

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MILITARY DIMENSION TO THE PROMOTION OF PORTUGAL'S STRENGTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS¹

O CONTRIBUTO DA DIMENSÃO MILITAR PARA A PROSECUÇÃO DO PODER DE PORTUGAL NAS RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

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Abstract

These are critical times, with significant upheaval in the international arena, surging under a prevailing rationale of a possible revision of the National Defence's conceptual building, initiated by the Strategic Concept of National Defence. It is therefore adequate to analyse the contribution of the Armed Forces to the pursuit of our national interests in the international arena. With that aim, this paper's main objective is to clarify in which ways the military dimension contributes to the promotion of Portugal's strength in the upcoming international relationship framework, in the medium and long term. An inductive reasoning methodology was used, based on a qualitative strategy and a case study design, using documentary analysis and conducting interviews with relevant entities to this study's scope. The results validated the Armed Forces' relevance for Portugal's external affirmation and credibility, as well as for its already achieved status of international security co-producing state, having concluded for the need to maintain and develop forces of an agile nature, with technical capabilities and appropriate equipment, that enable the country to further play an active role not only in current military operations but also in humanitarian support and natural disasters operations.

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Resumo

Numa altura em que a conjuntura internacional sofre um significativo sobressalto e na lógica justificativa de uma possível revisão do edifício concetual da Defesa Nacional, iniciada pelo Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional, é pertinente estudar o contributo das Forças Armadas para a prossecução dos interesses nacionais na “arena” internacional. Neste sentido, esta investigação tem por objetivo especificar contributos para o emprego da dimensão militar na promoção do poder de Portugal, no quadro das relações internacionais que se avizinham, a médio e longo prazo. Para o efeito utilizou-se uma metodologia de raciocínio indutivo, assente numa estratégia qualitativa e num desenho de pesquisa de estudo de caso, recorrendo-se à análise documental e a entrevistas a entidades relevantes no domínio do estudo. Os resultados obtidos confirmaram a importância das Forças Armadas na afirmação e credibilidade externa de Portugal, assim como o estatuto de Estado coprodutor de segurança internacional, que granjeia, concluindo-se pela necessidade de manter e desenvolver forças de natureza ágil, com capacidades técnicas e equipamentos adequados, que permitam ao país continuar a desempenhar um papel ativo, não só em operações militares correntes, como também em operações de apoio humanitário e em desastres naturais.

Palavras-chave: *Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa; Forças Nacionais Destacadas; Dimensão Militar; Poder de Portugal.*

1. Introduction

As a result of the shockwaves caused by recent events, International Relations (IR) are undergoing considerable turmoil. Regardless of the reasons behind it, the withdrawal of the US military from Afghanistan has shown, on the one hand, the importance of military forces (and of their continued presence), and, on the other, of the planning and implementation of force generation / regeneration, structural and operational aspects. Also of note is the US's involvement in official alliances or certain types of temporary coalitions.

On the other hand, it seems that the European Union (EU) and Russia are no longer the first priority of the US' national strategy, which currently focuses on the Indian-Pacific region, and China in particular. This assertion is based on the technological and defence cooperation agreement between the United States of America (US), Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), or AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) (Ramalho, 2021; Monjardino, 2021). This agreement embodies a new tripartite strategic partnership between these countries, which aims to contain China's presumed expansionism, and confirms that this region has become the (geo) political centre of international life (Teixeira, 2021).

Simultaneously, the war being waged in Europe between Russia and Ukraine has shown, among other things, that military defence forces continue to be crucial, and highlighted

something that many seemed to have forgotten: that are they necessary, and that weakening them is dangerous.

In the short and medium term, this will be reflected in new challenges for the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), two of the main International Organizations (IOs) where Portugal defends its interests, and through which it uses its Armed Forces (AAFF) to increase its power in IR. On the one hand, the EU will attempt to rekindle the debate on defence and take concrete steps to implement concepts such as the recently approved Strategic Compass (Compass, 2022; Leyen, 2021; Michel, 2022), and to coordinate a military response to address the Russia-Ukraine conflict. On the other hand, NATO has defined a new doctrine for the next decade, which is reflected in the new strategic concept adopted at the Madrid summit, where Russia is described as the Alliance's main Euro-Atlantic threat, and China as a challenge, and has begun the process to expand its membership to two new countries, Sweden and Finland (NATO, 2022; Stoltenberg, 2021).

Therefore, this topic is relevant because studying it will explain how the Portuguese military dimension (MD), a core element of national power, can be used to meet these challenges, individually or through its participation in IOs, on which its strategic potential depends. Simultaneously, the uncertainty and unpredictability of the International System (IS) and the war being waged in the European territory, which is shifting the balance of power to Asia, have led the EU to take concrete steps towards to ensure its common defence and NATO to update its Strategic Concept, providing an opportunity for Portugal to carry out a general review of its conceptual framework for National Defence (ND), beginning with the Strategic Concept on National Defence (CEDN, 2013), in order to assess the opportunities and challenges for Portugal, according to its capabilities and interests, and the role of the MD in increasing Portugal's power in IR in the medium and long term.

This study will examine how the participation of the Portuguese MD in international missions increases Portugal's power in IR. The study is delimited (Santos & Lima, 2019, p. 42):

- In terms of content, to the use of the MD outside national territory; the analysis focuses on the three branches of the AAFF, but does not include the National Republican Guard (GNR). A second delimitation was defined based on the External Action dimensions of ND issued by the Minister of National Defence (MDN) (Decision No. 4101/2018 of 12 April). Within the AAFF, the study will focus on the National Deployed Forces (FND) and National Deployed Personnel (END) involved in military missions or operations, and in Cooperation in the Defence Domain (CDD) actions (the analysis does not include international positions in the field of ND);

- Spatially, to the most important IOs of which Portugal is a member: NATO, the EU, the United Nations (UN) and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP);

- Temporally, to the last nine years, that is, the period between the publication of CEDN 2013 and CEDN 2021. Therefore, the research horizon begins with the entry into force of the last CEDN in 2013. However, given the recent changes to the organic structure of the AAFF introduced in the Law on National Defence (LDN) (Law No. 3/2021 of 9 August), the Basic

Law on the Organization of the Armed Forces (LOBOFA) (Law No. 2/2021 of 9 August) and the organic laws on the AAFF branches, as well as the various changes that have taken place in the international “arena” in recent years, a general review of the conceptual framework of ND should be carried out, beginning with the CEDN.

The General Objective (GO) of the study is *ascertain how Portugal can use its MD to increase its power in IR*. This GO was subdivided into the Specific Objectives (SO) shown in Table 1.

Table 1 – Specific Objectives

SO1	To ascertain how Portugal, as a small State, can increase its power in IR.
SO2	To assess the role of the DM in IR.

As this topic is likely to raise multiple questions, the following Research Question (RQ) was defined: *“How can Portugal use the MD to increase its power in IR?”*

2. Theoretical and methodological framework

This chapter contains the state of the art and the analysis model.

