aspects contributed to this, such as: the emergence of multiple postgraduate programmes in the field, South American regional integration, and an increase in dialogues between the military, diplomats and academics (HERZ, 2010)

In a globalised world, international actors increasingly interact. States, economic blocs, multinational companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), insurgent groups, mafias, among other things, are interconnected in a network of relationships, which are sometimes friendly and sometimes hostile. Furthermore, facts or problems that occur in one State may influence the security of another State. For instance, the Syrian civil war that began in 2011 led to a wave of immigration to the European continent, posing challenges to security in the member-States of the European Union. Thus, it can be said these types of facts are proof that the perception of what constitutes a threat and the definition of security have changed over time.

The definition of security has in fact evolved with time, and there has been a redefinition of the subjects and sources of threats. Herz (2010, 603) assures us that:

The end of the Cold War has been increasingly generating international discussion among analysts and policy-makers on the concept of security. The international environment has changed [...]. The concept of security has been both internationalised and amplified. Economic, ecological, social, and cultural processes are seen today as capable of producing threats. By contrast with the previous focus on threats to the State, threats to individuals, identity groups, regions, the global ecosystem, civilizations and other entities may be taken into account. [...]. Epidemics, global warming, environmental pollution, transnational criminal activity, **the consumption and production of drugs** [emphasis by author] have all been securitised local, national, and globally.

For the theorists associated with Realism, the source of threats is potential military aggressions by other States, which are still a reality today. Nevertheless, this research aims to distance itself somewhat from that 'realist' point of view, and to examine the threat of drug trafficking, as it considers it particularly harmful for the security of States. This unlawful act is intrinsically linked with the rise of urban violence, and is one of the most iconic issues of contemporary society.

It should be noted that choice to analyse the threat in question reflects an interface with the theoretical perspective formulated by the Copenhagen School, which can be characterised as broad, in that it argues that threats to security come not only from the military sphere, but also from the political, economic, environmental and societal spheres (TANNO, 2003).

In Brazil, the problem of drug trafficking is an abundant source for academic research. Until the 1980s, Brazil was considered solely an export corridor for cocaine (LABROUSSE and DELPIROU, 1988). Backing that data, according to the Drug Report produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2015), cocaine from Brazil is mainly sent to Europe, to South Africa, to the West Africa coast, to and Singapore, among other destinations.

In addition to being an export corridor, Brazil is currently considered a consumer and producer of illegal drugs. The Report on Drugs drafted by UNODC indicates that Brazil is the largest cocaine consumer in South America (UNODC, 2015).

In the meantime, Procópio Filho and Vaz (1997, p. 76) state that Brazil is no longer:

[...] just a preferred route for international drug trafficking, as has been traditionally believed. Brazil processes, imports and exports several types of drugs. It has become a crucial centre for production and consumption, aside from providing alternative drugs for the national and foreign markets, and from having become another cog in the machinery of international drug trafficking.

To make matters even worse for the largest South American country, Brazil has borders with two of the largest cocaine producers in the world: Peru and Colombia. The permeability of the borders and the lack of border controls result in large quantities of cocaine entering Brazilian territory and in links between Peruvian, Colombian and Brazilian drug dealers. Gradually, the *favelas* [slums] in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were dominated by criminal organizations linked to drug trafficking. News programmes routinely report on the difficulties felt by the military police in the fight against narcotics. According to the *Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública* [Yearbook of the Brazilian Forum on Public Safety] for 2014, 26% of the prison population is incarcerated for drug trafficking (FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, 2014).

As stated by Procópio Filho and Vaz (1997, p. 77), the Federal Government, especially with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, has attempted to reinforce its mechanisms and design a new policy on drugs, 'and will now choose not to exclude any instruments of the State (especially the Armed Forces) to deal with that threat'.

It is clear, then, that while the Brazilian military apparatus is prepared to protect Brazil against a hypothetical invasion by an aggressor State, it is now being used in the fight against another type of 'enemy': drug trafficking. This fight is linked to the different roles played by today's Armed Forces, which have had to adapt to face these new threats.

Bearing in mind the above, this article aims to present the use of the Brazilian Army in the fight against new threats, with emphasis on the fight against drug trafficking.

The research methodology was developed in two phases, a bibliographical survey and documentary analysis, with the purpose of selecting information that allowed us to present the Brazilian Army's action against drug trafficking in an effective manner. While it is true that the Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Air Force also take part in the fight against illegal drugs, the present research will focus on the Army, as the Brazilian Armed Forces component with the largest number of troops engaged in the fight against this scourge on society.

In addition to the Introduction and to the Conclusion, the present work was developed in four sections. The first section will demonstrate that the post-modern military institution categorizes drug trafficking as one of the new threats that must be fought with the support of the Armed Forces. The second section will show that the Brazilian Army has frequently been used in national operations and in the fight against drugs since the end of the Military Government. The third section will explore three fundamental aspects of the adjustments made in order to facilitate the fight against drugs by the Brazilian Army, as follows: the amendment to the legal support to the use of the Armed Forces in Operations to Guarantee Law and Order; the adaptation of the structure of the Brazilian Army, with the creation of new units and the intensification of military presence at the borders; and the adaptation of the military training, teaching and doctrine of the Brazilian Army. The final section will describe the actions taken by the Brazilian Army in the pacification of violent communities in Rio de Janeiro.

2. Development

a. Drug trafficking as a Perceived Threat for the Post-Modern Military

The military tend to see probable and imminent threats to the security of the State with alarm. Lord Salisbury once noted that 'If you believe doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent: if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe'. While the military acknowledge the permanent nature of the threats to the State, they also appreciate the seriousness of their immediate danger. Being competent at their duties requires them to assess a threat as accurately as possible. (...). As a result, the military will often see threats to the security of the State where there are, in fact, none (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 84)

Taking the ideas of renowned researcher and military theorist Samuel Huntington into account, it can be seen that the military play an important role in all States: it is their duty to act as a 'threat sensor'.

In the past, the military's idea of a threat was almost exclusively the invasion of the Homeland by another State. However, that perception of 'exclusive threat' has changed over time. Today's armed forces seek to identify and fight against so-called new threats. Thus, 'secondary challenges such as international terrorism and drugs have inspired some authors to state that new threats to national and international security are taking the place of the old threats of nuclear war and conventional warfare' (VILLA and REIS, 2006, p. 38).

