ESCOLA NAVAL

talanto bien faire

Miguel Ângelo de Brito Araújo

Campanha de Galípoli

O Estreito de Dardanelos no contexto político-militar internacional

Volume 1

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências Militares Navais, na especialidade de Fuzileiros



Alfeite

2016

ESCOLA NAVAL

talanto bien faire

Miguel Ângelo de Brito Araújo

Campanha de Galípoli

O Estreito de Dardanelos no contexto político-militar internacional

Volume 1

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências Militares Navais, na especialidade de Fuzileiros

Orientação de: CFR FZ RES Semedo de Matos

Coorientação de: CFR FZ Santos Formiga

O Aluno Mestrando,

_____

ASPOF FZ Brito Araújo

O Orientador,

_____

CFR FZ RES Semedo de Matos

Alfeite

2016

"Success is not final, failure is not fatal. It is the courage to continue that counts."

(Winston Churchill)

Dedicatória

Esta dissertação é dedicada à minha família, que desde sempre me apoiaram incondicionalmente. Tudo é possível quando acreditamos. Obrigado!

Agradecimentos

Os meus agradecimentos vão para todas as pessoas que me apoiaram e ajudaram na realização desta dissertação, direta ou indiretamente.

Ao meu orientador, Capitão-de-fragata Semedo de Matos, por todas as indicações, ajuda, conhecimentos e disponibilidade demonstrados desde o inicio. A sua orientação e consequente supervisão foram alguns dos aspetos chave para o sucesso desta dissertação.

Ao meu Coorientador, Capitão-de-fragata Santos Formiga, pela formação, passagem de lições de vida e pelo material que me disponibilizou para a leitura que me levou a enriquecer os meus conhecimentos sobre o meu tema.

Aos funcionários do *National Archives* em Londres, pela disponibilidade e boa disposição que transmitiram ao ajudarem-me na recolha de documentação vital para esta dissertação.

Ao historiador e professor John Hattendorf, que na sua visita a Portugal, no contexto do centenário da Grande Guerra, se mostrou disponível para me ajudar na minha dissertação e que me disponibilizou documentação muito valiosa da *Naval War College*, nos Estados Unidos. Que o nosso contato nunca se perda.

Por último, a todos os formadores militares que me incutiram os conhecimentos e valores que fazem de mim a pessoas que hoje sou.

Resumo

A Campanha de Galípoli foi uma operação ofensiva conduzida pela Grã-Bretanha, que teve como cenário a península de Galípoli, na Turquia (que fazia parte do Império Otomano, na época) entre fevereiro de 1915 e janeiro de 1916. Considerada uma das campanhas mais desgastantes da Grande Guerra. Envolveu uma combinação de forças Britânicas, Francesas, Australianas e Neozelandesas, numa tentativa de dominar o estreito de Dardanelos e subjugar o império Otomano, a fim de obrigar as forças Alemãs a estenderem-se para mais uma frente de guerra e obter uma rota segura com a Rússia através do Mar Negro, para ligar por sul os Aliados, cuja comunicação só podia fazer-se através do estreito.

Do lado dos defensores, os Turcos, esta batalha foi uma grande vitória no aspeto militar, que ergueu o orgulho e valor patriótico do povo turco, que eram vistos como um oponente fraco durante o conflito mundial, subestimados pelas suas capacidades de defender o estreito de Dardanelos. Um dos aspetos preponderantes, no resultado, seria que na época a tecnologia utilizada no campo de batalha favorecia maioritariamente o defensor.

Palavras-chave: Galípoli; Dardanelos; Constantinopla; Grande Guerra; Império Otomano.

Abstract

The Gallipoli campaign was an offensive operation conducted by Great Britain, which took place at the Gallipoli Peninsula in Turkey (which was part of the Ottoman Empire at the time) between February 1915 and January 1916. Considered one of the most wearing campaigns of the Great War. It involved a combination of British, French, Australian and New Zealand forces in an attempt to dominate the Dardanelles and subjugate the Ottoman Empire in order to force the German army to extend to another war front and get a safe route with Russia through the Black Sea to connect the Allies by south, the disclosure of which could only be done through the strait.

On the side of the defenders, the Turks, this battle was a major victory in the military aspect, which raised the pride and patriotic value of the Turkish people, which were seen as a weak opponent during the World War, underestimated by their ability to defend the Dardanelles. One of the predominant aspects in the outcome would be that at the time the technology used on the battlefield favoured mostly the defending side.

Keywords: Gallipoli; Dardanelles; Constantinople; Great War; Ottoman Empire.

Índice Geral

Índice de Figuras XVII

Introdução 1

1. Importância estratégica do estreito de Dardanelos 3

1.1. Introdução histórica 3

1.2. O Império Otomano 5

1.3. Conflitos navais pelo domínio do estreito no início do séc. XIX 14

1.4. A questão dos estreitos 16

1.5. Cerco à expansão russa no Mar Negro 18

2. As aspirações da Rússia e a Grande Guerra 23

2.1. A Rússia e o acesso a águas mais quentes 23

2.2. A aliança Franco-Russa e a Tríplice Entente 26

2.3. Ligação entre as Guerras dos Balcãs e o princípio da Grande Guerra 28

2.4. Disposição dos poderes navais no início da Grande Guerra 35

3. A decisão de forçar o estreito de Dardanelos 41

3.1. As primeiras ideias 41

3.2. A viabilidade de tomar a península de Galípoli 42

3.3. A visão de Winston Churchill e o ataque puramente naval 43

3.4. Situação geral na Europa e o impasse na guerra 50

3.5. Os acordos em Petrogrado e os despojos de guerra 53

4. A Campanha de Galípoli e as questões tático-operacionais 61

4.1. Sinopse da Campanha 61

4.2. As questões táticas, operacionais e estratégicas 65

Conclusão 73

Fontes e Bibliografia 79

Índice de Figuras

Figura 1 - Península de Galípoli e o estreito de Dardanelos, Turquia. 4

Figura 2 – Extensão do Império Otomano (a branco) no séc. XVII 11

Figura 3 – Mapa satírico da Europa em 1854.....19

Figura 4 - Pormenor da península da Crimeia da Figura 3. 20

Figura 5 – Localização das batalhas na Guerra Russo-japonesa.....25

Figura 6 - Modificações territoriais nos Balcãs acordadas na conferência de Londres (maio) e no tratado de Bucareste (agosto) em 1913.....30

Figura 7 - Mapa da Europa com as alianças militares em 1914 34

Figura 8 - Esboço das defesas no estreito de Dardanelos em março de 1915. 48

Figura 9 - Mapa do curso da "corrida para o mar".....51

Figura 10 - Mapa de Galípoli com os principais eventos. 63

Introdução

O tema desta dissertação corresponde uma problemática relacionada com a importância estratégica do estreito de Dardanelos, no contexto da Grande Guerra e da Campanha de Galípoli. O estreito faz parte do território otomano turco e é uma passagem incontornável entre o Mar Mediterrâneo e o Mar Negro, sendo que os turcos tinham uma aliança militar com a Alemanha e bloqueavam eficazmente essa passagem, cortando as linhas de comunicação entre a Rússia e os seus aliados: a França e a Grã-Bretanha.

A Rússia, numa altura crítica nos primeiros meses da Grande Guerra, pressiona os seus aliados em atacarem o Dardanelos, para poder receber apoio e reforços através dessa ligação marítima, dando origem aos primeiros planos da Operação Dardanelos, ou Campanha de Galípoli (como viria a ser oficialmente conhecida). A problemática surge quando os russos exigem, nas negociações sobre os despojos dessa operação, a soberania sobre o estreito de Dardanelos, vários territórios envolventes e a cidade de Constantinopla, a capital da Turquia otomana.

As exigências do czar russo aos seus aliados não são vistas da melhor forma e as suas aspirações entram em conflito com as da Grã-Bretanha, que mantinha uma política com quase dois séculos de afastar a Rússia de ganhar acesso ao Mediterrâneo, por esta representar uma ameaça às rotas comerciais com a Índia e com o equilíbrio de poder entre as potências europeias. Porém, a Rússia mostrava-se muito atraída em negociar uma paz separada com a Alemanha, já desde janeiro de 1915, alegando que já tinha sacrificado muito mais do que podia suportar, tendo em conta que nada tinha a ganhar com a guerra, a não ser que lhes fossem satisfeitas as suas aspirações em relação aos territórios turcos.

A Grã-Bretanha enfrenta um grande dilema: satisfazer a Rússia e meter em risco as suas rotas comerciais com a Índia e a sua superioridade económica, ou, ignorar essas exigências e perder o empenhamento do exército russo na frente oriental, colocando em risco o empenhamento total dos alemães na frente ocidental em França.

Para responder a esta problemática, o estudo foi dividido em quatro capítulos, começando por explicar mais pormenorizadamente a importância estratégica do estreito de Dardanelos e como vários impérios surgiram pelo seu domínio. Posteriormente interligar a evolução dos impérios otomano e russo, os conflitos que surgiram pelo domínio da região e como as outras potências europeias acabam por intervir na arbitragem internacional.

Com o declínio do Império Otomano e a fragmentação dos seus territórios, surgem vários conflitos que dão origem a novos estados independentes, a influência sobre esses estados torna-se também um pretexto de conflito entre as grandes potências, dando origem a guerras localizadas nos Balcãs, que consequentemente levam ao inicio da Grande Guerra. A Rússia sente-se encurralada e os planos de abrir uma linha de comunicação entre os Aliados surgem no pretexto de auxiliar a Rússia, afastar o exército turco do cenário europeu e obrigar a Alemanha a combater numa nova frente.

A Campanha de Galípoli segue em frente e resulta num grande desastre militar. Esta nova frente é sustentada durante quase um ano, até que o governo britânico convence a Rússia de que a situação atingiu um nível insustentável e que terá de procurar satisfazer as suas aspirações marítimas por outra via.

Todo o estudo desta dissertação foi orientado de forma a chegar à conclusão de que o governo britânico, da época, tendo assumido o comando da operação, mostrou indecisões e hesitações que afetaram a forma como a campanha foi conduzida, que levou ao desfecho desastroso que teve, porque o sucesso total da campanha comprometia a política externa britânica e colocava em risco a sua superioridade económica com o controlo das rotas comerciais euroasiáticas.

Os instrumentos utilizados, essencialmente, foram os documentos dos Arquivos Nacionais de Londres, onde foi possível acompanhar aspetos das relações políticas entre os Aliados e as negociações secretas que foram feitas de volta da questão principal da dissertação. Outras fontes bibliográficas foram necessárias para consulta e aprendizagem histórica, principalmente, dos impérios Russo e Otomano, a fim de compreender melhor como o estreito de Dardanelos se tornou numa região estrategicamente tão importante.

1. Importância estratégica do estreito de Dardanelos

1.1. Introdução histórica

É possível traçar a importância estratégica do estreito de Dardanelos em séculos, ou até mesmo milénios antes da Grande Guerra. Esta região foi um epicentro de vários conflitos entre grandes impérios na história conhecida e, mesmo na atualidade, ainda é um tópico bastante debatido. Este estreito faz parte da separação física entre o continente europeu e o continente asiático e é, acima de tudo, uma passagem marítima incontornável entre o Mar Negro e o Mar Mediterrâneo. Ao mesmo tempo, é um local de passagem tanto para migrações como para conquistas entre os dois continentes desde a origem das civilizações mais antigas da história.

O estreito de Dardanelos tem cerca de 61 km de comprimento e a sua largura varia entre os 1.2 e 6.5 km. Tem uma profundidade média de 55 m e o seu máximo chega aos 90 m.[1] Na margem norte encontra-se a península de Galípoli, que integra a parte europeia da Turquia e na margem sul a parte asiática, ou Ásia Menor, onde se encontra a cidade de *Çanakkale*, em turco, que é de onde deriva o nome atual do estreito (de *Çanakkale Boğazı*, que significa Dardanelos em português), como se pode observar na figura 1.

O Dardanelos está diretamente relacionado com vários acontecimentos históricos na região, pelo constante conflito pelo seu domínio, seja na história conhecida ou em lendas. Por exemplo, a lenda da Guerra de Troia, o grande conflito entre gregos e troianos que terá ocorrido entre 1300 a.C. e 1200 a.C. Certamente uma lenda famosa, que pode ser lida no poema épico de Homero, Ilíada. Troia era uma cidade-estado localizada na margem sul do Dardanelos, no continente asiático, banhado pelo Mar Egeu e era descrita como uma cidade muito cobiçada, tanto pela sua localização estratégica, em relação ao Mar Egeu, como pelo papel importante na ligação entre os dois continentes (rotas comerciais e passagem de migrações).

[1] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Dardanelles", 2013, http://www.britannica.com/place/Dardanelles, consultado em janeiro de 2016.



Figura 1 - Península de Galípoli e o estreito de Dardanelos, Turquia.[2]

[2] *Map of Dardanelles Strait*, http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/dardanelles.htm, consultado em janeiro de 2016.

Após o auge do império grego, outros grandes impérios dominaram e utilizaram o Dardanelos como passagem entre a Ásia e a Europa. O rei Xerxes I, ou Xerxes *o Grande* da Pérsia, em cerca de 480 a.C. ordenou a construção de uma ponte flutuante no estreito (feita com inúmeras embarcações)[3], para poder atravessar os seus grandes exércitos, ou hordas, para invadir a Grécia a partir da Ásia Menor e expandir o seu império pela Europa.

Alexandre III, *o Grande*, da Macedónia fez um caminho semelhante, mas no sentido oposto, em 334 a.C. numa expedição para repelir os persas da Europa e expandir o seu império por toda a Ásia, com o ideal de unir todos os povos do mundo conhecido e partilhar o conhecimento e as suas diferentes culturas.[4]

A luta pelo domínio do Dardanelos foi uma constante da história de vários impérios, que disputavam a passagem entre os dois continentes. Depois do reino da Macedónia a dominar esta região, surgiu o Império Romano, posteriormente o Império Bizantino (conhecido com o Império Romano do Oriente) e por fim o Império Otomano (após a conquista de Constantinopla em 1453). O estreito foi sempre de grande importância estratégica e económica como uma porta de entrada marítima para a cidade de Constantinopla (Istambul para os turcos) e para o Mar Negro, por onde passavam várias rotas comerciais entre a Europa e a Ásia.

1.2. O Império Otomano

A origem dos povos turcos na Anatólia, a região que se estende desde a costa oeste que é banhada pelo Mar Egeu até ao extremo oriental da Mesopotâmia (atualmente Iraque), data do século XI, quando várias tribos nómadas provenientes de toda a Ásia Oriental estabeleceram raízes sociais, religiosas (islamismo) e económicas na região. O Império Otomano[5] nasce no século XIII, pela mão de Osman I, o primeiro sultão da dinastia otomana.

[3] Kaveh Farrokh, *Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War*, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2007, p. 77.
[4] Bill Yenne, *Alexander the Great: Lessons From History's Undefeated General*, Londres, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. VIII.
[5] O nome "otomano" é derivado do nome Osman na língua persa, o fundador da dinastia.

Conta a lenda que, em meados do século XIII, Ertuğrul, pai de Osman, guiou a tribo turca Kayi da Ásia Central (algures do Irão) até à Anatólia, receando a morte ou a escravidão nas mãos dos mongóis, que se expandiam rapidamente por toda a Ásia.[6]

Osman tornou-se chefe, ou *Bey*, da sua tribo após a morte do seu pai em 1280.[7] Por esta altura, inúmeros mercenários fluíam de todo o mundo islâmico para o seu reino, com o propósito de combater e saquear o império bizantino. Além disso, a população turca do emirado[8] de Osman estava constantemente a ser reforçada por uma onda de refugiados, que fugiam da expansão mongol. Destes, muitos eram guerreiros *Gazi*, ou combatentes do Islão, guerreiros fronteiriços que acreditavam na expansão e defesa do Islão. Sob a liderança forte e capaz de Osman, estes guerreiros rapidamente provaram ser uma força formidável ao seu serviço. Osman seguia rigorosamente a estratégia do seu pai, de aumentar os seus territórios à custa dos bizantinos, evitando conflitos com os seus vizinhos turcos mais poderosos, até que o seu reino se tornasse forte o suficiente para lhes fazer frente.[9]

Osman declarou a independência do seu reino aos turcos seljúcidas de Rum em 1299, foi então aclamado o *Khan* (líder ou rei) da tribo Kayi. O principado Otomano era apenas uma tribo turca entre várias da Anatólia, todas as quais Osman acabaria por conquistar e reunir sob o seu domínio, fundando a dinastia Otomana.

No século após a sua morte, o domínio otomano começou a estender-se pelo o Mediterrâneo Oriental e os Balcãs. O seu filho, Orhan I, capturou a cidade de Bursa em 1324 e tornou-a a capital do Estado otomano. A queda de Bursa, nas mãos otomanas, significou o fim do domínio bizantino no noroeste da Anatólia. A importante cidade de Tessalónica foi conquistada em 1387, a vitória turca na batalha do Kosovo em 1389, efetivamente, marcou o fim do poder sérvio na região, abrindo caminho para a expansão otomana na Europa. A batalha de Nicópolis em 1396,

[6] Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, Vol. I, p. 13.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] Província ou país que é administrado por um membro da classe dominante.
[9] Shaw, pp. 13-14.

amplamente considerada como a última cruzada de grande escala da Idade Média, não conseguiu parar o avanço notável dos turco-otomanos.[10]

Com a extensão do domínio turco nos Balcãs, a conquista de Constantinopla tornou-se um objetivo fundamental e estratégico. O império controlava quase todas as terras ex-bizantinas que circundavam a cidade, mas os bizantinos haviam sido temporariamente aliviados da pressão otomana quando Tamerlão[11] invadiu a Anatólia em 1402, capturando e aprisionando o sultão Bayezid I. A captura de Bayezid gerou o caos entre os turcos. O Estado entrou numa guerra civil que durou de 1402 a 1413, com os filhos de Bayezid a lutar pela sucessão ao trono. Ela só terminou quando Maomé I emergiu como sultão e restaurou o poder da dinastia, pondo o fim ao período que ficou conhecido como Interregno Otomano.[12]

Parte dos territórios otomanos nos Balcãs (por exemplo, a Tessalónica, a Macedónia e o Kosovo) foram temporariamente perdidos após a invasão de Tamerlão em 1402, sendo posteriormente recuperados por Murad II entre 1430 e 1450. Seu filho, Maomé II, *o Conquistador*, reorganizou o exército do Estado e demonstrou a sua habilidade militar ao capturar Constantinopla em 29 de maio de 1453, com apenas 21 anos de idade.

A cidade de Constantinopla havia sido a capital do Império Bizantino, originalmente chamada de Bizâncio, que era uma cidade da Grécia Antiga, fundada por colonos gregos da cidade de Mégara, em 658 a.C., que recebeu o nome do seu rei, Bizas ou Bizante.[13] Os romanos latinizaram o nome para Byzantium. A cidade veio a tornar-se o centro do Império Bizantino, a metade do Império Romano que falava o idioma grego, da Antiguidade tardia até a Idade Média (entre o séc. IV e o séc. XV), sob o nome de Constantinopla, ou Nova Roma, que derivava do nome do imperador Constantino I, renomeada por si em 330 A.D.[14]

[10] David Nicolle, *Nicopolis 1396: The Last Crusade*, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 1999.
[11] Líder turco-mongol do Império Timúrida, proveniente da Ásia Central.
[12] Gábor Ágoston; Bruce Alan Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, Nova York, Facts on File Inc., 2008, p. 363.
[13] Demetrius John Georgacas, *The Names of Constantinople*, Baltimore, Maryland, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1947.
[14] *Ibid.*

A combinação do imperialismo e a sua localização estratégica, definia o papel de Constantinopla como ponto altamente importante de intersecção entre os dois continentes. A posição tinha uma vital importância comercial, cultural e diplomática e permitia à cidade controlar as rotas que ligavam a Ásia à Europa, assim como a passagem do Mar Mediterrâneo para o Mar Negro.

A conquista otomana de Constantinopla consolidou a posição do império como uma grande potência militar no sudeste da Europa e no Mediterrâneo Oriental. Durante este tempo, o Império Otomano entrou num período de conquistas e expansão, alargando as suas fronteiras pela Europa e no norte de África.[15] As conquistas em terra foram orientadas pela disciplina e inovação do exército otomano e, sobre o mar, a marinha otomana ajudou significativamente nesta expansão.[16]

A marinha otomana bloqueou as principais rotas comerciais marítimas, em concorrência com as cidades-estado italianas no Mar Negro, Mar Egeu e Mar Mediterrâneo e com as colónias portuguesas no Mar Vermelho e Oceano Índico.[17] O império também prosperou economicamente, graças ao seu domínio das rotas entre a Europa e a Ásia.[18] Este bloqueio sobre o comércio entre a Europa Ocidental e a Ásia é frequentemente citado como um fator primário de motivação para que os monarcas de Espanha financiassem a viagem de Cristóvão Colombo para encontrar rota de navegação alternativa para a Ásia.[19]

O império cresceu sob o domínio de uma linha de sultões empenhada e eficaz. O sultão Selim I (1512-1520) expandiu as fronteiras a leste e a sul do império, derrotando Shah Ismail do Império Safávida[20], na Batalha de Chaldiran. Selim I estabeleceu a presença otomana no Egipto e criou uma presença naval no mar

[15] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Ottoman state and its place in world history*, Leida, Brill, 1974, p. 111.
[16] Philip Mansel, *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453–1924*, Londres, Penguin Books, 1997.
[17] Andrew C. Hess, *The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, Vol. 4, pp. 55-76.
[18] Karpat, p. 111.
[19] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Christopher Columbus", 2016, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Christopher-Columbus, 2016, consultado em agosto de 2016.
[20] Dinastia xiita iraniana.

Vermelho.[21] Após esta expansão otomana, uma competição começou entre o Império Português e o Império Otomano para se tornar a potência dominante no Mar Vermelho.[22]

Sob Selim e Solimão (sucessor de Selim), o império tornou-se uma força dominante naval, controlando grande parte do mar Mediterrâneo. As proezas do almirante Hayreddin Barbarossa (o corsário *Barba Ruiva*), que comandou uma esquadra de navios fiel ao Império Otomano durante o reinado de Solimão, conduziu a uma série de vitórias militares contra as marinhas cristãs. Entre estas foram as conquistas aos espanhóis em Tunes e Argélia, durante a Inquisição Espanhola ajudou na evacuação dos muçulmanos e judeus da Espanha para a segurança das terras otomanas, e teve um papel importante na captura de Nice em 1543, do Sacro Império Romano-Germânico.[23]

Esta última conquista ocorreu em nome da França numa aliança entre as forças do rei francês Francisco I e as de Hayreddin Barbarossa. França e o Império Otomano, unidos pela oposição mútua à Monarquia de Habsburgo, no sul da Europa e na Europa Central, tornaram-se fortes aliados durante este período. A aliança era económica e militar, como os sultões concederam à França o direito do livre comércio dentro do império, sem cobrança de impostos. Por esse motivo, o Império Otomano foi, por volta deste tempo, aceite na esfera política europeia e assinou uma aliança militar com a França, o Reino da Inglaterra e a República Holandesa, contra a Espanha, Itália e Áustria.[24]

À medida que o século XVI avançava, a superioridade naval otomana foi desafiada pelo crescente poder marítimo da Europa ocidental, particularmente na Península Ibérica, no Golfo Pérsico, Oceano Índico e nas Ilhas das Especiarias[25]. Com os otomanos a bloquear as rotas marítimas para o oriente e sul, as potências

[21] R. M. Savory, *The Principal Offices of the Ṣafawid State during the Reign of Ismāʿīl I (907-30/1501-24)*, Londres, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1960, Vol. 23, pp. 91-105.
[22] Karpat, p. 111.
[23] Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power*, Londres, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
[24] *Ibid.*, p.53.
[25] Ilhas Molucas, situadas no arquipélago da Indonésia.

europeias foram impulsionadas a encontrar um caminho alternativo para o comércio da seda e das rotas de especiarias, que na altura estavam sob o domínio otomano. Em terra, o império estava preocupado com as campanhas militares na Áustria e na Pérsia, duas frentes amplamente separadas. A tensão destes conflitos sobre os recursos do império e da logística de manutenção das linhas de abastecimento e comunicação entre essas grandes distâncias, em última instância, fez com que os seus esforços marítimos se tornassem insustentáveis e sem êxitos significativos.

A extensão de territórios e poder do Império Otomano teve o seu apogeu no século XVII, como se pode verificar na figura 2, mas como qualquer império na história, este começara a entrar num longo período de perdas territoriais, derrotas militares e enfraquecimento económico. O evento que marcou o início desse declínio foi em 1683, quando foi feita a segunda e última tentativa falhada de conquistar Viena. Sem a conquista da Europa e da aquisição de novas riquezas significativas, o Império perdeu o seu ímpeto e entrou num declínio lento.[26]

Vários outros fatores contribuíram para o declínio do Império, nomeadamente pela expansão de outras potências europeias, por problemas económicos gerados pela concorrência de produtos mais baratos vindos das Américas e da Índia, surgimento de outras rotas comerciais, crescimento do desemprego nas províncias do Império, a corrupção nos altos cargos militares, o poder tornou-se menos centralizado e a fraca qualidade dos sultões nos séculos XVII e XVIII, pela abolição do fratricídio[27], em que os filhos dos próximos sultões passariam a ser aprisionados, como uma forma mais humana de controlar os seus concorrentes ao poder. Evidentemente que passar uma vida inteira numa prisão ou asilo não era a melhor forma de preparar um monarca para assumir o poder absoluto de um império.[28]

Um dos principais fatores do colapso do império fora uma política que o sustentava desde o inicio. Os sultões focavam-se em projetos a curto prazo, eles

[26] *BBC*, "Ottoman Empire (1301-1922)", 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ottomanempire_1.shtml#top, consultado em julho de 2016.
[27] A execução de irmãos e filhos do Sultão, prática imposta por Selim I para conter possíveis disputas ao trono.
[28] *BBC*.

rejeitavam o conceito de desenvolver o território e investir nele para futuros benefícios. A terra e os povos eram explorados até ao ponto de exaustão e, de seguida, eram mais ou menos abandonados a favor de novos territórios. Esta política fez com que o Império Otomano fosse totalmente dependente de uma expansão contínua para manter a estabilidade económica e social. Se não continuasse a crescer, era bastante provável que acabasse por entrar em colapso.[29]



Figura 2 – Extensão do Império Otomano (a branco) no séc. XVII[30]

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Ottoman Empire at the end of the 17th century,* http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=31208&lang=en, consultado em janeiro de 2016.

Durante o século XVIII, a expansão russa, começara a apresentar uma ameaça aos territórios otomanos. Esta época ficou marcada, principalmente, por dois czares que impulsionaram vigorosamente o crescimento territorial da Rússia, Pedro I (1689-1725) e Catarina II (1761-1796).[31]

Pedro I, *o Grande*, liderou o processo de modernização e ocidentalização do país. Interessado em navegação e assuntos marítimos, ele pretendia conquistar território com possibilidade de ter um porto, a fim de ser capaz de comercializar com outras nações marítimas. Na Grande Guerra do Norte[32], entre 1700 e 1721, Pedro captura a cidade sueca de Nyenskans e em 1703 ordena nesse local a construção de uma cidade portuária com acesso ao Mar Báltico, que viria a chamar-se de São Petersburgo, declarada a nova capital da Rússia. Esta cidade portuária servia como porta de entrada para o comércio marítimo com a Europa Ocidental. Pedro também tentaria ganhar o acesso ao Mar Negro, pela cidade de Azov, mas sem grandes êxitos e sofrera várias derrotas militares contra os otomanos.[33] [34]

Enquanto que Pedro I apenas tinha tido sucesso em conquistar uma pequena parte do Mar Negro, nas campanhas de Azov, mais tarde Catarina II complementou as conquistas a sul que ele tinha iniciado. A imperatriz tornou a Rússia numa potência dominante do sudoeste europeu após a sua vitória na Guerra Russo-Turca contra o Império Otomano (1768-1774), concluindo com o tratado de *Küçük Kaynarca*. As vitórias russas permitiram ao governo de Catarina obter acesso ao Mar Negro e incorporaram os vastos portos do sul da Ucrânia onde os russos fundaram as novas cidades de Odessa, Nikolayev, Yeakaterinoslav e Kherson.[35] [36]

O Tratado de *Küçük Kaynarca*, assinado a 10 de julho de 1774, concedeu também aos russos as províncias de Azov, Kerch, Yenikale, Kinburn e uma pequena linha de costa no Mar Negro entre os rios Dnieper e Bug. O tratado pôs termo às

[31] Charles E. Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, Santa Barbara, California, Greenwood Press, 1999.
[32] Guerra travada entre uma coligação composta pela Rússia, Reino da Dinamarca e Noruega e Saxónia-Polónia de um lado e o Império Sueco do outro lado, entre 1700 e 1721.
[33] Ziegler.
[34] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801-1917*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967.
[35] Ziegler.
[36] Seton-Watson.

restrições impostas à marinha russa e ao comércio no mar de Azov e fez da Crimeia um protetorado russo, que em 1783 viria a ser anexada pela Rússia.[37] Por esta altura, uma antiga aspiração dos lideres russos, em obter o controlo do estreito de Bósforo e Dardanelos, para ganhar acesso ao Mar Mediterrâneo, parecia ser um objetivo tangível, considerando o evidente enfraquecimento dos otomanos.[38]

A instabilidade do Império Otomano tornou-se uma preocupação para as principais potências europeias, que passou a ser conhecida como a Questão Oriental. A partir de meados do século XIX o termo "o homem doente da Europa", atribuído pelo czar Nicolau I[39], foi vulgarmente utilizado de forma pejorativa para referir a fraqueza e o evidente declínio do Império Otomano, desprestigiando-o no palco político europeu e criando a imagem de que seria um aliado militar fraco.[40]

A Questão Oriental foi o problema diplomático que surgiu no século XIX, incitado pela desintegração do Império Otomano, centrando-se na disputa pelo controlo de territórios otomanos. Quaisquer mudanças internas nos domínios turcos causavam tensão entre as potências europeias, cada uma das quais temiam que uma das outras podia tirar proveito da desordem política, para ampliar sua própria influência.[41]

O controlo do estreito de Dardanelos, entra neste contexto pelo motivo de que quem o controlava, seja direta ou indiretamente, podia alterar significativamente o equilíbrio do poder mundial, porque quem detinha o controlo das rotas comerciais entre a Europa e a Ásia, detinha também quem lucrava maioritariamente dessas rotas. Com estas riquezas, os impérios cresciam em todos os aspetos.

[37] Ziegler.
[38] Seton-Watson.
[39] *The Economist*, "The real sick man of Europe", 2005, http://www.economist.com/node/3987219, consultado em julho de 2016.
[40] *The New York Times*, "Austria in Extremis", 1860, http://www.nytimes.com/1860/05/12/news/austria-in-extremis.html, consultado em janeiro de 2016.
[41] Michael S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations*, Londres, MacMillan, 1966.

1.3. Conflitos navais pelo domínio do estreito no início do séc. XIX

As primeiras tentativas de forçar o estreito de Dardanelos por via marítima datam do ano de 1807, em dois conflitos distintos: a guerra Russo-Turca (1806-1812) e a guerra Anglo-Turca (1807-1809), que decorriam durante a época das Guerras Napoleónicas (1803-1815).[42]

A primeira tentativa de forçar o estreito de Dardanelos em 1807 teve o nome de Operação Dardanelos. Esta foi uma tentativa fracassada da Grã-Bretanha em aplicar o seu poder naval através deste estreito para forçar a Turquia a ceder às suas exigências, a fim de forçar a Turquia otomana em manter-se fora da guerra (como aliada do Império Francês).[43]

Depois de várias dificuldades no início da operação, com a falta de vento e um incêndio acidental no *HMS Ajax*, em 19 de fevereiro de 1807 o esquadrão comandado pelo Vice-almirante Sir John Thomas Duckworth consegue penetrar o Dardanelos. Durante a travessia os seus navios foram bombardeados pelas peças de artilharia centenárias que armavam os fortes ao longo do estreito, provocando várias baixas. Como não havia um número considerável de soldados turcos, as guarnições que operavam estas peças não foram suficientemente eficazes para deter os navios ingleses e estes rapidamente alcançam o Mar de Mármara, onde enfrentam e derrotam uma pequena esquadra otomana.[44]

O objetivo de Sir John Duckworth seria cercar a cidade de Constantinopla e por consequência a elite política iria procurar a rendição quando se deparassem com a esquadra inglesa a ameaçar a capital, o que não aconteceu, pois, a defesa da cidade estava bem organizada e os turcos nunca tentaram um confronto decisivo contra os ingleses. A 2 de março Sir Duckworth decide levantar o bloqueio naval de

[42] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Ottoman Empire: The empire from 1807 to 1920", 2015, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire/The-empire-from-1807-to-1920, consultado em janeiro de 2016.
[43] W. James, *The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by France in February 1793, to the accession of George IV in january 1820*, Londres, Richard Bentley, 1826, Vol. IV.
[44] *Ibid.*

Constantinopla e regressar à ilha de Ténedos (conhecida como Bozcaada em turco, a sul da entrada do Dardanelos).