2.1 Literature review

The study addresses the field of IR from the perspective of Geopolitics. IR as a field of study has produced several theories that have attempted to explain what makes the world hang together (Ruggie, 1998, cited in Mendes, 2019, p. 95). These theories have proposed different definitions for the concept, which correspond to general representations of reality and involve relationships between the actors in the IS (Mendes, 2019). Therefore, the concept of IS should be clarified. In simple terms, it can be defined as system “that functions as a whole because of the interdependence of its parts” (Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, & Robert, 2003, p. 138). Aron (1986, p. 153) expands on the concept and introduces the term “war”, defining it as “the ensemble constituted by political units that maintain regular relations with each other and that are capable of being implicated in a generalized war”. In the words of Nye and Joseph (2002, p. 38), “the IS is not just the States. The international political system is the pattern of relationships among the States”. This definition is in line with the one proposed by Couto (1988, p. 19), who describes the International Political System (IPS), as “a set of independent centres of political decision making, which interact with a certain frequency and regularity”. This is the conceptualisation of IR that will be followed in this study, that is, the study will analyse the interactions / relationships described in the above definitions (Cunha & Pereira, 2004, cited in Dias, 2007). Therefore, IR are regular and frequent interactions between actors with different possibilities of action, depending on their intrinsic and extrinsic capabilities. These relations aim to achieve specific goals (and the freedom of action to accomplish them), which generally depends on the power those relations generate. Therefore, power must also be classified according to its type.

Power is situational and relative (Nogueira, 2011). That is, it does not have an absolute meaning, and it is exercised over another power through IR (Nogueira, 2011). A narrower

definition of power is the ability to impose one's will on another person, whether they want to or not (Dias, 2018). In IR, it can be defined as the ability of a political entity to impose its will upon other entities (Aron, 1986). That is, "power is the ability to exercise one's will over others" (Max Weber, cited in Moreira, 2002, p. 247). In broader sense, it is an IR agent's ability "to use material and immaterial resources and values to influence international events to their advantage" (Walter Jones, cited in Moreira, 2002, p. 247). Based on this conceptualisation, Moreira (2002, p. 247) defines power as "the product of material and immaterial resources available to impose the agent's political will, and which that agent uses to influence, condition, mobilise, and overcome the power of other agents who are also pursuing their own interests". In other words, power has an objective basis, a subjective basis, and a relative basis (Dias, 2018). In this study, Portugal's power is analysed in terms of the country's "ability to exercise its will over another's, while being aware that the instruments to do so must be chosen and used (if necessary) based on defined objectives and on the current situation and circumstances" (Dias, 2011, cited in Dias & Sequeira, 2015, p. 153).

Finally, the concept of military dimension used in this work describes one of the material resources that influence Portugal's power in IR. This conceptualisation is based on Article 275 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (Law No. 1/2005 of 12 August) and on Articles 22 to 24 of the LDN (Law No. 3/2021), which state that the AAFP are the national institution responsible for the military defence of the Republic and for fulfilling the State's international military commitments, and that they are charged with ensuring the military aspects of ND. Specifically, Article 8 of LOBOFA (Law No. 2/2021) describes the structure of the AAFP, which includes, in addition to the General Staff of the AAFP (EMGFA) and the military command and advisory bodies, the Navy, the Army and the Air Force (PoAF). As defined in Article 1 of its Organic Law (Law No. 63/2007 of 6 November), the GNR is a military security force, and as such is also included in this conceptualisation of MD.

Several documents and works relevant to this study were identified. The following studies were analysed for this work: studies on strategic and geopolitical conceptualisation, which identify the concepts and the strategic and geopolitical theories relevant to this study, and studies that explain the events currently taking place in the international "arena" (Couto, 1988; Dias, 2012; 2018; Dias & Sequeira 2015; 2017; Mendes, 2019; Marshall, 2017; 2019); studies that explain how States exercise power in IR, which were useful to understand how Portugal can gain leverage in those IR (Almeida, 1990; Palmeira, 2006; Nogueira, 2011; Guedes & Costa, 2019); studies that identify Portugal's foreign policy priorities after 25 April 1974, and its role in preserving (or increasing) the country's power in IR (Telo, 1997; Galito, 2019); studies that map global and regional security dynamics and analyse the role of the US, the EU, or Portugal in those relationships (Brzezinski, 2004; 2008; Fukuyama, 2018; Pires & Marreiros, 2020); and studies that examine the role of the AAFP as a vector of Portuguese foreign policy, and that identify how missions are defined and executed (Álvares, 2020; Dias et al., 2021; PRONE, 2021). Finally, the policy documents that address the use of the MD in international missions and the national interests in IR were analysed, specifically, the CEDN and the LDN, NATO's strategic concept and the EU strategic concept (NATO, 2022; Compass, 2022).

2.2 Analysis model

The study was organized according to the analysis model shown in Table 2.

Table 2 – Analysis model

General Objective				
<i>To ascertain how Portugal can use its Military Dimension to increase its power in International Relations.</i>				
Research Question				
How can Portugal use its Military Dimension to increase its power in International Relations?				
Specific Objectives	Subsidiary Questions	Concepts	Dimensions	Data collection
Specific Objective 1 <i>To ascertain how Portugal, as a small State, can increase its power in International Relations</i>	Subsidiary Question 1 How can Portugal, as a small state, increase its power in International Relations?	Power	International Relations	Literature review, statistical analysis and semi-structured interviews
		International Relations		
Specific Objective 2 To assess the role of the Military Dimension in International Relations	Subsidiary Question 2 How do the AAF increase Portugal's power in International Relations?	Military Dimension	Foreign Policy	

3. Methodology and method

This chapter presents the methodology and method used in the study.

3.1 Methodology

The study used an inductive reasoning process, which began by collecting specific data on the use of the MD abroad. Those data were then analysed to infer generalisations and to identify proposals and opportunities to use the MD to increase Portugal's power in IR (Bryman, 2012, p. 26).

To complement this inductive approach, a qualitative research strategy was used to collect systematised data, perspectives, experiences and personal opinions, which are inseparable from the subjectivity with which the sources relate to the phenomena (Santos & Lima, 2019). In addition to this methodology, a case study research design with a longitudinal time horizon was used to assess the role of the Portuguese AAF and identify the changes that occurred during that period (and that may occur in the future) (Santos & Lima, 2019, p. 36).

3.2 Method

3.1.1 Participants and procedure

Participants. The study surveyed nine military and civilian experts (Table 3) with recognised experience and knowledge in the topic of the study, who occupy (or have occupied) positions relevant to the issues analysed here. These interviewed experts comprise a non-probability purposive sample (Sarmiento, 2013), as this was considered the most useful approach to accomplish the defined objectives, and all interviewees were asked the same questions (Rego, Cunha, & Meyer, 2018).

Table 3 – Interviewees

N.º	Position	Name
1	Deputy Commander in UN operation in Central African Republic - MINUSCA	Major General Paulo Maia Pereira
2	Chief of the Cabinet of the Internationalization State Secretary, Former political and defence adviser in the Portuguese delegation in NATO and Deputy to the Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs	Dr. Cristina Isabel Domingos de Matos
3	<i>Deputy Director / Chief of Staff EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability</i>	Major General Hermínio Maio
4	Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Air Force	General Joaquim Nunes Borrego
5	Portuguese Minister of National Defence	PhD Professor João Gomes Cravinho
6	Deputy Director for National Defence Policy	Brigadier General Ana Rita Baltazar
7	Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Army	General José Nunes da Fonseca
8	Secretary-General of the Portuguese Republic Information System, Former Portuguese Ambassador in the Political Committee and for Security of EU and for the Organization for the Cooperation and Security in Europe	Ambassador Graça Mira Gomes
9	Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Navy	Almirante Henrique Gouveia e Melo

Procedure. An email was sent to potential participants to ask if they would be willing to be interviewed and to assure them that the survey would be anonymous and confidential (only one interviewee asked to not be identified). After this, an interview was scheduled (face to face, by videoconference, or email).