It can be said that this refinement in the perception of new threats may be explained by considering several factors, among them the professionalisation of the military and the process that is transforming the Armed Forces, which we shall look at in more detail below.

In order to discuss military professionalisation, one must first look at the teachings of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz.

As can be seen in the work *The Soldier and the State*, for Huntington, military professionalisation may be a solution to the frequent threat of military power imposing itself on civilian power. The policies on security and defence should be elaborated by democratically elected civilian authorities (HUNTINGTON, 1996).

One of the choices presented by Huntington to allow civilian power more control over the military is objective civilian control. Military professionals should steer clear of politics and devote themselves exclusively to the technical and professional development of the Armed Forces. Thus, the military would have no cause to interfere in political matters.

In turn, in his book *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Morris Janowitz considers Huntington's argument of a civilian control based on the existence of apolitical armed forces unrealistic. Janowitz argues that military professionalisation is affected by temporal variation, changing over time and with the influence of the historical and social conditions in which the Armed Forces are integrated. The author shows wisdom in pointing out that the military are, and always will be, an integral part of the society they exist to defend, and, therefore, interaction between the civilian and military sectors of society is advantageous for civilian-military relations, leading to greater civic participation by the Armed Forces in the country's life (JANOWITZ, 1967).

Lieutenant-brigadier Murillo Santos, in his book *O caminho da profissionalização das Forças Armadas* [The path of the Armed Forces towards professionalisation] also contributed to the discussion on the professionalisation of the Armed Forces. The author states, in accordance with Huntington's premises:

The right type of relationship (between civilian and military power) is based on the professionalisation of the military, and on what is accurately called objective control, that is, a situation in which the Armed Forces are entrusted with clear duties, related to defence, and are endowed with a strictly professionalised officer corps. [...]. True civilian control derives from the maximisation of military professionalisation. [...]. This highly professionalised officer corps is ready to sustain the ambitions of any civilian group that exercises legitimate authority within a State. In truth, this sets the limits of military political power without referring to the distribution of political power among the different civilian groups (SANTOS, 1991, p.136-137).

It should be noted that the professionalisation of the armed forces is also linked to the adaptation to the demands of the new types of tasks they are asked to perform. This professionalisation will lead to better equipped and better trained troops, 'capable of operating in numerous scenarios and under different authorities, simultaneously suitable to the defence of the country, to missions abroad [...] as well as to other public interest missions' (CARDOSO, 2008, p.97).

Regardless of both the common and different aspects of the theoretical perspectives on the professionalisation of the military, it can be inferred that this professionalisation is crucial to the existence of a permanent military apparatus guided by the national objectives of a

democratic nation. If, after a situational and legal analysis, democratically elected civilian power finds that there is a need to use the armed forces in the fight against a given threat, it is up to those forces to strive to answer that call by the civilian authorities.

With regard to the process of transformation of the Armed Forces, post-modern armies come to mind, as they consider, in accordance to the lessons taught by Charles Moskos, that ‘threats to national security have increasingly transnational dimensions, as is the case of drug trafficking’ (MOSKOS, 2000, p. 17).

The concept of military post-modernism was well explored by Moskos, based on the historical experience of the United States and of the western European nations. The researcher, along with John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, argues that “*the Armed Forces of the United States and those of other Western developed democracies are moving from what can be termed Modern to Postmodern forms of military organization*” (MOSKOS, WILLIAMS e SEGAL, 2000, p. 1).

Based on this argument, the above researchers seek to contrast and describe the three types of military organizations: modern, late modern and post-modern.

Modern military organizations are temporarily positioned between the 19th century and the end of the Second World War. Modern militarism is strongly connected with the idea of the nation-State and the image of the citizen-soldier. The army was a combination of men with the lowest of ranks, who were conscripted or who belonged to militias, and a professional officer corps; warfare was mission-oriented; the male sex was prevalent; and there was a considerable difference between military forces and civil society, with regard to their structure and culture.

The second type, called Late Modern, prevailed from the early 1990s to the end of the Cold War. Armies had large numbers formed by enlisted ranks, and there was an increase in the professionalisation of the officer ranks. It should be noted that, before that time, officers were chosen more by lineage than by a professional military education in the military academies and war schools.

According to the observations by Moskos, Williams and Segal, the Post-Modern type is on the rise today, and the historical event that most pushed militarism into that post-modernity was the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and in Western Europe. Thus, as the threat of invasion ended, the existence of armed forces with markedly different social values from those of civil society was no longer necessary. Although national patriotism is still emphasised, globalisation has led to a decrease in the traditional basis for national sovereignty, which constitutes one of the aspects of post-modernism.

Williams (2000, p. 275) teaches us that some factors have driven military forces towards post-modernism, with particular emphasis on ‘global economic integration, telecommunications and advanced telecommunications systems, communication standards, and international travel’. This has led to increased contact between military personnel from different parts of the world, lending impetus to the ideas of military post-modernism.

Military post-modernism is also linked to cultural changes in the military structure. Post-modern forces must be ready to face the challenges intrinsic to an uncertain operational environment, and we only need to recall that, in some cases, an enemy may be concealed within a population. To respond to the current challenges, the armed forces should seek, on a daily basis, to create a more flexible and agile military structure, to better perform a growing number of different missions in a world increasingly characterised by vagueness and instability. Thus, the experiences of a military force will change its culture, which includes, among other aspects, its way of operating. For instance, after over ten years operating in Haiti under the aegis of the UN, considerable change has already been effected in the operational behaviour of the Brazilian Army.

Regardless of the approach one takes to military post-modernism, an issue dominates the ideas of the researchers who have devoted themselves to this theme: the post-modern military profile is different from that of the military of the past.

Confirming the above, Italian researcher Giuseppe Caforio published, in 2006, a series of surveys conducted after the 1990s in the United States and in the countries of Western Europe. The military profile Caforio drew based on his research reinforces some of the characteristics described by Moskos in his published work. In essence, the military profile had changed over time.