A viagem de regresso, ou a retirada, teve de ser feita de volta pelo estreito de Dardanelos, onde os navios foram novamente bombardeados pelas antigas peças de artilharia e a esquadra contaria no fim com mais baixas significativas. A operação foi considerada um fracasso e foi estudada a possibilidade de uma segunda tentativa de atacar Constantinopla com a mesma esquadra, mas foi recebida com bastantes críticas e nunca foi executada.[45]

A segunda tentativa de forçar o estreito foi executada pelos russos. Constantinopla era uma cidade altamente dependente do comércio marítimo. Em 6 de março de 1807 um esquadrão da marinha russa, a partir da ilha grega de Corfu e sob as ordens do Vice-almirante Dmitry Senyavin, iniciou um bloqueio naval à entrada do estreito de Dardanelos pelo Mar Egeu, utilizando a capturada ilha de Ténedos como base de apoio (onde se encontrou e recebeu informações de *Sir* Duckworth).[46]

Passados dois meses, depois de vários protestos nas ruas de Constantinopla devido à alta inflação dos preços dos alimentos, originada pelo bloqueio do estreito, o sultão Mustafa IV ordenou que a sua marinha quebrasse o bloqueio naval russo a todo o custo. Em 10 de maio a marinha turca tenta atravessar o bloqueio sem sucesso, sendo forçados a recuar de volta para o estreito de Dardanelos, onde foram seguidos pelos navios russos até ao fim do dia. Ao explorar o sucesso da batalha, Senyavin viu a sua esquadra a ser bombardeada por artilharia costeira. Apesar de nenhum navio russo ter sido afundado, esta ameaça e a falta de visibilidade levaram a que Senyavin ordenasse os seus navios a recuar de volta para a ilha de Ténedos e desistir assim da perseguição.[47]

[45] C. Ffoulkes, "The 'Dardanelles' Gun at the Tower", Londres, in *The Antiquaries Journal*, 1930, Vol. 10, pp. 217-227, http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0003581500041032, consultado em janeiro de 2016.
[46] James.
[47] *Ibid.*

O bloqueio à entrada do estreito de Dardanelos durou mais um mês, até as duas esquadras enfrentarem-se na batalha de Athos, de onde os russos saem vitoriosos, assegurando assim a supremacia naval russa na região. Por consequência da batalha, em 12 de agosto o Império Otomano assina um armistício com a Rússia. Este tratado de paz não dura muito mais do que um ano até as hostilidades retomarem-se entre estes dois impérios, ainda durante as Guerras Napoleónicas.[48]

1.4. A questão dos estreitos

Em toda a história diplomática entre as grandes potências europeias do século XIX, a questão sobre a passagem de navios de guerra através do Dardanelos, Mar de Marmara e estreito de Bósforo foi sempre uma questão bastante debatida pela importância estratégica e interesses associados à ligação comercial euroasiática entre o Mar Negro e o Mar Mediterrâneo.[49]

Os estreitos faziam parte do território turco, mas quando a Rússia tomou o domínio da margem norte do Mar Negro, no século XVIII, passou a ser consentida pelo império Otomano a passagem livre de navios mercantes russos por esses estreitos. A Rússia, com a intenção de proteger-se contra possíveis ameaças a partir do sul do seu território, em 8 de julho de 1833, persistiu ao império Otomano em fechar um acordo para negar o acesso aos estreitos a navios de guerra de nações não pertencentes ao Mar Negro.[50]

O acordo ficou conhecido como Tratado de *Hünkâr İskelesi*. Este acordo foi visto, principalmente pela Grã-Bretanha, como uma ameaça às políticas externas das principais potências europeias, que por exemplo, no caso da Grã-Bretanha, fazia parte da sua política externa manter a integridade do Império Otomano, para conter a Rússia de se expandir por território otomano e ganhar acesso ao Mar Mediterrâneo, a fim de proteger as suas rotas comerciais com a Índia, que estavam

[48] *Ibid.*
[49] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Straits Question", 2016, http://www.britannica.com/event/Straits-Question, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.
[50] *Ibid.*

a ganhar cada vez mais importância, principalmente pelas importações de algodão.[51] O tratado era uma alternativa ao apoio militar otomano, que em vez de enviar tropas e armas para apoiar os seus aliados russos, os otomanos bloqueavam o Dardanelos a todos os navios de guerra estrangeiros (expeto de nações pertencentes ao Mar Negro).

A assinatura do tratado despertou a Grã-Bretanha para a importância da posição geográfica, política e económica do Império Otomano em relação à Europa. Os britânicos protestaram contra o tratado, alegando que violava o tratado Anglo-Otomano de 1809, que estabeleceu os termos de que nenhum navio de guerra estrangeiro seria autorizado a atravessar os estreitos (incluindo navios de guerra russos). O seu protesto formal concluiu que se as estipulações deste tratado (*Hünkâr İskelesi*) levassem à interferência armada da Rússia nos assuntos internos da Turquia, o governo britânico sentir-se-ia em liberdade para agir de acordo com tal ocasião (de forma agressiva). O governo francês também emitiu uma declaração semelhante em relação às suas preocupações sobre a possível interferência militar russa. Estas duas declarações foram um indicativo do quão sério os termos do tratado foram tomados pelas potências ocidentais.[52]

O tratado de *Hünkâr İskelesi* acabaria por ser revogado mais tarde pela Convenção de Londres sobre os Estreitos, a 13 de julho de 1841[53], na qual todas as grandes potências europeias conciliaram principalmente em uma regra: de que apenas os navios de guerra turcos poderiam atravessar os estreitos em tempos de paz. A Grã-Bretanha e a França, como aliados da Turquia otomana, enviariam mais tarde as suas esquadras através dos estreitos para repelir e atacar a Rússia durante a Guerra da Crimeia (1853-1856).[54]

[51] Marjie Bloy, "Principles of British Foreign Policy 1815-1865", in *The Victorian Web*, 2002, http://www.victorianweb.org/history/forpol/principle.html, consultado em julho de 2016.
[52] Frank Edgar Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1942, pp. 48-53.
[53] The National Archives, *Turkey Convention the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, by ships of war*, Kew, Londres, 1841, FO 94/368. (Anexo I)
[54] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Straits Question".

1.5. Cerco à expansão russa no Mar Negro

A Guerra da Crimeia, que envolveu várias potências: a Rússia contra uma coligação entre a Grã-Bretanha, França, Império Otomano e o Reino de Sardenha, teve a sua causa imediata no conflito pelos direitos das minorias cristãs na "Terra Santa" (territórios da Palestina, que faziam parte do Império Otomano, maioritariamente islâmico). Os franceses apoiavam os cristãos católicos e os russos apoiavam os ortodoxos. Em 1853, o czar Nicolau I invocou o direito de proteger os locais santos dos cristãos ortodoxos em Jerusalém. Sob esse pretexto, a Rússia invade os principados otomanos do Rio Danúbio (Moldávia e Valáquia). O sultão otomano, contando com o apoio da Grã-Bretanha e da França, depois de assinar, em 12 de março de 1854, um tratado de uma aliança contra a Rússia[55], rejeitou as exigências do czar, declarando guerra à Rússia.[56]

Os britânicos temiam que uma possível queda da cidade de Constantinopla diante as tropas russas lhe pudessem retirar o controlo estratégico dos estreitos de Bósforo e Dardanelos, possivelmente cortando-lhe as comunicações com a Índia.

Por outro lado, Napoleão III de França queria aproveitar a oportunidade de mostrar que era o legítimo sucessor do seu tio, Napoleão I, envolvendo-se nesta causa que lhe traria o prestígio internacional que tanto desejava. Mediante a derrota naval dos turcos, ambos declararam guerra à Rússia no ano seguinte, seguidos pelo Reino da Sardenha.[57] [58]

Entre agosto e setembro de 1854, os turcos, com o auxílio dos seus aliados, conseguiram expulsar os invasores russos dos Balcãs. De forma a encerrar decisivamente o conflito, as esquadras dos aliados convergiram sobre a península da Crimeia, desembarcando tropas na península e iniciando o bloqueio naval e o

[55] The National Archives, *Treaty and Protocol. Alliance against Russia*, Kew, Londres, 1854, FO 93/110/6. (Anexo II)
[56] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Crimean War", 2016, http://www.britannica.com/event/Crimean-War, consultado em março de 2016.
[57] J. Sweetman, *The Crimean War*, Londres, Osprey Publishing Limited, 2001.
[58] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Crimean War".

cerco terrestre à cidade portuária fortificada de Sebastopol, sede da esquadra russa no Mar Negro.[59]

A situação política na Europa e as notícias sobre a guerra nesta época chegavam ao público europeu apenas por jornais e panfletos, muitas vezes apresentadas de forma satírica, como se pode ver representado na figura 3 e 4, a imagem de que a Rússia é um grande urso dominante (pormenor do chicote na mão) e que as outras nações nada conseguiam fazer para a derrubar.



Figura 3 – Mapa satírico da Europa em 1854[60]

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] Mapa satírico, pro russo, publicado em Hamburgo em 1854, pela editora B.S. Berendsohn (autor desconhecido). Retrata a situação política da Europa durante a Guerra da Crimeia, http://dpc.uba.uva.nl/cgi/i/image/image-idx?sid=b12a6fa7af236a87f9ec89cef8218eec;c=carto;q1=Karikaturen;rgn1=carto_tr;size=20;lasttype=boolean;view=entry;lastview=thumbnail;subview=detail;cc=carto;entryid=x-otm-col--sp-hb-kzl-sp-109.05.14;viewid=395109264;start=1;resnum=1, consultado em janeiro de 2016.



Figura 4 - Pormenor da península da Crimeia da Figura 3.[61]

O conflito prolongou-se até 1856 por a Rússia insistir em recusar os termos de paz exigidos pelos ingleses e franceses. O resultado final deste conflito permitiu à Turquia otomana manter a sua independência e integridade territorial, mas por outro lado, levou a acentuar ainda mais o declínio do seu império. Permitiu principalmente, pelo menos de forma temporária, repelir a expansão russa por via marítima a partir do Mar Negro e a sua presença nos países dos Balcãs.

Os termos de paz foram assinados no Tratado de Paris de 30 de março de 1856[62] e alguns dos pontos mais relevantes da cláusula, obviamente mais severa para a Rússia, foram os seguintes:

- O Mar Negro foi declarado como um mar neutro (11º artigo);
- A Rússia e a Turquia, como potências do Mar Negro, não estavam autorizadas a ter navios de guerra nesse mar (exceto um dado número de pequenas embarcações, apenas para patrulha costeira), arsenais e fortificações militares ao longo das suas margens;
- Os estreitos de Dardanelos e Bósforo foram novamente proibidos à passagem de navios de guerra de todos os países (onde a Rússia estaria em desvantagem em relação à Turquia, em que esta podia manter as suas esquadras no Mar de Mármara e no Mar Mediterrâneo);

[61] Pormenor onde as esquadras inglesas e francesas fazem frente à Rússia pelo Mar Negro onde apenas conseguem "cortar as garras do urso", que representa a península da Crimeia. A verdade é que no final do conflito, a Rússia seria forçada a retirar "as garras" do Mar Negro.
[62] The National Archives, *Treaty of Paris*, Kew, Londres, 1856, FO 93/81/36. (Anexo III)

- O Rio Danúbio abriu à navegação livre de navios mercantes de todos os países (que abriu as portas a uma ampla distribuição na península Balcânica de mercadorias austríacas, britânicas e francesas, o que causou danos consideráveis às exportações da Rússia);
- Obrigou à Rússia abandonar a reivindicação de protetorado aos cristãos ortodoxos nos territórios do Império Otomano;
- Forçou a Rússia a retirar-se de Sebastopol, Bessarábia, Kamiesch, Eupatória, Kinburn, entre outros territórios.

O Tratado de Paris foi uma forma de manter o Império Otomano relativamente intacto, não foi realmente um tratado de paz. Uma das cláusulas do tratado impôs o Mar Negro como mar neutro e fechado a todos os navios de guerra, outra proibia a construção de fortificações e a colocação de artilharia nas suas margens. O Mar Negro tornou-se uma área desmilitarizada, para impedir a Rússia de intimidar a Turquia. Estas cláusulas restabeleceram o padrão, mas acabou por ser uma trégua que só durou até 1871, quando a Rússia começou a rearmar-se no Mar Negro e os Aliados foram incapazes de detê-la.[63]

Com a inauguração do Canal do Suez[64] em 1869, o acesso ao Mar Mediterrâneo (de forma internacionalmente consentida) ganhou uma maior importância. As linhas de comunicação entre a Europa e a Ásia tornaram-se muito mais curtas e mais rentáveis para o comércio marítimo.

A Rússia, em 1871, depois de apoiar a Prússia durante a Guerra Franco-prussiana (1870-1871), ganharia de novo o reconhecimento internacional e o apoio que necessitava e repudiou o 11º artigo, entre outros, do Tratado de Paris de 1856 e conseguiu restabelecer rapidamente a sua esquadra do Mar Negro.[65] [66]

[63] Bloy.
[64] Via navegável artificial ao nível do mar, localizada no Egipto, entre o Mediterrâneo e o Mar Vermelho. Inaugurado em 17 de novembro de 1869, após 10 anos de construção, permite que navios viajem entre a Europa e a Ásia Meridional sem ter de navegar em torno de África.
[65] The National Archives, *Treaty. Black Sea, Danube. (Also known as the Treaty of London)*, Kew, Londres, 1871, FO 93/81/41. (Anexo IV)
[66] J. A. Larsen e J. M. Smith, *Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament*, Lanham, Maryland, Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2005, p. 224.

A Rússia envolve-se novamente numa guerra contra a Turquia (1877-1878), com o pretexto de apoiar o movimento político nacionalista das nações dos Balcãs em separarem-se do Império Otomano, com a esperança de recuperar as suas perdas e na aspiração pelo acesso ao Mar Mediterrâneo.[67] O conflito termina com vários principados do Danúbio a declararem independência do Império Otomano e o novo Estado da Bulgária seria formado sob a proteção da Rússia.[68.]

Este desfecho permitiu a que a Rússia conseguisse recuperar boa parte da sua soberania no Mar Negro e influência nos países dos Balcãs, estando cada vez mais perto de dominar o acesso ao Mar Mediterrâneo.[69]

[67] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Russo-Turkish wars", 2014, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Russo-Turkish-wars, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.
[68] Alguns anos mais tarde a Rússia viria a cortar relações diplomáticas com a Bulgária devido à escolha conflituosa de um novo monarca no país.
[69] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Russo-Turkish wars".

2. As aspirações da Rússia e a Grande Guerra

2.1. A Rússia e o acesso a águas mais quentes

Desde os primeiros czares até à atualidade que a Rússia ambiciona contornar o cerco de mar gelado do seu território, que a impede de poder dispor de uma marinha proporcional ao seu espaço territorial e com capacidade de alcançar qualquer ponto do mundo, independentemente da época do ano. Por tal motivo, é de todo o interesse para a Rússia o acesso a águas mais quentes (portos que não ficam cercados de gelo durante o inverno).[70] [71] [72]

Em todo o século XIX a Rússia fora repelida de se expandir pelo Mar Mediterrâneo, talvez por essa razão passou a investir cada vez mais nas suas bases navais no Extremo Oriente, como uma porta de saída para conseguir expandir as suas rotas comerciais marítimas e desenvolver o seu poder naval, a fim de ter uma maior presença na economia mundial.

Entre o final do século XIX e o início do século XX a Rússia tinha em desenvolvimento um grande projeto que ia ligar Moscovo com Vladivostok[73], o chamado caminho-de-ferro Transiberiano. Receando o persistente expansionismo russo, o Japão começou a exigir à Rússia a afastar-se da Coreia e da Manchúria. Estas duas vontades opostas levaram ao início da Guerra Russo-japonesa em 1904-1905.[74]

O choque de interesses entre a Rússia e o Japão no início do século XX, eram fortemente agravados pela corrida da industrialização. Este investimento industrial exigia uma necessidade acrescida de recursos naturais, que era a razão pela qual

[70] *Oregonian Media*, "Russia's aggression is really about warm water ports: Guest opinion", *2014,* http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/03/russias_aggression_is_really_a.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

[71] A. J. Soares, "Rússia e o acesso a águas quentes", in *Do miradouro*, 2014, http://domirante.blogspot.pt/2014/09/russia-e-o-acesso-aguas-quentes.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

[72] D. Fromkin, "A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East", in *GlobalSecurity.org*, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm, consultado em julho de 2016.

[73] A cidade de Vladivostok situa-se no Extremo Oriente, a norte da Coreia, perto das margens do Mar do Japão.

[74] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Russo-Japanese War", 2014, http://www.britannica.com/event/Russo-Japanese-War, 2014, (acedido em fevereiro de 2016).

todas as potências mundiais, que entraram na corrida industrial, procuravam estender a sua influência, proteger as suas colónias e as principais rotas comerciais a todo o custo. O conflito da Guerra Russo-japonesa teve os seus motivos pelas razões mais comuns: a luta por territórios ricos em recursos naturais e estrategicamente importantes. A base naval de Vladivostok (a norte da Coreia) só estava operacional durante o verão, porque durante o inverno estaria completamente bloqueada por gelo, enquanto a base naval de *Port Arthur*, na península de Liaodong (no Mar Amarelo, entre a China e a Coreia), permanecia operacional durante o ano inteiro.[75]

A guerra entre a Rússia e o Japão terminou com uma vitória japonesa notável, depois de várias batalhas navais históricas, como a Batalha de *Port Arthur*, onde os japoneses atacam a base naval russa de surpresa, antecedente a uma declaração de guerra oficial. A maior e mais importante batalha de todas seria a batalha naval de Tsushima (ver localização na figura 5). Os navios japoneses eram superiores em velocidade e armamento, e, no curso da batalha que durou dois dias, dois terços da esquadra russa foi afundada, seis navios foram capturados, quatro retiraram-se para Vladivostok e seis refugiaram-se em portos neutros. Foi uma derrota dramática e decisiva. A dificuldade de enviar reforços e recursos, a economia em colapso e o início de revoltas políticas internas levaram a que a Rússia se rendesse à supremacia do Império Japonês.[76]

O conflito termina com o Tratado de Portsmouth, assinado a 5 de setembro de 1905, tendo como mediador o presidente norte-americano Theodore Roosevelt. Nas negociações de paz em Portsmouth a Rússia acaba por reconhecer a soberania da Coreia ao Japão, retirar as suas tropas da Manchúria, entregar *Port Arthur*, a península de Liaodong e a metade sul da ilha Sacalina ao Japão. Com este desfecho, o Império Russo fica internacionalmente desprestigiado e o Império do Japão é reconhecido como uma nova superpotência mundial, por ser a primeira potência

[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Battle of Tsushima", https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Tsushima, consultado em julho de 2016.

asiática a derrotar uma potência europeia.[77] [78] Evidentemente, para a Rússia poder continuar a perseguir as suas aspirações, sendo que no Mar Báltico havia sempre a questão do gelo nos longos invernos no norte da Europa, ela teria de se virar novamente para o acesso ao Mar Mediterrâneo, como a única saída e solução para salvar a sua economia, ganhando assim uma importância acrescida na sua política externa.



Figura 5 – Localização das batalhas na Guerra Russo-japonesa.[79]

[77] *The Advocate of Peace*, "Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth", 1905, https://archive.org/details/jstor-25752586, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.
[78] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Russo-Japanese War".
[79] Mapa ilustrativo da Guerra Russo-japonesa de 1904-1905, https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Tsushima, consultado em julho de 2016.

2.2. A aliança Franco-Russa e a Tríplice Entente

A aliança Franco-Russa foi uma aliança formada em 1894, que durou até 1917. O crescimento do Império Alemão, a criação da *Triplice Alleanza*[80] [81] de 1882 e o agravamento das contradições franco-alemãs e russo-alemãs no final da década de 1880, levou a uma política externa comum e interesses militares estratégicos mútuos entre França e Rússia, em que ambos procuravam ganhar força para fazer frente à Alemanha. O desenvolvimento de laços financeiros entre os dois países criou os pré-requisitos económicos para formar esta aliança.[82]

A *Triplice Alleanza*, formada pela Alemanha, Áustria-Hungria e Itália havia deixado a Rússia vulnerável, enquanto a França tinha estado diplomaticamente isolada desde a sua derrota em 1870, na Guerra Franco-Prussiana. Apesar das divergências políticas entre a França, uma república, e a Rússia, uma monarquia absoluta, as relações entre os dois países melhoraram rapidamente.[83]

Desde 1888 que a Rússia obteve empréstimos baratos de Paris, que foi essencial para reconstruir e modernizar as suas forças armadas. Em 1891, a esquadra francesa visitou a base naval russa em Kronstadt e foi calorosamente saudada pelo czar Alexandre III.[84] [85]

O imperador alemão, Wilhelm II, supervisionou uma mudança na direção da política externa alemã e o Tratado de Resseguro[86] com a Rússia foi a abolido em 1890, apesar dos pedidos russos para renová-lo.

Para a Grã-Bretanha, a formação desta aliança Franco-Russa alterou as condições para manter uma colaboração Anglo-Alemã. A Rússia e a França, juntas, tornavam-

[80] Acordo militar entre o Império Alemão, o Império Austro-húngaro e o Reino de Itália, assinado em Viena a 20 de maio de 1882, para formar um bloco de países aliados no centro da Europa.
[81] John Grenville e Bernard Wasserstein, *The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts*, Oxford, Routledge, 2013.
[82] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Dual Alliance", 2006, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dual-Alliance, consultado em julho de 2016.
[83] *Ibid.*
[84] N. Mansergh, *The Coming of the First World War*, Londres, Longmans Green and Co., 1949, p. 35.
[85] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Dual Alliance".
[86] Tratado de aliança militar entre o Império Alemão e a Rússia, assinado em 1887.

se mais fortes e apresentavam uma ameaça aos interesses britânicos. Para proteger esses interesses, a Grã-Bretanha teria que ajustar a sua política externa e, em alternativa à aliança com a Alemanha, estabeleceu uma relação mais próxima com a Rússia e a França, a fim de reduzir as hostilidades com estas duas potências e ganhar mais liberdade de ação para seguir as suas aspirações e interesses.[87]

Esta situação também implicava à Grã-Bretanha a cortar relações políticas com a Turquia, recente aliada da Alemanha (que prometera defender a sua integridade contra a Rússia). Uma das exigências dos russos para aceitar uma aliança com os britânicos, seria de que teriam de ter o consentimento da Grã-Bretanha em tomarem o controlo dos estreitos (Bósforo e Dardanelos) e da cidade de Constantinopla.[88]

Eventualmente, com o chocar de interesses entre a Grã-Bretanha e a Alemanha e o rápido crescimento industrial e militar alemão, a probabilidade de uma guerra entre estas duas potências era muito elevada, o que impulsionou os britânicos a criarem uma aliança com os franceses (*Entente Cordiale*, em 1904) e com os russos (*Entente* Anglo-Russa, em 1907) e pôr fim a várias décadas (ou séculos, no caso da França) de conflito e rivalidade estratégica pela supremacia de territórios por todo o mundo.[89]

O acordo anglo-francês foi consequentemente perturbador para a Alemanha, cuja política há muito que contava com o antagonismo entre os dois Estados. O propósito da aliança britânica com a Rússia era de resolver a longa disputa sobre as esferas de influência na Pérsia, no Afeganistão e no Tibete, embora também tenha servido para objetivos diplomáticos mais amplos, tal como em contrabalançar a influência alemã.[90]

[87] John Holland Rose *et al.*, *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1929, Vol. 4, pp. 490-493.
[88] *Ibid.*
[89] Grenville e Wasserstein.
[90] F. William Engdahl, *A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order*, Londres, Pluto Press, 2004, pp. 29-30.

A aliança Franco-Russa, juntamente com a *Entente* Anglo-Russa (1907) e a *Entente Cordiale* (1904) viriam a formar a chamada *Tríplice Entente* (1910), a aliança militar entre a Grã-Bretanha, França e Rússia[91], a fim de travar a Alemanha, o pangermanismo[92] e as expansões alemãs e austro-húngaras pela Europa.

2.3. Ligação entre as Guerras dos Balcãs e o princípio da Grande Guerra

O incidente que precipitou os acontecimentos que deram origem à Primeira Guerra Mundial foi o assassinato do arquiduque austríaco Franz Ferdinand e da sua mulher, pelo nacionalista sérvio Gavrilo Princip. Mas as verdadeiras razões que levaram a este conflito mundial podem ser ligadas a uma série de eventos, anteriores, nomeadamente: questões geoestratégicas e políticas antigas, que o debate sobre "a culpa da guerra" pode não ter fim. Facto é de que este, ou qualquer conflito mundial, tem razões muito mais complexas para ser justificado do que unicamente no homicídio de uma figura importante ou qualquer outro acontecimento pontual.

Para compreender a entrada da Rússia na Grande Guerra para defender os seus interesses geoestratégicos na península balcânica, temos que entender a ligação entre as Guerras dos Balcãs (1912-1913) e a Grande Guerra.

A Primeira Guerra Balcânica foi travada entre os membros da Liga Balcânica: Sérvia, Bulgária, Grécia e Montenegro contra a Turquia otomana. A Liga Balcânica foi formada com o apoio da Rússia, na primavera de 1912, para tomar a Macedónia do Império Otomano. Oficialmente, a Rússia visava reivindicar a proteção das minorias de cristãos ortodoxos na Macedónia, numa altura em que a Turquia já estava envolvida num conflito com a Itália. Montenegro abriu as hostilidades ao declarar guerra à Turquia em 8 de outubro de 1912 e os outros membros da liga seguiram o exemplo 10 dias mais tarde.[93]

[91] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Dual Alliance".
[92] Movimento político do século XIX que defendia a união dos povos germânicos da Europa central, e que viria mais tarde dar origem ao movimento Nazi.
[93] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Balkan Wars", http://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkan-Wars, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

Sob um tratado de paz assinado em Londres em 30 de Maio de 1913, o Império Otomano perdeu quase todo o seu território europeu que restava, incluindo todos os territórios da Macedónia e Albânia. A independência da Albânia foi persistida pelas potências europeias e a Macedónia seria dividida entre os aliados balcânicos.[94]

A Segunda Guerra Balcânica começou quando a Sérvia, Grécia e Roménia debatiam com a Bulgária a divisão dos despojos das suas conquistas na Macedónia. A 1 de junho de 1913, a Sérvia e a Grécia formaram uma aliança contra a Bulgária, quando o czar Ferdinand I da Bulgária ordenou às suas tropas para atacar a Sérvia e as forças gregas na Macedónia. Os búlgaros acabam por ser derrotados e, em 10 de agosto de 1913, um tratado de paz foi assinado entre os beligerantes. Sob os termos do tratado, a Grécia e a Sérvia dividiram a maioria da Macedónia entre si, deixando a Bulgária com apenas uma pequena parte da região, ficando claramente desprestigiada e insatisfeita.[95]

Como resultado das Guerras dos Balcãs, a Grécia obteve o sul da Macedónia, bem como a ilha de Creta. A Sérvia adquiriu a região do Kosovo e estendeu-se para norte e centro da Macedónia. A Albânia ficou instituída como um Estado independente sob um príncipe alemão, como se pode observar a distribuição dos territórios na figura 6.[96]

As consequências políticas destas guerras foram consideráveis: a Bulgária, frustrada com os eventos na Macedónia, virou-se para a Áustria por apoio, enquanto a Sérvia, que tinha sido forçada pela Áustria a desistir das suas conquistas na Albânia, olhava para Viena com maior hostilidade do que nunca. O aumento das tensões nos Balcãs atingiram o seu clímax aquando o assassinato do herdeiro austríaco pelo nacionalista sérvio Gavrilo em Sarajevo, na Bósnia, em 28 de junho de 1914.[97]

[94] *Ibid.*
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] *Ibid.*
[97] *Ibid.*



Figura 6 - Modificações territoriais nos Balcãs acordadas na conferência de Londres (maio) e no tratado de Bucareste (agosto) em 1913[98]

[98] *Territorial Modifications in the Balkans - Conference of London [May 1913] and Treaty of Bukarest [August 1913]*, https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/balkan_modifications_1914.jpg, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

Alguns políticos austríacos viram o crime como uma oportunidade para humilhar a Sérvia e desse modo aumentar o prestígio da Áustria-Hungria nos Balcãs. A Alemanha já tinha expressado o seu parecer (em outubro de 1913) de apoiar a Áustria-Hungria em caso de esta entrar em guerra contra a Sérvia. A garantia fora confirmada na semana seguinte ao assassinato do arquiduque.[99]

Os austríacos decidiram apresentar um ultimato à Sérvia[100] com a intenção de iniciar uma guerra, contando com a Alemanha para dissuadir a Rússia de intervir. Os termos eram os seguintes:

1. Suprimir qualquer publicação que incite o ódio e a desobediência à monarquia austríaca;
2. Dissolver imediatamente a sociedade *Narodna Odbrana*[101] e proceder do mesmo modo contra outras sociedades dedicadas na propaganda anti Áustria;
3. Eliminar de instituições públicas sérvias quaisquer aspetos que sirvam para fomentar a propaganda anti Áustria;
4. Remover do serviço militar todos os oficiais ligados à propaganda anti Áustria, oficiais que deverão ter seus nomes dados ao governo Austro-Húngaro;
5. Aceitar a colaboração de organizações do governo Austro-Húngaro na supressão de movimentos subversivos direcionados contra a integridade territorial da monarquia;
6. Iniciar uma investigação judicial contra os cúmplices da conspiração de 28 de junho que estão em território sérvio, com órgãos delegados pelo governo Austro-Húngaro fazendo parte da investigação;

[99] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "World War I: 1914-1918", 2016, http://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.
[100] *firstworldwar.com*, "Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, 23 July 1914", 2009, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm, consultado em julho de 2016.
[101] Grupo nacionalista sérvio que foi criado por volta de 1908, como uma reação à anexação da Bósnia e Herzegovina pela Áustria-Hungria.

7. Prender imediatamente o major Voislav Tankosic e o oficial sérvio Milan Ciganovitch, comprometidos pelas investigações preliminares empreendidas pela Áustria-Hungria;
8. Providenciar, por meio de medidas efetivas, a cooperação da Sérvia contra o tráfico ilegal de armas e explosivos através da fronteira;
9. Fornecer à Áustria-Hungria explicações sobre declarações de altos oficiais sérvios tanto na Sérvia quanto no exterior, que expressaram hostilidades para com a Áustria-Hungria;
10. Notificar a Áustria-Hungria sem demora a execução dessas medidas.

Embora os termos do ultimato tenham sido validados a 19 de julho, a sua entrega à Sérvia foi adiada para a noite de 23 de julho, uma vez que por essa altura o presidente francês, Raymond Poincaré, tinha partido numa visita de Estado para a Rússia a 15 de julho e estaria de viagem de regresso, portanto, Poincaré estaria incapaz de ajustar uma reação imediata com os seus aliados russos (por ainda estar em viagem). Quando a entrega do ultimato foi anunciada, em 24 de julho, a Rússia declarou que deveriam impedir a Áustria-Hungria de atacar a Sérvia.[102]

A Sérvia respondeu ao ultimato austríaco no dia seguinte, em 25 de julho, aceitando a maioria das suas exigências, exceto a condição de incluir órgãos delegados pelo governo austro-húngaro na investigação judicial sérvia (6º artigo), que a Sérvia afirmou ser inconstitucional e uma violação da sua soberania. Embora a Sérvia se oferecesse para submeter na questão à arbitragem internacional, a Áustria-Hungria prontamente rompeu as relações diplomáticas e ordenou uma mobilização[103] parcial do seu exército.[104]

Em 28 de julho, Wilhelm II, imperador da Alemanha, recebeu a notícia da forma como a Sérvia tinha respondido ao ultimato. Em simultâneo, ele instruiu o Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros alemão para informar a Áustria-Hungria de que já não havia qualquer justificação para a guerra e que devia apenas contentar-se com uma ocupação temporária da cidade de Belgrado (capital da Sérvia) para a pressionar a

[102] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "World War I: 1914-1918".
[103] Ato de reunir e preparar tanto tropas como provisões, em geral para uma guerra.
[104] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "World War I: 1914-1918".

ceder às suas exigências. Mas, no entanto, os alemães já tinham encorajado o imperador austríaco que teria todo o apoio numa guerra contra a Sérvia e os eventos rapidamente desenrolaram-se, sem tempo para impedir o que se seguiu.[105]

No mesmo dia, a 28 de julho, a Áustria-Hungria declara guerra à Sérvia e logo no dia seguinte envia a sua artilharia para bombardear a cidade de Belgrado. A Rússia, então, ordena uma mobilização parcial do seu exército contra a Áustria-Hungria e esta responde ordenando uma mobilização na sua fronteira para deter o avanço das tropas russas. A Rússia responde com uma mobilização completa, ficando assim completamente empenhada numa guerra total contra os austríacos.[106]

A Alemanha, desde 28 de julho, ainda tinha esperanças de que a guerra entre Áustria-Hungria e a Sérvia poderia ser delimitada apenas nos Balcãs, estaria agora frustrada pelo motivo de que toda a Europa estaria em risco de um conflito global. Em 31 de julho a Alemanha envia um ultimato à Rússia exigindo a ela para suspender a mobilização do seu exército e outro ultimato à França a exigir a sua neutralidade em caso de guerra entre a Rússia e a Alemanha.[107]

Tanto a Rússia como a França ignoraram a ameaça alemã. Em 1 de agosto a Alemanha ordena a mobilização completa do seu exército e declara guerra à Rússia. Entretanto, a França faz o mesmo contra a Alemanha. No dia seguinte o exército alemão ocupa o pequeno estado de Luxemburgo e, de seguida, exige à Bélgica a passagem livre das tropas alemãs através de todo o seu território neutro (isto, para contornar a fronteira francesa fortemente defendida contra a Alemanha). O que se seguiu foi a declaração oficial de guerra à França e rapidamente as forças alemãs invadem a Bélgica, a fim de atacar a França por norte. Entretanto, a Grã-Bretanha, que não tinha qualquer obrigação com a Sérvia, nem nenhuma obrigação significativa de lutar tanto pela Rússia como pela França, assume explicitamente o compromisso de defender a Bélgica neste conflito e em 4 de agosto declara guerra à Alemanha. Assinalando assim o início da formação das duas fações beligerantes da

[105] *Ibid.*
[106] *Ibid.*
[107] *Ibid.*

Primeira Guerra Mundial: a *Triple Entente*, ou os Aliados (Grã-Bretanha, França e Rússia) e as Potências Centrais[108] (Alemanha e Áustria-Hungria) (figura 7).[109]



Figura 7 - Mapa da Europa com as alianças militares em 1914[110]

Facilmente consegue-se criar uma ligação lógica entre os vários eventos desde as Guerras dos Balcãs e o início da Grande Guerra, mas deve-se compreender que a formação da *Triple Entente* não se fundamentou numa cooperação com o objetivo de libertar a Sérvia da opressão austro-húngara, mas sim na casualidade do cruzar de interesses e compromissos geopolíticos destas 3 potências europeias, de certa forma a que as obrigou a avigorar esta aliança tripla, acrescentando a gradual ameaça que a Alemanha representava com o seu crescimento industrial e militar desde 1907. Da mesma forma que a intenção da Alemanha em apoiar a Áustria-Hungria não seria de provocar um conflito com tais proporções.