3.1.2 Data collection instruments

A semi-structured script was prepared for the interview. The script was the same for all interviewees and contained a contextualisation of the topic, the research objectives and the interview questions.

3.1.3 Data processing techniques

A content analysis was performed on the data obtained from the interviews based on the literature review and the state of the art. To identify the focus of the interviewees' answers, recording and context units were defined for each interview question (Sarmiento, 2013). Next, to systematise the findings, a category content analysis matrix was prepared for each interview question (Tables 4 to 10). The reliability and validity of the data obtained from the literature review and the interviews was confirmed by comparing those data with external sources and assessing their relevance to the research objectives (Sarmiento, 2013).

4. Data presentation and discussion of findings

In this chapter, the data collected is analysed and the subsidiary questions and research question are answered.

4.1 How can Portugal, as a small State, increase its power in IR

“Portuguese foreign policy is the result of a centuries-old project of global affirmation (through bilateral and multilateral strategic alliances) that was instrumental for Portugal’s survival as an independent State” (Galito, 2019, p. 21). This approach allowed Portugal to avoid becoming an exiguous State, as predicted by Moreira (2005) (due to the constraints posed by the challenges the country must deal with), and achieve more than its resources appeared to allow, by “using immaterial and material resources to advance its policies, strategies and ways of life, which could not be carried out without them” (Telo, 1997, p. 651). Thus, Portugal has succeeded in conveying the image of a power that uses different means and mechanisms to obtain resources and capabilities that multiply its strength and allow it to punch above its relative weight and participate in missions and strategies, both in at home and abroad (Telo, 1997, p. 652).

Therefore, the next sections will address the general attributes that give a State the ability to conduct IRs (which depends on its relative weight in a hierarchical IPS) and ascertain how Portugal fits into this hierarchy, in order to identify the factors that multiply its strength in the international “arena”.

4.1.1 The hierarchization of States

In an increasingly interdependent world, especially in the political, economic and military spheres, States continue to be the main centres of autonomous international decision making, as well as the main agents of IR (Cohen, 2003; Couto, 1988; Fernandes, 1991, 2008). However, a State’s ability to intervene depends on its attributes (territory, population, government, sovereignty (Cunha & Pereira, 2004), among others). Through Geopolitics, these attributes can be assessed in quantitative and qualitative terms to determine a State’s strengths and weaknesses and its power in IR (Dias, 2018). On the other hand, only sovereign States have the ability to intervene in the IS. So called semi sovereign States (vassals, confederates, neutralized, exiguous and others) have a limited ability to do so (Cunha & Pereira, 2004). This includes States whose sovereignty is fragile or shared as a result of events or circumstances (Dias, 2018).

Several authors have proposed criteria for ranking States. Ray Cline’s “huge” States have over 15 million inhabitants, and are ranked using a formula that helps to reduce subjective factors, while also accounting for material factors, the weight of the national will and the coherence of the State’s national strategy (Almeida, 1990). Adriano Moreira divided powers into large, medium, and small powers. The first group only includes powers that can initiate or wage a global war autonomously, and the latter group comprises those that must form alliances with a superior power or powers in order to pursue their interests (Moreira, 1994).

Cabral Couto classifies powers as superpowers, large / medium powers, regional or second tier powers, and small powers. The first are poles of power with the capacity for global action, and the latter have limited (or even zero) influence, and can only intervene in a multilateral context (Couto, 1988). Their power comes from their functional power (geographic location, resources required by the IS) or from the “power of numbers” that comes from their ability to form alliances with other powers of the same type and join forces to obtain a better outcome (Moreira, 1991, 1994).

The classifications above are not the only ones. There are opposite, similar and even complementary approaches (Dias, 2018). For example, the “Orders of National Power” approach describes a State system integrated in geopolitical structures (Cohen, 2003). In a clear hierarchization of powers, three IOs that participated in the Congress of Vienna of 1815 (the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the UN) attempted to create a balance of power in the IPS, in the aftermath of several armed conflicts on a global scale (Palmeira, 2006).

4.1.2 The power of small States

Small States are a part of the system described in the section above. This type of State does not have the strategic potential required to have sufficient freedom of action in the IPS. Therefore, such States must accept these power asymmetries, but find ways to mitigate them by exploiting the features they share with States of similar or superior power, by choosing their alliances carefully and by maintaining and developing historical, linguistic and cultural ties with friendly States (Almeida, 1990).

Diplomacy is the main course of at the disposal of small States in their relations with other powers. Under no circumstances should they abandon their objectives, as this would call into question their dignity, history, culture and traditional values (Almeida, 1990), and would be a symptom of the decline of the teleological purpose that justifies their existence. Diplomacy should be exercised in its various forms (e.g. digital, shared, economic and cultural) (Moita et al., 2019) to influence and attract other powers with similar interests (Moreira & Ramalho, 2011). Naturally, States should also use the instruments and mechanisms provided by International Law, in an IS increasingly marked by cooperation policies and shared sovereignties, in which diplomacy aims to align interests and is seen as an instrument of cooperative dialogue, rather than cautious form of conflict negotiation (Moita et al., 2019). Therefore, the foreign policy of States has an instrumental role, and their diplomacy is the ability to execute the plans that have been defined (Galito, 2019, p. 5).

Furthermore, small States’ influence capacity can also be seen as a means to disrupt the established order, as long as this benefits them. They can do this in several ways: by remaining neutral (Correia, 2004), by integrating international forums, by using the power to speak up and protest (or applaud), as well as the power to vote in global affairs (Almeida, 1990), or by using their functional power and “the power of numbers” mentioned above. Moreira (1997) adds that small States can develop a “service sovereignty” to acquire a power based on the recognition of their contributions to the international community, which are validated by the quality and relevance of the services it provides. This is the approach adopted in the Strategic

Military Concept (CEM, 2014).

Thus, although small States do not have the power associated with military or economic capacity, that power does exist, and these States they are part of the international “arena” and their contributions cannot be ignored (Almeida, 1990). Small States must live with the hierarchy of powers, because it exists, but must also develop strategies to mitigate asymmetries and defend / achieve their interests / objectives. Generally, these States’ actions are based on their functional power (when they have it), on the power of numbers (through multilateralism), on their influence capacity (which depends on their diplomatic capacity) and on a “service sovereignty” (that rewards them for their contributions to IR).

4.1.3 Portugal’s power

Portugal’s status as a State is that of a small power (Almeida, 1990; Couto, 1988; Moreira, 1994). However, this has not prevented it from taking the actions it deemed necessary to pursue its interests. Moreover, despite seeming to be a “dysfunctional” State in the IS (Telo, 1997), it has implemented a “consolidated” foreign policy based on three strategic vectors (Europe, the Atlantic and Lusophony) (Cravinho, 2012, cited in Galito, 2019, p. 4). This policy has been expanded with the addition of three other vectors (which result from the division of the first three): support to the Communities (or Portuguese diaspora); Internationalisation (or economic diplomacy); and Multilateralism (Galito, 2019; Silva, 2018).

Portugal has maintained a privileged relationship with the power that dominates the Atlantic, and has bilateral relations with Canada and the UK (Galito, 2019). This has allowed the country to be at the centre of the changes in the IS (Telo, 1997). As a founding member of NATO, Portugal’s participation allows it to protect the Portuguese Atlantic space and the values of Portuguese society (Telo, 2001). Portugal is also a member of the IO that unites Europe, which allows it to develop economically and socially (Galito, 2019), and has historical ties with countries that speak the Portuguese language. These ties make it a platform for dialogue and trade and enrich the national culture (Galito, 2019).