Caforio (2007, p. 220) confirmed that many members of the military already consider the fight against terrorism and the assistance to national police forces in the fight against organized crime (drug trafficking, for example) as vital tasks of the Armed Forces.

The Brazilian military consider drug trafficking a threat, which suggests that the Brazilian military profile is aligning with the post-modern profile outlined by Moskos and further developed by Caforio. Thus, the perception of the Brazilian military on new threats and their awareness that the permeable borders in the Amazon are used for drug trafficking can be observed in a 2011 interview to then Minister of Defence Nelson Jobim, who stated:

[...] drug traffickers frequently use the rivers and roads connecting Brazil to its continental neighbours. 'They prefer using the rivers to clandestine airstrips'. **'We must expand the reach of our fight against drug trafficking** [emphasis by author] and increase our surveillance from the Cabeça do Cachorro¹ downwards'. [...]. The minister also stated that operations on the Brazilian side will be coordinated between the Army, the National Force, the Federal Police and the Federal Highway Police. 'In Colombia, the fight against trafficking is a part of the Army's attributions. And we will act together on this', he stated. [...]. According to Jobim, the number of platoons on the Brazilian side of the borders will be increased from 24 to 49 over the coming months. Each platoon is composed of at least 90 soldiers (DEFESANET, 2011).

¹ An area of the deep Brazilian north-west, in the state of Amazonas, in the region of the border with Colombia and Venezuela. So named for the shape drawn by the borderline between Brazil and its neighbouring countries, which is reminiscent of a dog's head with its mouth open.

b. Frequency of the Use of the Brazilian Army in National Operations and in the Fight against Drugs after the End of the Military Government

According to Flores (2002), even countries with long-standing democratic traditions use their armed forces in internal actions.

Considering the historical context, there is no denying that ‘new threats’ such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have replaced the ‘communist danger’ of the Cold War. In the opinion of Santos (2004, p.116),

For latin-american countries, this implied a shift in the role assigned to the Armed Forces - to what is commonly called a ‘police role’. Thus, they would be responsible for **fighting against drug trafficking and organized crime** [emphasis by author].

The use of the Brazilian Army within national borders has been a constant since the end of the Military Government. Between 1998 and 1999, the year of issue of Complementary Law 97, an important legal milestone regulating the operation of the Armed Forces in Operations to Guarantee Law and Order², the Federal Government had already used the Brazilian Army in activities related to public security, as shown in the figure below:




Figure 1 - Use of the Brazilian Army in internal operations until 1999

Source: FUCILLE, 2001

² Operations to Guarantee Law and Order: according to the Manual of the Ministry of Defence, these are military operations conducted sporadically by the Armed Forces, in previously established areas and for a limited time, with the objective to preserve the public order and the safeguard of people and goods, in situations when all other instruments provided for in art. 144 of the Constitution have been exhausted, or in others which could potentially disturb the peace (BRASIL, 2003).

Although the area of action of the Army has been rather broad, providing assistance to problems as diverse as land invasion or strike actions by the public security bodies, the present study will focus on the operation of the Brazilian Army in the fight against drugs. Thus, this fight is essentially developed in two distinctive ways: the first consists in Operations to Guarantee Law and Order, as in the Alemão and Maré slum complexes, and the second is the exercise of police authority in the frontier area³, whether through routine patrols or through large-scale military operations.

Specifically with regard to the fight against unlawful acts, it is interesting to begin by looking at the North American pressure in what can be called the 'war on drugs'. It must be recalled that, after the end of the Cold War and with the introduction of the concept of 'new threats', the US Government aimed to encourage the South American armies to direct their actions towards the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime. Pressure from the US had already been felt during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's Administration, aiming to drive the Armed Forces towards the fight against drug trafficking, which should not be limited to the logistics support that was already being provided (PROCÓPIO FILHO e VAZ, 1997).

In the words of Rodrigo (2012, p. 30), 'since the late 1990s, some decisions by the federal government expanded the participation of the military in curbing transnational illegal activities'.

However, the use of the Armed Forces in operations of that nature is cause for much discussion, not only in Brazil but worldwide. As can be seen in the website of the Brazilian Federal Senate, the 'main argument of critics of the use of the Armed Forces in public security is that such a task requires an entirely different attitude and doctrine than what is taught in military barracks' (SENADO FEDERAL, 2012). That in itself demonstrates that the Armed Forces personnel employed in internal operations for the fight against drugs, in direct contact with Brazilian citizens, must be suited to the task.

Thus, two inevitable questions emerge: how can a country's war machine, which is prepared to solve conflicts with heavy, highly lethal weaponry, be adapted to operate in the fight against drugs, ensuring that the advantages it brings are greater than the collateral damage and political wear that will likely occur? How can military personnel trained for conventional military operations be used in 'police-type' activities conducted against civilians, many of whom are Brazilian citizens, but who at that moment represent an opposing force?

In order to explore these issues, and considering the specific case of the Brazilian Army, three key aspects may be approached: the first is the evolution of the Brazilian legal ordering, which stems in part from the pressure exerted by the military segment. While it is true that the Army cannot issue laws, the institution acted as a pressure group seeking to influence the legislative authority into creating laws to provide a minimum of protection to federal military personnel in police type activities; the second aspect concerns internal adaptation by the

³ Geographically, the Frontier Area region is a strip 150 km wide, running along 15,719 km of Brazilian border, covering 11 federate units.

Brazilian Army, the attempt to adapt military teaching, training and doctrine to the current context, which is characterised by new threats; and, finally, the third aspect is structural adaptation, with the creation of new military units and the transfer of others to the Amazon region, which has a weak State presence and is the stage for numerous cross-border crimes.

c. Key Aspects of the Adaptations made by the Brazilian Army in the Fight against Drugs

(1) Adaptation of the Legal Support of the Use of the Armed Forces in Operations to Guarantee Law and order: a Longing from the Barracks

One of the main controversial aspects of the use of the Brazilian Army in activities that will ultimately result in the fight against drugs concerns legal support. The aim of this research paper is not to evaluate the legal validity of the current legal support, which is widely contested by Law practitioners. Our only aim is to present the legal diplomas currently used by the Federal Government for the employment of federal troops in activities that will contribute to the fight against drugs, as well as noting the pressure exerted by the military for the revision of that legal diploma.