[108] No início da Grande Guerra, a Itália abandonou a *Triplice Alleanza* e recusou-se a participar do conflito. Contudo, em função das promessas territoriais que recebeu, a Itália entrou no conflito em maio de 1915, do lado da *Tríplice Entente*, ou Aliados.

[109] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "World War I: 1914-1918".

[110] *Europe's military alliances in World War I, 1914*, http://www.zonu.com/detail-en/2009-11-19-11176/-Europes-military-alliances-in-World-War-I-1914.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

A situação acabou por escalar ao ponto de estar fora de controlo e os generais alemães tiveram de agir rapidamente, executando o antigo plano de contingência do exército alemão: o *Schlieffen Plan*[111], para que as potências centrais não fossem esmagadas pelos seus inimigos e, idealmente, vencer a guerra nas duas frentes em simultâneo, o mais célere possível.

As motivações da Rússia em intervir, para além dos seus compromissos diplomáticos com os seus aliados, foi particularmente o seu interesse geoestratégico de manter a sua influência nos Balcãs.

2.4. Disposição dos poderes navais no início da Grande Guerra

No Mar do Norte estavam concentradas a "Esquadra de Alto-Mar" alemã e a "Grande Esquadra" britânica, em que a última se mantinha pronta para preservar a supremacia no mar do lado dos Aliados. A esquadra alemã tinha sido criada exclusivamente para o combate no Mar do Norte (fora do contexto da Grande Guerra). A primeira preocupação dos alemães, no inicio da Grande Guerra, era a defesa da sua costa, em segundo era em garantir a superioridade naval no Mar Báltico e, apenas depois, voltariam a sua atenção para o Mar do Norte.[112]

Com as declarações de guerra em 1914, o imperador alemão emitiu uma diretiva para a conduta de guerra no Mar do Norte: realizar operações ofensivas contra navios britânicos a patrulhar ou a bloquear as águas territoriais da Alemanha e, em simultâneo, realizar operações ofensivas com minas submarinas e, se possível, estender os ataques com submarinos até à costa britânica. Por fim, pelos meios referidos, assim que alcançar a simetria de forças com a esquadra britânica, a esquadra alemã deverá procurar a oportunidade de empenhar-se em batalha, sob

[111] Plano militar aplicado pelo exército alemão no início da Primeira Guerra Mundial. O plano previa resolver uma questão que preocupava os alemães em caso de conflito: uma guerra em duas frentes, ou seja, uma guerra contra a França e, muito provavelmente, contra a Grã-Bretanha, na frente ocidental e, simultaneamente, uma guerra contra a Rússia, na frente oriental.

[112] R. E. Krause, *German Naval Strategy in World War*, Tese apresentada no Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, Naval War College, 1934, p. 6.

condições favoráveis, a fim de eliminar a superioridade naval britânica no Mar do Norte.[113]

A política naval alemã tinha também como objetivo, de certa forma, empregar a sua avançada e dispendiosa esquadra como arma de dissuasão. Muitos especuladores acreditavam numa batalha naval iminente e decisiva no Mar do Norte, ao estilo da batalha de Trafalgar[114]. Por outro lado, a atenção virou-se seguidamente para a pequena divisão de dois navios alemães (a *Mittelmeer-Division*) no Mar Mediterrâneo: o cruzador de batalha *SMS Goeben* e o cruzador leve *SMS Breslau*[115], que tinham sido destacados a demanda do Estado-Maior General alemão quando a primeira Guerra Balcânica despertou, a fim de projetar poder naval no Mediterrâneo e proteger os seus interesses nesse cenário: defender a Áustria-Hungria da subversão do povo eslavo na sua monarquia (apoiados pela Rússia) e garantir a influência nos principais países balcânicos (Bulgária, Roménia, Albânia e Turquia)[116].

A Itália, que anteriormente fazia parte da *Triplice Alleanza* (do lado das Potências Centrais), declarou-se neutra quando a guerra eclodiu e viria só mais tarde, em maio de 1915, juntar-se ao lado dos Aliados. Isto deixou, inicialmente, apenas as esquadras navais britânicas e francesas disponíveis para tentar capturar ou destruir os navios de guerra alemães isolados. Durante a busca e perseguição persistentes, o *SMS Goeben* e *SMS Breslau* escapam com sucesso e chegam a Constantinopla em agosto de 1914, a capital da Turquia otomana sob influência alemã. Pouco depois, estes dois cruzadores foram oferecidos à marinha do Império Otomano, num ato de

[113] *Ibid.*, p.7.
[114] Batalha naval que ocorreu entre a França e Espanha contra a Grã-Bretanha, em 21 de outubro de 1805, na época das Guerras Napoleónicas, ao largo do cabo de Trafalgar, na costa espanhola.
[115] John B. Hattendorf, *Naval Policy and Startegy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future*, Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2000.
[116] W. Young, *German Diplomatic Relations 1871-1945: The Wilhelmstrasse and the Formulation of Foreign Policy*, Lincoln, Nebraska, iUniverse Inc., 2006, p. 109.

confiança entre os dois impérios, com intenções estratégicas de manter uma relação forte pelo decurso da guerra. [117] [118]

Uns dos principais fatores que levaram ao envolvimento otomano no lado das Potências Centrais, foram: a pressão alemã, as vitórias alemãs no início da guerra e a fricção da Turquia com a *Tríplice Entente* (nomeadamente com a Rússia). O objetivo da Alemanha era claro, queria manter a Turquia sobre a sua influência e incentivar a Roménia e a Bulgária a entrar do lado das Potências Centrais. Como resultado, incitam um novo teatro de guerra no Médio Oriente. Com a presença dos robustos navios de guerra ex-alemães (recentemente oferecidos à Turquia), em combinação com outros meios e ajuda alemã, os turcos bloqueiam de forma bastante eficaz os estreitos de Bósforo e Dardanelos, cortando as linhas de comunicação da Rússia com os seus aliados e o seu acesso ao Mar Mediterrâneo.[119] [120]

A esquadra austríaca encontrava-se obstruída no Mar Adriático, com a esquadra francesa a bloquear todo o acesso (entre o sul da Itália e a Albânia), com patrulhas periódicas para escoltar navios mercantes e transportar mantimentos para Montenegro (e, por essa via, auxiliar a Sérvia em simultâneo). A esquadra francesa enfrentava bastantes dificuldades logísticas a operar nessa área, pois a sua base naval mais próxima seria na ilha de Malta (uma base conjunta entre a França e a Grã-Bretanha).[121]

Os britânicos olhavam para a Alemanha como uma ameaça à sua autoridade nos mares, principalmente no Mar do Norte (entre a Alemanha e as ilhas britânicas). Quando Wilhelm II tomou o trono da Prússia (Alemanha) este liderou o seu império com uma forte política bélica e, olhando para o exemplo do grande império da Grã-Bretanha, este declarou "o nosso futuro está no mar"[122] e, nos anos que se seguiram,

[117] Hattendorf.
[118] *John B. Hattendorf*, "The Strategic Roles of Navies During the First World War". Comunicação apresentada na Escola Naval, no contexto do congresso internacional "A Marinha e a Grande Guerra: Política e Poder Naval", em 14 de outubro de 2015.
[119] Hattendorf, *Naval Policy and Startegy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future*.
[120] *Hattendorf*, "The Strategic Roles of Navies During the First World War".
[121] Hattendorf, *Naval Policy and Startegy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future*.
[122] Krause, p. 3.

passou a investir no desenvolvimento de uma marinha moderna e capaz de fazer frente ao poder naval britânico. Na época, fazia parte da política externa britânica manter uma marinha com capacidade, pelo menos, igual à força combinada das próximas duas maiores marinhas do mundo, de forma a manter a superioridade nos mares, que era o principal meio para controlar a economia mundial.[123] [124]

Em agosto de 1914, a Marinha Real Britânica contava com 26 couraçados e cruzadores de batalha modernos, enquanto a Marinha Imperial da Alemanha contava com uma força de 18 navios equivalentes. A superioridade naval britânica no Mar do Norte, contando com outros meios mais antigos, era consideravelmente maior. Só em submarinos é que os alemães possuíam a vantagem, contando com 28 unidades e os britânicos apenas com 18 equivalentes, sem contar com outras dezenas de submarinos costeiros[125] de ambas as marinhas.[126] Contando com todos os meios disponíveis, dos dois oponentes, a superioridade britânica relativa à alemã era de 3 para 2[127], o que eram boas probabilidades para a Alemanha, que contava com uma esquadra muito mais moderna que a britânica.

A intenção da Alemanha em empregar eficazmente a sua esquadra do Mar do Norte como elemento dissuasor de guerra (afastar a esquadra britânica de intervir) não criou o efeito desejado, mesmo assim, esta representou uma preocupação e distração estratégica à Grã-Bretanha, que tinha de sustentar uma grande dispersão de forças e, em simultâneo, manter a esquadra alemã sob constante observação, em que ambas as esquadras só estavam dispostas a procurar o confronto em condições favoráveis e se estivessem determinadas a uma batalha decisiva. Desta forma, a Marinha Imperial da Alemanha focou-se apenas, durante os primeiros anos da guerra, em operações de colocação de minas e em operações ofensivas com submarinos.[128]

[123] Hattendorf, *Naval Policy and Startegy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future*.
[124] *Hattendorf*, "The Strategic Roles of Navies During the First World War".
[125] Submarinos pequenos, de calado baixo e adequados a patrulhas em águas interiores e portos.
[126] *Hattendorf*, "The Strategic Roles of Navies During the First World War".
[127] Krause, p. 6.
[128] *Hattendorf*, "The Strategic Roles of Navies During the First World War".

As operações navais britânicas no Mar do Norte, desde o início da guerra, tiveram como principal objetivo cortar por completo as rotas comerciais marítimas entre a Alemanha e o resto do mundo. A abordagem geral foi através do embargo da economia alemã: escassez de mantimentos e recursos naturais, aumento do desemprego, dificultar as comunicações pelo corte de cabos telegráficos submarinos, bloquear todo o comércio destinado à Alemanha e capturar navios mercantes alemães, no mar, ou detendo-os em portos de outras nações. A Alemanha, como uma nação urbanizada e industrializada, dependia das rotas comerciais marítimas para sustentar a sua economia em rápido crescimento. Simultaneamente o embargo acabou por afetar outras nações neutras, nomeadamente a Dinamarca, Noruega, Holanda, Suécia e, particularmente, os Estados Unidos da América, resultando em protestos contra a política naval britânica, criando alguma pressão política sobre o governo britânico. Rapidamente esses protestos conduziram à alteração das principais intenções da Grã-Bretanha: o estrangulamento total da economia alemã, limitando assim a extensão dessas operações.[129]

Desta forma, confiando na brevidade da guerra, a Marinha Real Britânica recebeu instruções para efetuar um bloqueio naval à Alemanha, porém menos agressivo do que tinham planeado inicialmente. No início de 1915, a Grã-Bretanha declara como zona de guerra as águas entre a Escócia e a Noruega. Em resposta, a Alemanha declara também, como zona de guerra, as águas circundantes da Grã-Bretanha e da Irlanda, inclusive o Canal da Mancha, levando a que constituíssem um perigo enorme para a navegação de qualquer navio mercante, incluindo os de países neutros.[130] [131]

A Alemanha não tinha, até à data, desenvolvido nenhum conceito estratégico de coordenação entre os diferentes ramos das forças armadas para se apoiarem mutuamente em batalha. Como resultado, a marinha alemã perdeu várias oportunidades estratégicas. Por exemplo, enquanto a Alemanha empenhava grande

[129] *Ibid.*
[130] A. R. Scheer, *Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War*, Londres, Frontline Books, 2014.
[131] *Hattendorf*, "The Strategic Roles of Navies During the First World War".

parte do seu exército no ataque à França, não resolveu utilizar a sua esquadra para atacar o Canal da Mancha e interromper o suporte logístico e militar britânico aos franceses.[132]

Alguns oficiais da marinha alemã defendiam a importância de dominar o Mar Báltico com a esquadra do Mar do Norte, para proteger as rotas logísticas de material de guerra da Suécia, bloquear as rotas comerciais e linhas de comunicação russas e, ainda, impedir quaisquer desembarques inimigos na costa do Báltico alemão. O Alto Comando Naval alemão invalidou este plano, nunca, no entanto, atribuindo um objetivo estratégico específico à esquadra do Mar do Norte, com o dilema de tencionar utilizá-la como ameaça principal à marinha britânica, mas sem querer arriscá-la efetivamente em outras batalhas. Durante o final do ano de 1914 e início de 1915, com o aumento da atividade dos submarinos alemães, que se estendia até ao Atlântico Norte, a Grã-Bretanha criou uma barreira de minas ao longo do estreito de Dover e no Canal do Norte, no Mar da Irlanda, isolando o norte da Europa do comércio marítimo. O sucedido levou a uma revolta das nações neutras, que beneficiavam do comércio com as nações em guerra. Entretanto, a marinha alemã conduzia operações de colocação de minas e patrulhas no Mar Báltico para cortar as linhas de comunicação entre a Rússia e os seus aliados, em simultâneo efetuava vários ataques esporádicos à costa inglesa e a comboios de navios mercantes em diversas rotas comerciais.[133] [134]

É possível concluir, tendo em conta a disposição dos poderes navais no inicio da Grande Guerra, que o Mar do Norte e o Mar Báltico eram demasiado hostis para criar uma linha de comunicação entre os Aliados. No entanto, no Mar Mediterrâneo as forças navais da Grã-Bretanha, França e Itália detinham a superioridade naval, permitindo assim a liberdade de ação para executar operações navais e desembarques, levando à forte consideração de forçar o Dardanelos, a fim de ligar as potências ocidentais com a Rússia, que apelava por auxílio por essa via.

[132] *Ibid.*
[133] Krause, *German Naval Strategy in World War*.
[134] *Hattendorf*, "The Strategic Roles of Navies During the First World War".

3. A decisão de forçar o estreito de Dardanelos

3.1. As primeiras ideias

Assim que a guerra começara em 1914, a ideia de os Aliados capturarem e controlarem o tráfego marítimo no estreito de Dardanelos, era desde logo um projeto bastante desejável de concretizar. Se de imediato estivessem disponíveis os meios necessários e se fossem devidamente aproveitados para realizar tal operação, constituiria um objetivo potencialmente exequível.[135]

O possível cenário de os Aliados controlarem o Dardanelos logo desde o início da guerra iria facultar as linhas de comunicação marítimas entre as potências ocidentais, Grã-Bretanha e França, com a Rússia. Esta ligação iria permitir à Rússia receber material de guerra, que tanto necessitava, em troca dos seus produtos agrícolas (cereais) que eram essenciais para sustentar o esforço de guerra, sendo a Rússia um país maioritariamente agrícola e ainda pouco industrializado, tinha um excesso de cereais armazenados, por não conseguir faze-los escoar no mercado internacional, e, em contrapartida, tinha um défice de armamento e munições, por não ter capacidade de as produzir em massa como os seus aliados.

Em simultâneo, iria também melhorar a influência sobre os países dos Balcãs, de forma a persuadir algumas dessas nações a juntarem-se ao esforço dos Aliados. Em suma, se este objetivo fosse alcançado logo no início do conflito, a pressão na frente oriental (Rússia) e no Cáucaso não seria tão pesada e, no ponto de vista dos britânicos, esta seria a melhor forma de proteger o Canal do Suez.[136] Era, portanto, um objetivo operacional dos Aliados.

Mais tarde, em agosto de 1914, o embaixador britânico que estava em Constantinopla, quando o Império Otomano ainda era neutro neste conflito, sugeriu ao governo britânico que deveria de explorar a instabilidade política para forçar o

[135] V. W. Hall, "Events leading up to the Allied decision to force a landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and the operations of the fleet to include March 20, 1915", in *Combined Arms Research Library*, 1932, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll14/id/316/rec/8, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.
[136] *Ibid.*

Dardanelos. Pouco depois, em setembro, Winston Churchill, primeiro Lorde do Almirantado Britânico[137], considerou a possibilidade de empenhar o exército grego para invadir a península de Galípoli, desembarcando efetivamente essas tropas em terra e capturar os fortes que armavam o Dardanelos, para permitir que uma força naval atravessasse o estreito com segurança e atacasse o coração do Império Otomano, Constantinopla.[138]

3.2. A viabilidade de tomar a península de Galípoli

A questão da viabilidade de tomar a península de Galípoli, no início da Grande Guerra, foi levantada perante o Almirantado Britânico no dia 1 de setembro de 1914[139], como referido anteriormente. A proposta focava na ocupação da península de Galípoli para tomar as fortificações que armavam o estreito de Dardanelos, para garantir a sua travessia marítima com segurança e alcançar Constantinopla. Supunha-se que, dominando a margem da península de Galípoli, facilmente se dominava a margem asiática do estreito.[140]

O plano de capturar a península de Galípoli já existia em esquema desde 1906, em que, resumidamente, envolveria 4 divisões do exército grego, com 3 brigadas cada, a desembarcar na extremidade sudoeste da península para tomar, pela retaguarda, as fortificações que dominavam o estreito.[141]

Desde a data desse último esquema que as fortificações foram melhoradas, em termos de modernização e quantidade de armamento, com o auxílio dos alemães. Neste caso, uma tentativa de capturar a península seria uma operação muito mais séria e arriscada do que o cenário de 1906.[142]

A força do exército turco presente por todo o estreito de Dardanelos, Mar de Mármara e Bósforo, estimava-se que seria cerca de 220.000 homens, um número

[137] O responsável pela Marinha Real Britânica, que era um cargo ostentado por uma só pessoa.
[138] *Hall.*
[139] The National Archives, *Feasibility of seizing the Gallipoli Peninsula*, Kew, Londres, 1914, WO 106/1463. (Anexo V)
[140] *Ibid.*
[141] *Ibid.*, pp.3-7.
[142] *Ibid.*, p.3.

desconhecido de metralhadoras e uma quantidade de artilharia costeira por volta de 1.200 peças de vários tipos e calibres.[143]

Ficou bem claro, tendo em conta as melhorias feitas no estreito com o apoio dos alemães, que uma operação ofensiva à península de Galípoli a partir do mar iria provar-se uma operação de guerra extremamente difícil de realizar. A questão foi anteriormente considerada pelo Estado-Maior General e apresentado ao Comité de Defesa Imperial em 1906, mas já nessa data ficou assente de que a operação não seria viável de executar, muito menos com tão pouco tempo para reunir e preparar todos os meios necessários.[144]

Desde a última Guerra dos Balcãs, que os turcos reforçaram eficazmente a península de Galípoli para se protegerem da Bulgária e da Grécia, ou de qualquer ataque surpresa dirigido a Constantinopla. Só na península de Galípoli estimava-se que os turcos teriam permanentemente cerca de 27.000 homens, com 136 peças de artilharia, sem contar que por esta altura, em setembro de 1914, já teriam sido fortemente reforçados, treinados e modernizados pela Alemanha. Seria também de lembrar que não havia forma de impedir os turcos de reforçar a península a partir de Constantinopla ou de qualquer outro ponto do Mar de Mármara. Para a operação de invadir Galípoli, foi estimado que seriam precisos, pelo menos, 60.000 homens para capturar a península, para além de toda a artilharia e logística necessária.[145]

3.3. A visão de Winston Churchill e o ataque puramente naval

Para entender melhor o que levou à execução da Campanha de Galípoli, em que os primeiros desembarques só tiveram inicio em 25 de abril de 1915, convém ter conhecimento que o fator surpresa foi totalmente descurado e vários ataques foram realizados ao Dardanelos, meses antes de ser tomada uma decisão final e formulado um plano consistente para conquistar os estreitos e Constantinopla.

[143] *Ibid.*, p.8.
[144] *Ibid.*, p.10.
[145] *Ibid.*, pp.10-11.

A Turquia já contava com apoio político e militar da Alemanha vários anos antes da Grande Guerra. Em dezembro de 1913 o General Liman von Sanders foi enviado pela Alemanha, para reorganizar e treinar o exército turco. A influência alemã na Turquia ganharia mais força no mês de agosto de 1914, aquando a oferta dos navios de guerra alemães *SMS Goeben* e *SMS Breslau* à marinha turca, como referido no capítulo anterior. O Império Otomano entra na guerra do lado das Potências Centrais, oficialmente, em 31 de outubro de 1914, justificando a aliança citando as primeiras vitórias da Alemanha na guerra, porque estar do lado do vencedor daria a oportunidade de alcançar uma vitória rápida sobre os seus inimigos vizinhos e evitar a desintegração iminente do Império Otomano.[146]

Prontamente depois da declaração de guerra da Turquia aos Aliados, em 3 de novembro, os esquadrões britânicos e franceses do Mediterrâneo bombardearam, durante 10 minutos, os fortes turcos à entrada do estreito de Dardanelos, de forma a realizar reconhecimento pelo fogo, para testar a resistência das fortificações e a sua capacidade de resposta. Em dezembro, um submarino britânico consegue atravessar o estreito, passando por baixo dos campos de minas que já estavam colocadas e consegue ainda atacar e afundar um velho navio de guerra turco, o *Massoudieh*[147].

Durante uma reunião do Conselho de Guerra Britânico, em 25 de novembro, Churchill reaviva o plano de atacar a península de Galípoli, particularmente com o pretexto de proteger o Canal do Suez de possíveis ameaças. Ele relembraria de que esta seria uma operação difícil e que requeria uma força militar considerável, mas a opinião geral do Conselho na altura era de que os esforços na frente francesa não deveriam de ser desviados para uma nova frente e que não havia os meios e homens disponíveis para divergir desta forma[148]. A opinião geral sobre a frente ocidental, seria de que o problema seria resolvido com mais homens e não com a criação de novas frentes e mais dispersão de forças.

[146] Hall, p. 2.
[147] *Ibid.*
[148] *Ibid.*

Entretanto a Rússia, altamente pressionada na frente oriental e por sul, solicita o auxílio dos seus aliados e, em 3 de janeiro de 1915, o Secretário de Estado da Guerra britânico informou Winston Churchill do pedido da Rússia para efetuar uma demonstração de força contra a Turquia, de forma a aliviar a pressão que os turcos incitavam à Rússia por sul, no Cáucaso. A demonstração teria de ser realizada pela Marinha britânica, pois nenhuma força do exército britânico poderia ser desviada da frente ocidental em França. Churchill definiu a cidade de Constantinopla como o objetivo principal da força naval que iria ser empregue na operação. Esta ideia de atacar a capital turca através de uma operação puramente naval foi alvo de várias críticas dos outros membros do Concelho de Guerra Britânico.[149]

Winston Churchill, entretanto, conseguiu persuadir o Conselho de Guerra de que as peças de artilharia navais modernas, que armavam por exemplo o *HMS Queen Elizabeth*, seriam tão eficazes como as peças de artilharia alemãs utilizadas na batalha de Liège[150] e que conseguiam destruir as fortificações do Dardanelos sem que a artilharia costeira tivesse alcance suficiente para atingir os navios.[151] Poucos dias depois o Almirantado recebeu a diretiva de preparar um ataque naval ao Dardanelos, com a cidade de Constantinopla como o seu objetivo principal. A intenção desta operação, por esta altura, seria de conduzir uma operação puramente naval e se a operação falhasse em contemplar o sucesso intencionado, esta seria facilmente cancelada e a esquadra podia retirar a qualquer momento, sem qualquer perda de meios ou de prestígio.[152]

O Governo Britânico validou a operação, puramente naval, em 28 de janeiro de 1915. Nesta mesma data o Secretário de Estado de Guerra comunicou que se a Marinha necessitasse do apoio de forças terrestres, numa fase mais avançada da operação, que tal reforço seria fornecido posteriormente. Novamente, os seus

[149] A. F. Howard, "Events leading up to the Allied decision to force a landing at Gallipoli, and the operations of the fleet to include March 20, 1915", in *Combined Arms Research Library*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: the Command and General Staff School, 1933, p. 2, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll14/id/318/rec/10, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

[150] A batalha de Liège foi a primeira batalha terrestre da Grande Guerra, em agosto de 1914, quando o Segundo Exército alemão cruzou a fronteira da Bélgica, na altura neutra, de modo a atacar a França pelo norte. O *Schlieffen Plan* tinha então começado.

[151] Howard, p. 2.

[152] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

conselheiros militares eram contra a ideia de divergir tropas da frente ocidental.[153] A expedição, concebida pelos britânicos, foi aceite pelos franceses, que de seguida destacaram 4 couraçados e uma flotilha de draga-minas para se apresentarem ao serviço do Almirante Carden, comandante da Esquadra do Mediterrâneo.[154] As condições para realizar a operação naval estavam reunidas.

Para reunir todos os meios, a Grécia evacua a ilha de Lemnos e os britânicos estabelecem uma base naval no porto de Mudros. Este porto seria um excelente ponto de apoio e estrategicamente bem localizado para conduzir esta operação. A força naval reunida inicialmente, em fevereiro, para atacar o Dardanelos foi a seguinte:

- 16 Couraçados;
- 16 Contratorpedeiros;
- 7 Submarinos;
- 1 Porta-aviões, com 6 hidroaviões;
- 35 Draga-minas.[155]

Porém, toda a surpresa tática havia sido perdida, porque 3 meses antes a esquadra britânica tinha realizado bombardeamentos à entrada do estreito de Dardanelos, na altura fora determinado pelo Almirantado Britânico, sem qualquer objetivo claro. Isto permitiu à Turquia que se preparasse devidamente das possíveis ameaças futuras, melhorando as suas defesas.[156]

As defesas turcas no Dardanelos, que foram identificadas por reconhecimento anterior, eram as seguintes:

- Entrada do estreito:
  - Na península: 12 peças pesadas (alcance máximo: 14.800 m) e 4 peças ligeiras;
  - Na costa asiática: 9 peças pesadas e 2 peças médias.

[153] *Ibid.*
[154] *Ibid.*
[155] *Ibid.*
[156] *Ibid.*, p.5.

- Zona intermédia:
  - Na península: 10 obuses[157] pesados, 22 obuses e morteiros[158] médios, 15 peças médias e 21 peças e obuses ligeiros.
  - Na costa asiática: 8 obuses e morteiros pesados, 8 peças médias, 16 obuses médios e 24 peças ligeiras.[159]

As defesas do Dardanelos contavam com um total de 27 baterias[160], em que 23 das quais foram instaladas e guarnecidas desde a declaração de guerra em 31 de outubro de 1914. Grande parte foram implementadas em construções improvisadas e muitas eram móveis, para proteger os campos minados nas águas do estreito. Foram também colocadas um total de 10 linhas de minas paralelas que se estendiam desde a entrada do estreito, até ao ponto chamado de *The Narrows*, o local mais estreito do Dardanelos. No total seriam cerca de 377 minas, estendidas por 8 km.[161]

Os turcos tinham também 12 grandes holofotes, em que 6 eram móveis, 3 lança-torpedos, cada um com capacidade de lançar 2 torpedos e na região mais estreita ainda contava com as seguintes defesas: 8 peças pesadas (alcance máximo: de 14.800 a 16.900 m) e 70 peças de médio e curto alcance. Possuíam também 6 batalhões de infantaria a patrulhar a costa asiática.

Na figura 8 os três diferentes níveis de defesas turcas, acima referidos, são identificados como *Entrance*, *Intermediate Defense Zone* e *The Narrows*.[162]

[157] Peças de artilharia de cano relativamente curto, com tiro curvo, em que a aplicação tática é feita de forma a ter proteção de terreno mais alto, na frente do tiro, em que o projétil sobrevoa o terreno mais alto até ao alvo.
[158] Arma de tiro curvo utilizada, na sua maioria, como arma de apoio de infantaria, projetando granadas de alto explosivo a longos alcances. No caso dos morteiros pesados, estes são utilizados como arma de artilharia.
[159] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
[160] Agrupamentos de bocas-de-fogo ou de outros sistemas de armas de artilharia.
[161] Howard, p. 4.
[162] *Ibid.*



Figura 8 - Esboço das defesas no estreito de Dardanelos em março de 1915.[163]

O plano da operação, apresentado pelo Almirante Carden, a pedido do Almirantado, para atacar e atravessar o estreito, tinha as seguintes fases:

- 1ª Fase: Redução/destruição das defesas à entrada do estreito;
- 2ª Fase: Limpeza dos campos de minas e reduzir as defesas até ao *The Narrows*;
- 3ª Fase:
  a. Redução/destruição das defesas no *The Narrows*;
  b. Limpeza dos campos de minas principais;
  c. Silenciar os fortes acima do *The Narrows*;
  d. Passar a esquadra para o Mar de Mármara;
  e. Operações consequentes no Mar de Mármara e patrulhas no Dardanelos.[164]

[163] *Outline map of Gallipoli peninsula*. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[164] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

O Almirante Carden afirmou que a operação no estreito não podia ser apressada, e que o estreito tinha que ser forçado com o plano acima mencionado. Ele estimou que esta operação iria demorar pelo menos quatro semanas.[165]

Os ataques navais às defesas na entrada do estreito, seguidas de operações de destruição por pequenos grupos de marinheiros, tiveram sucesso em destruir algumas fortificações. A tentativa naval de destruir as defesas na zona mais estreita e limpar os campos de minas em simultâneo, não teve sucesso, devido a uma grande extensão de peças e obuses móveis localizados na zona intermédia do estreito, que protegiam os campos de minas.[166]

Esta operação, que decorreu no final de fevereiro de 1915, não atingiu o objetivo determinado e ficou comprovado de que uma tentativa de forçar o estreito de Dardanelos, utilizando apenas unidades navais, não era eficaz. Era necessária uma campanha conjunta com forças terrestres para projetar o poder naval para terra. As peças e obuses móveis utilizados pelos turcos mostraram ser muito eficazes em combinação com os campos de minas nas águas do estreito, em que os navios tanto não conseguiam limpar as minas com a ameaça da artilharia costeira, como a artilharia naval não era suficientemente eficaz para silenciar as defesas no estreito a longo alcance.

Ficou então evidente de que o auxílio de forças terrestres era necessário para dominar as defesas do Dardanelos. Desde esta tentativa falhada até à decisão final de realizar a Campanha de Galípoli, como a conhecemos, iriam passar cerca de 2 meses, que foram também fulcrais para os turcos reforçarem e reorganizarem as suas defesas.

Por outro lado, a opinião geral de vários conselheiros militares, era de que não se deveria tentar tal operação, mesmo sendo uma operação conjunta entre forças navais e do exército. Havia imensa informação disponível relativamente a operações projetadas contra o Dardanelos, tanto de experiências anteriores como de estudos

[165] *Ibid.*
[166] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

do Departamento de Guerra britânico, que provavam na ineficácia de armamento naval contra fortificações em terra e que o Estreito de Dardanelos não pode ser subjugado apenas com uma força naval, a utilização de forças terrestres era indispensável para anular a ameaça que se apresentava por terra, ainda mais por se tratar de um estreito, onde os navios eram alvos fáceis para a artilharia costeira e para as minas nas suas águas.

Vários exemplos práticos no passado, do aspeto operacional, comprovaram que atacar o estreito, apenas com unidades navais, era inexequível. Como referido anteriormente, em 1807, o Almirante Duckworth recebeu a ordem, contra a sua opinião no assunto, de atacar o Dardanelos com os seus navios, de qual não teve sucesso. Durante a guerra russo-turca em 1877, o Almirante Hornsby recebeu a diretiva de preparar um ataque ao Dardanelos. Ele protestou vigorosamente contra o plano de atacar o estreito apenas com navios, contudo os planos para o ataque foram concebidos, mas a operação nunca foi realizada. O estudo, referido anteriormente, preparado em 1904, pelo Almirante Fisher, concluiu que, mesmo com cooperação do exército, uma operação de forçar o Dardanelos seria demasiado arriscada para ser exequível. O Departamento de Guerra britânico, em 1906, apresentou outro estudo que referia de que uma tentativa de forçar o Dardanelos, apenas com navios, teria pouca probabilidade de atingir qualquer propósito útil e mesmo com uma ação conjunta, considerando os riscos envolvidos, tal operação não era recomendada. Outros estudos, em 1908 e 1911, confirmavam e reforçavam estas afirmações.[167]

3.4. Situação geral na Europa e o impasse na guerra

Desde setembro de 1914 que o avanço do exército alemão na frente ocidental começava a perder o seu ímpeto. Ambos os oponentes, Grã-Bretanha e França contra a Alemanha, tentavam continuamente flanquearem-se um ao outro no combate de trincheiras, sem atingir qualquer progresso significativo, estendendo uma frente de guerra que ia desde o sul de França, na fronteira com a Suíça, até à

[167] Hall, pp. 3-4.

costa belga no Mar do Norte, conhecida como a "corrida para o mar", representado na figura 9, atingindo um estado de impasse que iria durar até ao fim da guerra.[168]



Figura 9 - Mapa do curso da "corrida para o mar".[169]

[168] *HistoryOfWar.org*, "Race to the Sea, 15 September - 14 October 1914", 2007, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_race_to_sea.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

[169] *Carte des différentes opérations qui ont constitué "la course à la mer"*, http://www.remembrancetrails-northernfrance.com/history/battles/the-race-to-the-sea-september-and-october-1914.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

Por outro lado, a Rússia, na sua frente contra as Potências Centrais, estava a ser fortemente pressionada e sofre várias derrotas em batalha. No Cáucaso, a sul do território russo, os turcos abrem uma nova frente que obriga a Rússia a divergir ainda mais tropas para defender o seu território, levando-a a pedir auxílio à Grã-Bretanha para realizar uma demonstração contra a Turquia, a fim de aliviar a pressão nessa frente.

Na Frente Oriental o combate tinha muito mais fluidez e as trincheiras nunca foram realmente utilizadas. Esse facto deve-se à grande extensão da frente de batalha, o que mantinha uma baixa densidade de soldados nas linhas, que ficavam vulneráveis. Uma vez quebradas as linhas, as redes de comunicação esparsas tornavam difícil para o defensor conseguir receber reforços contra a sua rotura a tempo de montar uma contraofensiva rápida para retomar as linhas defensivas. Soma-se a isto ao facto de que o terreno no cenário da Europa Oriental era muito mais consistente, o que por vezes tornava quase impossível a construção de qualquer coisa que se assemelhasse aos sistemas de trincheira da Frente Ocidental, que geralmente possuía um terreno mais lamacento e viável de se escavar. Em suma, na Frente Oriental o lado que se defendia não tinha as vantagens esmagadoras que tinham na Frente Ocidental.[170]

No Egipto, entre 26 de janeiro e 4 de fevereiro de 1915, o 4º Exército turco é repelido no seu ataque ao Canal do Suez, garantindo a segurança do Egipto de forma temporária.