This global presence, which has granted it the privilege of being “recognised” by other powers, is sustained by specific elements that grant it power in IR:

(i) its geography - continental Portugal is located on the westernmost coast of Europe, which is peripheral in relation to its centre, but central in relation to the American, European and African continents, and acts as a platform that links the two Atlantic coasts, and simultaneously, as a link between the north and the south. Additionally, Portugal has access to the ocean and an archipelagic territory. This gives it a competitive edge because of the land, sea (the continental shelf can still be expanded) and airspace for which the country is responsible (Guedes & Costa, 2019);

(ii) its national cohesion, which is based on a common language - Portuguese is the fifth most spoken language in the world (with about 250 million speakers) (Tourism, 2022) -, on the patriotic and religious values of its population (Guedes & Costa, 2019), on more than two million Portuguese emigrants (a number that rises to more than five million if Lusodescendants are included) and a diaspora spread across five continents, who continue

to have ties to Portugal (Diplomacy Portal, 2022), and on a culture with elements from all over the world, which emerged from a millenary process of biological and cultural miscegenation (Saraiva, 2005);

(iii) the ability to act as a hub for cultures, people and regions (Telo, 1997) thanks to its prestigious history (Guedes & Costa, 2019) and to the sea lines of communication its geography provides, such as the Sines seaport, which could become an “Atlantic gateway to Europe” as international land and sea trade routes are being redefined, a process that began in 2016 with the expansion of the Panama Canal (which made it possible for ships with twice the size to use the transatlantic route between the Pacific and the Atlantic, saved money and time), which could give it a prominent role vis a vis the Chinese “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” project (Duarte, 2019, p.59), and even as a result of the current conflict in Eastern Europe;

(iv) the weight of the political level, and especially the quality of its diplomacy, and the way it conducts its foreign policy based on the principles of “economy of efforts”, in order to maximise the return on its political and diplomatic investment, for example, by focusing its negotiating efforts where they will have the most impact, and by avoiding getting involved in every issue with the same intensity (Guedes & Costa, 2019, p. 25); the peculiar rules of the Portuguese social game, which have shown that “in the periods of Portugal’s history during which the country is more open to the outside world, there is more innovation and the pace of change accelerates exponentially”, and that the opposite happens when the country closes itself, that is, “collective and corporate values become more burdensome and innovation is slower and more difficult to achieve” (Telo, 1997, p. 667); and the role of the military in participating regularly in missions under the aegis of several IOs in the IS (Guedes & Costa, 2019).

4.1.4 Brief overview and answer to SQ1

The above analysis provides an answer to SQ1 (*How can Portugal increase its power in IR?*). Portugal achieves this by pursuing its interests in IR, using the functional power granted by its geographical location, which allows it to serve as a platform that links both shores of the Atlantic and as a link between the North and the South, and to act as a hub for people, cultures and regions; by using the “power of numbers” and its influence capacity, which results from its active participation in the multilateral initiatives of the main IOs, and on the weight of the political level, which is based on its diplomacy; and, finally, to use the “power” granted by its “service sovereignty”, that is, its ability to adapt and the national cohesion that comes from its permanent participation in bilateral and multilateral forums.

4.2 The AAFP’s international missions

This sub chapter will analyse the participation of the AAFP in NATO, EU and UN missions, and in CDD missions with CPLP countries. It will also provide the answer to SQ2.

The involvement of the FND in international operations depends on the objectives that Portugal wishes to achieve through its commitments to the IOs to which the country belongs (EMGFA, 2020). This involvement increases the country's credibility and shows its commitment and determination to participate in processes and collective actions that aim to create an environment of international peace and security, which directly benefits the country, and allows it to affirm its national identity through a "service sovereignty" (CEM, 2014, pp. 7, 22).

The EMGFA is the body that plans, directs and controls the use of military forces in operations, and the Chief of the EMGFA (CEMGFA) is responsible for their deployment and operational command, whereas the branches are responsible for their readiness and sustainment (LOBOFA, Law No. 2/2021).

However, the decision-making process for the use of FND begins earlier, when the CEMGFA, based on the guidelines defined by the political level, and after consulting with the Council of Chiefs of Defence Staff (LOBOFA, Law no. 2/2021), proposes the forces (or military response options) that will be used to take advantage of new opportunities to pursue the national interest provided / identified by the Directorate General of ND Policy (Regulatory Decree No. 14/2015 of 31 July). These proposals are presented to the MDN and, if approved, to the National Security Council, who issues an opinion (LDN, Law No. 3/2021). After this, the Prime Minister informs the President of the Republic of the decision and the circumstances that justify it, and the Government communicates its decision to use the FND to the Portuguese Parliament (LDN, Law No. 3/2021).

The opportunities to use the FND in missions under the aegis of NATO, the EU and the UN depend on the international context and on these IOs' decision to use military forces. The factors that influence the choice of missions in which Portugal participates are shown in Table 4. Even though the interviewees did not specifically state it, pursuing the national interest is the main decision-making element mentioned by 89% of the interviewees². J.G. Cravinho (face-to-face interview, 10 February 2022) states that this choice "follows an established pattern that has evolved over the years" and that the country "benefits from being seen as a net contributor to international security and stability". Portugal's permanent presence in these three IOs and the national commitments were also mentioned as factors by 78% of interviewees. H. Maio (Zoom interview, 23 January 2022) adds that "by defending the interests of these IOs, Portugal is defending its own interests", and A.R. Baltazar (Zoom interview, 12 February 2022) states that Portugal's participation is also "a matter of credibility and reliability between allies and Member States". On the other hand, more than half of interviewees believe that Portugal's decision to participate in missions also depends on the available capabilities, which must be useful for the type of operations that are carried out by these IOs (56% of interviewees).

² The tables in this chapter summarise the category content analysis performed on the expert interviews (Table 3). The tables are organized around the topic of the study and serve to: identify the factors that influence Portugal's decision to participate in missions and how the CEDN affects that decision; ascertain how the AAFP's international commitments increase the country's power in IR, and identify these missions; and to assess how the national forces should be used in the international missions of these IOs and in the geographic areas analysed here.

On the other hand, the military response options proposed for each opportunity are based on Portugal's capabilities in terms of forces (and their suitability for the operation), on the available budget, and on the IOs' acceptance of its force generation proposals (Talambas, 2019).

Table 4 – Analysis of Question 1

Q1: What are the factors/considerations, which in your view, are at the origin of the choice of the missions in which Portugal participates, within the framework of NATO, EU and UN? What about CDD actions with CPLP member countries?														
Category	Subcategory	Un Reg ³	Interviewee									UnEn ⁴		
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Σ	%	
National interest	NATO/EU/ UN	1.1	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	8	89	
Increasing of the participation importance, associated with the current situation		1.2	x		x		x					3	33	
Geography / Funding		1.3				x		x				2	22	
Permanent presence in the 3 IO / International Obligations		1.4	x	x	x	x	x			x	x	7	78	
Contribution to the objectives of IOs		1.5			x				x	x		3	33	
Capabilities associated with the type of operations		1.6	x	x	x	x		x				5	56	
Specific niche areas (leadership training, joint projects...)	CDD	1.7	x	x				x			x	4	44	
Participation at the strategic level in the country with whom it occurs		1.8	x	x					x	x	x	5	56	
National interest, associated with specific factors		1.9	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	8	89	
Bridge to other IOs		1.10	x	x				x	x				4	44

The decision to participate in CDD actions, according to 89% of interviewees, is based on national interests associated with specific factors (Table 4). Some of those factors are: the execution of joint projects and the maintenance of institutional relationships, and cultural and economic aspects (C. I. Matos, Zoom interview, 21 January 2022); the security and defence of the countries with which Portugal cooperates (J. G. Cravinho, op. cit.; H. Maio, op. cit.).