While the use of the Brazilian Armed Forces in operations to guarantee law and order may come as a surprise for some, these forces have a history of participating in operations of that nature. Article 14 of the 1891 Constitution provided for the enforcement laws in national territory by the Armed Forces; article 162 of the 1934 Constitution set out the constitutional powers of law and order; article 177 of the 1946 Constitution, and article 92 of the 1967 Constitution provided guarantees for the constituted powers of law and order.

As per article 142 of the 1988 Federal Constitution, the Armed Forces are ‘permanent and regular national institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic, and intended to defend the Nation, guarantee the constitutional branches of government and, on the initiative of any of these branches, law and order’ (BRASIL, 2005).

Article 142 of § 1 of the Constitution also determines that a complementary law will set out the general rules for the organization, training and use of the Armed Forces (BRASIL, 2005).

Thus, Complementary Law 97/99, which was created to regulate the form of organization, training and use of the Armed Forces, was changed over time by amendments from Complementary Laws n. 117/2004 and n. 136/2010 (BRASIL, 1999).

Article 15 of Complementary Law 97/99, which already considers the changes introduced by Complementary Laws n. 117/2004 e n. 136/2010, includes some relevant aspects regarding the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO), as shown in the table below:

Table I - Relevant aspects of article 15 of CL 97/99

A Relevant Aspect of the GLO	What are the Law's provisions?
Responsibility for the use of the Armed Forces in GLO	Belongs to the President of the Republic, who will instruct the State Minister for the Defence to activate the operational bodies.
Operation of the Armed Forces in the GLO	Will be carried out under the guidelines emanated from an act by the President of the Republic, after the instruments for the preservation of the public order and the safety of people and goods, provided for in article 144 of the Constitution, have been exhausted.
Exhaustion of the instruments listed in article 144 of the Constitution	Occurs when, at a given moment, these instruments are formally declared unavailable, inexistent or insufficient by the current Head of the of Federal or State Executive Power
Length and Location of the GLO	Sporadic preventive and repressive actions to ensure that the operations result in the guarantee of law and order, in a previously established area, for a limited duration.
Operational control of public security bodies	It is up to the responsible authorities to transfer the operational control of the public security bodies required for the development of actions to the authority in charge of operations.

Source: Elaborated by author (BRASIL, 1999).

Another noteworthy aspect of Complementary Law 97/99 is the police power granted to the Armed Forces in the frontier area. According to article 16-A of the Law in question:

It is up to the Armed Forces [...] to operate, by means of preventive and repressive actions, in the frontier area on land, at sea and underwater, regardless of ownership, property, purpose, or any encumbrances, against cross-border and environmental crimes, on its own or in coordination with other bodies of the Executive Power, performing, among other actions:

I - patrolling;

II - searches on people, land vehicles, embarkations, and aircraft;

III - arrests in *flagrante delicto*.

Decree 3.897 of 24 August 2001 was issued with the purpose of setting the guidelines to the use of the Armed Forces in the guarantee of law and order. Thus, article 3 of that decree notes that the Armed Forces were entrusted with developing heavy police actions, and others of a preventive or repressive nature, which are included in the constitutional and legal responsibility of Military Police forces, in compliance with the terms and limits that have been imposed to the latter by the legal ordering. Furthermore, article 5 recalls that the use of the Armed Forces in the guarantee of law and order should be sporadic, should be circumscribed to a previously defined area, and should end as rapidly as possible (BRASIL, 2001).

Thus, it is clear that the legislative authority, fully aware that public security is the responsibility of the bodies listed in article 144 of the Federal Constitution, among which the Federal, Civilian and Military Police, seeks to use the Armed Forces only when social peace is disturbed and the bodies responsible for the preservation of the public order and the safety of people and goods are considered exhausted in a specific case.

Consulting the amendments to Complementary Law 97/99, and the issue of Decree 3.897/2001, helps shed light on the attempt by the Federal Government to normalise the use of the Brazilian Armed Forces in activities that are not, a priori, related to the traditional mission of a country's military apparatus: the defence against external threats.

It should be noted that this attempt by the Federal Government resulted partly from the pressure of the Armed Forces, who did not feel legally supported when operating in the national territory against Brazilian citizens disrupting the public order.

Statements from military authorities are not easy to come by, especially after the Ministry of Defence criticised the Federal Government by giving voice to the feelings of lack of legal support for Guarantee of Law and Order activities. Some of those conversations were conducted 'off-camera' and later reported by journalists, as shown below:

Table II - Excerpts of reports on the perception of lack of legal support by the military in the performance of Guarantee of Law and Order activities

Transcript of the Report	Report and Source Information
<p><i>The military argued in favour of the decree signed by the president, published in last monday's Diário Oficial da União [Official Union Journal], as they felt unprotected whenever they were called upon to fulfil MP roles and saw their actions questioned by the Law.</i></p>	<p>Report in <i>Estadão</i>, on 29/08/2001, about the signature of Decree 3.897/2001 by then President Fernando Henrique, granting police authority to the Armed Forces. Retrieved from < http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,genoino-contesta-poder-de-policia-para-o-exercito,20010829p39630>.</p>
<p><i>The proposal which supports the National Strategy of Defence, and which should be sent to Congress still this month, also faces an old complaint by the military, when they are called upon to intervene in repressive actions such as 'hill-climbing' or social protection work during elections. It is now clear that the troops will perform 'military activities' in those actions.</i></p>	<p>Report in <i>Estadão</i>, on 06/11/2009, on the referral of the proposal for Complementary Law 136/2010. Retrieved from < http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Politica/0,,MUL1368889-5601,00-GOVERNO+QUER+DAR+PODER+DE+POLICIA+AS+FORCAS+ARMADAS.html>.</p>

Table II - Excerpts of reports on the perception of lack of legal support by the military in the performance of Guarantee of Law and Order activities (cont.)