A esquadra britânica no Mar do Norte mantinha a esquadra alemã contida com uma ampla margem de segurança. A esquadra francesa no Mediterrâneo mantinha a esquadra austríaca contida no Mar Adriático. O domínio dos mares no lado dos Aliados nunca estaria tão completo, este cenário garantia a supremacia dos mares para realizar uma operação anfíbia.

A Rússia sofria uma escassez de munições, mas tinha uma abundância de produção de cereais, que era essencial para os seus aliados. Não havia qualquer linha

[170] Stone Norman, *The Eastern Front 1914-1917*, Londres, Penguin Books, 1998.

de comunicação direta para tal permuta, o Mar Báltico, a norte, ou estava bloqueado por gelo ou por navios alemães[171], por sul, no Mar Negro, a Rússia estava bloqueada pelos estreitos de Bósforo e Dardanelos fortemente defendidos pelos turcos.

Os vários estados dos Balcãs oscilavam de opinião sobre qual o lado é que deveriam de tomar no decurso da guerra, sendo a Bulgária o estado balcânico mais influente e o principal que deveria de ser persuadido.[172]

A intenção de forçar o Dardanelos, por esta altura, tinha fortes motivos e começava a ser vista como uma forma de acabar a guerra mais rapidamente. Os objetivos principais da campanha eram os seguintes:

- Abrir uma linha direta de comunicação marítima com a Rússia, para permitir o abastecimento de munições, em troca do seu excesso de cereais;
- Inverter a frente de sul contra as Potências Centrais, para obrigar a Alemanha a divergir mais tropas;
- Cingir ainda mais o cerco às Potências Centrais;
- Afastar a Turquia da guerra;
- Convencer os estados dos Balcãs e a Itália a juntarem-se à causa dos Aliados;
- Manter o Médio Oriente e a Índia seguros (principalmente para beneficio dos britânicos).[173]

3.5. Os acordos em Petrogrado e os despojos de guerra

A Rússia havia perdido uma boa parte da sua capacidade militar na guerra Russo-Japonesa, não tinha a capacidade industrial dos seus adversários, o sistema de ferroviários ainda estava incompleto, que a impedia de reforçar as suas tropas na frente a tempo devido, e sofria uma grande dificuldade financeira por não conseguir exportar os seus bens agrícolas, tudo isto levou a que a Rússia fizesse um pedido de auxilio urgente aos seus aliados, ou a única opção seria a sua rendição à Alemanha.

[171] The National Archives, *Progress of the War; Russia and Constantinople*, Kew, Londres, 1916, CAB 42/2/5. (Anexo XV)
[172] Howard, p. 1.
[173] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Por volta de janeiro e fevereiro de 1915 a Rússia mostrou várias vezes a intenção de negociar uma paz separada com a Alemanha[174], os seus esforços na guerra estavam a tornar-se insustentáveis, as várias derrotas em batalha, as revoltas internas e outros motivos relacionados ao empenho da Rússia na guerra levaram aos russos a repensarem seriamente se seria favorável manter esse esforço, isto despertou imediatamente preocupação no alto comando britânico, pois sem a Rússia na guerra, facilmente a Alemanha dirigia todos os seus esforços na frente ocidental e os Aliados, muito provavelmente, teriam muitas dificuldades em vencer o conflito.

Os acordos realizados na cidade russa de Petrogrado, entre fevereiro e março de 1915, foram uma série de garantias secretas ajustadas entre os aliados da *Triple Entente*. O acordo mais relevante para esta dissertação foi o "Acordo de Constantinopla", como é mencionado em algumas fontes. Este acordo prometia, por parte da Grã-Bretanha e de França, em entregar Constantinopla, a capital do Império Otomano, o estreito de Dardanelos e outros territórios adjacentes, à soberania da Rússia no caso de sucesso de uma operação ofensiva contra a Turquia pelo estreito.[175] [176]

Antes de mencionar os documentos que comprovam estas negociações, é de referir novamente que o que amplificou a importância de forçar o Dardanelos, que foi realizado de forma precipitada, foi a ameaça da Rússia sair da guerra, se as suas aspirações não fossem satisfeitas. Um dos documentos em questão é um telegrama de 2 de fevereiro de 1915[177], dirigido a *Sir* Edward Grey, que na altura era ministro britânico dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Este telegrama discute a posição da Suécia no caso de a Rússia assinar uma paz separada com a Alemanha, e faz referência a um telegrama anterior de 27 de janeiro, em que já haveria rumores de uma negociação

[174] The National Archives, *Position of Sweden in the event of peace between Germany and Russia*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 37/124/11. (Anexo VI)
[175] C. J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations: A-E*, Londres, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, Vol. I, p. 50.
[176] Fromkin.
[177] The National Archives, *Position of Sweden in the event of peace between Germany and Russia*. (Anexo VI)

de paz entre a Rússia e a Alemanha. Refere também o desastre que seria para os Aliados em ter a Rússia fora da guerra.

Era evidente que a Rússia não tinha nenhum benefício politico com a guerra, exceto a aquisição de Constantinopla e dos estreitos. Abatida pelas derrotas em várias batalhas e com o seu exército em plena retirada no seu teatro de guerra, seria muito perigoso privá-la desta perspetiva, levando-a a perder todo o interesse na guerra e levá-la a uma paz separada, apesar dos tratados em contrário.[178] A aquisição destes territórios era a única coisa que motivava a Rússia a manter-se na guerra. Não tinha outra coisa a ganhar e, se essa hipótese deixasse de estar no seu horizonte, sairia da guerra de forma unilateral.

Da perspetiva estratégica da situação, era de todo o interesse da Rússia em forçar e abrir os estreitos o mais rapidamente possível, do que esperar pelo colapso definitivo da Turquia, que poderia ainda demorar indefinidamente. Se os estreitos fossem imediatamente abertos, ela poderia começar a reequipar-se e expandir as suas rotas comerciais, para salvar a sua economia, o que era impossível faze-lo de outra forma.[179] A Alemanha, com certeza, que aproveitava quaisquer oportunidades de ajustar uma paz separada com a Rússia.[180]

Mas, enquanto decorriam as negociações em Petrograd em 11 de março de 1915, outra questão foi levantada sobre os efeitos da presença naval da Rússia no Mar Mediterrâneo, e sobre a sua ocupação da cidade de Constantinopla e dos estreitos.[181] A questão demonstrava uma grande preocupação relacionada com a aliança Franco-Russa e a sua livre comunicação entre o Mar Negro e o Mar Mediterrâneo.

Mesmo sem o controlo dos estreitos, a Rússia, juntamente com a França como sua aliada, no caso de conflito com os britânicos, não hesitaria em forçar o

[178] The National Archives, *The Dardanelles. Memorandum on the situation.*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 42/3/19. (Anexo XII)
[179] *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
[180] The National Archives, *The Dardanelles; Smyrna; The future of Constantinople; After the Dardanelles, the next step; The Danube; War material*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 42/2/3. (Anexo VII)
[181] The National Archives, *Russia and Constantinople*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 24/1/11. (Anexo X)

Dardanelos, a partir do Mar Negro, e que não teria grande dificuldade em realizar tal operação, com ou sem o consentimento da Turquia. Obter ou não esse consentimento dependia, obviamente, de várias considerações políticas e diplomáticas que são impossíveis de prever. Os britânicos partiam do pressuposto de que a Rússia, durante a pressão de um grande conflito, não hesitaria em criar uma ligação entre o seu esquadrão do Mar Negro e a esquadra francesa no Mediterrâneo para fazer frente ao poder naval britânico. A Grã-Bretanha encarava de forma muito cuidadosa o perigo que isso representava para as rotas comerciais com a Índia (a "joia da coroa" do Império Britânico).[182]

Na opinião do Almirantado britânico, a corrente entre o Mar de Mármara e o estreito de Dardanelos oferecia uma grande vantagem e maior segurança aos navios russos de forçar o Dardanelos, dificultando apenas o regresso dos seus navios para o Mar Negro, que não faria muita diferença, pois teriam imediatamente acesso a todos os portos franceses no Mediterrâneo para reabastecer e rearmar.[183]

Sem dúvida, se a Rússia se estabelecesse em Constantinopla, a cooperação com a esquadra francesa seria bastante facilitada. As 400 milhas de águas protegidas entre a base naval de Sebastopol (Crimeia) e o Mar de Mármara ofereciam uma larga margem de segurança.[184] Mesmo que os britânicos aumentassem o número e distribuição de navios na sua esquadra do Mar Mediterrâneo, não faria diferença como ameaça à Rússia, pois teria sempre o Dardanelos como ponto de estrangulamento para se defender de qualquer força naval, independentemente da quantidade de navios.

Durante as conversações em Petrogrado, o imperador russo, czar Nicolau II, deixou bem claro que as aspirações da Rússia teriam de ser satisfeitas para chegar a um acordo sobre o impasse no conflito, para que a Rússia tivesse um isentivo para se manter na guerra e suportar os esforços que tem feito até à data.

[182] *Ibid.*
[183] *Ibid.*
[184] *Ibid.*

Em 4 de março, um telegrama[185] é dirigido ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros britânico, *Sir* Edward Grey, sobre as negociações com a Rússia em relação aos despojos de guerra, no contexto da questão de Constantinopla e dos estreitos.

O telegrama de 4 de março de 1915, acima referido, cita um *aide-mémoire*[186] do embaixador francês presente nas negociações, que transcreve as exigências do czar Nicolau II, da forma que não deixa dúvidas quanto aos seus objetivos: a questão de Constantinopla e do Estreito deve ser definitivamente resolvida em conformidade com as aspirações tradicionais da Rússia. Qualquer outra solução seria insatisfatória e precária, se não incorporar futuramente no Império Russo a cidade de Constantinopla, a costa ocidental do Bósforo, do Mar de Mármara e do Dardanelos, bem como desde o sul da Trácia até a linha de Enos-Mídia. *Ipso facto* e por necessidade estratégica, a costa asiática, entre o rio Sakarya e um ponto a ser fixado no Golfo de Izmit, as ilhas do Mar de Mármara e as ilhas de Imbros e Ténedos, devem ser incorporadas no império.[187]

As exigências apresentadas pelo imperador russo deixaram os seus aliados, particularmente os britânicos, um pouco relutantes quanto à hipótese da Rússia ganhar o controlo, quase total, dos estreitos de Bósforo e Dardanelos. Este dilema deixa os Aliados divididos: o objetivo operacional comum tem consequências globais diferentes: para a Rússia significava a expansão do seu império para lá do Mar Mediterrâneo e a possibilidade de dominar todas as rotas comerciais entre a Europa e a Ásia, por outro lado, a Grã-Bretanha iria perder a supremacia no Mar Mediterrâneo, o controlo das suas rotas comerciais com a Índia e a possibilidade de a Rússia e a França criarem uma ligação militar forte no Mediterrâneo, representando uma ameaça ao Império Britânico.

Os territórios exigidos pela Rússia, estrategicamente importantes, sempre foram do interesse de qualquer potência europeia, tanto por motivos militares como económicos. A soberania desses territórios era fulcral para a Rússia e para a sua

[185] The National Archives, *Russian views on Constantinople and the Dardanelles*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 37/125/19. (Anexo VIII)
[186] The National Archives, *Agreement regarding Constantinople*, Kew, Londres, 1917, CAB 24/9/69. (Anexo XVI)
[187] The National Archives, *Russian views on Constantinople and the Dardanelles*. (Anexo VIII)

opinião pública, que nunca aceitariam a rejeição dessas exigências, depois dos sacrifícios que tinha feito até à data. Vários eventos recentes na guerra levaram ao governo imperial russo a insistir nesta solução final e definitiva. A Rússia não podia aceitar outra solução senão a que foi delineada no *aide-mémoire* apresentado. Esta era a única solução que satisfazia os interesses políticos, aspirações e exigências da defesa nacional e política externa da Rússia.[188]

A insatisfação do governo britânico, sobre este acordo com a Rússia, é evidente. Os Aliados não queriam perder a Rússia, que combatia a Alemanha e Áustria-Hungria na frente oriental. Se a Rússia desistisse dos seus esforços na guerra e negociasse uma paz separada com a Alemanha, seria o pior cenário para a Grã-Bretanha e para a França, pois todos os esforços do exército alemão iriam ser direcionados para a frente ocidental em França.

Sir Edward Grey enviou um telegrama, no dia 11 de março de 1915, dirigido ao embaixador britânico presente nas negociações em Petrogrado, dizendo que as exigências feitas pelo governo russo iam muito mais além do que o ministro russo, das Relações Exteriores, indicou como provável algumas semanas antes e que a Rússia está a exigir uma promessa irrevogável a seu favor, no que respeita ao "maior prémio de toda a guerra"[189], antes de sequer considerar as aspirações da Grã-Bretanha.[190]

Outras preocupações que *Sir* Edward Grey exprimiu, no contexto deste acordo, eram as seguintes:

- A fiabilidade da aliança entre a Grã-Bretanha e a Rússia, a longo prazo;
- A liberdade comercial dos estreitos e a passagem de navios mercantes;

[188] *Ibid.*
[189] The National Archives, *Observations to be made to Russian government concerning Constantinople and the Dardanelles*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 37/126/3. (Anexo IX) & *Agreement regarding Constantinople*. (Anexo XVI)
[190] The National Archives, *Observations to be made to Russian government concerning Constantinople and the Dardanelles*. (Anexo IX)

- O compromisso da Rússia em auxiliar nas operações de forçar o Dardanelos, devido ao insucesso corrente nesse teatro de operações por parte dos britânicos;
- A influência sobre os estados balcânicos, principalmente a Bulgária e a Roménia, e persuadi-los a juntarem-se aos Aliados, que podem ficar apreensivos pela futura posse russa de Constantinopla e dos estreitos;
- Que os locais sagrados árabes e muçulmanos se mantenham sobre domínio muçulmano independente;
- Que fique claro que a Grã-Bretanha não aprova que os estreitos sejam fortificados ou que seja permitida a passagem de navios de guerra, mas que a Bulgária e a Roménia devem ter especiais privilégios, negociados devidamente com a Rússia, sobre a passagem dos seus navios de guerra;
- Que este acordo se mantenha só no conhecimento dos governos da Grã-Bretanha, França e Rússia até que os Aliados consigam garantir a posição dos estados balcânicos na guerra.[191]

O "Acordo de Constantinopla" levou a Grã-Bretanha a comprometer parte da política externa, que mantinha desde o início do século XIX, de afastar a Rússia de qualquer influência naval no Mar Mediterrâneo.

A fim de conseguir persuadir a Rússia em manter-se no esforço dos Aliados, promete-lhe "o maior e mais valioso prémio de toda a guerra". É referido num memorando de 12 de março de 1915[192], que as operações navais e militares, em que o governo britânico estava empenhado no Dardanelos até à data, contribuíam para a causa comum dos Aliados. Com este tratado, era evidente de que as operações futuras no Dardanelos, se fossem bem-sucedidas, não iriam trazer qualquer vantagem para o Governo de Sua Majestade, nas condições dos termos acima referidos. "A Rússia por si só, se a guerra for bem sucedida, iria colher todos os frutos diretos destas operações".[193]

[191] *Ibid.*
[192] The National Archives, *Agreement regarding Constantinople*. (Anexo XVI)
[193] *Ibid.*

Este acordo com a Rússia, levou ainda a Grã-Bretanha a debater, prematuramente, sobre a distribuição dos despojos de guerra em relação à distribuição e conservação de territórios estrangeiros, apontando a preocupação sobre as colónias alemãs, os territórios ricos em petróleo na Pérsia e pontos estratégicos, como a cidade de Alexandreta, para cercar e possivelmente bloquear a saída da Rússia pelo estreito de Dardanelos, na eventualidade de ela ganhar os despojos a ela prometidos nas conversações de paz em Petrogrado[194].

Este objetivo operacional para os britânicos, de conquistar os estreitos e a cidade de Constantinopla, era para a Rússia um objetivo estratégico, que entrava evidentemente em conflito com os objetivos estratégicos da Grã-Bretanha. Esta tanto não podia permitir que a Rússia desistisse de continuar a lutar pelos Aliados, como também não podia cumprir com estas promessas, pelo bem do futuro do seu império. Por essa razão nunca iria estar totalmente empenhada na Campanha de Galípoli, pois se atingisse o objetivo final dessa campanha, significava entregar uma série de territórios estrategicamente importantes, que podia significar o fim do imperialismo britânico e uma mudança drástica na balança do poder mundial.

[194] The National Archives, *Discussion of a division of the yet unacquired spoils of war*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 37/126/27. (Anexo XI)

4. A Campanha de Galípoli e as questões tático-operacionais

4.1. Sinopse da Campanha

A Campanha de Galípoli, também conhecida como Batalha dos Dardanelos, teve como palco a península de Galípoli, na Turquia, de 25 de abril de 1915 a 9 de janeiro de 1916 (quase 1 ano), durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial. Foi uma das campanhas mais desgastantes e trágicas da guerra. Uma combinação de forças britânicas, francesas, australianas e neozelandesas (ANZAC[195]) desembarcaram em Galípoli, numa tentativa de eliminar a presença da Turquia na guerra, capturando o estreito de Dardanelos e a cidade de Constantinopla, a fim de aliviar o esforço da Rússia e abrir uma linha de comunicação por essa via.[196]

Em janeiro de 1915, em resposta ao apelo do imperador russo, Nicolau II, o governo britânico concordou em executar uma demostração contra a Turquia para aliviar a pressão sobre os russos na frente do Cáucaso. O Dardanelos foi escolhido como o local para efetuar uma operação naval e militar em grande escala, fortemente apoiada por Winston Churchill que era, então, o primeiro Lorde do Almirantado.

No final de janeiro, o comité de Dardanelos decidiu realizar uma tentativa de forçar o estreito usando apenas navios de guerra, na sua maior parte obsoletos e demasiado deteriorados para a ação. Em fevereiro a decisão foi alterada, tal como foi acordado que as margens do Dardanelos teriam que ser conquistadas com forças em terra, para permitir que a esquadra passasse em segurança. Para este efeito, uma grande força militar, sob o comando do general *Sir* Ian Hamilton, foi reunida no Egipto. Os franceses contribuíram também com um contingente de forças.[197]

Os transportes de tropas foram organizados ao largo da ilha de Lemnos, e os desembarques deram inicio na madrugada de 25 de abril, na península de Galípoli

[195] *Australian and New Zealand Army Corps*, que designa o exército conjunto da Austrália e Nova Zelândia em tempos de guerra.
[196] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Gallipoli Campaign", 2015, https://www.britannica.com/event/Gallipoli-Campaign, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.
[197] *Ibid.*

em duas áreas: no Cabo Helles (para a mais experiente, a 29ª Divisão de Infantaria Britânica) e na praia Gaba Tepe (para as forças ANZAC, que acabaram por desembarcar mais a norte perto de Ari Burnu, devido a dificuldades na navegação noturna). Uma brigada francesa desembarcou na frente da costa da asiática, em Kum Kale, apenas como manobra de deceção. Várias cabeças de praia pequenas foram conquistadas com bastante dificuldade, pois as ANZAC eram constantemente flageladas por reforços turcos sob o comando do temível Mustafa Kemal. Grandes reforços britânicos sucederam-se, mas pouco progresso foi feito. Em agosto foram realizados mais desembarques na costa oeste, na baía de Suvla, no entanto, após alguns progressos iniciais o assalto foi interrompido (mapa de Galípoli: figura 10).[198]

[198] *Ibid.*



Figura 10 - Mapa de Galípoli com os principais eventos.[199]

[199] *A collection of significant facts about the Gallipoli Campaign*, https://www.britannica.com/event/Gallipoli-Campaign, consultado em agosto de 2016.

Em maio de 1915, o Almirante *Lord* Fisher havia renunciado do cargo devido a opiniões divergentes sobre a operação. Em setembro de 1915 estava claro que, sem reforços significativos e no tempo devido, não havia esperança de resultados determinantes, sendo então tomada a decisão de retirar *Sir* Hamilton, substituindo-o pelo Tenente-General *Sir* Charles Monro.

Ao chegar a Galípoli e aperceber-se das condições e da gravidade da situação, *Sir* Monro, recomendou a retirada das forças militares e abandono da campanha. A recomendação foi ratificada em novembro pelo Secretário de Estado da Guerra, *Lord* Kitchener, depois da sua visita à península. A operação de retirada das forças entrincheiradas, para navios da esquadra britânica, demonstrou-se um desafio bastante complexo e foi realizada por várias fases, detalhadamente e de modo a iludir e evitar que os turcos se apercebessem da retirada e atacassem pela retaguarda. A retirada terminou com sucesso em 9 de janeiro de 1916.[200]

Na campanha, o equivalente a cerca de 16 divisões britânicas, australianas, neozelandesas, indianas e francesas fizeram parte do esforço. As baixas britânicas e da *Commonwealth*[201], além de grandes perdas entre os navios de guerra antigos, estimam-se entre as 210.000 e 220.000 baixas[202] (para os turcos as baixas foram ligeiramente superiores).

A campanha foi um verdadeiro massacre de vidas humanas, considera-se um sucesso apenas na medida em que desviou as forças turcas para longe dos russos e da Europa. O plano falhou em produzir resultados decisivos por vários motivos: fraca liderança militar, táticas inadequadas, a completa falta de surpresa, inexperiência das tropas, equipamento e meios de transporte inadequados, uma aguda escassez de munições e outros problemas logísticos.[203]

As divisões ANZAC viram-se particularmente lesadas e esta campanha originou certa discórdia por parte dos aliados oriundos da Nova Zelândia e da Austrália, que

[200] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Gallipoli Campaign".
[201] Países cuja forma de governo pode tanto ser uma monarquia constitucional parlamentarista, como uma república, cujo o chefe de estado é o monarca do Reino Unido.
[202] As baixas militares incluí os mortos, feridos e doentes (ao ponto de ficarem inaptos) em campanha.
[203] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Gallipoli Campaign".

acusaram as tropas britânicas de arrogância, crueldade e inaptidão, bem como os principais responsáveis pelo fracasso das operações. O *Anzac Day* (a 25 de abril) continua a ser a comemoração mais significativa dos veteranos na Austrália e na Nova Zelândia, em honra aos mortos em combate nessa campanha e, principalmente, pela calamidade que foi no dia dos primeiros desembarques na praia que mais tarde ganharia o nome de *Anzac Cove*, em memória aos que lá sucumbiram.[204]

Esta longa batalha afetou profundamente todas as nações envolvidas. Na Turquia, a batalha é conhecida como um momento decisivo na história da nação: a defesa final da terra-mãe, após séculos de declínio do Império Otomano. O conflito gerou fortes sentimentos patrióticos entre os veteranos turcos e estabeleceu as bases para a Guerra da Independência Turca e a fundação da República na Turquia oito anos mais tarde, sob Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, ele próprio um oficial do exército turco em Galípoli.[205]

4.2. As questões táticas, operacionais e estratégicas

Esta campanha foi matéria de estudo nos anos, ou décadas, que se seguiram e faz parte dos alicerces da criação de doutrina das Operações Anfíbias. O rótulo de "Operações Anfíbias", ou "Operações de Desembarque" não existia na altura e a criação de doutrina, especificamente, só surgiria na década de 1930[206], mas já na época da Grande Guerra existiam conceitos básicos de como conduzir uma operação conjunta entre a marinha e o exército, para projeção de forças para terra a partir do mar, mas o conceito geral conhecido era a execução de operações navais apoiadas por operações terrestres, ou projeção de poder naval para terra. A inexistência de doutrina própria não invalidava certos erros cometidos, mais propriamente do aspeto operacional, que se baseiam em princípios da guerra e no senso comum.

[204] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "ANZAC", 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ANZAC, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.
[205] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Gallipoli Campaign".
[206] United States Navy, *Landing Operations Doctrine*, *Government Printing Office*, Washington, D.C., 1938, https://archive.org/details/landingoperation00unit_0, consultado em janeiro de 2016.

Quanto a lições aprendidas no aspeto tático, é de referir que são inúmeras as fontes diferentes disponíveis sobre estudos desta campanha. As lições em baixo mencionadas foram doutrinadas no *Naval War College*, nos Estados Unidos, desde 1936, como exemplos do que se podia aprender com a Campanha de Galípoli.[207]

Em primeiro lugar, na questão da defesa no Dardanelos, a combinação de minas e artilharia, especialmente com peças de tiro rápido, mostrou-se muito eficaz na defesa contra navios draga-minas. A utilização de holofotes foi fundamental para iluminar as águas do estreito em alturas de visibilidade reduzida e a artilharia naval mostrou-se ineficaz contra estes. As baixas provocadas pelo tiro rápido, com metralhadoras em posições defensivas nas praias, provaram que é essencial a aplicação de embarcações (para desembarque) com proteção balística contra armamento portátil e estilhaços, pelo menos para as primeiras vagas de desembarque. *Sir* Ian Hamilton faz essa sugestão no seu livro de testemunho sobre a campanha, em 1920[208].[209]

No que respeita a operações navais, ficou provado que os navios não conseguem garantir, por si só, a destruição de defesas costeiras com artilharia naval. Em Galípoli, os navios da esquadra britânica suprimiam o fogo dos fortes de forma temporária, mas não conseguiam efetivamente destruí-los. Os fortes centenários, a maioria datava do século XV, estavam em plena vista e os navios britânicos conseguiam efetuar fogo direto sobre estes, sem grandes efeitos. Ficou provado, também, que o fogo naval era eficaz contra artilharia móvel e os navios mais robustos aguentavam com bastante fogo costeiro, sofrendo apenas alguns danos superficiais. Os navios que resistiam mais ao fogo costeiro, devem ser utilizados para silenciar as metralhadoras nas praias. Para fornecer fogos de apoio às tropas em terra, os navios só eram eficazes contra as posições mais expostas nas primeiras linhas de altura, para efetuar tiro curvo, a artilharia terrestre era muito mais eficaz e era específica

[207] *T. Peck*, "Lessons of Gallipoli", Comunicação apresentada no Naval War College em 16 de dezembro de 1936.
[208] Sir Ian Hamilton, *Gallipoli diary*, Londres, Edward Arnold, 1920, Vol. 2, p. 3.
[209] Peck.

para esse tipo de emprego, devem então, equipar com sistemas de controlo de fogo adequados e treinar os navios para esse tipo de aplicação.

Quanto aos desembarques, as primeiras vagas devem ser mais amplas e procurar, através de meios/forças avançadas, pontos fracos nas defesas do inimigo. As reservas devem estar imediatamente disponíveis para explorar prontamente esses pontos fracos, antes do reforço das reservas do inimigo. Para tal, deve haver flexibilidade no planeamento e reservas para manter a liberdade de ação. Em Galípoli, demonstrou-se que a mobilidade dos meios de transporte/desembarque determinam a capacidade de aplicar o efeito de surpresa tático até ao momento que se desembarca as tropas em terra. O devido controlo do tempo é essencial para o sucesso.[210]

Os perigos inerentes à falta de planeamento e de treino foram claramente demonstrados. Um ataque com projeção de tropas para terra deve ser, de forma geral, para objetivos mais restritos e deve ter um planeamento detalhado, tal como a coordenação das movimentações navio-terra, em simultâneo com fogo de artilharia naval e suporte aéreo. Outro perigo, associado à falta de planeamento de comando, foi o facto de Hamilton não ter imposto os seus pontos de vista ao *staff* em reforçar e explorar certas oportunidades que surgiram nos desembarques. Nunca se deve improvisar um desembarque numa ofensiva.[211]

No aspeto operacional, quando Kitchener e Churchill se comprometeram em realizar a demonstração naval na península de Galípoli, tiveram apenas em consideração os benefícios políticos da operação, de satisfazer temporariamente a Rússia e mantê-la no esforço de guerra. Ambos ignoraram, ou deram pouca importância, às opiniões dos seus conselheiros militares, que tinham bons fundamentos com vários exemplos passados e de estudos antigos, tendo em conta as dificuldades e os riscos envolvidos de tentar atacar o Estreito de Dardanelos.[212]

[210] *Ibid.*
[211] *Ibid.*
[212] Howard, p. 10.

Todos os comandantes e respetivos estados-maiores deverão ter sempre bem presentes os princípios da guerra quando planeiam e conduzem as suas operações. Os princípios fundamentais da guerra foram claramente descuidados (princípios doutrinários que já existiam há muitos séculos), começando pelo principio da surpresa, que pelos ataques navais ao Dardanelos, em novembro de 1914 e em fevereiro de 1915, ofereceram aos turcos uma ampla margem para se prepararem para o que poderia, e veio, a acontecer. O principio da economia de forças foi quebrado por Kitchener, quando foi incapaz de determinar quando as tropas podiam ser rendidas/aliviadas no principal teatro de operações, como foi comprovado pela sua incapacidade de chegar a uma decisão definitiva ao período de tempo razoável em relação ao emprego da 29ª Divisão do Exército Britânico.[213]

Não estava definida explicitamente uma política definitiva quanto à natureza da campanha. A ideia geral, no início, era de que seria uma demonstração naval e que se não atingisse o sucesso podia ser facilmente retirada, sem qualquer perda de prestígio. Passado um mês, ficou definido que a operação seria um ataque puramente naval, com o intuito de conquistar a cidade de Constantinopla. Passado outro mês ficou definido que o exército seria usado em operações menores com vista a apoiar a marinha. Esta decisão que se seguiu sobrepôs-se à anterior e o exército passaria a ser utilizado como esforço principal, depois da marinha exercer todos os seus esforços e não atingir o objetivo. Finalmente, dois meses e meio após a decisão inicial, foi determinado que seria necessária uma operação conjunta para obter resultados decisivos.[214]

A série de dilemas consecutivos demonstrou a necessidade de um exame completo à situação e tomar uma decisão definitiva, antes de se organizar uma força expedicionária para o teatro de operações. O princípio da unidade de comando (pela delegação de responsabilidades) e o princípio da economia de forças (pelo desgaste exigido ao exército), foram violados na medida em que a marinha estaria inicialmente empenhada no esforço principal e no final seria o exército que acabaria por se cometer às operações principais, não estando devidamente preparado e

[213] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[214] *Ibid.*

equipado para combater nas condições totalmente desfavoráveis que enfrentaram, acrescentando o tempo excessivo em que estiveram empenhados no terreno, sem reforços ou rendições adequadas, aumentando o stress induzido nesses homens, de dia para dia.[215]

De forma geral, ficou a convicção de que os navios de guerra não eram adequados para ataques contra as defesas em terra[216] e que as operações conjuntas obrigam a um planeamento e coordenação complexa e cuidadosa, para que possam ter resultados decisivos.

Inicialmente, o ataque ao Dardanelos tinha dois objetivos públicos principais[217]: o primeiro era estratégico: abrir uma linha de comunicação para o Mar Negro, a fim de permitir à Rússia obter equipamento de guerra e munições nos mercados das potências ocidentais e exportar os seus cereais; o segundo objetivo era de natureza política e visava convencer a Bulgária, e os outros estados dos Balcãs, a reunirem-se à causa dos Aliados. No pressuposto da ocupação aliada da região do Estreito, a Rússia apresentou as suas aspirações, exigindo ocupar e tomar posse da cidade de Constantinopla e de toda a região dos Dardanelos. Esta exigência estava fora das perspetivas dos Aliados e chocava particularmente com as aspirações estratégicas da Grã-Bretanha. Nenhum destes objetivos públicos foi alcançado no terreno, de forma que a Rússia acabou por se manter "fechada" no Mar Negro, durante todo o tempo do conflito, e a Bulgária (o principal estado balcânico que os Aliados queriam do seu lado) pendeu para o lado das Potências Centrais juntando-se a elas em outubro de 1915.

Quanto aos restantes objetivos, referidos no capítulo 3 (subcapítulo 3.4), a operação teve alguns sucessos: a Turquia manteve-se (temporariamente) fora do cenário de guerra na Europa e a Itália juntou-se aos Aliados em maio de 1915. Todavia, aquele que seria o objetivo mais importante da estratégia aliada, foi de

[215] *Ibid.*
[216] Atendendo às características dos sistemas de pontaria dos navios, a falta de treino específico da guarnição dos navios e da adequabilidade das peças e das munições da artilharia naval contra alvos em terra.
[217] The National Archives, *The Dardanelles. Memorandum on the situation.* (Anexo XII)

manter a Rússia na guerra e sempre do seu lado. Perder a Rússia como aliada representava um cenário insustentável para a Grã-Bretanha e França, capaz de comprometer a frente europeia e, sobretudo, as aspirações territoriais sobre o Império Otomano.

A Campanha de Galípoli terminou, porque a situação era evidentemente insustentável: os turcos mantinham uma defesa forte e conseguiam ser reforçados e reabastecidos muito mais facilmente do que os atacantes, principalmente com a ajuda dos alemães; as condições nas trincheiras e o apoio logístico não eram adequadas e a maioria das baixas na fase final eram maioritariamente causadas por doenças; aproximava-se o inverno[218], o que iria provocar mais baixas por doença ou hipotermia, porque o material e o equipamento eram mais indicados para o clima de verão e requeria um grande esforço logístico e uma rendição dessas forças para continuar a campanha no inverno.[219]

A retirada das tropas de Galípoli só viria a ser realizada após o consentimento da Rússia, sendo clara a forma como o assunto era muito sensível, significando que os russos tinham que adiar as suas aspirações políticas em Constantinopla. A campanha, contudo, tinha chegado a um ponto de insustentabilidade e vários tópicos foram considerados antes de se passar à fase da evacuação de Galípoli. Era necessário chegar a um acordo com a França, e discutir esta questão muito francamente com a Rússia, tentando depois no negociar com a Turquia – por uma via informal – a questão da passagem de navios pelos seus estreitos. Este processo negocial tinha ainda uma pressão adicional relacionada com a falta de preparação e de equipamento próprio para fazer frente ao inverno que se aproximava. Finalmente, era necessário debater o assunto e chegar a acordo com a Itália, que também tinha interesses operacionais específicos no Estreito.[220]

[218] The National Archives, *Preperations for a winter campaign at the Dardanelles*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 42/4/16. (Anexo XIII)
[219] Keith A. Lawless, *The evacuation phase of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915*, Nova York, Estados Unidos, Hofstra University, 1979.
[220] The National Archives, *The Dardanelles. Memorandum on the situation.* (Anexo XII)

Todas estas questões acima referidas foram discutidas, entre as partes mencionadas, entre agosto e novembro de 1915, e só em janeiro de 1916 é que a evacuação foi efetivamente realizada. As razões que levaram a que a decisão fosse tão demorada estão relacionadas com as dificuldades de negociar este assunto com a Rússia. Sobretudo porque houve a preocupação de a manter nos combates ao lado dos Aliados, apesar de que o abandono da península de Galípoli, extinguia, a curto prazo, a única oportunidade desta ganhar acesso aos territórios que tanto desejava.[221]

[221] The National Archives, *The future military policy at the Dardanelles*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 42/5/25. (Anexo XIV)

Conclusão

Os aspetos mais relevantes desta dissertação foram os esclarecimentos das questões políticas, entre os Aliados, em torno da Campanha de Galípoli. Esta campanha tinha repercussões geostratégicas muito diferentes, consoante o seu resultado final e na hipótese de ser ou não realizada na sua totalidade.