³ RecUn are fragments of the transcribed contents of the interviews which have a similar context (organized by colour, for example). In other words, they are fragments of the transcribed interviews that have similar and comparable content, and which defined as categories (Sarmiento, 2013, pp. 53-66).

⁴ Enumeration Units (EnUn). EnUn aggregate the findings according to the recording units identified in the interviewee's answers (Sarmiento, 2013, pp. 53-66).

When asked about the influence of the CEDN on Portugal's decision to use its AAF in missions abroad (Table 5), 78% of interviewees stated that the document is a guideline that is not followed in practice. H. Maio (op. cit.) adds that "what happens in the IOs is more important".

Table 5 – Analysis of Question 2

Q2: Do you consider that the CEDN of 2013, has changed the way Portugal uses its FFAA in promoting Portugal's power in IR? Why?													
Category	Un Reg	Interviewee									UnEn		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Σ	%	
Yes, but only in some aspects	7.1	x						x			2	22	
No, the CEDN is a framing document / inconsequential / it is more relevant what goes on in the IOs	7.2		x	x	x	x	x		x	x	7	78	

However, while H. G. e Melo (email interview, 26 February 2022) agree that the CEDN does not influence this decision, they believe that the document "provides strategic and doctrinal guidelines to build the capabilities required to meet the defined level of ambition". Furthermore, J. G. Cravinho (op. cit.) states that it will be necessary to "create mechanisms to make the next CEDN more consistent with the way Portugal uses its AAF".

4.2.1 The role of the Navy

Figures 1 to 5 show the participation of the Navy in missions that increase Portugal's power in IR⁵. This branch is deployed in missions under the aegis of the IOs analysed here on a regular basis⁶. These missions reached a peak between 2016 and 2017, but have increased in the last year (Figure 1).

⁵ The data shown in the figures included in this chapter refer to the use of the AAF in the international context from 2013 to 2021. The data include the participation of FND and END in NATO, EU and UN missions and in CDD actions with CPLP member countries. These data were obtained from the following sources, which are listed in the References section and throughout the text: Defence Yearbooks, General Secretariat of the MDN, EMGFA, Navy, Army and Air Force.

⁶ The missions listed here include the national forces assigned to NATO and EU high readiness forces. The following NATO missions in which Portugal participates are also included: Operation Active Endeavour (Mediterranean), Operation Sea Guardian (which followed Active Endeavour), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, Afghanistan), Resolute Support Mission (RSM, which followed ISAF), Kosovo Force (KFOR, in Kosovo), NATO Mission Iraq (Iraq), Operation Ocean Shield (off the coast of Somalia), Baltic Air Policing (BAP, Baltic airspace), Enhanced Air Policing (Poland), Immediate Assurance Measures (Lithuania and Romania), Tailored Forward Presence (Romania), Focused Collection Activities (Baltic) and Operation Allied Solace (Kosovo). In the EU: European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) (Operation Atalanta, Gulf of Eden and Somali Basin), European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (Operations Sophia and Irini, Mediterranean), European Union Training Mission (EUTM) (Mali, Somalia, CAR and Mozambique), European Union Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC, Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the participation of AAF assets in the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX). Finally, within the aegis of the UN: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA, CAR), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA, Mali), United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVMC, Colombia), United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK, Kosovo), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA, Afghanistan), and Operation IDAI to provide humanitarian aid to Mozambique.

However, the number of personnel involved in these operations did not accompany this trend, reaching a peak in 2018, when about 1210 service members were deployed in nine missions (Figures 1 and 2). More than 300 service members were assigned to Operation Sea Guardian (NATO), which aims to ensure a safe maritime environment in the Mediterranean. Portugal participated in this mission with frigates NRP D. F. Almeida and Alvares Cabral (Secretariat-General of the MDN, email, 10 December 2018). H. G. e Melo (op. cit.) also mentions the Navy's participation with a Marines Company in NATO's Assurance Measures in Lithuania, which "contributes to the efforts to deter the Russian threat and to strengthen the defensive measures on Europe's eastern border". C. I. Matos (op. cit.) highlights the participation of this branch in the EU's FRONTEX mission, which "had concrete 'benefits' for the national foreign policy, including the support for the Portuguese candidate for the position of Director-General of the International Organization for Migration".




Figure 1 – Total Navy missions, per year, in the International Organizations




Figure 2 – Total Navy effective, per year, in missions in the International Organizations

Overall, the Navy participates in more NATO and EU missions than UN missions (Figure 3). The Navy is mainly deployed in the areas of influence of the European and African continents (Figure 5), and most of its deployed personnel is assigned to NATO, largely due to the capabilities allocated to this IO's high-readiness forces (Figure 4).




Figure 3 – Navy missions, per year, per IO




Figure 4 – Navy personnel assigned to each IO, per year




Figure 5 – Total Navy missions, per year, in each continent

Similarly, Figures 26 to 33 show that the Navy participates in CDD activities on a regular basis (a trend that is increasing) (Figure 27), and that, on average, about 50 service members are deployed each year (Figure 29) (this number decreased in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic). The Navy also provides training to military personnel from CPLP countries in Portugal (Figure 31). However, as in the other branches, the number of military personnel trained in their countries of origin has decreased (Figure 33).

4.2.2 The role of the Army

Figures 6 to 10 show the Army's participation in missions that increase Portugal's power in IR (CDD activities are shown in Figures 26 to 33). This participation has followed a cyclical trend, reaching a peak in 2017 and 2019 (Figure 6). The number of deployed personnel shows a similar trend (Figure 7), as a result of the country's participation in NATO's high-readiness

forces, but also in the peace support mission in Kosovo in 2017 (KFOR), and the mission to train, advise and assist the National Defence and Security Forces of Afghanistan in 2019 (RSM), both under the umbrella of NATO.

However, the number of deployed personnel reached a peak in 2021, when approximately 1541 service members were assigned to NATO's high-readiness forces, but also to the UN MINUSCA mission, which aimed to curb the threat posed by armed groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) and implement a peaceful and secure environment in that country (Resources Division of the EMGFA, email, 13 December 2021). J. G. Cravinho (op. cit.) and C. I. Matos (op. cit.) highlight this mission as an important contribution to leverage Portugal's relations with other UN countries, and especially with the EU, in the field of defence. P. M. Pereira (Zoom interview, 16 January 2022) adds that "Portugal does more than what is asked of it" in the CAR and that it "plays a key role in the region and is an important factor for Portugal's credibility".




Figure 6 – Total Army missions, per year, in the International Organizations




Figure 7 – Total Army effective, per year, in missions in the International Organizations

The Army mainly participates in NATO missions, but also integrates several missions under the umbrella of the EU and the UN (in the latter, from 2016 onwards) (Figure 8). Most of these the missions took place in the African continent, and the majority of personnel was assigned to NATO due to the capabilities allocated to this IO's high-readiness forces (Figures 9 and 10).




Figure 8 – Total Army missions, per year, per International Organizations




Figure 9 – Total Army effective, per year, in each International Organization




Figure 10 – Total Army missions, per year, in each continent

As for CDD activities, the number of missions in which the Army has participated has decreased (Figure 27). Similarly, the number of personnel deployed annually (on average, 60 service members) has also decreased (Figure 29). In the last years, the Army has provided training to military personnel from CPLP countries in Portugal on a regular basis (Figure 31). However, the number of personnel trained by the Army in their countries of origin has decreased (Figure 33).