Transcript of the Report	Report and Source Information
<p><i>The project provides legal security to conduct arrests and apprehensions, something which we did not have before, analyses the general in charge of 50.000 soldiers under the Comando Militar do Sul (CMS) [Southern Military Command], the unit which includes the Army troops in the three southern States.</i></p>	<p>Interview to the commander of the Southern Military Command on 07/08/2010 by reporter Humberto Trezzi, of <i>ZH Notícias</i>, on the referral of the proposal for Complementary Law 136/2010. Retrieved from < http://zh.clicrbs.com.br/rs/noticias/noticia/2010/08/exercito-adverte-que-nao-quer-substituir-as-policias-2998068.html>.</p>
<p><i>Our actions are now constitutional. For the first time, I saw a document with the signature of the president of the Republic authorising that type of action - reports a general close to the commander of the Army, General Enzo Peri.</i></p> <p><i>According to military sources, the Army wanted to avoid potential wear resulting from using the troops prematurely. There were concerns that soldiers might be sued in court if they injured someone during the occupation of the favelas.</i></p>	<p>Report by Fábio Schaffner, on 05/12/2010, in newspaper <i>Zero Hora</i>, on the authorisation for the use of the Armed Forces in Vila Cruzeiro (Rio de Janeiro). Retrieved from < http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Politica/0,,MUL1368889-5601,00-GOVERNO+QUER+DAR+PODER+DE+POLICIA+AS+FORCAS+ARMADAS.html>.</p>

Source: Elaborated by author.

Currently, the barracks are somewhat more satisfied regarding the legal support to their activities in operations to Guarantee Law and Order. According to an interview with the Commander of the Army, General Villas Bôas, 'the Constitution and the complementary laws are clear on the use of the Armed Forces in situations of incapability and failure to act by the responsible bodies' (MAZUÍ, 2015).

It must be noted that the normative documents of the Brazilian Defence Policy - the National Defence Policy (NDP), the National Strategy of Defence (NSD), and the Defence White Paper (DWP) - also mention the use of the Armed Forces for internal purposes.

Thus, it is important to recall that the Ministry of Defence was created in 1999 as a result of Brazil's transition towards full democracy, consolidating the subordination of the military power to the civilian power and merging the former Army, Navy and Aeronautics Ministries.

In 2005, the MD issued a National Defence Policy (NDP), and the first version of the National Strategy of Defence was launched in 2008. Three important events occurred in 2012: the NDP

was revised and reissued under the title National Policy for Defence (NPD), emphasising the fact that it concerns the interests of Brazilian society as a whole, that is, it is a 'national' policy, and not just a military issue; the NSD was also revised and reissued; and, finally, the Defence White Paper (DWP) was launched.

It can be said that the emergence of these documents, especially considering the versions revised and/or launched in 2012, brought the discussions on the theme of National Defence, which used to be the sole purview of the military sphere, to the forefront of the national agenda.

The NPD is the highest level document regulating the planning of actions for purposes of National Defence, for which the Brazilian State is responsible. The document specifies the National Defence Objectives (NDO), which include a structure for the Armed Forces with organizational and operational capabilities appropriate to an increasingly complex world. In that same document, the Ministry of Defence emphasises that the 'use of the Armed Forces in the guarantee of law and order is **regulated by a specific legislation** [emphasis by author]' (BRASIL, 2012b, p. 34).

The NSD addresses, among other issues, the reorganization and reorientation of the Armed Forces, of the Defence Industrial Base (DIB), and of the hierarchy policy for the Army, Navy and Aeronautics (BRASIL, 2012). The document includes twenty five guidelines. Guideline 17 expresses the determination 'To prepare troops to fulfil law and order enforcement missions, **under the terms of the Constitution** [emphasis by author]' (BRASIL, 2012, p. 58).

The DWP, first issued in 2012, is a public document which 'adds to the National Strategy of Defence and the National Policy for Defence and is a document clarifying Brazil's defence activities' (BRASIL, 2012a, p. 8). It should be noted that the DWP also recalls that 'the use of the Armed Forces to guarantee law and order is the responsibility of the President of the Republic, **under the terms of art. 15 of Complementary Law 07/1999** [emphasis by author]' (BRASIL, 2012a, p. 156).

(2) Adequacy of the Structure of the Brazilian Army: the Creation of New Military Units and the Intensification of Military Presence in the Frontier Area

As a result of the fight against drugs, the Brazilian Army has sought to implement changes to its structure, creating new military units and/or reinforcing the existing ones.

The 11th Light Infantry Brigade, known as the Guarantee of Law and Order Brigade, was created during the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in the state of São Paulo, in 2004, ensuring that troops could deploy rapidly in national territory to carry out activities of that nature (SENADO FEDERAL, 2012).

Although the Brigade was created for strategic use in the defence of the Homeland, later it was also prepared for Law and Order enforcement actions. Training in the Brigade is done according to the Military Training Programme dictated by Ground Operations Command, and it focuses on issues preparing troops for 'police-type' missions.

The Army Communication Centre confirms this state of affairs:

In compliance with the legal precepts (specifically those laid down in the Federal Constitution and in Complementary Law 97/99, amended by Complementary Law 117/04), which essentially express societal impositions, the Army must be prepared to fulfil its missions. Thus, the decision to prepare troops that are also geared towards GLO actions was due to, among other aspects, the need for troops better suited to that end. Furthermore, this prevents the use of other troops which cost more to train, as they are not the most appropriate to this type of mission (DEFESANET, 2005).

The Army also sought to enhance its presence in the frontier area, particularly in the Amazon region, as it has permeable borders through which a large part of foreign cocaine from other South American countries enters the country. Evidently, the increased presence of the Army in the Amazon was not solely motivated by the fight against cross-border crimes, but is also due to the familiar presence strategy inherited from the Portuguese colonisers. However, it is not out of the question that the underlying concerns by the Brazilian military with threats of that nature boosted the deployment of more soldiers to that region.

Santos (1991, p. 117) recalls the importance of the presence strategy for a country of continental size such as Brazil, considering that the strategy 'serves to guide the distribution of the troops in national territory and, above all, to ensure that this distribution is compatible with the principle of mobility, that is, the possibility that they can be rapidly deployed to any locations requiring a concentration of troops'. Thus, considering the specificities of the Amazon, a region where the roads are few and highly restricted, it is imperative to maintain military units stationed in that region, in order to mitigate the issue of troop mobility in adverse environments.