Os passos que foram tomados, no inicio, passaram por estudar toda a situação operacional e estratégica na Grande Guerra e como foi conduzida a Campanha de Galípoli. A questão de levantar a hipótese de que o governo britânico influenciou a forma como a campanha foi conduzida, surgiu na sequência de ter conhecido o "Acordo de Constantinopla" e a forma como a Grã-Bretanha prometia territórios à Rússia, que não faziam sentido tendo em conta a política britânica de manter a Rússia retida no Mar Negro, pelo mar, e para lá do Afeganistão, por terra, para proteger a Índia (a fonte da maioria das riquezas da coroa britânica).

A ilação que retirei desta investigação foi de que era da intenção do governo britânico, em 1915, garantir que o Dardanelos e a cidade de Constantinopla não caíssem sobre a soberania da Rússia. A pressão que o governo russo havia causado por não querer mais sustentar os seus esforços na guerra, para que lhe fossem satisfeitas as suas aspirações territoriais, levou a que a Grã-Bretanha se empenhasse numa operação que era considerada impossível por várias vezes no passado. Deixa então, de forma grosseira, a impressão de que a campanha foi concebida e realizada, particularmente, como um artifício para manter os russos na guerra e, portanto, a prolongação da Frente Oriental.

O tratado conhecido como "Acordo de Constantinopla" por si só revela muito a posição de cada governo, dos Aliados, quanto aos seus objetivos estratégicos e políticos que intencionavam alcançar no fim da guerra. Por esse tratado, os britânicos e os franceses prometeram que, sobre a conclusão de uma campanha bem-sucedida contra o Império Otomano turco, haveria uma anexação do estreito de Dardanelos, outros territórios circundantes e da cidade de Constantinopla à Rússia.

A motivação britânica em concordar com este acordo era de manter o seu aliado, a Rússia, na guerra. Ao garantir que esta mantinha a Frente Oriental operacional, mantinha também milhares de soldados alemães longe da Frente Ocidental, tal como o exército turco, que estava recentemente modernizado e treinado pelos alemães.

A Rússia tinha sido derrotada no final de 1914 em várias batalhas significativas, desde então considerava seriamente um armistício com a Alemanha. Além disso, havia sofrido ainda mais derrotas em batalha, no Cáucaso, infligidas pelo exército otomano, mesmo com as dificuldades que os otomanos sofriam com a neve. Em janeiro de 1915 a Rússia apelou urgentemente por ajuda aos seus aliados.

Os britânicos e os franceses tinham perfeitamente a noção de que se a Rússia saísse da guerra, representava uma perspetiva muito negativa para os Aliados e procuraram encontrar maneiras de mantê-la na guerra. De todas as razões dadas para a Campanha de Galípoli, a ameaça de um segundo exército alemão do leste a chegar à frente ocidental, o epicentro do conflito mundial, seria o golpe mais grave contra os Aliados e um forte motivo pelo qual tinham que, a todos os custos, evitar.

A ideia de Churchill, de atacar o Império Otomano através dos Dardanelos, não foi apoiada por todos os intervenientes no Gabinete de Guerra britânico, e os generais que defendiam a frente ocidental acreditavam que todos os recursos deveriam de ir para as ofensivas em França e no Báltico, mas o pedido russo de reforços contra os otomanos e o tratado posterior, insistido pelos russos, deu aos defensores da operação ao Dardanelos o seu trunfo.

O resultado foi a Campanha de Galípoli: a tentativa da marinha de guerra britânica e francesa de forçar o estreito e capturar Constantinopla, a aventura militar com um desfecho desastroso. O ponto de interesse desses eventos, é que na verdade essa era uma promessa, a favor dos interesses russos, que a Grã-Bretanha não podia cumprir, porque era contra tudo o que sempre defendeu na sua política externa.

A existência do tratado referido mostra uma incoerência nos quase duzentos anos de política externa britânica, que se opunha à presença russa no Mediterrâneo e de qualquer avanço da hegemonia russa nas possessões do Império Otomano. Mesmo

relativamente pouco tempo antes da Grande Guerra, mais precisamente em 1854, a Guerra da Crimeia foi travada contra os russos sobre esta questão.

A Grã-Bretanha, cada vez mais, tinha a preocupação de que a Rússia constituía uma ameaça às suas rotas imperiais e posses no Oceano Índico, sobretudo após a conclusão do Canal do Suez. Os acordos secretos, em 1915, entravam em conflito com as aspirações britânicas e oferecia o livre acesso ao Mar Mediterrâneo à Rússia, o que não fazia nenhum sentido no aspeto geoestratégico a longo prazo.

Em seguida, a falta de recursos, os ataques à entrada do Dardanelos com vários meses de antecedência à decisão final, o planeamento apressado e inadequado, os planos de desembarque muito complicados e em praias expostas e de difícil acesso, sem bombardeios iniciais eficazes a fim de pulverizar as defesas inimigas, a seleção de comandantes demasiado inibidos e sem qualquer conhecimento prévio da área onde iam operar, para uma operação difícil e estrategicamente importante, caracterizam a conduta dos Aliados na campanha, que pode ser assumida como algo mais do que descuidada.

Todas as questões que podem ser referidas como falhas da campanha, tornam-se menos intrigantes se as intenções da campanha eram de garantir uma nova frente, durante o tempo necessário, como uma "demonstração" ao invés de uma invasão bem-sucedida. O resultado desejado será o mesmo, sem a necessidade de cumprir as suas promessas à Rússia. Nos últimos duzentos anos de política externa britânica, contemplava a sustentação do Império Otomano contra a expansão russa em direção ao Mediterrâneo e à Índia.

Num memorando, de 12 de março de 1915[222], sobre a campanha de Galípoli, o governo britânico, conscientemente, afirmou que "a Rússia por si só, se a guerra for bem-sucedida, iria colher todos os frutos diretos destas operações ". Uma interpretação desta afirmação é concluir que a coligação liderada pelos britânicos a atacar e invadir a península de Galípoli, foram enviados à morte para satisfazer os desejos do governo czarista russo. Outra interpretação é olhar para a campanha como um sucesso em

[222] The National Archives, *Agreement regarding Constantinople*. (Anexo XVI)

manter a Rússia na guerra e, desta forma, servir os interesses britânicos e franceses na frente ocidental.

As palavras "se... for bem-sucedida" são palavras fortes, que indicavam uma possível duplicidade contra a Rússia. Não atingir o sucesso total em Galípoli, mantinha o *status quo* regional, e matinha viva a possibilidade de ganhos imperiais britânicos na Mesopotâmia, conservando um estado Otomano retraído e compatível na Anatólia. Na guerra, milhares de vidas são sacrificadas para estas grandes estratégias.

No final, porém, o acordo nunca teve de ser honrado, naturalmente, para grande alívio do governo britânico.

Em última análise, a Grã-Bretanha, certamente, não queria entregar os estreitos e Constantinopla à Rússia. O governo britânico, no mínimo, mostrou hesitações e indecisões que prejudicaram a condução da campanha a alcançar o que foi definido como os objetivos públicos da mesma. O objetivo operacional definido entre os Aliados, era para a Rússia um objetivo estratégico muito importante, que entrava em conflito com os objetivos estratégicos da Grã-Bretanha. O percurso para sair de tudo isto, claro, era garantir que Constantinopla permanecesse invicta, sem dar a entender à Rússia de que o governo britânico não tinha nenhum interesse em entregar os territórios negociados nos acordos secretos.

Algumas dificuldades desta investigação residem no facto de que nem todos os documentos sobre a Campanha de Galípoli aparentam estar presentes no Arquivo Nacional de Londres. Existem lacunas nas coleções de documentos de determinados eventos e em momentos cruciais da campanha, alguns desses estando alegadamente perdidos, mesmo constando na base de dados.

A falta de certa documentação nos arquivos em Londres, quanto a alguns pontos sensíveis da operação, faz toda a diferença no que toca a conseguir determinar as verdadeiras intenções do governo britânico e como afetaram diretamente a condução da campanha, permitindo apenas deduzir a origem da problemática pelos acordos secretos, receios, aspirações e políticas externas de cada governo da época.

Na perspetiva de dar continuidade a este projeto, os arquivos nacionais de Paris e Moscovo devem, também, ser consultados para cruzar a informação e para confirmar os pontos de vista dessas outras partes dos Aliados, principalmente da Rússia, que será muito importante saber o que realmente lhe foi proposto ou prometido para "esquecer" as suas aspirações no Dardanelos, sem perderem o interesse dos russos na guerra, quando foi insistido pelo governo britânico de retirar todo o contingente da península de Galípoli.

Fontes e Bibliografia

Fontes

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, *Agreement regarding Constantinople*, Kew, Londres, 1917, CAB 24/9/69.

———, *The Dardanelles; Smyrna; The future of Constantinople; After the Dardanelles, the next step; The Danube; War material*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 42/2/3.

———, *The Dardanelles. Memorandum on the situation.*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 42/3/19.

———, *Discussion of a division of the yet unacquired spoils of war*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 37/126/27.

———, *Feasibility of seizing the Gallipoli Peninsula*, Kew, Londres, 1914, WO 106/1463.

———, *The future military policy at the Dardanelles*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 42/5/25.

———, *Observations to be made to Russian government concerning Constantinople and the Dardanelles*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 37/126/3.

———, *Position of Sweden in the event of peace between Germany and Russia*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 37/124/11.

———, *Preperations for a winter campaign at the Dardanelles*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 42/4/16.

———, *Progress of the War; Russia and Constantinople*, Kew, Londres, 1916, CAB 42/2/5.

———, *Russia and Constantinople*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 24/1/11.

———, *Russian views on Constantinople and the Dardanelles*, Kew, Londres, 1915, CAB 37/125/19.

———, *Treaty and Protocol. Alliance against Russia*, Kew, Londres, 1854, FO 93/110/6.

———, *Treaty of Paris*, Kew, Londres, 1856, FO 93/81/36.

———, *Treaty. Black Sea, Danube. (Also known as the Treaty of London)*, Kew, Londres, 1871, FO 93/81/41.

———, *Turkey Convention the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, by ships of war*, Kew, Londres, 1841, FO 94/368.

Bibliografia

ANDERSON, Michael S., *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations*, Londres, MacMillan, 1966.

BAILEY, Frank Edgar, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1942.

BBC, "Ottoman Empire (1301-1922)", 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ottomanempire_1.shtml, consultado em julho de 2016.

BLOY, Marjie, "Principles of British Foreign Policy 1815-1865", in *The Victorian Web*, 2002, http://www.victorianweb.org/history/forpol/principle.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, "ANZAC", 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ANZAC, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

———, "Balkan Wars", http://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkan-Wars, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

———, "Battle of Tsushima", https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Tsushima, consultado em julho de 2016.

———, "Christopher Columbus", 2016, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Christopher-Columbus, consultado em agosto de 2016.

———, "Crimean War", 2016, http://www.britannica.com/event/Crimean-War, consultado em março de 2016.

———, "Dardanelles", 2013, http://www.britannica.com/place/Dardanelles, consultado em janeiro de 2016.

———, "Dual Alliance", 2006, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dual-Alliance, consultado em julho de 2016.

———, "Gallipoli Campaign", 2015, https://www.britannica.com/event/Gallipoli-Campaign, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

———, "Ottoman Empire: The empire from 1807 to 1920", 2015, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire/The-empire-from-1807-to-1920, consultado em janeiro de 2016.

———, "Russo-Japanese War", 2014, http://www.britannica.com/event/Russo-Japanese-War, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

———, "Russo-Turkish wars", 2014, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Russo-Turkish-wars, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

———, "Straits Question", 2016, http://www.britannica.com/event/Straits-Question, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

———, "World War I: 1914-1918", 2016, http://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

ENGDAHL, F. William, *A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order*, Londres, Pluto Press, 2004.

FARROKH, Kaveh, *Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War*, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2007.

FFOULKES, C., "The 'Dardanelles' Gun at the Tower", in *The Antiquaries Journal*, Londres, 1930, Vol. 10, http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0003581500041032, consultado em janeiro de 2016.

FIRSTWORLDWAR.COM, "Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, 23 July 1914", 2009, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrianultimatum.htm, consultado em julho de 2016.

FROMKIN, D., "A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East", in *GlobalSecurity.org*, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm, consultado em julho de 2016.

GEORGACAS, Demetrius John, *The Names of Constantinople*, Baltimore, Maryland, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1947.

GRENVILLE, John, e WASSERSTEIN, Bernard, *The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts*, Oxford, Routledge, 2013.

HAMILTON, Sir Ian, *Gallipoli diary*, Londres, Edward Arnold, 1920, Vol. 2.

HALL, V. W., "Events leading up to the Allied decision to force a landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and the operations of the fleet to include March 20, 1915", in *Combined Arms Research Library*, 1932, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll14/id/316/rec/8, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

HATTENDORF, John B., *Naval Policy and Startegy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future*, Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2000.

———, "The Strategic Roles of Navies During the First World War". Comunicação apresentada na Escola Naval, no contexto do congresso internacional "A Marinha e a Grande Guerra: Política e Poder Naval", em 14 de outubro de 2015.

HESS, Andrew C., *The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, Vol. 4.

HISTORYOFWAR.ORG, "Race to the Sea, 15 September - 14 October 1914", 2007, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_race_to_sea.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

HOWARD, A. F., "Events leading up to the Allied decision to force a landing at Gallipoli, and the operations of the fleet to include March 20, 1915", in *Combined Arms Research Library*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: the Command and General Staff School, 1933, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll14/id/318/rec/10, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

IMBER, Colin, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power*, Londres, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

JAMES, W., *The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by France in February 1793, to the accession of George IV in january 1820*, Londres, Richard Bentley, 1826, Vol. IV.

KARPAT, Kemal H., *The Ottoman state and its place in world history*, Leida, Brill, 1974.

KRAUSE, R. E., *German Naval Strategy in World War*, Tese apresentada no Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, Naval War College, 1934.

LARSEN, J. A., e SMITH, J. M., *Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament*, Lanham, Maryland, Scarecrow Press Inc., 2005.

LAWLESS, Keith A., *The evacuation phase of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915*, Nova York, Hofstra University, 1979.

MANSEL, Philip, *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453–1924*, Londres, Penguin Books, 1997.

MANSERGH, N., *The Coming of the First World War*, Londres, Longmans Green and Co., 1949.

MASTERS, Gábor Ágoston e ALAN, Bruce, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, Nova York, Facts on File Inc., 2008.

NICOLLE, David, *Nicopolis 1396: The Last Crusade*, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 1999.

NOLAN, C. J., *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations: A-E*, Londres, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, Vol. I.

NORMAN, Stone, *The Eastern Front 1914-1917*, Londres, Penguin Books, 1998.

OREGONIAN MEDIA, "Russia's aggression is really about warm water ports: Guest opinion", 2014, http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/03/russias_aggression_is_really_a.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

PECK, T., "Lessons of Gallipoli", Comunicação apresentada no Naval War College em 16 de dezembro de 1936.

ROSE, John Holland *et al.*, *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1929, Vol. 4.

SAVORY, R. M., *The Principal Offices of the Ṣafawid State during the Reign of Ismā'īl I (907-30/1501-24)*, Londres, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1960, Vol. 23.

SCHEER, A. R., *Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War*, Londres, Frontline Books, 2014.

SETON-WATSON, Hugh, *The Russian Empire 1801-1917*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967.

SHAW, Stanford J., *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, Vol. I.

SOARES, A. J., "Rússia e o acesso a águas quentes", in *Do miradouro*, 2014, http://domirante.blogspot.pt/2014/09/russia-e-o-acesso-aguas-quentes.html, consultado em julho de 2016.

SWEETMAN, J., *The Crimean War*, Londres, Osprey Publishing Limited, 2001.

THE ADVOCATE OF PEACE, "Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth", 1905, https://archive.org/details/jstor-25752586, consultado em fevereiro de 2016.

THE ECONOMIST, "The real sick man of Europe", 2005, http://www.economist.com/node/3987219, consultado em julho de 2016.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, "Austria in Extremis", 1860, http://www.nytimes.com/1860/05/12/news/austria-in-extremis.html, consultado em janeiro de 2016.

UNITED STATES NAVY, *Landing Operations Doctrine*, *Government Printing Office*, Washington, D.C., 1938, https://archive.org/details/landingoperation00unit_0, consultado em janeiro de 2016.

WILLMOTT, H.P., *World War I*, Nova York, Dorling Kindersley, 2003.

YENNE, Bill, *Alexander the Great: Lessons From History's Undefeated General*, Londres, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

YOUNG, W., *German Diplomatic Relations 1871-1945: The Wilhelmstrasse and the Formulation of Foreign Policy*, Lincoln, Nebraska, iUniverse, Inc., 2006.

ZIEGLER, Charles E., *The History of Russia*, Santa Barbara, California, Greenwood Press, 1999.

ESCOLA NAVAL

talanto bien faire

Miguel Ângelo de Brito Araújo

Campanha de Galípoli

O Estreito de Dardanelos no contexto político-militar internacional

Volume 2

Corpo documental

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências Militares Navais, na especialidade de Fuzileiros



Alfeite

2016

ESCOLA NAVAL



Miguel Ângelo de Brito Araújo

Campanha de Galípoli

O Estreito de Dardanelos no contexto político-militar internacional

Volume 2

Corpo documental

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências Militares Navais, na especialidade de Fuzileiros

Orientação de: CFR FZ RES Semedo de Matos

Coorientação de: CFR FZ Santos Formiga

O Aluno Mestrando,

_____

ASPOF FZ Brito Araújo

O Orientador,

_____

CFR FZ RES Semedo de Matos

Alfeite

2016

Índice de anexos

Anexo I: *Turkey Convention: the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, by ships of war,* 13 de julho de 1841. 1

Anexo II: *Treaty and Protocol. Alliance against Russia,* 12 de março de 1854..... 5

Anexo III: *Treaty of Paris,* 30 de março de 1856..... 25

Anexo IV: *Treaty. Black Sea, Danube. [Also known as the Treaty of London],* 13 de março de 1871. 95

Anexo V: *Feasibility of seizing the Gallipoli Peninsula,* 5 de setembro de 1914. 125

Anexo VI: *Position of Sweden in the event of peace between Germany and Russia,* 12 de fevereiro de 1915..... 139

Anexo VII: *Minutes (The Dardanelles; Smyrna; The future of Constantinople; After the Dardanelles, the next step; The Danube; War material.),* 3 de março de 1915. 141

Anexo VIII: *Russian views on Constantinople and the Dardanelles,* 8 de março de 1915..... 149

Anexo IX: *Observations to be made to Russian government concerning Constantinople and the Dardanelles,* 11 de março de 1915..... 153

Anexo X: *Russia and Constantinople,* 12 de março de 1915..... 157

Anexo XI: *Discussion of a division of the yet unacquired spoils of war,* 25 de março 1915..... 165

Anexo XII: *The Dardanelles. Memorandum on the situation,* 30 de agosto de 1915.. 171

Anexo XIII: *Preparations for a winter campaign at the Dardanelles,* 23 de outubro de 1915. 201

Anexo XIV: *The future military policy at the Dardanelles,* 29 de novembro de 1915. . 215

Anexo XV: *Progress of the War; Russia and Constantinople,* 1 de agosto de 1916..... 225

Anexo XVI: *Agreement regarding Constantinople,* 1 de abril de 1917..... 235

Anexo I: *Turkey Convention: the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, by ships of war,* 13 de julho de 1841.

Código do arquivo:

FO 94/368

Descrição:

Convenção de Londres sobre os Estreitos (em francês), entregue ao sultão do Império Otomano, que limitava a passagem de navios de guerra pelos estreitos de Bósforo e Dardanelos.





Article I.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan, d'une part, déclare qu'Il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir, le principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de Son Empire, et en vertu duquel il a été de tout tems défendu aux Bâtimens de guerre des Puissances étrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore; et que tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Hautesse n'admettra aucun bâtimens de guerre étranger dans les dits détroits.

Et Leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi des Français, la Reine du Royaume uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Roi de Prusse et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, de l'autre part, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

Article II.

Il est entendu qu'en constatant l'inviolabilité de l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, mentionnée dans l'article précédent, le Sultan se réserve, comme par le passé, de délivrer des firmans de passage aux Bâtimens legers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels seront employés comme il est d'usage, au service des Légations des Puissances amies.



Article III.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan se réserve de porter la présente Convention, à la connoissance de toutes les Puissances avec lesquelles la Sublime Porte se trouve en relation d'amitié, en les invitant à y accéder.

Article IV.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les Ratifications en seront échangées à Londres, à l'expiration de deux mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres le 13 Juillet, l'an de grace mil-huit-cent quarante et un.

Anexo II: *Treaty and Protocol. Alliance against Russia,* 12 de março de 1854.

Código do arquivo:

FO 93/110/6

Descrição:

Acordos entre a Grã-Bretanha, França e Império Otomano para unir os seus esforços para combater a Rússia no Mar Negro (durante a guerra da Crimeia).



Sa Majesté La Reine du Royaume uni
de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et
Sa Majesté L'Empereur des Français,
ayant été invitées par Sa Majesté
Impériale Le Sultan, à l'aider à
repousser l'agression dirigée par Sa
Majesté L'Empereur de toutes les
Russies contre les territoires de la
Sublime Porte Ottomane, agression, par
laquelle l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman
et l'indépendance du trône de Sa
Majesté Impériale Le Sultan se
trouvent



trouvent menacées, et leurs dites Majestés
étant pleinement persuadées que l'existence
de l'Empire Ottoman dans ses limites
actuelles est essentielle au maintien de
la balance du pouvoir entre les Etats
de l'Europe, et ayant en conséquence,
consenti à donner à Sa Majesté Impériale
le Sultan, l'assistance qu'il a demandée
dans ce but, il a paru convenable à
leurs dites Majestés et à Sa Majesté
Impériale Le Sultan, de conclure un
traité, afin de constater leurs intentions
conformément à ce qui précède, et de
régler la manière d'après laquelle
Leurs dites Majestés prêteront assistance
à Sa Majesté Impériale Le Sultan.

Dans



Dans ce but, Leurs dites Majestés et
Sa Majesté Impériale Le Sultan, ont
nommé pour être leurs plénipotentiaires,
savoir: Sa Majesté La Reine du Royaume
Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande
Le très honorable Stratford, Vicomte
Stratford de Redcliffe, Pair du Royaume
Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique
en son conseil Privé, Chevalier Grand
Croix du très honorable ordre de Bain,
et Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et
Plénipotentiaire près la Porte Ottomane;
Sa Majesté L'Empereur des Français
Le Comte Baraguey d'Hilliers
Général de division, &c. &c.
Et Sa Majesté Impériale Le Sultan,
Mustapha



Mustapha Rechid Pacha, son Ministre
des affaires étrangeres; les quels, après
s'être réciproquement communiqué leurs
pleins-pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et dûe
forme, sont convenus des articles qui
suivent.

Art: I

Sa Majesté La Reine du Royaume
Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande,
et Sa Majesté L'Empereur des Français,
ayant déja, à la demande de Sa
Majesté Impériale Le Sultan ordonné
à de puissantes divisions de leurs forces
navales, de se rendre à Constantinople,
et d'étendre au territoire et au pavillon
Ottomans

Ottomans la protection que permettraient
les circonstances, leurs dites Majestés se
chargent par le présent traité de coopérer
encore davantage avec Sa Majesté
Impériale Le Sultan, pour la défense
du territoire Ottoman, en Europe et en
Asie, contre l'agression Russe, en
employant à cette fin, tel nombre de
leurs troupes de terre qui peut paraître
nécessaire pour atteindre ce but; les
quelles troupes de terre, Leurs dites
Majestés expédieront aussitôt vers tel
ou tels points du territoire Ottoman
qu'il sera jugé à propos, et Sa
Majesté Impériale Le Sultan convient
que les troupes de terre Britanniques
et

et Françaises, ainsi expédiées pour la
défense du territoire Ottoman, recevront
le même accueil amical et seront traitées avec
la même considération que les forces
navales Britanniques et Françaises —
employées depuis quelque temps dans les
eaux de la Turquie.

Art: II

Les Hautes Parties contractantes —
s'engagent chacune de leur côté à se
communiquer réciproquement, sans perte
de temps, toute proposition que recevrait
l'une d'Elles de la part de l'Empereur
de Russie soit directement soit —
indirectement, en vue de la cessation

des

des hostilités d'un armistice ou de la paix; et Sa Majesté Impériale Le Sultan s'engage en outre à ne conclure aucun armistice et à n'entamer aucune négociation pour la paix, ou à ne conclure aucun préliminaire de paix ni aucun traité de paix avec L'Empereur de Russie, sans la connaissance et le consentement des Hautes Parties contractantes.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Art: III

Dès que le but du présent traité aura été atteint par la conclusion d'un traité de paix, La Majesté La Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et Sa Majesté L'Empereur



l'Empereur des Français, prendront
aussitôt des arrangemens pour retirer
immédiatement toutes leurs forces militaires
et navales employées pour réaliser
l'objet du présent traité; et toutes les
fortresses ou positions dans le territoire
ottoman qui auront été temporairement
occupées par les forces militaires de
l'Angleterre et de la France, seront
remises aux autorités de la Sublime
Porte ottomane dans l'espace de quarante
jours, ou plutôt, si faire se peut, à
partir de l'échange des ratifications
du traité par lequel la présente
guerre sera terminée.

Art IV.

Il est entendu que les armées
auxiliaires



auxiliaires conserveront la faculté de
prendre telle part qui leur paraîtrait
convenable aux opérations dirigées contre
l'ennemi commun sans que les
autorités Ottomanes, soit civiles soit
militaires, aient la prétention d'exercer
le moindre contrôle sur leurs mouvements;
au contraire, toute aide et facilité
leur seront prêtées par ces autorités,
spécialement pour leur débarquement,
leur marche, leur logement ou campement,
leur subsistance et celle de leurs
chevaux; et leurs communications, soit
qu'elles agissent ensemble, soit qu'
elles agissent séparément.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Il



Il est entendu de l'autre côté, que les Commandants des dites Armées s'engagent à maintenir la plus stricte discipline dans leurs Troupes respectives, et feront respecter par elles, les lois et les usages du pays.

Il va sans dire que les Propriétés seront partout respectées.

Il est de plus entendu de part et d'autre que le plan général de campagne, sera discuté et convenu entre les Commandants en Chef des trois armées, et que, si une partie notable des Troupes Alliées, se trouvait en ligne avec les Troupes Ottomanes, aucune opération ne pourrait être exécutée contre l'ennemi

l'ennemi sans avoir été préalablement concertée avec les Commandants des forces Alliées.

Finalement, il sera fait droit à toute demande, relative aux besoins du service, adressée par les Commandants en Chef des troupes auxiliaires, soit au Gouvernement Ottoman par le canal de leurs Ambassades respectives, soit d'urgence aux autorités locales, à moins que des objections majeures, clairement enoncées, n'en empêchent la mise à execution.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Art: V

Le présent traité sera ratifié, et les ratifications seront échangées à Constantinople



Constantinople, dans l'espace de dix semaines, ou plutôt il faire le point à partir du jour de la signature.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait en triple pour un seul et même effet, à Constantinople, le Douze Mars 28 février mil huit cent cinquante quatre.

Stratford de Redcliffe

Réchid



Les Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France s'étant réunis aujourd'hui en conférence avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, à l'Hôtel de son Altesse, les trois Représentans ont arrêté le présent Protocole pour constater ce qui suit:

Les Gouvernemens Anglais et Français ayant pris la résolution, pour le cas où la Porte Ottomane en exprimerait le désir, d'envoyer des troupes de terre pour aider la Majesté Impériale le Sultan à repousser l'agression de la Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, et ce désirant d'être



d'être manifesté au nom de Sa Majesté
Impériale le Sultan, par son Altesse Rechid
Pacha, les trois Représentans ont arrêté
d'un commun accord les articles d'un
Traité ci annexé, qui a été signé par
Son Altesse Rechid Pacha et Son Excellence
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, en vertus des
pleins pouvoirs dont ils sont munis.
Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de France
n'étant pas muni des mêmes pouvoirs,
n'a pu signer le dit Traité pour le
moment, tout en étant d'accord que
les articles stipulés dans cet acte
sont conformes aux intentions de son
Gouvernement, et que l'armée des Troupes
Françaises en Turquie n'aurait lieu
qu'après l'acceptation formelle du
Traité



Traité par la Cour de France.

En employant d'un commun accord la langue Française pour la rédaction du Traité précité, les Représentans n'ont voulu préjuger en rien les cas à venir.

Son Altesse Reschid Pacha ayant proposé de laisser le susdit Traité ouvert à l'acceptation de toute autre puissance amie qui désirerait y adhérer, les deux Ambassadeurs se sont engagés à soumettre cette proposition à leurs Cours respectives.

Fait en triple pour un seul et même effet.

Constantinople le 12 Mars 1854
28 Février

Stratford de Redcliffe

Reschid



Protocolo signé entre les
Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre
et de France et Rechid
Pacha le 12 Mars 1854
28 Février

2

Sent Homein Ld Ls No 108/54

The Undersigned having met together for the purpose of exchanging the Ratifications of a Treaty between Her Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Imperial Majesty The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, and His Majesty The Emperor of the French, relative to Military aid to be given to Turkey, concluded and signed at Constantinople on the 12th of March 1854; and the respective Ratifications of the said Treaty having been carefully compared, and found to be exactly conformable to each other, the said Exchange took place this day in the usual form. -

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

In Witness whereof they have signed the present Certificate of Exchange, and have affixed thereto the Seal of their Arms. -

Done at Constantinople, the eighth day of May 1854.

Stratford de Redcliffe

Pisheid



The Undersigned having met together for the purpose of exchanging the Ratifications of a Treaty between Her Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty The Emperor of the French, and His Imperial Majesty The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, relative to Military aid to be given to Turkey, concluded and signed at Constantinople on the 12th of March 1854; And the respective Ratifications of the said Treaty having been carefully compared, and found to be exactly conformable to each other, the said Exchange took place this day in the usual form.

In Witness whereof they have signed the present Certificate of Exchange, and have affixed thereto the Seal of their Arms.

Done at Constantinople, the eighth day of May 1854.

Stratford de Redcliffe

Anexo III: *Treaty of Paris,* 30 de março de 1856.

Código do arquivo:

FO 93/81/36

Descrição:

Tratado de Paris original (em francês) escrito e assinado após o fim da guerra da Crimeia (1853-1856).



Au nom de Dieu Tout-Puissant.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur des Français, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Roi de Sardaigne et l'Empereur des Ottomans, animés du désir de mettre un terme aux calamités de la guerre, et voulant prévenir le retour des complications qui l'ont fait naître, ont résolu de s'entendre avec Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche sur les bases à donner au rétablissement et à la consolidation de la paix, en assurant, par des garanties efficaces et réciproques, l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman.

A cet effet, Leurs dites Majestés ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le très-honorable George Guillaume Frédéric Comte de



Clarendon, Baron Hyde de Hindon, Pair du Royaume Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en son Conseil privé, Chevalier du très noble Ordre de la Jarretière, Chevalier Grand' Croix du très-honorable Ordre du Bain, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté pour les Affaires Etrangères,

et le très Honorable Henri-Richard Charles Baron Cowley, Pair du Royaume-Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté en son Conseil privé, Chevalier Grand'Croix du très-honorable Ordre du Bain, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté près Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, le Sieur Charles Ferdinand Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de Léopold d'Autriche et chevalier de l'Ordre de la Couronne de Fer de première classe; Grand' Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, Chevalier des Ordres de l'Aigle noir et de l'Aigle rouge de Prusse, Grand' Croix des Ordres Impériaux d'Alexandre

Nieuwski, en brillants, et de l'Aigle blanc de Russie;
Grand Croix de l'Ordre de Saint Jean de Jérusalem;
décoré de l'Ordre Impérial du Medjidyé de
première classe, &c. &c. &c., Son Chambellan et
Conseiller intime actuel, Son Ministre de la Maison
et des Affaires Etrangères, Président de la Conférence
des Ministres;

et le Sieur Joseph Alexandre Baron de Hübner,
Grand Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Couronne de
Fer, Grand officier de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion
d'Honneur, Son Conseiller intime actuel et Son
Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire
à la Cour de France.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,
le Sieur Alexandre Comte Colonna Walewski,
Sénateur de l'Empire, Grand officier de l'Ordre
Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, Chevalier Grand
Croix de l'Ordre équestre des Séraphins, Grand Croix
de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, décoré de
l'Ordre Impérial du Medjidyé de première classe,
&c. &c. &c., Son Ministre et Secrétaire d'Etat au
Département des Affaires Etrangères,



et le Sieur François Adolphe Baron de Bourqueney, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur et de l'Ordre de Léopold d'Autriche, décoré du portrait du Sultan en diamants, &c. &c. &c., Son Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur Alexis Comte Orloff, Son aide de camp général et Général de cavalerie, Commandant du quartier général de Sa Majesté, Membre du Conseil de l'Empire et du Comité des Ministres, décoré des deux Portraits en diamants de Leurs Majestés feu l'Empereur Nicolas et l'Empereur Alexandre II, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint André en diamants et des Ordres de Russie, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre de Saint Etienne d'Autriche de première classe, de l'Aigle noir de Prusse en diamants, de l'Annonciade de Sardaigne et de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers,

et le Sieur Philippe Baron de Brunnow, Son Conseiller privé, Son Envoyé extraordinaire et



Ministre plenipotentiaire près la Confédération Germanique et près Son Altesse Royale le Grand Duc de Hesse, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint Wladimir de première classe; de Saint Alexandre Nieswki, enrichi de diamants; de l'Aigle blanc; de Sainte Anne de première classe, de Saint Stanislas de première classe; Grand' Croix de l'Ordre de l'Aigle rouge de Prusse de première classe, Commandeur de l'Ordre de Saint Etienne d'Autriche et de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, le Sieur Camille Benso, Comte de Cavour, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, Chevalier de l'Ordre du Mérite civil de Savoie, Grand'Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, décoré de l'Ordre Impérial du Medjidyé de première classe, Grand'Croix de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers, Président du Conseil des Ministres et Son Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Finances,

et le Sieur Salvator, Marquis de Villamarina,



Grand'Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, Grand Officier de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, &a. &a. &a., Son Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à la Cour de France,

et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, Mouhammed Emin Aali Pacha, Grand Vézir de l'Empire Ottoman, décoré des Ordres Impériaux du Medjidyé et du Mérite de première classe, Grand Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, de Saint Etienne d'Autriche, de l'aigle rouge de Prusse, de Sainte Anne de Russie, des Saints Maurice et Lazare de Sardaigne, de l'Etoile Polaire de Suède et de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers,

et Mehemmed Djemil Bey, décoré de l'ordre Impérial du Medjidyé de seconde classe et Grand Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, Son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, accrédité en la même qualité près Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne,



5

Lesquels se sont réunis en Congrès à Paris.