4.2.3 The role of the Air Force

The PoAF's participation in missions that increase Portugal's power in IR is shown in Figures 11 to 15 (and 26 to 33, in the case of CDD activities). This participation has been irregular, reaching a peak in 2016, 2017 and 2019, but increased in the last year (Figure 11). On the other hand, the number of deployed personnel has decreased, having reached a peak in 2015, when approximately 538 service members were assigned to eight missions.

That year, the PoAF participated in UN operation MINUSMA in Mali, which aimed to support the political transition and protect the population, to consolidate the State's authority, and to assist the country in holding free elections. The PoAF deployed two aircraft, the C-130H and the C-295M, along with their crews and support personnel. It also participated in the NATO Assurance Measures mission in Romania with four F-16M aircraft to assist in the Air Policing of that country (Yearbook, 2015). J. N. Borrego (email interview, 10 February 2022) states that "the PoAF's Air Policing activities in the Baltic countries have played an important role in Portugal's recognition in IR". C. I. Matos (op. cit.) adds that they help "garner goodwill and international sympathy for the national interests".




Figure 11 – Total Air Force missions, per year, in the International Organizations




Figure 12 – Total Air Force effective, per year, in missions in the International Organizations

The PoAF mainly participates in NATO missions, but also in missions for the UN and the EU (Figure 13), especially in the European and African continents (Figure 15). Most of its deployed personnel is assigned to NATO due to the capabilities allocated to this IO's high-readiness forces (Figure 14).




Figure 13 – Total Air Force missions, per year, per International Organization




Figure 14 – Total Air Force effective, per year, in each International Organization




Figure 15 – Total Air Force missions, per year, in each continent

On the other hand, the PoAF regularly participates in CDD activities, a trend that had two peaks, in 2015 (four missions) and 2019 (six missions), respectively (Figure 27). On average, the PoAF has deployed, on average, 27 service members per year (Figure 29). Finally, unlike the other branches, the PoAF has not participated regularly in the training of military personnel from CPLP countries (Figures 31 and 33).

4.2.4 The role of the Armed Forces

The role of the AAFF in increasing Portugal's power in IR by participating in missions of the IOs analysed here was described as highly positive by 89% of interviewees (Table 6). However, P. M. Pereira (op. cit.) has reservations, mainly in relation to NATO, "due to the constant lack of capabilities that can be allocated exclusively" to that organization. However, C. I. Matos (op. cit.) argues that the country's low investment in Defence research and

development is more relevant to that IO (a substantial part of the budget allocated to this area is used to cover personnel costs) because it is common practice in some EU countries to have forces allocated both to NATO and the EU.

Table 6 – Analysis of Question 3

Q3: In general terms, how do you evaluate the use of AAFF in National Detached Forces in the UN, NATO and EU, as a factor in promoting Portugal's power in IR? What about CDD with CPLP member states?													
Category	Subcategory	Un Reg	Interviewee									UnEn	
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Σ	%
Significantly positive, but with uncertainty	NATO/EU/ UN	2.1	x									1	11
Significantly positive, without uncertainty		2.2		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8	89
Growing	CDD	2.3	x									1	11
Very positive		2.4		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8	89

On the other hand, Table 7 helps explain the assessment that the AAFF are a factor that increases Portugal's power in IR (Table 6).

Table 7 – Análise da Questão 4

Q4: What are the contributions resulting from the use of the AAFF, in National Detached Forces, which you identify, as promoters of Portugal's power in IR? What about in CDD?													
Category	Subcategory	Un Reg	Interviewee									UnEn	
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Σ	%
Affirmation / Credibility of Portugal	OTAN/UE/ ONU	3.1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	9	100
Creation of windows of opportunity (trading tables / outsourcing of industry and trade, ...)		3.2	x	x			x	x				4	44
Training (increasing of power) of Portuguese AAFF		3.3			x				x			2	22
Leveraging the capacity for national influence		3.4			x	x		x				3	33
International security co-producers		3.5	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	8	89
Facilitator of national action in different areas	CDD	3.6	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	9	100
Promotion / Consolidation of Portuguese culture		3.7	x	x	x		x			x		5	56
Contribution to affirmation / Credibility in the various IO / Bridge in the EU to Africa		3.8	x		x		x			x	x	5	56

All interviewees agree that the main benefit of the AAF's participation in international missions is Portugal's increased recognition and credibility (Table 7). J. N. da Fonseca (email interview, 15 February 2022) states that "Portugal has acquired recognition and prestige as a present, active stakeholder". Furthermore, the fact that Portugal is becoming recognised as a co-producer of international security was also mentioned (by 89% of respondents). H. G. and Melo (op. cit.) agrees that this allows "the country to consolidate its role as a coastal state and as a contributor to common security". J. G. Cravinho (op. cit.) states that Portugal has obtained a return on its investment by deploying the AAF under the aegis of the EU and the UN. That is, it has successfully defended its national interests. However, in the case of NATO, there are still some steps to take. On the other hand, for 44% of interviewees, the participation of the AAF in these missions has had the additional benefit of opening windows of opportunity (for example, to integrate international forums) that may have remained closed without it.

Having analysed the situation of the branches, this section will examine the participation of the AAF as a whole (Figures 16 to 25) in NATO, EU and UN missions, and in CDD activities with CPLP countries (Figures 26 to 33). Overall, these figures show that, between 2013 and 2021, there was an increase of more than 62% in the number of missions involving the AAF (from 21 to 34 missions), which constitutes an increasing trend (Figure 16), with the exception of 2018 and 2020, when the number of missions decreased for the three branches (Figure 17).




Figure 16 – Total Armed Forces missions, per year, in the International Organizations




Figure 17 – Total Armed Forces missions, per branch, per year




Figure 18 – Committed Armed Forces effective, per year




Figure 19 – Committed Armed Forces effective, per branches

The PoAF was the branch that participated in more IOs until 2017 (except in 2013 and 2015), after which the Army took the lead until 2019 (except in 2018), reaching another peak in 2021 (Figure 17).

In the period analysed in this study, the AAF deployed, on average, more than 2,000 service members to the IO missions listed in this work. This number peaked in 2021, a year in which the branches contributed more than 1,450 service members to the NATO high-readiness forces (EMGFA Resources Division, op. cit.) (Figures 18 and 19). NATO was the IO to which Portugal deployed more forces, followed by the EU and the UN (Figure 20). However, in recent years, more personnel has been assigned to the UN than to the EU (Figure 21). The Navy participated in 39 NATO missions, the Army in 37 and the PoAF in 41 (Figure 23); in the case of the EU, the Navy has participated in 38 missions, the Army in 30 and the PoAF in 25 (Figure 24); and in case of the UN, the Navy has participated in five missions, the Army in 21 and the PoAF in 24 (Figure 22).




Figure 20 – Missions, per year, in each International Organization, with Armed Forces participation




Figure 21 – Committed Armed Forces effective in each International Organization




Figure 22 – Total Armed Forces missions, per branches, in UN




Figure 23 – Total Armed Forces missions, per branches, in NATO




Figure 24 – Total Armed Forces missions, per branches, in EU

For 67% of interviewees, the “priority” given to the missions that the AAFB integrates in each IO is correct (Table 8), and it should be maintained in the medium and long term, as it is the most appropriate to defend Portugal’s interests in IR. However, N. Borrego (op. cit.) states that “these priorities can be changed if the circumstances require it”, and C. I. Matos (op. cit.) adds that the country should “participate in missions of all three IOs on a regular basis”.