The Brazilian NSD includes two guidelines related to the reinforcement of military presence along the borders. Guideline 9 states that Brazil must 'intensify the presence of units from the Army, the Navy and the Air Force along the borders', and guideline 10 specifies that priority should be given to the Amazon region (BRASIL, 2012, p. 14).

It is interesting to note that the Army has been effectively transferring units from other regions in Brazil to the Amazon. For instance, the former 2nd Motorised Infantry Brigade stationed in Niterói (RJ) became the 2nd Jungle Infantry Brigade in São Gabriel da Cachoeira (AM). The 1st Motorised Infantry Brigade, which used to be headquartered in Petrópolis (RJ), is now the 1st Jungle Infantry Brigade in Boa Vista (RR). And the 16th Motorised Infantry Brigade, formerly in Santo Ângelo (RS), became the 16h Jungle Infantry Brigade in Tefé (AM).

According to the interview conducted with the Commander of the Army, the Brazilian Army:

[...] intends to increase the number of units in the region. According to the Force commander, a minimum four garrisons will be stationed in the area. 'Some will be transferred there and others will be created', elaborated General

Villas Bôas. 'We have about 27.000 men in the North today, and we predict that, by 2030, the number will reach 40.000' (LUIZ, 2015).

Evidently, the military apparatus alone will not solve all the problems in the Brazilian Amazon. Fuccille (2015, p. 145) reminds us that 'with a land border with its neighbours five times the size of the USA-Mexico border, militarisation will not be enough for Brazil to [...] solve its security and defence problems'. The State's presence is vital to the integration of that region into the rest of the country.

Meanwhile, the military are aware of the negative effects of the lack of State presence in the Amazon. Neglect by the public power may lead the drug traffickers operating in the border areas to recruit the inhabitants of those regions. Marques (2005, p. 69) states that:

The Army's conjunctural analyses on South America also point to events that may compromise the Brazilian sovereignty over the Amazon, such as the link between drug traffickers and guerilla movements in the Andean region.

Buzan and Wæver (2013) corroborate this idea, stating that Brazil's objectives for the securitisation of the Amazon are due more to the issue of drugs than to border concerns.

Brazil cannot act militarily in the area without its neighbours also conducting anti-drug operations in their territories. For that purpose, Brazil has made efforts in South America towards promoting a common security agenda. 'In theory, an agreement on that common agenda would even allow us to create a security community, given the importance of territoriality in the dynamics of security studies' (FUCCILLE, 2014, p. 116).

It should be noted that the Brazilian NPD emphatically addresses the integration between States, arguing for a 'close relationship between the Amazonian countries, under the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (BRASIL, 2012b, p. 21).

Along the same lines, the theme of cooperation has been widely explored in the DWP. In the words of Celso Amorim, it must be stressed that Brazil is aware that the document 'was also drafted with the goal of strengthening cooperation with the South American countries (BRASIL, 2012a, p. 8). Regarding the Amazon, the DWP specifies that, for Brazil, the defence of that region is linked with the cooperation between neighbouring countries.

The intensification of the military presence of the Brazilian Army has also brought with it an increase in military operations in the frontier area, both exclusively using Army units and in joint operations with the Navy and the Air Force, under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence.

The frontier region is thus a sensitive area, worthy of attention. Still according to Mattos (2011, p. 76), 'the border is the epidermis of the state body, and as such it is sensitive to reactions from the exterior. The land border is more sensitive to reactions from neighbour States'. Also according to the researcher, the State receives and transmits inflows from abroad, which may influence, favourably or not, its ambitions and interests.

These military operations are carried out under Article 16-A of Complementary Law 97/99, which authorises the Army to carry out preventive and repressive measures in the frontier area against cross-border and environmental crimes, on its own or in coordination with other bodies of the Executive Power, conducting patrols and searches on persons, vehicles and embarkations.

Operation ÁGATA, ongoing since 2011, is one such joint military operation. It is included in the Strategic Frontier Plan (SFP) of the Federal Government, created to prevent and repress criminal actions in Brazil's border with ten South American countries. Tactical missions are carried out to curb crimes such as drug trafficking, contraband and smuggling, arms and munition trafficking, environmental crimes, and illegal immigration and mining. It is then clear that this joint operation aims mainly to fight these so-called new threats.

The table below, put together by the Brazilian Army's Ground Operations Command (COTER), presents the results of the ÁGATA Operations. The 72 tonnes of drugs apprehended over the five years of activity of this Operation show the effectiveness of the Brazilian military in the fight against drug trafficking.

Table III - Quantitative balance of the actions carried out during the ÁGATA Operations

ATIVIDADE	UN	Operações ÁGATA										TOTAL
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Veículos inspecionados	Qnt	119.436			200.199			278.596	133.061		66.292	797.584
Aeronaves inspecionadas	Qnt	150			72			0	31		77	330
Embarcações apreendidas	Qnt	49			449			274	207		195	1.174
Embarcações vistoriadas e/ou notificadas	Qnt	3.589			2.092			19.760	8.238		7.627	41.306
Armas apreendidas	Qnt	58			48			93	30		60	289
Contrabando ou descaminho	R\$	236.600			6.295			125.318	1.932.651		742.744	3.043.608
Munição apreendida	Qnt	Dados não tabulados		Dados não tabulados				2617	1.261		813	4691
Explosivo apreendido	Kg	8.150			11.742			1.855	200		0	21.947
Drogas apreendidas	kg	2.358			9.443			19.573	36727		3.930	72.031
Pessoas revistadas	Qnt	11.499			5.420			17.165	22.242		14.147	70.473
Pessoas detidas	Qnt	32			43			53	40		88	256

Source: GROUND OPERATIONS COMMAND, 2016

(3) Adequacy of the military training, teaching and doctrine of the Brazilian Army

The actions of a Ground Force with police power require specific preparation, bearing in mind that the Army is designed to be used in conventional or regular warfare. Thus, over the

last few years, the Brazilian Army has sought to adapt military teaching, military training and even military doctrine to the new emerging threats.

The NSD, one of the framework documents in matters of Defence, points out the need to 'train specific assets of the Armed Forces for sporadic use in Guarantee of Law and Order, under the Federal Constitution (BRASIL, 2012, p. 64).