L'entente ayant été heureusement établie entre eux, Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Roi de Sardaigne et l'Empereur des Ottomans, considérant que, dans un intérêt européen, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, signataire de la Convention du treize Juillet mil huit cent quarante un, devait être appelée à participer aux nouveaux arrangements à prendre, et appréciant la valeur qu'ajouterait à une œuvre de pacification générale le concours de Sadite Majesté, l'ont invitée à envoyer des Plénipotentiaires au Congrès.

En conséquence, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse a nommé pour ses Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Sieur Othon Théodore Baron de Manteuffel, Président de son Conseil et Son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères; Chevalier de l'Aigle rouge de Prusse, première classe, avec feuilles de chêne, couronne et sceptre, Grand Commandeur de l'Ordre de Hohenzollern; Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint Jean

de Prusse, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre de Saint Etienne de Hongrie, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint Alexandre Newski, Grand Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare et de l'Ordre du Nichan-Iftihar de Turquie, &c. &c. &c.;

et le Sieur Maximilien-Frédéric-Charles-François Comte de Hatzfeldt Wildenburg-Schoenstein, Son Conseiller privé actuel, Son Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à la Cour de France, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'aigle rouge de Prusse, seconde classe, avec feuilles de chêne et plaque, Chevalier de la Croix d'honneur de Hohenzollern, première classe, &c. &c. &c.

Les Plénipotentiaires, après avoir échangé leurs Pleins-Pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants:

Art: 1er

Il y aura, à dater du jour de l'échange des Ratifications du présent Traité, paix et amitié entre Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et

d'Irlande, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des ... Français, Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, d'une part, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, de l'autre part, ainsi qu'entre Leurs héritiers et Successeurs, Leurs Etats et sujets respectifs, à perpétuité.

Artᵉ: 2.

La paix étant heureusement rétablie entre Leurs dites Majestés, les territoires, conquis ou occupés par Leurs armées, pendant la guerre, seront réciproquement évacués.

Des arrangements spéciaux régleront le mode de l'évacuation qui devra être aussi prompte que faire se pourra.

Artᵉ 3.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'engage à restituer à Sa Majesté le Sultan la ville et citadelle de Kars, aussi bien que les autres parties du territoire Ottoman dont les troupes Russes se trouvent



en possession.

Artᵉ: 4.

Leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Roi de Sardaigne et le Sultan s'engagent à restituer à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies les villes et ports de Sébastopol, Balaklava, Kamiesch, Eupatoria, Kertch, Jenikaleh, Kinburn, ainsi que tous autres territoires occupés par les troupes alliées.

Artᵉ: 5.

Leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Roi de Sardaigne et le Sultan accordent une amnistie pleine et entière à ceux de Leurs Sujets qui auraient été compromis par une participation quelconque aux évènements de la guerre en faveur de la cause ennemie.

Il est expressément entendu que cette amnistie s'étendra aux sujets de chacune des Parties belligérantes, qui auraient continué, pendant la guerre, à être employés dans le service de l'un des autres belligérants.

Art.: 6.

Les prisonniers de guerre seront immédiatement rendus de part et d'autre.

Art.: 7.

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne déclarent la Sublime Porte admise à participer aux avantages du droit public et du concert européens. Leurs Majestés s'engagent, chacune de son côté, à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, garantissent en commun



la stricte observation de cet engagement, et considéreront, en conséquence, tout acte de nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d'intérêt général.

Artᵉ: 8.

S'il survenait, entre la Sublime Porte et l'une ou plusieurs des autres Puissances signataires, un dissentiment qui menaçât le maintien de leurs relations, la Sublime Porte et chacune de ces Puissances, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, mettront les autres Parties contractantes en mesure de prévenir cette extrémité par leur action médiatrice.

Artᵉ: 9.

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, dans sa constante sollicitude pour le bien être de ses Sujets, ayant octroyé un firman qui, en améliorant leur sort, sans distinction de religion ni de race, consacre ses généreuses intentions envers les populations chrétiennes de Son Empire, et voulant donner un nouveau

témoignage de ses sentiments à cet égard, a résolu de communiquer aux Puissances contractantes le dit firman, spontanément émané de sa volonté Souveraine.

Les Puissances contractantes constatent la haute valeur de cette communication. Il est bien entendu qu'elle ne saurait, en aucun cas, donner le droit aux dites Puissances, de s'immiscer soit collectivement, soit séparément, dans les rapports de Sa Majesté le Sultan avec ses Sujets, ni dans l'administration intérieure de Son Empire.

Artᵉ: 10.

La Convention du treize Juillet mil huit cent quarante un qui maintient l'antique règle de l'Empire Ottoman relative à la clôture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, a été revisée d'un commun accord.

L'acte, conclu à cet effet et conformément à ce principe, entre les Hautes Parties contractantes, est et demeure annexé au présent Traité, et aura même force et valeur que s'il

en faisait partie intégrante.

Artᵉ: 11.

La Mer noire est neutralisée: - ouverts à la Marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux et ses ports sont, formellement et à perpétuité, interdits au pavillon de guerre soit des Puissances riveraines, soit de toute autre Puissance, sauf les exceptions mentionnées aux articles 14 et 19 du présent Traité.

Artᵉ: 12.

Libre de toute entrave, le commerce, dans les ports et dans les eaux de la Mer noire, ne sera assujetti qu'à des réglements de santé, de douane, de police, conçus dans un esprit favorable au développement des transactions commerciales.

Pour donner aux intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations la sécurité désirable, la Russie et la Sublime Porte admettront des Consuls dans leurs ports situés sur le littoral de la Mer noire, conformément aux principes

du droit international.

Artº 13.

La Mer noire étant neutralisée, aux termes de l'article 11, le maintien ou l'établissement sur son littoral d'arsenaux militaires-maritimes devient sans nécessité comme sans objet. En conséquence, Sa. Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa. Majesté Impériale le Sultan s'engagent à n'élever et à ne conserver sur ce littoral, aucun arsenal militaire-maritime.

Artº 14.

Leurs Majestés l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et le Sultan ayant conclu une Convention à l'effet de déterminer la force et le nombre des bâtiments légers, nécessaires au service de leurs côtes, qu'Elles se réservent d'entretenir dans la mer noire, cette Convention est annexée au présent Traité, et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie intégrante. Elle ne pourra être ni annulée, ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du

présent Traité.

Art.e 15.

L'acte du Congrès de Vienne ayant établi les principes destinés à régler la navigation des fleuves qui séparent ou traversent plusieurs Etats, les Puissances contractantes stipulent entre Elles qu'à l'avenir, ces principes seront également appliqués au Danube et à ses embouchures. Elles déclarent que cette disposition fait, désormais, partie du droit public de l'Europe, et la prennent sous leur garantie.

La navigation du Danube ne pourra être assujettie à aucune entrave ni redevance qui ne serait pas expressément prévue par les stipulations contenues dans les articles suivants. En conséquence, il ne sera perçu aucun péage basé uniquement sur le fait de la navigation du fleuve, ni aucun droit sur les marchandises qui se trouvent à bord des navires. Les réglements de police et de quarantaine à établir, pour la sûreté des Etats séparés ou traversés par ce fleuve, seront conçus de manière à favoriser, autant que faire se

pourra, la circulation des navires. Sauf ces 13
règlements, il ne sera apporté aucun obstacle, quel
qu'il soit, à la libre navigation.

Artᵉ 16.

Dans le but de réaliser les dispositions de
l'article précédent, une Commission dans laquelle
la Grande Bretagne, l'Autriche, la France,
la Prusse, la Russie, la Sardaigne et la
Turquie seront, chacune, représentées par un
délégué, sera chargée de désigner et de faire exécuter
les travaux nécessaires, depuis Isatcha, pour
dégager les embouchures du Danube, ainsi que
les parties de la mer y avoisinantes, des sables
et autres obstacles qui les obstruent, afin de
mettre cette partie du fleuve et les dites parties
de la mer dans les meilleures conditions possibles
de navigabilité.

Pour couvrir les frais de ces travaux ainsi que
des établissements ayant pour objet d'assurer et
de faciliter la navigation aux bouches du Danube,
des droits fixes, d'un taux convenable, arrêtés par
la Commission à la majorité des voix, pourront

être prélevés, à la condition expresse que, sous ce rapport comme sous tous les autres, les pavillons de toutes les nations seront traités sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité.

Art.e: 17.

Une Commission sera établie et se composera des délégués de l'Autriche, de la Bavière, de la Sublime Porte et du Würtemberg (un pour chacune de ces Puissances) auxquels se réuniront les Commissaires des trois Principautés Danubiennes dont la nomination aura été approuvée par la Porte. Cette Commission qui sera permanente, 1.o élaborera les réglements de navigation et de police fluviale; 2.o fera disparaître les entraves, de quelque nature qu'elles puissent être, qui s'opposent encore à l'application au Danube des dispositions du Traité de Vienne; 3.o ordonnera et fera exécuter les travaux nécessaires sur tout le parcours du fleuve; et, 4.o veillera, après la dissolution de la Commission Européenne, au maintien de la navigabilité des embouchures

du Danube et des parties de la mer y avoisinantes. ... 11

Art.e 18.

Il est entendu que la Commission Européenne aura rempli sa tâche et que la Commission riveraine aura terminé les travaux désignés dans l'article précédent sous les N.os 1.o et 2.o, dans l'espace de deux ans. Les Puissances signataires réunies en conférence, informées de ce fait, prononceront, après en avoir pris acte, la dissolution de la Commission Européenne; et, dès-lors, la Commission riveraine permanente jouira des mêmes pouvoirs que ceux dont la Commission Européenne aura été investie jusqu'alors.

Art.e 19.

Afin d'assurer l'exécution des réglements qui auront été arrêtés d'un commun accord d'après les principes ci-dessus énoncés, chacune des Puissances contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner, en tout temps, deux bâtiments légers aux embouchures du Danube.



Art.e: 20.

En échange des villes, ports et territoires énumérés dans l'article 19 du présent Traité, et pour mieux assurer la liberté de la navigation du Danube, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies consent à la rectification de sa frontière en Bessarabie.

La nouvelle frontière partira de la Mer Noire, à un kilomètre à l'est du lac Bourna-sola, rejoindra perpendiculairement la route d'Akerman, suivra cette route jusqu'au Val de Crajan, passera au sud de Bolgrad, remontera le long de la rivière de Yalpuck jusqu'à la hauteur de Saratsika, et ira aboutir à Katamori sur le Pruth. En amont de ce point, l'ancienne frontière, entre les deux Empires, ne subira aucune modification.

Des délégués des Puissances contractantes fixeront, dans ses détails, le tracé de la nouvelle frontière.

Art.e: 21.

Le territoire, cédé par la Russie, sera

annexé à la Principauté de Moldavie, sous la suzeraineté de la Sublime Porte. 12

Les habitants de ce territoire jouiront des droits et privilèges assurés aux Principautés; et, pendant l'espace de trois années, il leur sera permis de transporter ailleurs leur domicile, en disposant librement de leurs propriétés.

Artᵉ 22.

Les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie continueront à jouir, sous la suzeraineté de la Porte et sous la garantie des Puissances contractantes, des privilèges et des immunités dont Elles sont en possession. Aucune protection exclusive ne sera exercée sur Elles par une des Puissances garantes. Il n'y aura aucun droit particulier d'ingérence dans leurs affaires intérieures.

Artᵉ 23.

La Sublime Porte s'engage à conserver aux dites Principautés une administration indépendante et nationale, ainsi que la pleine

liberté de culte, de législation, de commerce et de navigation.

Les lois et statuts, aujourd'hui en vigueur, seront revisés. Pour établir un complet accord sur cette revision, une Commission spéciale, sur la composition de laquelle les Hautes Puissances contractantes s'entendront, se réunira, sans délai, à Bucharest, avec un Commissaire de la Sublime Porte.

Cette Commission aura pour tâche de s'enquérir de l'état actuel des Principautés et de proposer les bases de leur future organisation.

Art. 24.

Sa Majesté le Sultan promet de convoquer immédiatement, dans chacune des deux Provinces, un divan ad hoc, composé de manière à constituer la représentation la plus exacte des intérêts de toutes les classes de la société. Ces divans seront appelés à exprimer les vœux des populations relativement à l'organisation définitive des Principautés.

Une instruction du Congrès règlera les rapports de la Commission avec ces divans. ---- 13

Artᵉ 25.

Prenant en considération l'opinion émise par les deux divans, la Commission transmettra sans retard, au siège actuel des Conférences, le résultat de son propre travail.

L'entente finale avec la Puissance suzeraine, sera consacrée par une Convention conclue à Paris entre les Hautes Parties contractantes; et un Hatti-schériff, conforme aux stipulations de la Convention, constituera définitivement l'organisation de ces Provinces, placée désormais sous la garantie collective de toutes les Puissances signataires.

Artᵉ 26.

Il est convenu qu'il y aura dans les Principautés, une force armée nationale, organisée dans le but de maintenir la sûreté de l'intérieur et d'assurer celle des frontières. Aucune entrave ne pourra être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense que, d'accord avec la Sublime Porte, Elles seraient

appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

Artᵉ 27.

Si le repos intérieur des Principautés se trouvait menacé ou compromis, la Sublime Porte s'entendra avec les autres Puissances contractantes sur les mesures à prendre pour maintenir ou rétablir l'ordre légal. Une intervention armée ne pourra avoir lieu sans un accord préalable entre ces Puissances.

Artᵉ 28.

La Principauté de Servie continuera à relever de la Sublime Porte, conformément aux Hats Impériaux qui fixent et déterminent ses droits et immunités placés désormais sous la garantie collective des Puissances contractantes.

En conséquence, ladite Principauté conservera son administration indépendante et nationale, ainsi que la pleine liberté de culte, de législation, de commerce et de navigation.

Artᵉ 29.



Art.e 29.

14

Le droit de garnison de la Sublime Porte, tel qu'il se trouve stipulé par les réglements antérieurs, est maintenu. Aucune intervention armée ne pourra avoir lieu en Servie, sans un accord préalable entre les Hautes Puissances contractantes.

Art.e: 30.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Majesté le Sultan maintiennent dans son intégrité l'état de Leurs possessions en Asie, tel qu'il existait légalement avant la rupture.

Pour prévenir toute contestation locale, le tracé de la frontière sera vérifié, et, s'il y a lieu, rectifié, sans qu'il puisse en résulter un préjudice territorial pour l'une ou l'autre des deux Parties.

A cet effet, une Commission mixte, composée de deux Commissaires Russes, de deux Commissaires Ottomans, d'un Commissaire Anglais et d'un Commissaire Français, sera envoyée sur les lieux



immédiatement après le rétablissement des relations diplomatiques entre la Cour de Russie et la Sublime Porte. Son travail devra être terminé dans l'espace de huit mois, à dater de l'échange des Ratifications du présent Traité.

Artᵉ: 31.

Les territoires occupés pendant la guerre par les troupes de Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français et le Roi de Sardaigne, aux termes des Conventions signées à Constantinople le douze Mars mil huit cent cinquante-quatre entre la Grande Bretagne, la France et la Sublime Porte; le quatorze Juin de la même année entre l'Autriche et la Sublime Porte, et le quinze Mars mil huit cent cinquante cinq entre la Sardaigne et la Sublime Porte, seront évacués après l'échange des Ratifications du présent Traité, aussitôt que faire se pourra. Les délais et les moyens d'exécution



feront l'objet d'un arrangement entre la
Sublime Porte et les Puissances dont les
troupes ont occupé son territoire. 15

Art.e: 32.

Jusqu'à ce que les Traités ou Conventions
qui existaient avant la guerre entre les
Puissances belligérantes aient été ou renouvelés,
ou remplacés par des actes nouveaux, le
commerce d'importation ou d'exportation aura
lieu réciproquement sur le pied des réglements
en vigueur avant la guerre; et leurs sujets,
en toute autre matière, seront respectivement
traités sur le pied de la nation la plus
favorisée.

Art.e 33.

La Convention conclue, en ce jour, entre
Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni
de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande,
l'Empereur des Français, d'une part, et Sa
Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, de
l'autre part, relativement aux Iles d'Aland,



est et demeure annexée au présent Traité et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie.

Art.e: 31.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié et les Ratifications en seront échangées à Paris dans l'espace de quatre semaines, ou plus tôt, si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Paris le trentième jour du mois de Mars de l'an mil huit cent cinquante six.

Clarendon

Cowley


16





Article additionnel et transitoire. 17

Les stipulations de la Convention des Détroits signée en ce jour, ne seront pas applicables aux bâtiments de guerre employés par les Puissances belligérantes pour l'évacuation, par mer, des territoires occupés par leurs armées, mais lesdites stipulations reprendront leur entier effet aussitôt que l'évacuation sera terminée.

Fait à Paris le trentième jour du mois de Mars de l'an mil huit cent cinquante six.

Clarendon

Cow Leg.

Bruot Schneider

Hübner




18
Mehemmed Djémil



21

PAR LA GRACE DE DIEU

NOUS ALEXANDRE II,

EMPEREUR ET AUTOCRATE

DE TOUTES LES RUSSIES,

de Moscou, Kiow, Wladimir, Novgorod, Tsar de Casan, Tsar d'Astrakhan, Tsar de Pologne, Tsar de Sibérie, Tsar de la Chersonèse-Taurique, Seigneur de Pleskow, et Grand Duc de Smolensk, de Lithuanie, Volhynie, Podolie et de Finlande, Duc d'Estonie, de Livonie, de Courlande et Semigalle, de Samogitie, Bialostock, Carélie, Twer, Jugorie, Perm, Viatka, Bolgarie et d'autres; Seigneur et Grand Duc de Novgorod-inférieur, de Czernigow, Riasan, Polotzk, Rostow, Jaroslaw, Bélooserak, Oudor, Obdor, Condie, Witepsk, Mstislaw; Dominateur de toute la contrée du Nord, Seigneur d'Ibérie, de la Cartalinie, de la Géorgie, de la Cabardie et de la province d'Arménie; Prince Héréditaire et Souverain des Princes de Circassie et d'autres Princes montagnards; Successeur de Norvège, Duc de Schleswig-Holstein, de Stormarn, de Dithmarsen et d'Oldenbourg, etc. etc. etc. Savoir faisons par les présentes que d'un commun accord entre

Nous et Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, l'Empereur des Français, le Roi de Prusse, le Roi de Sardaigne et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, Nos Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont conclu et signé à Paris, le 18./30. Mars de l'année 1856., un Traité de paix avec un Article additionnel et transitoire dont la teneur est mot pour mot comme suit:

/: fiat insertio :/

A ces causes après avoir suffisamment examiné ce Traité avec son Article additionnel et transitoire, Nous les avons agréés, confirmés et ratifiés, comme par les présentes Nous les agréons, confirmons et ratifions dans toute leur teneur, promettant sur Notre parole Impériale, pour Nous, Nos Héritiers et Nos Successeurs que tout ce qui a été stipulé dans le dit Traité et son Article additionnel



....22

et transitoire sera observé et exécuté inviola-
blement. En foi de quoi Nous avons
signé de Notre propre main la présente
Ratification Impériale et y avons fait
apposer le sceau de Notre Empire. Fait
à St. Pétersbourg, le trois Avril, de l'an
de grâce mil huit cent cinquante six et
de Notre règne la seconde année.

L'original est signé de la
propre main de Sa Majesté
l'Empereur, ainsi : Alexandre.

L. S.

Contresigné: Le Chancelier de l'Empire Comte de Nesselrode

Pour traduction conforme: Le Comte de Nesselrode



Grande Bretagne.

—

23

Procès-Verbal d'échange.

Les Soussignés s'étant réunis pour procéder à l'échange des Ratifications de Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, le Roi de Prusse, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Roi de Sardaigne et l'Empereur des Ottomans, sur le Traité de paix et d'amitié, suivi d'un article additionnel et transitoire, et de trois Conventions annexes, et conclu à Paris, le 30 mars 1856; — les Instruments de ces Ratifications, confirmant le dit Traité et l'Article additionnel et transitoire, ont été produits, et ayant été, après examen, trouvés en bonne et due forme, l'échange en a été opéré.

Dans la même séance ont été échangés les Actes réciproques de Ratifications, entre les Puissances signataires, des Conventions annexes.

En foi de quoi, les Soussignés ont dressé le présent Procès-Verbal qu'ils ont revêtu du sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Paris, le vingt-septième jour du mois d'Avril de l'an mil huit cent cinquante six.

Les Soussignés constatent que l'alternat n'a pas été observé par toutes les Puissances de la même manière, dans les actes de Ratifications; qu'il ne l'a pas été du tout par la Turquie; Que cette différence de forme

ne préjuge




24
Mehemmed Djémil


A
annex to Art: 10
25
Grande Bretagne.



principe sur lequel elle repose.

En conséquence, Leurs dites Majestés ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Très-honorable George Guillaume Frédéric Comte de Clarendon, Baron Hyde de Hindon, Pair du Royaume-Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en son Conseil privé, Chevalier du très noble Ordre de la Jarretière, Chevalier Grand' Croix du très honorable Ordre du Bain, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté pour les Affaires Etrangères,

et le Très honorable Henri Richard Charles Baron Cowley, Pair du Royaume Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté en son Conseil privé, Chevalier Grand' Croix du très honorable Ordre du Bain, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté près Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

Sa Majesté



Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche &c.;
le Sieur Charles Ferdinand Comte de Buol-
Schauenstein, Grand Croix de l'ordre Impérial
de Léopold d'Autriche, et Chevalier de l'Ordre de
la Couronne de Fer de première classe, Grand'Croix
de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, Chevalier
des Ordres de l'Aigle noir et de l'Aigle rouge de
Prusse, Grand'Croix des Ordres Impériaux d'Alexandre
Nieswski, en brillants, et de l'Aigle blanc de Russie;
Grand'Croix de l'Ordre de saint Jean de Jérusalem;
décoré de l'Ordre Impérial du Medjidyé de
première classe, &c. &c. &c. Son Chambellan et
Conseiller intime actuel, Son Ministre de la
Maison et des Affaires Etrangères, Président de
la Conférence des Ministres;

et le Sieur Joseph Alexandre Baron de Hübner,
Grand'Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Couronne
de Fer, Grand Officier de l'ordre Impérial
de la Légion d'honneur, Son Conseiller
intime actuel et Son Envoyé extraordinaire
et Ministre plénipotentiaire à la Cour de
France,

Sa Majesté



Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,
le Sieur Alexandre Comte Colonna Walewski,
Sénateur de l'Empire, Grand Officier de l'Ordre
Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, Chevalier Grand'
Croix de l'Ordre équestre des Séraphins, Grand'Croix
de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, décoré de
l'Ordre Impérial des Medjidyé de première classe,
&c. &c. &c. Son Ministre et Secrétaire d'Etat au
Département des Affaires Etrangères,

Et le Sieur François Adolphe Baron de Bourqueney,
Grand'Croix de l'ordre Impérial de la Légion
d'honneur et de l'Ordre de Léopold d'Autriche,
décoré du Portrait du Sultan en diamants, &c. &c. &c.
Son Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire
près Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique,

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, le Sieur
Ochon Chévdore Baron de Manteuffel, Président
de son Conseil et Son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,
Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle rouge de Prusse
première classe, avec feuilles de chêne, couronne et
sceptre, Grand Commandeur de l'Ordre de
Hohenzollern, Chevalier de l'ordre de Saint Jean



de Prusse, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre de Saint Etienne 28
de Hongrie, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint Alexandre
Nevski, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice
et Lazare et de l'Ordre du Nichan Iftihar
de Turquie, &a &a &a;

et le sieur Maximilien Frédéric Charles François
Comte de Hatzfeldt Wildenburg Schoenstein, Son
Conseiller privé actuel, Son Envoyé extraordinaire et
Ministre plénipotentiaire à la Cour de France,
Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'aigle rouge de Prusse,
seconde classe, avec feuilles de chêne et plaque,
Chevalier de la Croix d'honneur de Hohenzollern,
première classe, &a &a &a.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les
Russies, le sieur Alexis Comte Orloff, Son
Aide-de-camp général et Général de cavalerie,
Commandant du quartier général de Sa Majesté,
membre du Conseil de l'Empire et du Comité des
Ministres, décoré des deux Portraits en diamants
de Leurs Majestés feu l'Empereur Nicolas et
l'Empereur Alexandre II, Chevalier de l'Ordre de
Saint André en diamants et des Ordres de Russie,

Grand'Croix de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers,
Président du Conseil des Ministres et son Ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Finances,

et le Sieur Salvator, Marquis de Villamarina,
Grand'Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et
Lazare, Grand Officier de l'Ordre Impérial de
la Légion d'honneur, &c. &c. &c., Son Envoyé
extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à la
Cour de France,

Et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan
Mouhammed Emin Aali Pacha, Grand Vézir
de l'Empire Ottoman, décoré des Ordres Impériaux
du Medjidyé et du Mérite de première classe,
Grand'Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion
d'honneur, de Saint Etienne d'Autriche, de l'aigle
rouge de Prusse, de Sainte Anne de Russie, des
Saints Maurice et Lazare de Sardaigne, de
l'Etoile Polaire de Suède et de plusieurs autres
Ordres étrangers,

et Mehemmed Djemil Bey, décoré de
l'ordre Impérial du Medjidyé de seconde classe
et Grand'Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et



Lazare, Son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, accrédité en la même qualité près Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne,

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs Pleins Pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants:

Artc. 1er.

Sa Majesté le Sultan, d'une part, déclare qu'il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir le principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de son Empire, et en vertu duquel il a été de tout temps défendu aux bâtiments de guerre des Puissances étrangères d'entrer dans les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore et que, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Majesté n'admettra aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans lesdits Détroits.

Et Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur de



Français, le Roi de Prusse, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et le Roi de Sardaigne, de l'autre part, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

Artc. 2.

Le Sultan se réserve, comme par le passé, de délivrer des firmans de passage aux bâtiments légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels seront employés, comme il est d'usage, au service des Légations des Puissances amies.

Artc. 3.

La même exception s'applique aux bâtiments légers sous pavillon de guerre que chacune des Puissances contractantes est autorisée à faire stationner aux embouchures du Danube, pour assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du fleuve et dont le nombre ne devra pas excéder deux pour chaque Puissance.

Artc. 4.

La présente Convention, annexée au Traité



général, signé à Paris en ce jour, sera ratifiée et les Ratifications en seront échangées dans l'espace de quatre semaines, ou plustôt, si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Paris, le trentième jour du mois de Mars de l'an mil huit cent cinquante six

Clarendon

Cowley.

Buol Schauenstein

Hübner







35

Grande Bretagne.

—

Procès Verbal d'échange.

Les Soussignés s'étant réunis pour procéder à l'échange des Ratifications de Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, le Roi de Prusse, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Roi de Sardaigne et l'Empereur des Ottomans, sur la Convention relative à la fermeture des détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, signée à Paris, le 30 mars 1856; – les Instruments de ces Ratifications ont été produits, et ayant été, après examen, trouvés en bonne et due forme, l'échange en a été opéré.

En foi de quoi, les Soussignés ont dressé le présent Procès Verbal qu'ils ont revêtu du Sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Paris, le vingt-septième jour du mois d'Avril de l'an mil huit cent cinquante six.

Cowley.

Buol




37
B
Annexe to Article 14
Grande Bretagne.



Au nom de Dieu Tout-Puissant.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, prenant en considération le principe de la neutralisation de la Mer Noire établi par les préliminaires consignés au Protocole N.o 1, signé à Paris le 25 Février de la présente année, et voulant, en conséquence, régler d'un commun accord le nombre et la force des bâtiments legers qu'Elles se sont réservé d'entretenir dans la Mer Noire pour le service de leurs côtes, ont résolu de signer, dans ce but, une Convention spéciale, et ont nommé à cet effet:

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur Alexis Comte Orloff, Son aide-de-camp général et Général de cavalerie, Commandant du quartier général de Sa Majesté, Membre du Conseil de l'Empire et du Comité des Ministres,

décoré des deux Portraits en diamants de Leurs
Majestés feu l'Empereur Nicolas et l'Empereur
Alexandre II, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint André
en diamants et des Ordres de Russie, Grand' Croix
de l'Ordre de Saint Etienne d'Autriche de première
classe, de l'aigle noir de Prusse en diamants, de
l'Annonciade de Sardaigne et de plusieurs autres
Ordres étrangers,

et le Sieur Philippe Baron de Brunnow, Son
Conseiller privé, Son Envoyé extraordinaire et
Ministre plénipotentiaire près la Confédération
Germanique et près Son Altesse Royale le Grand
Duc de Hesse, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint
Wladimir de première classe, de Saint Alexandre
Nieswski, enrichi de diamants; de l'Aigle blanc;
de Sainte Anne de première classe, de Saint
Stanislas de première classe, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre
de l'Aigle rouge de Prusse de première classe,
Commandeur de l'Ordre de Saint Etienne d'Autriche
et de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers,

et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan,
Mouhammed Emin Aali Pacha, Grand Vézir

de l'Empire Ottoman, décoré des Ordres Impériaux du Medjidyé et du Mérite de première classe, Grand'Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, de Saint Etienne d'Autriche, de l'Aigle rouge de Prusse, de Sainte Anne de Russie, des Saints Maurice et Lazare de Sardaigne, de l'Etoile Polaire de Suède et de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers,

et Mehemmed Djemil Bey, décoré de l'Ordre Impérial du Medjidyé de seconde classe et Grand'Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, Son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, accrédité en la même qualité près Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne,

Lesquels après avoir échangé leurs Pleins-Pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants :

Artᵉ : 1ᵉʳ

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent mutuellement à n'avoir dans la Mer Noire



d'autres bâtiments de guerre que ceux dont le nombre, la force et les dimensions sont stipulés ci-après.

Art.: 2.

Les hautes Parties contractantes se réservent d'entretenir chacune, dans cette Mer, six bâtiments à vapeur de cinquante mètres de longueur à la flottaison, d'un tonnage de huit cents tonneaux au maximum et quatre bâtiments légers à vapeur ou à voile d'un tonnage qui ne dépassera pas deux cents tonneaux chacun.

Art.: 3.

La présente Convention, annexée au Traité général signé à Paris en ce jour, sera ratifiée et les Ratifications en seront échangées dans l'espace de quatre semaines, ou plus tôt, si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.


40
Fait à Paris, le trentième jour du mois de Mars
de l'an mil huit cent cinquante six.
Orloff
Brunnow.
Adlig
Mehemmed Djémil



Au nom de Dieu Tout-Puissant.

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, voulant étendre à la Mer Baltique l'accord si heureusement rétabli entre Elles en Orient et consolider par là les bienfaits de la paix générale, ont résolu de conclure une Convention et nommé à cet effet:

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le très-honorable George Guillaume Frédéric Comte de Clarendon, Baron Hyde de Hindon, Pair du Royaume Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en son Conseil privé, Chevalier du très Noble Ordre de la Jarretière, Chevalier Grand Croix du très honorable Ordre du Bain, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté pour les Affaires



Etrangères,

et le très-honorable Henri Richard Charles Baron Cowley, Pair du Royaume Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté en son Conseil privé, Chevalier Grand'Croix du très-honorable Ordre du Bain, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté près Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, le Sieur Alexandre Comte Colonna Walewski, Sénateur de l'Empire, Grand Officier de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, Chevalier Grand' Croix de l'Ordre équestre des Séraphins, Grand'Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, décoré de l'Ordre Impérial du Medjidyé de première classe, &c. &c. &c., Son Ministre et Secrétaire d'Etat au Département des Affaires Etrangères,

et le Sieur François Adolphe Baron de Bourqueney, Grand Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur et de l'Ordre de Léopold d'Autriche, décoré du Portrait du Sultan en diamants, &c. &c. &c., Son Envoyé extraordinaire et

Ministre plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique,

et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur Alexis Comte Orloff, Son Aide-de-camp général et Général de cavalerie, Commandant du quartier général de Sa Majesté, Membre du Conseil de l'Empire et du Comité des Ministres, décoré des deux Portraits en diamants de Leurs Majestés feu l'Empereur Nicolas et l'Empereur Alexandre II, Chevalier de l'ordre de Saint André en diamants et des Ordres de Russie, Grand'Croix de l'ordre de Saint Etienne d'Autriche, de première classe, de l'aigle noir de Prusse en diamants, de l'Annonciade de Sardaigne et de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers,

et le Sieur Philippe Baron de Brunnow, Son Conseiller privé, Son Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire près la Confédération Germanique et près Son Altesse Royale le Grand Duc de hesse, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint Wladimir de première classe, de Saint Alexandre Niewski, enrichi de diamants; de l'Aigle blanc;

de Sainte Anne de première classe, de Saint Stanislas de première classe, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre de l'Aigle rouge de Prusse de première classe, Commandeur de l'Ordre de Saint Etienne d'Autriche et de plusieurs autres Ordres étrangers;

Lesquels après avoir échangé leurs Pleins-Pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants.