As the table shows, several interviewees (44% of participants) believe that Portugal should have a permanent presence in NATO, EU, UN and CPLP missions, in the case of the latter, integrated one of the first three organizations.

Table 8 – Analysis of Question 5

Q5: In relation to what the future employment of the FFAA in the medium and long term (National Detached Forces and CDD) may be, can you establish a hierarchy of the IO (NATO, EU, UN and CPLP) that best considers enhancing the defence of Portugal's interests in IR? Why?													
Category	Subcategory	Un Reg	Interviewee									UnEn	
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Σ	%
Always in the 3 IO and with the CPLP contributing to one of them (UN)	IO	6.1	x		x	x				x		4	44
NATO, EU, UN and CPLP, because it is the one that best defends national interests		6.2	x	x	x		x	x		x		6	67
NATO, UN, EU and CPLP, for the universal dimension of the UN		6.3							x			1	11

[Cont.]

ATO, EU, CPLP and UN, to enhance CDD programs within the framework of the CPLP		6.4										x	1	11
Europe (including Atlantic and Mediterranean zone of influence), Africa and South America, due to the relationship with Brazil	Geographical area	6.5	x										1	11
Africa (Gulf of Guinea), Europe (including the Mediterranean and Atlantic zone of influence), because they are areas of strong influence and interest of Portugal		6.6										x	1	11
Europe (including Atlantic and Mediterranean influence zone) and Africa, because they are the areas of our strategic interest		6.7		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		7	78

When asked about which AAF mission contributed the most to increase Portugal's power in IR and in what way (Table 9), 67% of interviewees stated that it was difficult to name just one. H. Maio (op. cit.) added that this assessment also "depends on Portugal's interests at that time". However, despite stating that most missions are important, some interviewees mentioned the participation of the AAF in the UN's MINUSCA mission in the CAR (and the EU's EUTM) as one of the most relevant to enhance Portugal's power in IR (44% of interviewees). This choice is justified by the fact that the Portuguese FND have a decisive impact in that country, not only because they are the force leading the operation, but also because of the highly professional attitude of the Portuguese personnel, compared to the other forces operating in the region. This not only increases Portugal's credibility with the CAR and fellow member countries of the UN and the EU (100% of interviewees), but also contributes to the country's recognition as an active stakeholder in international peace and security (78% of interviewees).

Table 9 – Analysis of Question 6

Q6: Taking as an initial reference the year of CEDN (2013), until 2021 (inclusive), what was the mission that most contributed to enhance the power of Portugal in the IR? Why? And what are the concrete results achieved by this mission?														
Category	Subcategory	Un Reg	Interviewee									UnEn		
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Σ	%	
MINUSCA (CAR/UN), because Portugal makes a difference	Mission that contributed the most	4.1	x				x		x	x		4	44	
Air policing in NATO and FRONTEX, because it allowed specific gains for foreign policy		4.2				x						1	11	
Assurance Measures, because it contributed to the deterrence of the Russian threat		4.3									x	1	11	
Afghanistan (ISAF and RSM), by the characteristics of the Portuguese militaries and being NATO first Art. 5 mission		4.4							x			1	11	
Mozambique, because it has leveraged the national relationship with the EU		4.5					x					1	11	
There are several, and it is difficult to identify only one		4.7		x	x	x		x		x	x	6	67	
International credibility	Results	4.8	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	9	100	
Aggregation of wills		4.9		x		x		x				3	33	
Reference model for other forces		4.10	x				x		x			3	33	
Affirmation of Portugal as an active member of international peace and security		4.11	x		x	x	x		x	x	x	7	78	
Creation of windows of opportunity (for trade)		4.12	x									1	11	
Leverage in our relationship with partners		4.13		x		x	x	x		x	x	6	67	

Some interviewees also mentioned that gaining leverage in the national relations with partners is an important benefit of the AAFP's participation in missions of these IO (67% of interviewees).

On the other hand, 56% of interviewees did not specify the mission which, in their opinion, was less relevant to increase Portugal's power in IR (Table 10). H. G. e Melo (op. cit.) adds that, while some missions do not have obvious benefits, those benefits exist, even if they are not as significant, because all missions are important to the national interest. However, 22% of

interviewees mentioned the mission in Afghanistan as an example of a mission that had no practical benefits, because the political objectives of the mission were not properly defined / sustained (J. G. Cravinho, op. cit.). C. I. Matos (op. cit.) adds that the costs / benefits of the national participation in that mission were not discernible.

Table 10 – Analysis of Question 7

Q7: Taking as an initial reference the year of CEDN (2013), until 2021 (inclusive), what was the mission that contributed least to enhance the power of Portugal in IR? Why?													
Category	Un Reg	Interviewee									UnEn		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Σ	%	
Atalanta (Horn of Africa/EU) / Short term mission	5.1	x									1	11	
ISAF / Inconsequential	5.2		x			x					2	22	
EUTM Somalia / Reduced number of military personnel	5.3						x				1	11	
I do not identify one in concrete / In all there is a relevant and distinct contribution	5.4			x	x			x	x	x	5	56	

Finally, with regards to the continents where Portugal tends to intervene, the country mainly deployed forces to the European continent until 2019, after which Africa took the lead as the continent with the most Portuguese deployed forces (Figure 25). However, the European continent (including the Atlantic and Mediterranean area of influence) remains Portugal's first priority, followed by Africa, as mentioned by 78% of interviewees (Table 8). C. I. Matos (op.cit.) explains that the country should “avoid diverting efforts to other areas because it may not be advantageous in terms of costs / benefits”; J. N. Borrego (op. cit.) states that “we should not neglect our regional interests in the areas where we already have a presence”; H. Maio (op. cit.) points out that “we must understand that Africa is becoming increasingly more important for the EU”; and J. G. Cravinho (op. cit.) notes that “it is clear that the European defence identity is becoming crystallised”, a process in which “Portugal cannot fail to participate”, as such, the country must “increase its participation in EU activities”.




Figure 25 – Total Armed Forces missions, per continent

The AAFP's participation in CDD missions is seen as positive by 89% of interviewees (Table 6). C. I. Matos (op. cit.) states that these actions are “a permanent national interest” and J. N. Borrego (op. cit.) adds that they play an “important role in strengthening [Portugal's] relationship with the diaspora”. The AAFP participate in these missions on a regular basis, with a peak in 2018 and 2019 (31 missions) (Figure 26) and a peak in deployed personnel in 2015 (Figure 28). The Army is the branch that has deployed more personnel (Figure 27). However, in the last year, the Navy deployed more service members than the Army (Figure 29).




Figure 26 – Total Cooperation in the Defence Domain missions, per year




Figure 27 – Total Cooperation in the Defence Domain missions, per year, per branch




Figure 28 – Total effective in Cooperation in the Defence Domain missions




Figure 29 – Total effective in Cooperation in the Defence Domain missions, per branch

On average, more than 100 foreign students are trained in Portugal every year (Figures 30 and 31), and more than 3,400 are trained in the countries of origin of CPLP Member States. However, in the latter case, this number has been steadily decreasing in all branches (Figures 32 and 33).




Figure 30 – Total Community of Portuguese-speaking countries military personnel formed in Portugal




Figure 31 – Total Community of Portuguese-speaking countries military personnel formed, per year, in Portugal, per branch




Figure 32 – Total military personnel formed in the Community of Portuguese-speaking countries, per year




Figure 33 – Total Community of Portuguese-speaking countries military personnel formed in the Community of Portuguese-speaking countries, per branch

As for the role of CDD missions in increasing Portugal's power in IR, all interviewees agree that they facilitate the national actions in several areas, promote and consolidate the Portuguese culture, and increase the country's recognition and credibility (56% of interviewees, Table 7).