The Brazilian DWP assures that:

GLO operations require special preparation and training. The use of forces in that type of operations is fundamentally different, in principle and in doctrine, than their traditional use in missions related to external defence, in which the focus is on fighting enemy forces, clearly identifiable on the ground, generally described as uniformed, armed military forces (BRASIL, 2012b, p. 156).

Thus, issues related to Guarantee of Law and Order were added over time to military training programmes, which guide the preparation of the Brazilian Army for activities of that nature. For instance, the 2003 *Programa-Padrão de Instrução para Cabos e Soldados* [Standard Training Programme for Corporals and Soldiers] (EB70-PP-11.012) lays down the training guidelines for Guarantee of Law and Order, especially in police-type operations. It is then noticeable that the Institution is attempting to provide better training for its troops in activities conducted by the public security bodies, such as ostensive patrolling, roadblocks and checkpoints, transfer of prisoners, dawn raids, etc.

The military academies are also in the process of adapting their syllabi, in a clear attempt to provide to their students the expertise needed to face these new threats. The syllabus of the *Escola de Comando e Estado-maior do Exército* [Army Command and General Staff College], where the Ground Force high level advisers are trained, features a 170-hour course on Guarantee of Law and Order Operations (ECEME, 2010). This demonstrates the concern of the Brazilian Army's educational system in better preparing military decision-makers for current threats.

With regard to military doctrine, it is also clear that the Brazilian Army is aware of that new modus operandi, which involves the conduct of military operations with different characteristics than those of conventional offensive and defensive operation against an enemy army of another State. Thus, the Brazilian Army launched a campaign manual in 2010, under the title *Guarantee of Law and Order Operations* (C 85-1), with the purpose of standardising the doctrine of use of military forces in operations such as the ones that took place in the Alemão and Maré complexes. Furthermore, the Brazilian Army planning also complies with the provisions of the new *Guarantee of Law and Order Document* (MD33-M-10) prepared by the Ministry of Defence in 2014.

When speaking of the participation of the Brazilian Army in the fight against drugs, one must recall that this activity is carried out in partnership with other agencies and bodies of the Brazilian Government, as well as with other countries. Noriega (2004) states that transnational crimes (such as drug trafficking) that originate in a neighbouring countries and cross the

frontier area must be fought in a coordinated, multi-lateral fashion by Government agents. In the Army, these operations are known as interagency operations.

Zaia (2013) reminds us that several agencies have acted in coordination with the Brazilian Army in different versions of Operation ÁGATA, as follows: FUNAI, Ministry of Justice, IBAMA, Ministry of the Environment, Federal Police, among others. Thus, it should be noted that the Brazilian Army has also carried out its actions in accordance with the Interagency Operations Document (MD33-M-12) prepared by the Ministry of Defence in 2012.

d. The role of the Brazilian Army in the Pacification of Violent Communities

One of the strategies used by the Federal Government to fight drug trafficking was the occupation of the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, with the effective support of the Armed Forces, in particular the Brazilian Army, followed by the implantation of Pacifying Police Units (PPUs). This was, and remains, the commitment by the Government to bring State presence to regions previously under control of trafficking, not only in light of international criticism but also as part of the preparations for the World Cup in 2014 and the 2016 Olympics.

The Brazilian Army has participated in two large-scale Guarantee of Law and Order operations since 2010, with the assistance of the Navy and the public security bodies of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Those two large-scale operations had the purpose of pacifying the violent areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro, formerly under control of drug traffickers: the Alemão and Penha Complex, and the Maré Complex.

With regard to the operation in the Alemão and Penha Complex, heavy repressive actions by the public security bodies of the state of Rio de Janeiro triggered a series of retaliatory actions by organized crime in early November, 2010. Private vehicles, public buses, and police offices and stations were attacked. A climate of terror set in over the *carioca* capital.

Since 21 November 2010, the Rio de Janeiro Government conducted the invasion of Vila Cruzeiro in the Penha community, in order to control the region, which is of crucial importance for the public security forces. This action had the support of logistics assets from the Ministry of Defence (Brazilian Navy) and resulted in the achievement of limited objectives.

As the law enforcement assets of the state of Rio de Janeiro were proven insufficient to effectively pacify the Alemão and Penha Complexes, the Governor requested the assistance of the Federal Government. Consequently, on 25 November 2010, the President of the Republic authorised the use of the Armed Forces to guarantee law and order in the city of Rio de Janeiro. On 28 November, the military began Operation ARCANJO and occupied the Alemão Complex.

On 1 December 2010, in order to continue the integrated process of pacification of the state of Rio de Janeiro, the Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro asked the Minister of Defence for temporary use of the Armed Forces in the preservation of public order in the Alemão and Penha Complexes, which was to end on 31 October 2011 at the most. This did not come to be, and the Army troops remained on the ground during the entire 1st semester of 2012.

As for the quantity of drugs, the Pacifying Force troops seized 76 kg of cocaine, 60 kg of marijuana, 13 kg of crack, and 17.5 kg of hashish during the period of occupation of the Alemão and Penha Complexes (MONKEN, 2012).

With regard to violence rates, it can be said that the statistics are less severe with the presence of the Brazilian Army in those violent areas. The table below presents a comparison of the figures of crimes recorded by three police stations (22nd, 38th and 44th) which serve the communities of Alemão and Penha, and also the surrounding neighbourhoods. From 28 November 2009 to 27 November 2010, there was no presence of Brazilian Army troops in those communities. However, between 28 November 2010 and 23 November 2011 there was a military presence in those areas.

Table IV - Violence rates immediately before and after Operation Arcaño

INDICADOR ESTRATÉGICO	28 NOV 09 a 27 NOV 10	28 NOV 10 a 23 NOV 11	Diferença	
			Absoluto	%
Homicídio doloso	121	110	-11	-9,1
Latrocínio	10	6	-4	-40,0
Resistência com morte do opositor	73	25	-48	-65,8
Lesão corporal seguida de morte	4	0	-4	-100,0
Letalidade violenta (homicídio+latrocínio+auto de resistência+lesão seguida de morte)	208	141	-67	-32,2
Roubo de veículo	1.560	1.047	-513	-32,9
Roubo de aparelho celular	571	367	-294	-35,7
Roubo a transeunte	3.016	2.183	-833	-27,6
Roubo em ônibus	411	286	-125	-30,4
Roubo de rua (transeunte+celular+coletivo)	3.998	2.836	-1162	-29,1

Source: MENDES, 2012, p. 3

Thus, it can be seen that the presence of the Brazilian Army in those violent areas during Operation Arcaño led to a decrease in the number of crimes committed.