Artc. 1er.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, pour répondre au désir qui Lui a été exprimé par Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et l'Empereur des Français, déclare que les Iles d'Aland ne seront pas fortifiées, et qu'il n'y sera maintenu ni créé aucun établissement militaire ou naval.

Artc. 2.

La présente Convention, annexée au Traité général signé à Paris en ce jour, sera ratifiée, et les Ratifications en seront échangées dans



46

l'espace de quatre semaines ou plus tôt, si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Paris le trentième jour du mois de Mars de l'an mil huit cent cinquante six.

Clarendon

Cowley.

Walewski

Bourqueney

Bloomfield





49

PAR LA GRACE DE DIEU

NOUS ALEXANDRE II,

EMPEREUR ET AUTOCRATE

DE TOUTES LES RUSSIES,

de Moscou, Kiew, Wladimir, Novgorod, Tsar de Casan, Tsar d'Astrakhan, Tsar de Pologne, Tsar de Sibérie, Tsar de la Chersonèse-Taurique, Seigneur de Pleskow, et Grand Duc de Smolensk, de Lithuanie, Volhynie, Podolie et de Finlande, Duc d'Estonie, de Livonie, de Courlande et Semigalle, de Samogitie, Bialostock, Carélie, Twer, Jugorie, Perm, Viatka, Bolgarie et d'autres; Seigneur et Grand Duc de Novgorod-inférieur, de Czernigow, Riasan, Polotzk, Roston, Jaroslaw, Bélooserk, Oudor, Obdor, Condie, Witepsk, Mstislaw, Dominateur de toute la contrée du Nord, Seigneur d'Ibérie, de la Cartalinie, de la Géorgie, de la Cabardie et de la province d'Arménie; Prince Héréditaire et Souverain des Princes de Circassie et d'autres Princes montagnards; Successeur de Norvège, Duc de Schleswig-Holstein, de Stormarn, de Dithmarsen et d'Oldenbourg, etc. etc. etc. Savoir faisons par les présentes que d'un commun accord



entre Nous et Leurs Majestés la Reine
du Royaume Uni de la Grande-
Bretagne et d'Irlande et l'Empereur
des Français, Nos Plénipotentiaires res-
pectifs ont conclu et signé à Paris le 30
Mars de l'année 1856 une convention
concernant les îles d'Aland dont la te-
neur est mot pour mot comme suit:

/Tiat inserto/

A ces causes, après avoir suffisam-
ment examiné cette convention, Nous
l'avons agréée, confirmée et ratifiée, -
comme par les présentes Nous l'agréons
confirmons et ratifions dans toute sa
teneur, promettant sur Notre parole
Impériale pour Nous, Nos héri-
tiers et Nos successeurs, que tout ce -
qui a été stipulé dans la dite conven-
tion sera observé et exécuté inviolable-
ment En foi de quoi Nous avons

50

signé de Notre propre main la présente Ratification Impériale et y avons fait apposer le sceau de Notre Empire. Fait à St. Pétersbourg, le trois Avril de l'an de grâce mil huit cent cinquante six et de Notre règne la seconde année.

L'original est signé de la propre main de Sa M.a jesté l'Empereur ainsi: Alexandre.

L. S.

Contresigné Le Chancelier de l'Empire Comte de Nesselrode

Pour traduction conforme: Le Comte de Nesselrode



Grande Bretagne.

51

Procès-Verbal d'échange.

Les Soussignés s'étant réunis pour procéder à l'échange des Ratifications de Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur des Français et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, sur la Convention relative aux Iles d'Aland, conclue à Paris, le 30 Mars 1856; — les Instruments de ces Ratifications ont été produits, et ayant été, après examen, trouvés en bonne et due forme, l'échange en a été opéré.

En foi de quoi, les Soussignés ont dressé le présent Procès-Verbal qu'ils ont revêtu du sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Paris, le vingt septième jour du mois d'Avril de l'an mil huit cent cinquante-six./.

Cowley.

Ad. Rec

Chasqueux

Ct. Orloff

Nuenow.

Anexo IV: *Treaty. Black Sea, Danube. [Also known as the Treaty of London],* 13 de março de 1871.

Código do arquivo:

FO 93/81/41

Descrição:

Revogação de vários artigos do tratado de Paris de 1856, permitindo a Rússia a reativar a sua frota do Mar Negro.



Au nom de Dieu Tout-Puissant.

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohème &c et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, Le Chef du Pouvoir Exécutif de la République Française, Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, ont jugé nécessaire de réunir Leurs Représentants en Conférence à Londres, afin de s'entendre, dans un esprit de concorde, sur la révision des stipulations du Traité conclu à Paris le 30 Mars, 1856, relatives

à

à la navigation de la Mer Noire, ainsi qu'à celle du Danube; désirant en même temps assurer dans ces contrées de nouvelles facilités au développement de l'activité commerciale de toutes les Nations, les Hautes Parties Contractantes ont résolu de conclure un Traité, et ont nommé à cet effet pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir;

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Très Honorable Granville George Comte Granville, Lord Leveson, Pair du Royaume Uni, Chevalier du Très Noble Ordre de la Jarretière, Conseiller de Sa Majesté en Son Conseil Privé, Lord Gardien des Cinque Ports et Connétable du Château de Douvres, Chancelier de l'Université de Londres, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté pour les Affaires Etrangères; &c.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, le Sieur Albert, Comte de

de Bernstorff-Stintenburg, Son Ministre
d'Etat et Chambellan, Grand Commandeur
de Son Ordre de la Maison Impériale
et Royale de Hohenzollern en diamants,
et Grand-Croix de Son Ordre de l'Aigle
Rouge avec des feuilles de Chêne, Grand
-Croix de l'Ordre ducal de la Branche
Ernestine de la maison de Saxe,
Chevalier de l'Ordre Impérial de St Stanislas
de Russie de première classe, et de l'Ordre
Royal du Lion d'Or de la Maison de
Nassau, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre Royal
du Mérite civil de la Couronne de
Bavière, de l'Ordre de la Légion d'Honneur
de France, de l'Ordre Impérial du Lion
et du Soleil de Perse, de l'Ordre Royal
et Militaire du Christ de Portugal &c
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et
Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Impériale
et Royale près Sa Majesté Britannique; &c
Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche
Roi de Bohême &c, et Roi Apostolique de
Hongrie

Hongrie, le Sieur Rodolphe Comte Apponyi, Chambellan, Conseiller Intime de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, Chevalier de l'Ordre de la Toison d'Or, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre Impérial de Léopold, Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près Sa Majesté Britannique; &c

Le Chef du Pouvoir Exécutif de la République Française, le Sieur Jacques Victor Albert Duc de Broglie, Chevalier de l'Ordre de la Légion d'Honneur, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la République près Sa Majesté Britannique, &c;

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie, le Chevalier Charles Cadorna, Ministre d'Etat, Sénateur du Royaume, Chevalier Grand-Croix décoré du Grand Cordon de ses Ordres de St. Maurice et de St. Lazare et de la Couronne d'Italie, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique, &c;

Sa

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur Philippe Baron de Brunnow, Son Conseiller Privé actuel, Chevalier des Ordres de Russie, de l'Aigle Rouge de Prusse de la première classe, Commandeur de St. Etienne de Hongrie, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre de la Légion d'Honneur de France, de l'Ordre du Mérite de Turquie, Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique, &c;

Et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, Constantin Musurus Pacha, Muchir et Vizir de l'Empire, décoré des Ordres Impériaux de l'Osmanié et du Medjidié de première classe, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, et de plusieurs autres Ordres Etrangers, Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique, &c;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants:

Art: I.

Article I.

Les articles XI, XIII, et XIV du Traité de Paris du 30 Mars 1856, ainsi que la Convention Spéciale conclue entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, et annexée au dit Article XIV, sont abrogés et remplacés par l'Article suivant.

Article II.

Le principe de la clôture des détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, tel qu'il a été établi par la Convention séparée du 30 Mars, 1856, est maintenu, avec la faculté pour Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan d'ouvrir les dits Détroits en temps de paix aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances Amies et Alliées, dans le cas où la Sublime Porte le jugerait nécessaire pour sauvegarder l'exécution des stipulations du Traité de Paris du 30 Mars, 1856.

Art: III.

Article III.

La Mer Noire reste ouverte, comme par le passé, à la Marine Marchande de toutes les Nations.

Article IV.

La Commission établie par l'Article XVI du Traité de Paris, dans laquelle les Puissances co-signataires du Traité sont chacune représentées par un Délégué, et qui a été chargée de désigner et de faire exécuter les travaux nécessaires depuis Isakteha, pour dégager les embouchures du Danube, ainsi que les Parties de la Mer Noire y avoisinantes, des sables et autres obstacles qui les obstruent, afin de mettre cette partie du fleuve et les dites parties de la Mer dans les meilleures conditions de navigabilité, est maintenue dans sa composition actuelle. La

durée

durée de cette Commission est fixée pour une période ultérieure de douze ans, à compter du 24 Avril, 1871, c'est à dire, jusqu'au 24 Avril, 1883, terme de l'amortissement de l'emprunt contracté par cette Commission sous la garantie de la Grande Bretagne, de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la France, de l'Italie, et de la Turquie.

Article V.

Les conditions de la réunion nouvelle de la Commission Riveraine, établie par l'Article XVII du Traité de Paris du 30 Mars, 1856, seront fixées par une entente préalable entre les Puissances Riveraines sans préjudice de la Clause relative aux trois Principautés Danubiennes; et en tant qu'il s'agirait d'une modification de l'Article XVII du dit Traité, cette dernière fera l'objet d'une Convention Spéciale entre les Puissances co-signataires.

Art: VI.

Article VI.

Les Puissances Riveraines de la Partie du Danube où les Cataractes et les Portes de Fer mettent des obstacles à la navigation, se réservant de s'entendre entre elles à l'effet de faire disparaître ces obstacles, les Hautes Parties Contractantes leur reconnaissent dès à-présent le droit de percevoir une taxe provisoire sur les navires de commerce sous tout pavillon qui en profiteront désormais, jusqu'à l'extinction de la dette contractée pour l'exécution des travaux; et elles déclarent l'Article XV du Traité de Paris de 1856 inapplicable à cette partie du fleuve pour un laps de temps nécessaire au remboursement de la dette en question.

Article VII.

Tous les ouvrages et établissements de

de toute nature erées par la Commission Européenne en exécution du Traité de Paris de 1856 ou du présent Traité, continueront à jouir de la même neutralité qui les a protégés jusqu'ici, et qui sera également respectée à l'avenir dans toutes les circonstances par les Hautes Parties Contractantes. Le bénéfice des immunités qui en dérivent s'étendra à tout le personnel administratif et technique de la Commission. Il est cependant bien entendu que les dispositions de cet Article n'affecteront en rien le droit de la Sublime Porte de faire entrer, comme de tout temps, ses bâtiments de guerre dans le Danube en sa qualité de Puissance territoriale.

Article VIII.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes renouvellent et confirment toutes les

les stipulations du Traité du 30 Mars 1856, ainsi que des annexes, qui ne sont pas annulées ou modifiées par le présent Traité.

Article IX.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres dans l'espace de six semaines, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le treizième jour du mois de Mars de


de l'an mil huit cent
soixante onze.
Granville
Bernstorff
Apponyi
Broglie
Zadora
Brunnow
Musurus

9

Protocole

de la Conférence tenue au Foreign Office, le 20 Avril, 1871.

Présents:

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Allemagne;
M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche-Hongrie;
M. le Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne;
M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie;
M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie;
M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie

Le terme fixé pour l'échange des Ratifications du Traité du 13 Mars dernier, pour la révision des stipulations du Traité du 30 Mars, 1856, relatives à la Navigation de la Mer Noire, ainsi qu'à celle du Danube, devant échoir le 24 du mois courant; et les Actes de Ratification de quelques unes des Parties Contractantes n'ayant encore pas été reçus par

cependant



par leurs Plénipotentiaires.

Les Plénipotentiaires s'étant réunis, sont convenus de proroger jusqu'à Lundi 8 Mai le terme pour l'échange des dites Ratifications.

Bernstorff

Apponyi

Granville

Cadorna

Brunnow.

Musurus

11

Protocole

de la Conférence tenue au Foreign Office le 8 Mai 1871.

Présens :-

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Allemagne;
M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche-Hongrie
M. le Plénipotentiaire de France;
M. le Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne;
M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie;
M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie;
M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie.

A l'échéance du terme additionnel fixé par le Protocole du 20 du mois passé pour l'échange des Ratifications du Traité du 13 Mars, les Plénipotentiaires se sont réunis :-

Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours d'Allemagne, d'Autriche-Hongrie, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, d'Italie, et de Russie se déclarent être munis des Ratifications de leurs Cours respectives;

Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman a déclaré qu'à son grand regret les Ratifications de sa Cour ne lui sont pas encore parvenues; elles sont cependant



cependant — en route, et il attend leur arrivée de jour en jour. .

Sur la proposition du Comte Granville la Conférence a alors pris la résolution de prolonger le terme pour l'échange des Ratifications jusqu'à Lundi 15 Mai.

Bernstorff

Apponyi

Brunnow.

Gr. Bretagne

13

Les Soussignés s'étant réunis afin de procéder à l'échange des ratifications du Traité conclu et signé le 13 Mars, 1871, entre Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, Sa majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême, &c., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, le Chef du Pouvoir Exécutif de la République Française, Sa majesté le Roi d'Italie, Sa majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et Sa majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, pour la révision des stipulations du Traité du 30 Mars, 1856, relatives à la navigation de la Mer Noire, ainsi qu'à celle du Danube, et les ratifications respectives ayant été soigneusement collationnées et trouvées en bonne et due forme, l'échange en a eu lieu aujourd'hui dans les formes usitées.

Les Plénipotentiaires de Russie et de la Sublime Porte ont, en même temps, échangé les ratifications de la Convention qui a été conclue entre leurs Cours respectives, le 13 Mars, pour abroger les stipulations de celle signée à Paris le $\frac{18}{30}$ Mars, 1856, relative au nombre et à la force des bâtiments de guerre des Puissances riveraines dans la Mer Noire; et ont communiqué cette Convention à la Conférence d'après les termes du

Protocole



Protocole No. 5 du 13 Mars.

En foi de quoi les Soussignés ont signé le présent Procès-Verbal d'Echange, et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le 15 Mai 1871

Granville

Bernstorff

A Wedderburn

Broglie

Cadorna

Brunnow.

Musurus



15

The Russian & Turkish
Plenips communicated to
the Conference on Monday
according to the terms
of the Protocol of the 13th
of March, a certified Copy of the
Separate Convention
concluded on the same
day between their Courts
relative to the Black Sea.
If it is thought desirable
to lay these before Parl.
with the general Treaty, this
can



can be done by laying the Procès Verbal of Exchange, in which it is stated that the separate Convention was communicated to the Conference.

F.O.

May 17/71


Convention.



Au Nom de Dieu Tout Puissant.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, mutuellement animés du désir de consolider les relations de paix et de bonne intelligence heureusement existant entre leurs Empires, ont résolu de conclure dans ce but une Convention et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur Philippe Baron de Brunnow, Son Conseiller Privé Actuel et Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique, Chevalier des Ordres de Russie et décoré de

l'Ordre Impérial Ottoman du Nisham Iftihar, et
Sa Majesté Impériale le
Sultan, Constantin Musurus Pacha,
Muchir et Visir de l'Empire, décoré des
Ordres Impériaux de l'Osmanié et
du Medjidié de 1ère classe, Son Ambassa
deur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire
près Sa Majesté Britannique.

Lesquels, après avoir échan-
gé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne
et due forme, sont convenus des articles
suivants:

Article I

La Convention Spéciale con-
clue à Paris entre Sa Majesté l'Empe-
reur de toutes les Russies et Sa Ma-
jesté Impériale le Sultan, le dix-huit
/ trente / Mars de l'an mil-huit-cent
cinquante-six, relative au nombre
et à la force des bâtiments de guerre

des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes dans la Mer Noire est et demeure abrogée.

Article II.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres dans l'espace de six semaines, ou plus tôt, si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres le premier / treizième jour du mois de Mars de l'an mil-huit-cent-soixante-onze.

[L. S.] Brunnow.
[L. S.] Musurus.

pour copie conforme à l'original
Londres le 3/15 Mai 1871.
Le Comte de Brunnow
Ambassadeur de Russie


Convention.



Au nom de
Dieu Tout-Puissant.

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, mutuellement animés du désir de consolider les relations de paix et de bonne intelligence heureusement existant entre leurs Empires, ont résolu de conclure dans ce but une Convention, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, Constantin Musurus Pacha, Muchir et Vizir de l'Empire, décoré des Ordres Impériaux de l'Osmanié et du Medjidié de première classe, Son

Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ; et

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur Philippe Baron de Brunnow, Son Conseiller Privé actuel, et Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique, Chevalier des Ordres de Russie et décoré de l'Ordre Impérial Ottoman du Nishan Iftihar ;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants :

Article I.

La Convention Spéciale conclue

à Paris le dix-huit (trente) Mars
de l'an mil huit cent cinquante-
six entre Sa Majesté Impériale
le Sultan et Sa Majesté l'Empereur
de toutes les Russies, relative au
nombre et à la force des bâtiments
de guerre des deux Hautes Parties
Contractantes dans la mer Noire,
est et demeure abrogée.

Article II.

La présente Convention sera
ratifiée, et les ratifications en
seront échangées à Londres dans
l'espace de six semaines, ou
plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires
respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont
apposé le sceau de leurs armes.
Fait à Londres le treizième



jour du mois de Mars de l'an
mil huit cent soixante-onze.

(L. S.) Musurus.

(L. S.) Brunnow.

Pour copie conforme à l'original.
Londres, le 15 Mai, 1871.

Musurus
ambassadeur de Turquie.

Anexo V: *Feasibility of seizing the Gallipoli Peninsula,* 5 de setembro de 1914.

Código do arquivo:

WO 106/1463

Descrição:

Descreve a viabilidade de forçar o estreito de Dardanelos e tomar a península de Galípoli com forças terrestres. Faz referência a um esquema de 1906 para esta tarefa e a sua adaptação em abril de 1915, com a descrição das forças do exército grego necessárias.

Register No. Minute Sheet No.

Gallipoli Peninsula.

The question of the feasibility of seizing the Peninsula was raised on the 1st Sept 1914.
On that date Col. Talbot prepared A. in the D.M.O. to give the C.I.G.S.
Col. Dallas. (M.O.2) having hurriedly looked through the scheme prepared B.
Further details of the Greek & Ottoman armies were supplied later by M.O.2. C
On the 1st Sept. the D.M.O. & Col. Talbot attended a meeting at the admiralty at 6. P.M. present. Captain C.F. Lambert. The Director of Transport & Captain H.W. Richmond.
The representatives of the admiralty stated that with 6 weeks warning they could collect sufficient transport to convey 40000, or 50000 men to the selected landing places. Ships of war could also be provided to cover the landing with their fire.
The D.M.O stated that, considering the strength of the Turkish Garrison & the large force already mobilised in European Turkey, he did not regard it as a feasible military operation & that he believed this to be the War Office view.



On the 2nd. or 3rd Sept. the D.M.O. attended a meeting at the Admiralty. Present First Lord, First Sea Lord, Capt. Lambert, Capt Richmond. The matter was thrashed out again, with the result that the D.M.O. put his views on D.

5. 9. 14 Maj. Talbot.

THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA. A

Access to Constantinople from the Mediterranean is by the Straits of the Dardanelles, which are bounded on the S.E. by the coast of Asia Minor and on the N.W. by the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The latter has an extreme length of 52 miles and greatest breadth of 14 miles.

The narrowest portion - only 6,000 yards wide - is at a point 1½ miles S.W. of the village of Bulair, where the peninsula joins the mainland.

The backbone of the peninsula consists of hills which rise in the centre to nearly 1,000 feet.

On both banks of the Dardanelles there are many batteries commanding the passage, those on the Gallipoli side, as a rule, command those on the Asiatic side.

Access to the peninsula from the mainland is closed by the Bulair Lines, which successfully kept out the Bulgarians.

In 1906 a scheme was prepared for the capture of this Peninsula. It involved the use of 4 divisions, each of 3 brigades, The general plan was to land them on the S.W. end of the peninsula and take in rear the forts commanding the Dardanelles.

Since the date of this scheme the fortifications have been much strengthened, and their armament has been modernized and increased: and it is believed that an attempt to capture the peninsula would be a much more serious operation now, than it was before the Turko-Bulgarian war.

1/9/14

Register No. B Minute Sheet No.

The Dardanelles & Gallipoli Peninsula.

The Garrison of the Gallipoli Peninsula is 1 Army Corps (Exclusive of Garrison Artillery). The troops allotted normally to the Southern Shore of the Dardanelles is about 1 Turkish Division.-

Both of the foregoing garrisons can be readily reinforced from the Army Corps now mobilised in the neighbourhood of Constantinople and the Asiatic Peninsula. One at the former place; the Corps in the latter possibly incomplete.

Two of the Divisions of the Smyrna Army Corps are reported to have moved northwards - possibly to the Dardanelles.

In European Turkey between 200000 & 300,000 troops are now mobilised.

The minefields are laid & the Turks have now considerable Experience in this respect.

A map is attached to show the armament as it Existed before the last Balkan war. Since then additional modern guns have been mounted and it is

OLDEN, LTD. PRINTERS, ALDERSHOT. T. 412—889. 100,000. 4/13. W [164c]

[P.T. Over.

Register No. Minute Sheet No.

possible that some of the armament reported to have been brought to Constantinople through Roumania during the last week may have been sent to the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The extreme width of the Bulair Peninsula is some 5200 yards.

In 1912 the Turks easily held it against a serious military operation in force undertaken by the Bulgarians.

It is believed that German Officers & a proportion German personnel are in charge of the Dardanelles defences.

It might be possible to induce Greece to undertake the military part of ~~the~~ an offensive directed against the Gallipoli peninsula but this would most probably lead to a Bulgarian incursion into Macedonia. The pressure now being exerted by Servia on Austria would then at once be removed. Servia is nervous of her rear & of any proposal or threat against Macedonia from which she has drawn a part of her army & is drawing supplies.

AGD
1.9.14

...LDEN, LTD. PRINTERS, ALDERSHOT.
412—389. 100,000. 4/13. W [164c]

[P.T. Over.

C

- GREEK ARMY . -

1. The New Organization scheme was only adopted in April 1914 and it is doubtful how much of it has been given effect to. The Scheme may be summarized as follows :-

2. 5 Army Corps: Athens, Patras, Salonica, Cavalla, Janina; each of 3 Divns. except the Janina Corps: total 14 1st. line Divns.

3. A Division comprises :-

Peace Estbt. 7,000. — 3 Infantry Regts. of 2 Bns. in Peace and 3 Bns. in War.

War Estbt. 15,000. —
1 Evzone Battalion.
1 Group of Mountain Artillery (3 4- gun Batteries).
1 Squadron of Cavalry.
Medical & Transport Units.

4. Corps Troops :-

One Field Artillery Regt. = 3 groups = 9 batteries.
One Cavalry Regt, of 3 Squadrons.
One Engineer Regt.
One Ambulance Battalion.
One Transport Battalion.

5. Army Troops:-

Independent Cavalry Divn. of 4 Regts: probably available.
Garrison Artillery: One Regt. at Salonica, one Battalion at Janina; these may be partially available.

Heavy Artillery: a group of 3 Batteries at Salonica. One Battery probably available.

Garrison Engineers: 1 Regt. Salonica, 1 Battn. Janina.
Telegraph Troops: 1 Regt. & 1 Wireless Coy. Salonica.
Communication Troops: 1 Railway Bn. Salonica.
1 Motor car Bn. Athens.
Aviation Troops: 1 Flying Coy. at Salonica.
Bridging Battn: One Pontoon Bn. at Topsin (Salonica).

6. It was intended to organize eight 2nd. line Divns., but it is probable that only the fourteen 1st. line Divns. and some of the Army Troops could be mobilized at the present moment, and it is doubtful if these would give a greater total strength for the Field Army than 180,000.

7. The Field Army is supported by the Territorial Army (men who have completed their time in the Active Army and it's reserve), the

Campanha de Galípoli: O Estreito de Dardanelos no contexto político-militar internacional. Vol. 2

the task of which is Home Defence, but the men may be employed with the Field Army if required.

8. In the recent Balkan Wars, the Greek heavy artillery was only mobilized for the seige of Janina, the batteries being :-

(a) Four 15 c.m. guns.
(b) Two 15 c.m. guns.
(c) Four 10·5 c.m. guns.

M. O. 2. (b)
3. 9. 14.

F. W. Gofset
Major G.S.

Present dispositions and strength of Turkish Army Corps exclusive of those in Eastern Asia Minor, Lower Syria and the Yemen.

Strength. 1. The probable strength of the Ottoman troops available in Turkey in Europe and on the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus is 200,000 men, including fortress artillery and engineers.

Mobilization. 2. The present mobilization has been a great improvement on that preceding the Balkan War. Horses, equipment, supplies and stores of all sorts are lacking. The insufficiency of artillery has not yet been made good, while there is also a lack of rifles and ammunition. Mobilization was completed on the 3rd August 1914.

Coast defence Ordnance. The ordnance for the coast defences of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus includes :-

7	35.5 cm.	guns.
32	24 ,,	,,
20	21 ,,	mortars
20	15 ,,	,,
20	12 ,,	,,
1000	8.7 ,,	field guns.
100	7.5 ,,	,, ,,
2	6 inch	Q.F. Armstrong guns
-	Nordenfelt machine guns.	

From latest reports the armament of these defences has been increased by the addition of modern German artillery.

W.H. Cavendish. Capt. G.S.

M.O. 2(6)
3. S. 14

	Army Corps.	Present Position.	War Strength.				Remarks.
			Inf.	Art.	Cav.	M.G. Companies.	
	I	European side of the Bosphorus	27,000	H.A. 16 guns F.A.108 ,, F.H. 12 ,,	1,500	19	
	V	Asiatic side ,, ,, ,,	18,000	H.A. Nil. F.A. 108 F.H. 12	500	4	
	III (less portion at Adrianople).	Gallipoli Peninsula	18,000	H.A. Nil. F.A. 108 F.H. 8	1,500	11	Portion has been taken as 1 Division.
	II (plus portion at Adrianople).	Adrianople - Demotika - Enos	36,000	H.A. Nil. F.A. 108 F.H. 12	1,500	11	Ditto.
	IV	Panderma	18,000	H.A. Nil. F.A. 108 F.H. 12	500	12	
	VI	Towards Constantinople.	18,000	H.A. Nil. F.A. 108 F.H. Nil.	500	6	
Total	6 Army Corps		135,000	H.A. 16 F.A. 648 F.H. 56	6,000	63	4 machine guns per company.

It ought to be clearly understood that an attack upon the Gallipoli Peninsula from the sea side (outside the Straits) is likely to prove an extremely difficult operation of war. The subject has often been considered before by the General Staff and it was examined into by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1906; it was then decided that such an operation could not be regarded as feasible with the British Troops that might at short notice have been collected for the purpose at that time. Since then the garrison has been greatly augmented, and as a consequence of threats on the part of Greeks and Bulgarians during the first Balkan War, and of the attack made upon the Lines of Bulair, the protection of the rear of the various batteries and works dominating the Straits was taken in hand. It is understood that what was then done renders them secure against anything in the nature of a surprise attack.

The garrison of the Peninsula now normally consists of an Army Corps which may be taken at 27,000 men with 136 guns. But under existing conditions this garrison will almost certainl have been strengthened considerably, and it would be unsafe to assume that the attacking side would only have the above number to deal with. In any case it would not seem justifiable to undertake an operation of this kind with an army of less than 60,000 men against the Ottoman Forces likely to be encountered. These 60,000 might, however, cross the sea in two echelons, admitting of the transports returning to Greece after disembarking the first echelon. The Expeditionary Force could dispense almost entirely, if not entirely, with cavalry, and its mobile artillery might well be composed mainly of mountain batteries. It ought, however, to be accompanied by a strong

contingent of siege pieces, especially howitzers, for attacking the batteries and forts bearing on the straits, which are the real objective; but unfortunately the Greeks do not seem to have any howitzers and very few siege guns.

It has to be remembered that there is nothing to prevent the Turks bringing strong re-inforcements to the Gallipoli Peninsula from Constantinople, Panderma and elsewhere across the Sea of Marmora, until such time as it becomes impracticable for them to disembark such troops within the Peninsula. There is a division - say 6,000 men - normally stationed on the Asiatic side of the Straits which could be got across at the very start if there were a few steamers and launches available at Chanak. Moreover a report just to hand says that there is now an army corps assembled on the Asiatic side.

As a rough outline of the plan of attack it is suggested that in the first instance 30,000 men should be landed, should gain as much ground as possible, and should prepare landing stages, while the transports return for the other 30,000 and the siege ordnance. The first 30,000 would have to be prepared to hold their own for about a week, allowing for the time taken on the voyage and in getting the transports loaded up afresh at the port of embarkation. But the actual details would of course have to be worked out by the General appointed to command the Expeditionary Force. It is not unlikely that the Greek War Office and Admiralty are in possession of later information as to the conditions of the land defences of the Gallipoli Peninsula than we are.

3/9/14

Chas Mitchell
DMO


Secret.
C. 3.
22
Map No. 1


TURKEY 1:250,000
GALLIPOLI
GULF OF XEROS
(MAHARIS GULF)
GALLIPOLI (GELIBOLU)
GALLIPOLI STRAIT
Chardak
Lapsaki
Bergaz
CHANAK
KALE SULTANIE
Maidos
Erenkeui
Kum Kale
Rabbit Is.
Tavshan Adalari
Beshik or Bashika Bay
TENEDOS
Yukyeri Bay
Bairamich
Ezine
Burgus
Topographical Section, General Staff No 2097
(Proof.)
MAP 1
Scale 250,000 or 1 Inch to 3.95 Miles
Miles
Kilometres

Anexo VI: *Position of Sweden in the event of peace between Germany and Russia,* 12 de fevereiro de 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 37/124/11

Descrição:

Discussão sobre a posição da Suécia no caso de uma paz separada entre a Rússia e a Alemanha. Fala nos rumores da mesma já no inicio de 1915.

12FEB 1915.

CIRCULATED TO THE CABINET

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

46.

814

Printed for the use of the Cabinet. February 1915.

LIBRARY

CONFIDENTIAL.

[14895]

Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 18.)

Sir, *Stockholm, February 2, 1915.*

IN spite of the categorical denial issued by the Russian Legation here, and reported in my telegram No. 5 of the 27th ultimo, to the rumours of an imminent peace between Germany and Russia, certain of the papers which are especially under the German influence continue to give currency to the idea that such a peace is not far off.

Thus the "Aftonbladet" of yesterday, in the concluding article of a series entitled "The World War's Menacing Dangers for Sweden," emphasises the probabilities of such a peace, and goes on to say that in this case Sweden will be in a particularly dangerous situation. The Russian Government, according to the writer, having had to admit complete failure in its policy of conquest in Galicia and in its support of Serbia, would be face to face with a most serious situation internally, and would be forced to seek compensation elsewhere. What more natural than that she should at once take to her old policy of seeking an open port in the north of the Scandinavian peninsula? The policy of the present Swedish Government, which is purely materialistic and temporary without any consideration for the future, will have alienated Germany, who will not care to renew the war just concluded with Russia in order to save a country like Sweden, which has done nothing to help her in the present struggle of Germanism against the rest of Europe. England and France would not be able to help Sweden, having their hands quite full with Germany, and so the result would be obvious. The article concludes with the usual appeal for national defence, but it is clear that that is not its object. National defence has now been secured within the limit set by the military experts, and therefore the military newspapers themselves can hardly ask for much more. The real object is to point out that, if Sweden does not join Germany now, Germany will throw her over later on, in case of a separate peace with Russia. This coincides exactly with what I was told over a month ago would be the line of the next press campaign to be started by the German influence at work here.

The first move was to try and convince the Swedish public that a separate peace between Russia and Germany was on the eve of conclusion, the next was to point out the dangers to Sweden that such a separate peace would involve unless she had first thrown in her lot with Germany.

This is only interesting because it shows that Germany is still endeavouring to win over Sweden to take an active part in the war.

Herr von Reichenau offered Sweden Finland if she would join, and then got the German Government to make wood contraband, and to lay mines for Swedish ships in the Gulf of Bothnia to punish the Swedes for not allowing themselves to be seduced.

He was recalled, but his successor, Herr von Lucius, continues the work in another way. He is much more amiable to the authorities of the Swedish Foreign Office than his predecessor was. But he is none the less actively engaged through the press in trying to win over Sweden to the cause of Germany.

I have, &c.

ESME HOWARD.

Anexo VII: *Minutes (The Dardanelles; Smyrna; The future of Constantinople; After the Dardanelles, the next step; The Danube; War material.),* 3 de março de 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 42/2/3

Descrição:

Conjunto de minutas e opiniões de vários generais e políticos (britânicos), sobre as questões dos despojos e o resultado final do ataque ao Dardanelos.

LORD CREWE.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. July 1916.

SECRET.

5

SECRETARY'S NOTES OF A MEETING OF A WAR COUNCIL HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, MARCH 3, 1915.

Present:

The PRIME MINISTER (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. the Viscount HALDANE OF CLOAN, K.T., the Lord High Chancellor.

The Most Hon. the Marquess of CREWE, K.G., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.

Admiral of the Fleet the Right Hon. the Lord FISHER OF KILVERSTONE, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. K. WILSON, G.C.B., V.C., O.M., G.C.V.O.

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. Sir E. GREY, Bt., K.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Field-Marshal the Right Hon. Earl KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for War.

Lieutenant-General Sir JAMES WOLFE MURRAY, K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel M. P. A. HANKEY, C.B., *Secretary*.

THE DARDANELLES.

MR. CHURCHILL read two messages regarding the progress of the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts, the net result of which was that forts 8 and 9 were in process of being destroyed, and that the forts at the entrance had been practically demolished. (*Vide* communiqué to newspapers, dated 4th March, 1915.)