4.2.5 Brief overview and answer to SQ2

The above analysis provided an answer to SQ2 (*What is the role of the AAFP in increasing Portugal's power in IR?*). The data revealed that the AAFP participates regularly in multilateral missions under the aegis of NATO, the EU and the UN, as well as in CDD missions with CPLP countries, and that the number of these missions is increasing. NATO is the IO to which Portugal assigns more NDF/END, followed by the EU, the UN and CPLP countries. Most of these missions take place in Europe (and in its area of influence in the Atlantic and Mediterranean), followed by Africa.

Most interviewees confirmed that the AAFP play an important role in increasing Portugal's power in IR and in the country's recognition and credibility, and that the participation of the AAFP in CDD activities provides benefits for Portugal in several areas.

Generally, Portugal participates in international missions to pursue the national interest and to fulfil the country's commitments by maintaining a permanent presence in all three IOs. In the case of CDD, the missions are chosen based on national interests associated with specific factors. On the other hand, the CEDN has little influence on that decision.

4.3 The role of the MD in increasing Portugal's power in IR, and answer to the RQ

The above section provided an answer to the RQ (*How can Portugal use the MD to increase its power in IR?*). The data revealed that the AAFP's play a significant role in increasing Portugal's power in IR, and in the country's recognition and credibility in the IS, and that they

allow the country to pursue its ambition of affirming itself as a co-producer of international security. Furthermore, the participation of the AAF in CDD missions provides benefits for Portugal in several areas.

Moreover, Portugal should continue to prioritise NATO missions when deploying its AAF (this is partially addressed in the CEDN), followed by the EU, the UN and CPLP countries (the last two may be changed if the circumstances require it). Similarly, the AAF should be deployed in missions that take place in Europe (and its area of influence in the Atlantic and Mediterranean) and Africa, and avoid missions in areas that are less attractive in terms of costs / benefits and that will not increase Portugal's power in IR in a discernible way.

Therefore, Portugal must choose its international missions carefully and avoid committing forces to missions where the national presence will be less relevant, as this could prevent those forces from being available for missions that could increase Portugal's power in IR. This assumption is based on the fact that military forces are increasingly called upon to participate not only in military operations, but also in humanitarian and natural disaster operations. Therefore, Portugal should develop military capabilities that can be easily deployed, increase the capabilities linked to combat support and services (such as health and psychological support, provisioning and services, search and rescue, engineering, among others), which can be used in a dual capacity in Civil Support operations (especially to provide support to civilian emergencies in natural disasters), in a joint and combined environment.

In general, the national capabilities must focus on developing agile and flexible forces with a high response capacity, which can be regenerated quickly, equipped with advanced technical and technological capabilities (which should always be kept up to date) and specialised equipment that can meet the level of demand of the scenarios where it will be used.

5. Conclusions

The recent events in the international arena are likely to disrupt IR in the future. This new status quo will be reflected in new challenges for NATO and the EU in the short and medium term. This may require Portugal to rethink its ND and carry out a general review of its conceptual framework.

On the other hand, although the country is a State with the status of a small power, and is thus limited in its strategic actions to defend / achieve its interests / objectives in the IR "game", it has developed several means and mechanisms to do this, such as using its AAF in missions under the aegis of IOs and in CDD activities that allow it to increase its influence as an actor in the IS.

Methodologically, this study used an inductive reasoning approach based on a qualitative strategy and a case study research design, complemented by a literature review and interviews with experts.

To achieve SO1 - *To ascertain how Portugal, as a small State, can increase its power in IR* - and answer SQ1, a review of the literature published by experts was carried out, which revealed that Portugal, as a small power, does not have the strategic potential to have sufficient freedom of action in the IS. Therefore, it accepts these power asymmetries, but develops ways

to mitigate them and pursue its national interests by using its capabilities, which are based on: the functional power granted by its geographic location; the “power of numbers” and the influence capacity it acquires by participating in the multilateral missions of the main IOs, as well as the weight of its political level, which depends on the quality of its diplomacy; and by using the “power” granted by the “service sovereignty” it ensures through its participation in bilateral and multilateral initiatives. In practice, these “forces” increase (and become a part of) Portugal’s strategic potential.

To achieve SO2 - *To assess the role of the MD in IR* and answer SQ2, a review of the documents that list the capabilities, type of forces and military resources used in international missions was carried out, and a descriptive statistical analysis of the AAFP’s participation in missions of these IOs was performed. A content analysis was also performed on the semi-structured interviews with nine experts on the issues analysed in the study. The analysis revealed that the AAFP play a significant (and positive) role in increasing Portugal’s power in IR by participating in missions under the aegis of these IOs, and in the recognition and credibility of the country in the IS, allowing it to pursue its ambition of becoming an international co-producer of security; and that they provide benefits in various areas through their participation in CDD activities.

The analysis also revealed that the main factors that influence Portugal’s decision to participate in international missions are their relevance for the national interests and fulfilling the country’s commitments by maintaining a constant presence in the three IOs. Furthermore, the CEDN has little influence on this decision, or in defining the priorities for the use of the AAFP in missions abroad. The first priority is the participation in NATO’s collective defence forces, followed by the EU, the UN and the CPLP (the latter may be changed if the circumstances require it). Similarly, the main area where the AAFP should operate is Europe (and its area of influence in the Atlantic and Mediterranean), followed by Africa, and they should not be used in areas that are less attractive in terms of costs / benefits and that do not increase Portugal’s power in IR.

The above analysis achieved the GO - *ascertain how Portugal can use its MD to increase its power in IR*. The AAFP’s role in increasing Portugal’s influence as an actor in the IS was assessed and confirmed, as such, they should continue to be deployed in the missions of all IOs analysed here, especially those in which they may play a relevant role or, at least, in which the national capabilities are equivalent or proportional to those of the other forces in the operation. Therefore, the priority should be to develop agile and flexible forces with a high response capacity and that can be regenerated quickly, equipped with advanced technical and technological capabilities and specialised equipment suited to the level of demand of the scenarios where it will be used.

Therefore, the next CEDN should include elements that make it more useful for the selection and prioritization of Portugal’s international missions, both in terms of the IOs involved and of the regions where the missions will take place. The first priority should be the participation in NATO collective defence missions, followed by the EU, the UN and the CPLP,

and those missions should take place mainly in the European and African continents, in that order, rather than in areas where the costs / benefits are not discernible.

The study's main **contributions to knowledge** are that it provides a statistical analysis of the international missions in which the AAFP were involved, as well as its CDD missions, from 2013 to 2021, and confirms, through interviews with experts in the field of ND, that the AAFP play an important role in increasing Portugal's power in IR.

The main **limitation** was the scarcity or lack of updated statistical data on the ND in open sources. This limitation was unrelated to the study and did not affect the relevance of the findings, but made it more challenging to carry out the analysis.

Future studies should be conducted to assess the use of the AAFP in missions that result from bilateral and multilateral agreements with Portugal's partner countries, and the appointment of military personnel to international positions, in order to complement the data analysed in this study and conduct a global assessment of the role of the AAFP in increasing Portugal's power in IR. Furthermore, a study on the CEDN be carried out to determine how to make this document more objective regarding the way Portugal selects the international missions of its Armed Forces.

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