The Brazilian Army was also used in the pacification of the Maré Complex. In April 2014, by request of the Government of the state of Rio de Janeiro, the President of the Republic authorised the use of the Brazilian Army and of Brazilian Navy troops in that community, with the purpose of cooperating in the process to pacify the area.

Consequently, the Government of the state of Rio de Janeiro, the Ministry of Defence (MD) and the Ministry of Justice celebrated an agreement in which the parties committed, based on an Operation to Guarantee Law and Order (GLO), to use any means necessary to render services and security to the population of the Maré Complex. That operation was entitled Operation SÃO FRANCISCO.

It can be said that the action of the Brazilian Army resulted in positive outcomes. According to the Press Release by the *Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército* [Army Centre of Media Communications], these outcomes were extremely positive:

The goals defined for this Operation were achieved by retaking the area in question and by the loss of freedom to act by the criminal organizations. All spaces in the community are now patrolled, the ostensive use of firearms has decreased and the illegal trade of narcotics was greatly reduced. It is worth mentioning the support of the population, who is no longer exploited with impunity by crime and now benefits from the growing presence of the State, with improvements in social areas.

Since the beginning of the operation, there have been more than 65.000 actions, 583 arrests, 228 apprehensions of minors for infractions committed, and 1.234 apprehensions of drugs, firearms, ammunition, vehicles, motorcycles, and various materials. Mention must be made of the arrest of important members of the organized crime structure, which resulted in organizational disruption in the factions and a significant loss of profits from the narcotics trade (CCOMSEX, 2015).

A critical analysis of operations of that nature leads to a certainty: the pacification process involves far more than the use of military and police forces. These simply create the minimum security conditions for the population by fighting against criminal factions, stripping them of their feeling of impunity and of their financial power. These operations also establish a window of opportunity, which the federal, state and municipal spheres of Public Administration must take advantage of. It is up to the Government, after using its coercive apparatus, to support the citizenship and life conditions of the population through an effective presence of the State in those deprived regions by building good hospitals, good schools, and programmes to foster career growth among young people. Should the Government not provide a minimum of dignity to the population, the drug traffickers will do so, and the efforts of the Brazilian Army will have been in vain.

3. Conclusion

It must be taken into account that the armed forces of a country must be aware of today's new threats, such as drug trafficking. Although this scourge is primarily the responsibility of the public security forces (police), the post-modern military can, and must, if necessary, take action in the fight against drugs.

The use of the Armed Forces in the internal environment is a controversial subject. Nevertheless, in the last few years these forces have been frequently used in urban public security activities, in the context of guarantee of law and order (GLO) operations, in particular in the city of Rio de Janeiro.

This research revealed that the issue and amendments to Complementary Law 97/99, and the issue of Decree 3.897/200, were an attempt by the Federal Government to standardise

the use of the Brazilian Armed Forces in activities which are not, a priori, related to the traditional mission of a country's military apparatus: the defence against external threats. It was also revealed that these amendments were not made only in response to the constant controversy about the use of federal troops in the internal environment, but were also motivated by the pressure exerted by the military personnel of the Brazilian Army, who felt unprotected when taking part in 'police-type' actions.

This research also showed that, in 2004, the Army created a Great Command specialised in Guarantee of Law and Order operations: the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, headquartered in Campinas. That city also hosts the *Centro de Instrução de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem* [Guarantee of Law and Order Training Centre], which trains troops from all across the country in operations of that nature.

Furthermore, the Brazilian Army, aware of the permeable nature of its borders, particularly in the Amazon region, has strived to intensify military presence in that region. Brigades from the south and south-west regions were transferred to cities in the northern region of Brazil: São Gabriel da Cachoeira (AM), Tefé (AM) and Boa Vista (RR).

The intensification of the military presence of the Brazilian Army has also brought with it an increase in military operations in the frontier area, both exclusively using Army units and in joint operations with the Navy and the Air Force, under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence. The various versions of Operation ÁGATA have had success in the fight against cross-border crime and larger quantities of drugs have been apprehended each year, exceeding 20 tonnes in 2013.

Because the action of a Ground Force with police power requires specific preparation, the Brazilian Army has sought to adapt military teaching, military training and even military doctrine to the new emerging threats. Clear examples of this were the changes to the military training programmes, which now also include training in Guarantee of Law and Order for corporals and soldiers; the adaptation of the syllabi of military academies, which now offer courses on Operations to Guarantee Law and Order; and the issue of military manuals geared towards 'police-type' missions such as the campaign manual entitled Guarantee of Law and Order Operations (C 85-1) standardising the doctrine for the use of military forces in operations of the same type as the ones conducted in the Alemão and Maré complexes.

Finally, the Brazilian Army was found to have acted in a positive manner in the pacification of the Alemão and Maré complexes, in light of the outcomes regarding drug apprehensions, arrests of drug traffickers, and the decrease of the violence rates. Clearly, this is not the primary mission of the Ground Force, but it must be understood that, at least for the time being, the public security bodies have proven incapable of solving the issue of drugs without resorting to federal forces. Unquestionable proof of that are the pacification operations conducted by the Army, in which the Brazilian Army occupied parts of the territory unreachable by the Military Police of the state of Rio de Janeiro, and provided the minimum security for the implementation of the Pacifying Police Units (PPU).

In the words of the Commander of the Army, General Villas Bôas:

That use should be sporadic and limited in time, because the structure and preparation of the Army are not geared towards those aims. It is not up to the Army to solve the situation in the Maré and Alemão Complexes, or even in Haiti. The Force is designed to create stability and provide conditions for other bodies to implement measures to change the reality of that environment (MAZÚ, 2015).

The idea is thus reinforced that the process of pacification goes far beyond the use of military and police forces. Should the State not make its presence known, the criminal factions will again dominate those deprived regions.

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