SMYRNA.

MR. CHURCHILL then informed the War Council that orders had been sent on the previous evening for two battleships and an armoured cruiser to bombard Smyrna. The primary object of this operation was to smash the forts and prevent Smyrna from being used as a base for submarines. It was feared that Austrian submarines might come from Pola, and a submarine, the nationality of which was uncertain, had been seen off Tangier. The delays caused by bad weather in the bombardment of the Dardanalles increased the anxiety regarding the possible appearance of submarines. The orders for the forces attacking Smyrna were to destroy the forts deliberately by long-range bombardment, but to land no troops.

Submarines in the Mediterranean.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Greeks should be asked to attack Smyrna. This might have a double effect: first it would get rid of the Russian objections to the

co-operation of Greece, as suggested by M. Venizelos, on the Gallipoli Peninsula; and second, it would probably force Italy to take part in the war.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the Greek fleet had not yet been put at our disposal, and the bombardment of Smyrna was required immediately.

THE FUTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that Greece would want to co-operate in the Gallipoli Peninsula. We are approaching a point at which we should have to say to Russia what we were willing to concede in regard to the Straits. What Russia required was access to the sea, and this implied a route of access which she can control. It was absurd that a huge empire such as Russia should have only ports that were icebound part of the year, such as Archangel and Vladivostock, or ports such as those in the Baltic and Black Sea, which were liable to be closed in time of war.

MR. BALFOUR said that he himself had no objection to Russia having an outlet which no one else could control, but he was not very anxious that Russia should herself be able to control the outlet from the Black Sea.

LORD HALDANE suggested that the Suez Canal provided a useful analogy. We might concede to Russia a privileged position such as we ourselves occupied in Egypt, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus being neutralized.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that some months ago, when the question was first discussed, M. Sazonoff had been willing to agree to the neutralization of Constantinople. Now, however, he said that there was a growing feeling in Russia that they ought to control the Straits.

MR. CHURCHILL said that we should stick to our general principle that the settlement of all territorial questions should be left until the end of the war, but suggested that we might in the meanwhile signify that we were in sympathy with Russian aspirations. He considered it absurd to compare Egypt with Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was clear that Russia wants territory.

SIR EDWARD GREY was not certain that we could leave the question to be settled at the eventual peace negotiations. It was very important to avoid anything in the nature of a breach with Russia, or any action which would incline Russia to make a separate peace. He had asked for the French view. There was great satisfaction in Paris that we were taking the lead in this matter, but this made it important for us to avoid being manœuvred by the French into a position of opposing Russia. It would never do for us to drift into a position of again checking Russian aspirations in the Dardanelles as we had in the past.

LORD HALDANE said this was the more important, because Germany would seize any opportunity to conclude a separate peace with Russia.

LORD CREWE suggested that perhaps some arrangement might be made with Roumania, as a condition of her entering the war. Roumania had a great interest in keeping the Straits open at all times, and some treaty might be made to which she was a party.

SIR EDWARD GREY pointed out that treaties were apt to be disregarded in war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, if this were the case, the only question which arose was as to who should control this passage.

LORD HALDANE said that, even if Russia controlled the Straits, the British and French fleets, if they had command of the sea, could always close the exit.

MR. CHURCHILL agreed. It would, he said, be impossible to prevent Russia from closing access to the Black Sea, but we could prevent them from coming out.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Gallipoli Peninsula might be internationalized.

LORD KITCHENER suggested that the Gallipoli Peninsula should be handed over to Greece.

LORD FISHER said that all our requirements would be met if we obtained possession of Lemnos, which would enable us to control the exit from the Black Sea.

SIR EDWARD GREY reminded the War Council that we had promised Greece that our occupation of Lemnos would be only temporary, and that we would lay no permanent claim to it.

LORD FISHER suggested that this might be got over by bartering Cyprus for Lemnos, or by obtaining a lease.

SIR EDWARD GREY said he would try to stave off the question of any permanent territorial settlement with regard to Turkey until after the war. He would approach M. Sazonoff in some such terms as these: "You say that Russian sentiment will insist on the occupation of Constantinople by Russia. My personal opinion is that the British Government will not interpose a veto. But public opinion in this country will insist on all sorts of economic questions being settled. France will say that Syria must be earmarked for her. We ourselves have up to now asked for nothing, and have only declared a protectorate over Egypt. We should have to consider our claims in Asia Minor. British opinion, however, had entirely changed in regard to a Russian occupation of Constantinople, and he personally did not anticipate any veto to it."

AFTER THE DARDANELLES. THE NEXT STEP.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if it was intended that an Allied force should occupy Constantinople?

MR. CHURCHILL said that a change had occurred. In consequence of the success of the bombardment of the outer forts Rússia was preparing to embark an army corps at Batoum.

SIR EDWARD GREY read a telegram confirming this.

MR. CHURCHILL said that Russia had always been favourable to the proposed attack on the Dardanelles. With a Russian army corps, three divisions from Greece, a French division, and our own troops from Egypt, we should dispose of from 120,000 to 140,000 men. The Greeks were quite close; 4,000 men from Egypt and 2,000 Marines were at Lemnos. 4,000 Marines and the Naval Division had sailed from this country. **British forces available.**

LORD KITCHENER said that 6,000 more men were waiting at Alexandria, to proceed as soon as asked for.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the transports would be ready to embark either the XXIXth Division or a mounted Territorial brigade by the 15th March, but if both these forces were to go a further delay of a fortnight would be occupied in collecting the necessary transport.

LORD KITCHENER proposed to leave the question open until the 10th March, when he hoped to have heard from General Birdwood.

He suggested that it would be a good plan to announce that we were coming as the ancient friend of the Turks, &c. It would be quite easy to get this information through by means of aeroplanes. There are also other channels by which it could be passed through. **Distribution of leaflets in Turkey.**

MR. CHURCHILL reminded Sir Edward Grey that some time ago he had suggested that the Foreign Office should prepare a leaflet.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that, after listening to this discussion, he thought a leaflet would be either very misleading or so offensive as to fail in its object.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that we might promise not to damage mosques or private buildings at Constantinople if no rising or opposition was made.

LORD KITCHENER did not agree in this. He suggested that the American Ambassador in Constantinople should be asked to prepare transports, to which the European population could be sent in the event of disturbance.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that he had seen the son of the American Ambassador in Constantinople, who was in London. He had said that his father believed he might be able to avert a massacre if he could issue an assurance that no damage would be done to Constantinople if the Allies were not attacked there.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Admiral should receive orders to cut the bridges on his arrival at Constantinople. He understood that by this means great difficulties were placed in the way of a massacre of Europeans, as the native quarter would be separated from the European quarter.

Action by fleet after forcing Dardanelles.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he thought it would be a mistake to give any assurance whatsoever to Turkey. He then outlined the action to be taken by our fleet, if and when the Dardanelles were forced. The first thing to be attempted would be the capture or destruction of the Turco-German fleet. A battle might take place either in the Dardanelles or the Sea of Marmora, or the enemy might seek to escape into the Black Sea. He hoped in this latter event that its egress would be barred either by mines or by the Russian fleet. The second step would be the destruction of the defences of the Bosphorus. This was not so easy as appeared at first sight, owing to the difficulty in attacking some of the forts from a distance. As soon as the fleet was through the Dardanelles, the Turkish lines of communication would be cut at Bulair, and the garrison of the Gallipoli Peninsula would be isolated. In addition, it might be possible to cut some of the bridges on the line between Adrianople and Constantinople by means of aircraft. The prize we ought to seek from this action was nothing less than the occupation by the Allies of Turkey in Europe. All must pass into our hands, and we ought to accept nothing less.

MR. BALFOUR said that he hoped that the railways running along the shore of the Sea of Marmora on both the European side and the Asiatic side would be cut.

LORD KITCHENER said this would be done at once if the Turks resisted.

Command of the military forces.

He then discussed the question of the command of the military forces of the Allies in this expedition. The French had agreed that the supreme command should be vested in a British officer, notwithstanding that the French general (d'Amade) was senior to General Birdwood. For the present, therefore, he proposed to leave General Birdwood in command. Later on, however, particularly if the forces increased, it might be necessary to send a more senior general, for which purpose he proposed Sir Ian Hamilton.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if General Birdwood was highly thought of.

LORD CREWE said he was considered the best general in India, though he lacked experience of a high command on active service.

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that the Russians might send a very senior general. The Greeks also might send a senior man. It might be advisable to send a very senior general now, in order to avoid the risk of an attempt on the part of the Allies to outbid one another in the seniority of the generals.

LORD KITCHENER thought that all difficulties were covered by the French consent to allow us to have the supreme command.

Various military measures.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the road on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles should be broken up directly the ships effected a passage. This would prevent the possibility of field guns and howitzers being brought in to embarrass us after the Straits had been forced. The road round the head of the Gulf of Xeros ought also to be broken up so that nothing could pass in or out of the Gallipoli Peninsula. He asked whether the Admiralty anticipated opposition from howitzers.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the longer the delay the greater was the chance of such interruptions. He had obtained six howitzers, which had been mounted on board some of the ships, for the special purpose of dealing with the shore howitzers. As regards the road round the head of the Gulf of Xeros, four French battleships were already there. The road on the Asiatic shore would also be dealt with.

LORD KITCHENER anticipated that, when the forts began to fall, the garrison would either surrender or slip out over the Bulair lines in small parties by night.

Terms to be offered to Turkey.

MR. CHURCHILL said that we ought to be content with nothing less than the surrender of Turkey in Europe. Everything in Turkey in Europe comes from Asia, and we should cut them off from there. Now that the Greeks had expressed their

intention of joining we should have plenty of men available. Everything in Europe, arsenals, arms, and even the fortress of Adrianople, ought to fall into our hands. Constantinople was only a step towards the Balkans. If we granted Turkey an armistice it should be on the condition of the military surrender of Turkey in Europe. We might, however, permit Turkey temporarily to hold on to Turkey in Asia.

LORD KITCHENER said the first step to insist on was the surrender of the German officers in Turkey. After that the Turks would be no good.

MR. CHURCHILL said that it was quite possible that Turkey might sue for peace, whereas the Russian proposals only contemplated an armistice.

SIR EDWARD GREY suggested that the evacuation of the line of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by Turkey, and the withdrawal of their army to a certain distance behind that line by their army, ought to meet our needs.

LORD KITCHENER said that, if we could get the Germans out, Turkey would probably sue for peace. There would then be no need of an armistice.

MR. CHURCHILL suggested that we ought to hire the Turkish army as mercenaries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Turks had never been any use as mercenaries. In their own country they fought well, but not when employed as mercenaries.

SIR EDWARD GREY said we should have to pay rather a heavy price politically to secure Turkish co-operation.

LORD CREWE considered that it would be quite impossible to settle the question of Turkey in Asia during the war.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the view that the Turks and their German masters would not give in easily. He asked if they would not in all probability mine the arsenal?

SIR EDWARD GREY said they were reported already to have mined the British and French Embassies.

LORD KITCHENER said it would not be easy to mine the arsenal and blow it up at precisely the right moment.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that, from the Balkan point of view, he hoped we should get through the Dardanalles before the Russians met with another reverse.

LORD FISHER said it was even more important to get through before the arrival of Austrian submarines.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that the psychological moment was the fall of the defences at the Narrows. We could then invite Bulgaria to take the Enos–Midia line, on condition that they joined the Allies. We might also get in touch with Italy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that we ought to give a pledge to Bulgaria that, as a condition of her joining, she should, in the final settlement, receive the portion of Macedonia lost after the last Balkan war, provided that Serbia obtained Bosnia and Herzegovina. There should be no bargaining with Serbia, who should be told that we had secured her safety and the cause of the Allies by this move, and that she would have to accept it.

SIR EDWARD GREY said the difficulty was that Bulgaria wanted something on account.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it was by no means improbable that Bulgaria was already on the move.

LORD KITCHENER said he would not be surprised if they were to seize Adrianople.

SIR EDWARD GREY explained our present position towards Bulgaria. He had told the Bulgarian Minister quite plainly that he must know what conditions they desired before he could do anything. If he knew this, he could approach Serbia, but it was useless to do this unless he knew what they wanted. If we considered their proposals reasonable we could go to Serbia, and say they must accept them. He had

arranged for this offer to be conveyed to the Opposition, as well as to the Government in Bulgaria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if Bulgaria came into the war *now* her co-operation would be worth more than later on. He asked if it was correct that there are 300,000 Turks in Thrace, as stated in a recent telegram.

LORD KITCHENER thought this unlikely. In any case, the Turkish troops were not good ones. He felt convinced that the Bulgarians would be at them. It would be a mistake to make further overtures to Bulgaria unless we were certain of getting through the Narrows.

THE DANUBE.

MR. BALFOUR asked how we were getting on as regards the preparations for action on the Danube.

LORD FISHER said that the monitors had been ordered, but that their construction was being very seriously delayed by strikes.

MR. CHURCHILL said that we ought not to make the main line of advance up the Danube. We ought not to employ more troops in this theatre of war than are absolutely essential in order to induce the Balkan States to march. He was still of opinion that our proper line of strategy was an advance in the north through Holland and the Baltic. This might become feasible later on when our new monitors were completed. The operation in the East should be regarded merely as an interlude.

WAR MATERIAL.

Rifles.

LORD KITCHENER read out the following figures as regards the anticipated output of rifles, which the Prime Minister had asked him to furnish:—

Month.	New.	Re-sighted.	Total.
1915.			
March	43,000	20,000	63,000
April	47,000	12,000	59,000
May	70,000	10,000	80,000
June	70,000	4,000	74,000
July	82,000	..	82,000
August	88,000	..	88,000
September	100,000	..	100,000
October	130,000	..	130,000
November	140,000	..	140,000
December	155,000	..	155,000
1916.			
January	175,000	..	175,000

After January 1916 the output of rifles would continue at 175,000 a month. In October 1915, 130,000 rifles would be received from America. By the end of the year 1915 we should have received from all sources 1,321,000 rifles in addition to 1,400,000, which we already possess. These estimates were on a most conservative basis. For example, he hoped that he might receive some of the American rifles before August, as a large bonus had been offered for every rifle delivered before the 31st July.

SIR EDWARD GREY said these figures were merely academic, so long as labour troubles continued.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in his opinion, the number of rifles ordered was not sufficient.

LORD KITCHENER did not agree. At the present time, he said, we had 1,950,000 British troops enlisted, including Canadians, but not including Australians or any native troops. Recruiting was proceeding at the rate of 15,000 men a week.

The outlook as regards shells was worse than in regard to rifles. Small arms ammunition was also rather unsatisfactory, though improving.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE felt certain that with proper organization we ought to be able to turn out more rifles and shell than at present. He had recently seen the head of a big engineering firm in South Wales, who had assured him that many large engineering firms could make practically any war material, if they were ordered to put everything else aside. In France, for example, M. Renaud had been put in charge of the organization of industry to produce shells.

LORD KITCHENER said this system had not worked very well. The French had found that a number of their shells did not burst, owing to defective fuses. This, however, had now been rectified. He insisted that whatever war material we produced must be the very best. As regards rifles, he had made a contract with a large firm to induce firms not on the War Office list to take up the manufacture of rifles. One of the firms so employed was turning out 500 a week. The whole of the first Service Army of 114,000 men was now equipped with rifles.

MR. BALFOUR said it was outrageous that we should be held up for want of fuses. He asked if women could not be employed.

LORD KITCHENER agreed that it was absurd to be held up for want of fuses. He said that women were employed in their manufacture.

MR. CHURCHILL said that everything really depended on labour. The Danube monitors were badly held up by the strikes on the Clyde. He asked if the War Council could discuss the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Bill.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this was rather a question for the Cabinet.

o

Anexo VIII: *Russian views on Constantinople and the Dardanelles,* 8 de março de 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 37/125/19

Descrição:

Discussão inicial antes dos aliados assinarem o acordo em Petrogrado ("Acordo de Constantinopla").

File — Circulated to Cabinet on the morning of Mch. 8/15

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Cabinet. 8 *March* 1915.

110.

CONFIDENTIAL.

RUSSIA

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 5, 6·55 P.M.)

Petrograd, March 4, 1915.

(No. 249. Secret.) (*March* 4, 9·10 P.M.)

I READ to Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon your telegram No. 298 of 2nd March, and his Excellency begged me to assure you that he had never doubted your sympathy, and that he was much touched with terms in which you had referred to Russian aspirations.

He thought, however, that the time had come for preparing public opinion in Great Britain and France for their approaching realisation. French Government were, equally with His Majesty's Government, fully acquainted with the views of Russian Government on Constantinople and the Straits, and French Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed himself in entire sympathy with them except on one point which, as a matter of fact, Russian Government never raised. French Minister for Foreign Affairs had been under the impression that Russia intended to claim both shores of the Dardanelles. This was a mistake, as she had never intended to ask for the Asiatic shore, provided it was left in the possession of Turkey, and on the understanding that no fortifications were to be erected on it.

On my way to Ministry for Foreign Affairs with French Ambassador, latter had told me that in the audience in which he had presented General Pau yesterday to the Emperor His Majesty had in conversation himself said that there was one question—that of Constantinople—on which he must speak with precision. Passions of his subjects with regard to its possession were deeply stirred, and he had no right to impose on them the tremendous sacrifices entailed by the war without securing for them in return the realisation of a secular ambition. His decision was taken, and he must insist on a radical solution of the question of Constantinople and the Straits. He asked French Ambassador to call on Minister for Foreign Affairs the same afternoon and to repeat to him what he had said. Minister for Foreign Affairs had in the meanwhile received a [group omitted: ? message] from the Emperor informing him of above conversation and desiring him to come to Tsarskoe Selo to see His Majesty this morning.

This afternoon Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to me and French Ambassador *aide-mémoire*, of which translation follows, embodying result of his Excellency's conversation with Emperor and definitely recording Russian claims. His Excellency does not ask us publicly to announce our approval of these claims, but I gather that he would be grateful for an assurance that we would not raise any objections to them. [? Subsequently] public opinion might be gradually prepared for desired solution.

Aide-mémoire begins:—

"Course of latest events leads His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas to think that the question of Constantinople and the Straits must be definitely solved in accordance with traditional aspirations of Russia.

"Any solution would be unsatisfactory and precarious if it did not incorporate henceforward in Russian Empire the city of Constantinople, western shore of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmora, and of the Dardanelles, as well as Southern Thrace up to the Enos–Midia line.

"*Ipso facto* and by strategic necessity part of Asiatic shore included between the Bosphorus, River Sakharia, and a point to be fixed on the Gulf of Ismid, islands of the Sea of Marmora, islands of Imbros and Tenedos, ought to be incorporated in the empire."

[376]

Special interests of France and of Great Britain in the region above described will be scrupulously respected.

Imperial Government likes to hope that above considerations will meet with sympathy of the two allied Governments. Said Governments are assured of meeting with, at the hands of Imperial Government, the same sympathy for realisation of desiderata which they may form in other regions of Ottoman Empire and elsewhere.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6, 9·40 A.M.)

Petrograd, March 5, 1915.
(March 5, 10 P.M.)

(No. 257. Secret.)

FRENCH Ambassador received a telegram from his Government this morning instructing him to speak to Minister for Foreign Affairs on the question of the Straits, but as it had crossed one in which he had reported our interview with his Excellency, recorded in my telegram No. 249 of 5th March, he thought it better to speak privately and not officially in view of changed situation.

He drew attention to fact that the questions of Constantinople and the Straits were distinct, and that, whereas former had a special interest for Russia, freedom of the Straits was of general interest to all countries, and liberal solution of latter question would facilitate solution of the former. On the other hand, annexation of both shores of the Bosphorus, with the right to fortify them as well as European shore of the Straits, could hardly be reconciled with freedom of the Straits. His Excellency then enquired whether Russia would be content with European shore of the Bosphorus, on the condition that neither it nor the Asiatic shore should be fortified.

M. de Sazonof replied that Russian public opinion would never accept such a restriction; recent events and sacrifices made by Russia in the war forced the Imperial Government to insist on radical and final settlement. Russia could not, he said, admit any other solution than the one which he had sketched in *aide-mémoire* handed to us yesterday. It was the only one that would satisfy Russia's political interests and aspirations and exigencies of her national defence.

On French Ambassador remarking that if shore were fortified passage could not be termed free, his Excellency said he was ready to give most binding guarantees that there should be complete liberty and equality for commerce and navigation. Russia, he said, had no intention of monopolising the Black Sea, and, though he could not say so officially as he had not taken the Emperor's orders, she might consent to free ingress and egress of men-of-war at all times.

As French Ambassador continued to press the point which he had already raised, Minister for Foreign Affairs adopted a more serious tone. We both, he said, knew him well enough not to suspect him of wishing to deceive or intimidate us, but he could assure us that were our respective Governments not to sanction settlement of question of the Straits and Constantinople in accordance with Russia's national aspirations consequences might be incalculable, as, regardless of himself, he would be obliged to place his resignation in the hands of the Emperor and to request His Majesty to replace him by Minister more capable of protecting Russia's national interests.

On several occasions during the course of the conversation I intervened in support of what my French colleague had said, but to no purpose. In speaking of his possible resignation M. de Sazonof was absoutely in earnest, and the Emperor, from language held by His Majesty to the French Ambassador, appears to have taken unalterable decision. M. de Sazonof is ready to give any guarantees we asked for with regard to freedom of commerce and navigation, but will not, I fear, yield single claim advanced in his *aide-mémoire*. I do not know whether guarantees of which he speaks would acquire more weight and inspire more confidence [group undecypherable] backed by Great Britain and France.

Anexo IX: *Observations to be made to Russian government concerning Constantinople and the Dardanelles,* 11 de março de 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 37/126/3

Descrição:

Refere que o governo russo exige, muito mais do que teriam afirmado semanas antes, quanto aos despojos de guerra, relativamente a Constantinopla e os Dardanelos ("o prémio mais valioso de toda a guerra").

File ✓ Sir E. Grey ✓ Cabinet ✓ Mr. Lovat } March 12/15

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Cabinet. March 1915.

114.

(1.)

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd).

(No. 43. Private and Secret.) *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1915, 7·20 P.M.

IN giving the Minister for Foreign Affairs the *aide-mémoire* about Constantinople and the Straits you should make the following observations:—

The claim now made by the Russian Government goes much beyond what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated as probable a few weeks ago, and Russia is asking for a definite promise in her favour as regards the greatest prize of the whole war before we have had time to consider what our own desiderata would be elsewhere in the eventual terms of peace.

I hope, therefore, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will realise that the *aide-mémoire* now given him is the greatest proof of friendship that it is in our power to give. It involves the complete abandonment of what has been our traditional policy, and runs counter to opinions and sentiments once universal and still by no means extinct in this country, and will, I hope, be recognised as a most loyal and ample fulfilment of our previous general assurances made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs recently. It is given now in the hope and belief that the settlement proposed will, when realised, make lasting friendship between the two countries. It follows that our own desiderata, however important to us elsewhere, will not include any conditions to impair Russian control over the territory described in her *aide-mémoire*.

We shall ask that there should be commercial freedom of the Straits for merchant vessels, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs has already promised, and that, as Constantinople will always be a trade entrepôt for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, Russia should, when in possession of it, arrange a free port for goods in transit to and from territory other than Russian.

His Majesty's Government are engaged in operations in the Straits which it is now clear cannot, however successful, be of any advantage to them in the terms of peace, except in so far as they contribute to the general cause. The direct fruits of these operations will, if the war is successful, be gathered entirely by Russia. We think therefore that Russia should not now raise objection to the co-operation of any Power which offers its help as an ally on reasonable conditions. Greece is the only Power which is likely to participate in the operations in the Straits, and the Greek flotilla, if we could have secured its aid, would already have been of inestimable value, as Admiral Carden is asking for more destroyers, and we have none to spare for him.

One of the great objects in undertaking the operations in the Dardanelles was to bring the Balkan States over to our side. We trust that Russia will now do all in her power to prevent Roumania and Bulgaria from being apprehensive that future Russian possession of Constantinople and the Straits will be to their disadvantage, and that Russia will do all she can to make the prospect of participation in the war on the side of the Allies attractive to those two States.

I cannot formulate British desiderata as to the Ottoman Empire except in consultation with the French as well as the Russian Government, and it is clear that the whole question of ulterior British and French interests, in what is now Asiatic Turkey, must come under consideration, but whenever it becomes known that Russia is to have possession of Constantinople at the end of the war, as stated in our *aide-mémoire*, I shall want to state that His Majesty's Government have throughout all the negotiations stipulated that in all circumstances Arabia and the Mussulman Holy Places shall remain under independent Mussulman rule.

One of the British desiderata will be the revision of the Anglo-Russian agreement about Persia, recognising the present neutral sphere as a British sphere, but I am not yet in a position to make any definite proposals on this or any other subject.

If the Minister for Foreign Affairs asks whether we propose to make any conditions

[398]

as to the fortification of the Straits or passage of ships of war, you may reply in the negative, though it would seem reasonable for Roumania and Bulgaria to have special privileges accorded them by Russia as regards their ships of war.

It is very desirable that the understanding now come to between the British, French, and Russian Governments should not become known until the Allies are able to assure the Balkan States as to their position and prospects generally, especially Roumania and Bulgaria, with regard to the territories adjoining their frontiers, which they are known to desire, and until an agreement as to British and French desiderata in the ultimate terms of peace is more advanced.

You can let Minister for Foreign Affairs have a memorandum of these observations, but it should be separate from the *aide-mémoire* of my telegram No. 329 of 10th March, which gives the official assent of His Majesty's Government.

Copies of what is given to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can be given by you personally to the Emperor.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 29, Private and Secret.)

---

(2)

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie (Paris).

(No. 30. Private and Secret.) *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1915.

MY telegram No. 43, Private and Secret, of to-day to Petrograd is for your information only.

Anexo X: *Russia and Constantinople,* 12 de março de 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 24/1/11

Descrição:

Referência a um memorando de fevereiro de 1903, do diretor da *British Naval Intelligence*, sobre os efeitos da presença naval da Rússia no Mar Mediterrâneo. Os efeitos da mesma ter acesso livre pelo estreito de Dardanelos e a ocupação de Constantinopla (Istambul), relativamente a 1903.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

34

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. March 1915.

SECRET.

G-11.

23

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

THE WAR.

Russia and Constantinople.

I.—Note by the Secretary.
II.—C.I.D. Paper 1-B.
III.—C.I.D. Paper 2-B.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
March 11, 1915.

SECRET.

I.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY.

THE two following C.I.D. Papers, 1–B and 2–B, have a close bearing on the subjects discussed at the meeting of the War Council on Wednesday, the 10th March, 1915.

2. The circumstances under which these papers were prepared were as follows :—

At the second meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, held on the 11th February, 1903,* the question arose as to the effect on the naval position in the Mediterranean of a Russian occupation of Constantinople and the Straits. For this meeting the Admiralty circulated the enclosed C.I.D. Paper No. 2–B. After a discussion, at which Sir Nicholas O'Conor, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, was present, Mr. Balfour prepared a report on the conclusions of the Committee, which was printed as C.I.D. Paper 1–B.

3. The following two passages are of particular importance :—

"What difference would it make to the balance of power in the Mediterranean if Russia were to obtain, through the possession of Constantinople, free egress from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, these remaining closed, as at present, against other Powers?

"The answer to this question, unanimously accepted by the Committee, was that, while Russia would no doubt obtain certain naval advantages from the change, it would not fundamentally alter the present strategic position in the Mediterranean.

* * * * * * *

"The occupation of Lemnos, near the mouth of the Dardanelles, would, on the other hand, be easy; but it could not, with advantage, be made permanent. The British naval position in the Mediterranean would be weakened, not strengthened, by the possession of another naval base, which could not be self-sufficing without costly fortifications and a large garrison; and which, if it were not self-sufficing, would merely be an additional anxiety to the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief."

M. P. A. H.

March 11, 1915.

SECRET.

1–B.

II.

REPORT BY MR. BALFOUR OF THE CONCLUSION ARRIVED AT ON FEBRUARY 11, 1903, IN REFERENCE TO RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE subject of the Dardanelles and Constantinople was discussed on the 11th February in connection with two different but closely allied problems.

The first of these may be stated as follows :—

What difference would it make to the balance of power in the Mediterranean if Russia were to obtain, through the possession of Constantinople, free egress from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, these remaining closed, as at present, against other Powers ?

The answer to this question, unanimously accepted by the Committee, was that while Russia would no doubt obtain certain naval advantages from the change, it would not fundamentally alter the present strategic position in the Mediterranean.

* The following were present: The Duke of Devonshire (in the chair); the Prime Minister; the Earl of Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty; Admiral the Lord Walter Kerr, Senior Naval Lord; Captain H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, Director of Naval Intelligence; the Right Honourable St. J. Brodrick, Secretary of State for War; Field-Marshal the Earl Roberts, Commander-in-Chief; Lieutenant-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, Director-General of Mobilization and Military Intelligence.

This view is based on the assumption that Russia, with France as an ally, would, in the case of conflict with England, have no hesitation in forcing the Dardanelles, and would find no serious difficulty in carrying out such an operation, with, or without, the consent of the Turks. Whether she would obtain that consent would depend, of course, upon political and diplomatic considerations, which it is impossible to foresee. But, even were Turkey unwilling to consent to this violation of European Treaties, we must proceed on the assumption that Russia, in the stress of a great conflict, would not hesitate, did it seem otherwise expedient, to effect a junction between her Black Sea Squadron and the French Fleet in the Mediterranean. In the opinion of the Admiralty, the rapidity of the current flowing from the Sea of Marmora would render it a comparatively safe operation for them to force the Dardanelles, and though the return journey could not be easy—and might even be impossible*—this would make comparatively little difference, as all the French ports in the Mediterranean would be available for their ships, either to coal or to refit.

No doubt, if Russia were established at Constantinople, co-operation with a foreign fleet would become somewhat easier. The 400 miles of protected waters between Sebastopol and the Sea of Marmora would be saved, and any risks and complications arising out of a forced passage of the Dardanelles would be avoided. But these advantages, though not to be ignored, do not constitute, so far as we are concerned, any fundamental or even very important, change in the naval problem, and would not require us to make any substantial alteration in the number and distribution of our Mediterranean Fleet.

Throughout the above argument, it has been assumed that Russia is acting as the ally of France. Were she fighting against us single-handed, it is certain that her fleet would not venture to leave the Black Sea so long as the relative sea power of Russia and Great Britain remained unchanged.

The most important corollary of the foregoing argument is, that the maintenance of the *status quo* as regards Constantinople is not one of the primary interests of this country. It would carry with it, as has been pointed out above, some naval advantages to Russia, and some naval disadvantages to ourselves; but these are not of the decisive character which has sometimes been supposed.

The second question discussed at the meeting was suggested in a private letter of January 1901 by Sir Nicholas O'Conor, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who was present during this part of the discussions of the Defence Committee.

Sir Nicholas had asked what course this country was likely to pursue if, as might well happen, disorder and anarchy broke out at Constantinople, and if Russia, proclaiming herself to be acting in the interests of public order, were by a sudden *coup de main* to occupy the city. It is to be presumed that such an occupation would be (professedly at least) of a temporary character; but in Sir Nicholas's opinion, when the situation it produced came to be diplomatically dealt with by other Powers, it would be found that Russia had practically acquired a position from which diplomacy alone would be powerless to dislodge her. It is well known that the Russians are constantly practising in the Black Sea the rapid embarkation and disembarkation of troops, that they have a number of men-of-war and transport sufficient to make the maritime portion of the operation a very simple one, and that we could not count on more than a week at the outside, and more probably only on a few days, between our first notice that the attempt was to be made and its successful consummation.

Sir Nicholas O'Conor seemed to contemplate the possibility of meeting a sudden contingency of this kind by a British occupation of Gallipoli; and schemes have been from time to time suggested under which 5,000 British soldiers and marines, supported by the fleet, are to hold the peninsula, thus making an effective counter-stroke to the Russian occupation of Constantinople.

In the opinion, however, of the Defence Committee, this scheme is, in existing circumstances, impracticable. Even granting that 5,000 men would be sufficient for such an operation, which is probably not the case (see note at the end of the Paper), it seems more than doubtful whether they would be forthcoming. The fleet could supply no large number of marines, and it would be most unwise, at what would certainly be a crisis of European policy, to denude either the ships of the Mediterranean Fleet of an important portion of their complements, or Malta or Egypt of an equally important portion of their necessary garrison.

* The current flowing through the Dardanelles makes a difference of 7 knots between the speed of a ship going up and going down the Straits.

The occupation of Lemnos, near the mouth of the Dardanelles, would, on the other hand, be easy; but it could not, with advantage, be made permanent. The British naval position in the Mediterranean would be weakened, not strengthened, by the possession of another naval base, which could not be self-sufficing without costly fortifications and a large garrison, and which, if it were not self-sufficing, would merely be an additional anxiety to the Admiral Commanding-in-chief.

No doubt these disadvantages would not attach to a temporary occupation, but an occupation known to be temporary would be of very little use as a coercive threat to Russia, whose Government is presumably as well acquainted as we are both with the strength and with the weakness of our Mediterranean position.

Hence it appears that there is at the command of Great Britain no effective naval or military retort to a *coup de main* on Constantinople. Nor, if the arguments developed in the first part of this Paper are sound, is there any reason why Great Britain should take upon herself the burden of protecting by her solitary exertions what is first a Turkish and then a European interest. Our Ambassador at the Porte should be instructed, if the emergency arises, to urge the Sultan, or whoever on the spot seems capable of taking a decision, to adopt active measures of resistance, either at Constantinople or Gallipoli; and in the meanwhile, if a fitting opportunity occurs, it would be desirable to consult with Austria, Italy, and possibly France, and other European Powers as to the part which each was to play in the case of any such eventuality as Sir N. O'Conor fears; it being intimated to them that Great Britain was prepared to take her share in any common action that might be agreed on, but was not prepared single-handed to do the work of Europe.

A. J. B.

February 14, 1903.

NOTE BY DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

The distance from Malta to Gallipoli is 720 miles.

NOTE BY DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF MOBILISATION AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

It is estimated that an army corps would be needed effectively to hold the Gallipoli Peninsula in the face of a Russian occupation of Constantinople. But it has been calculated that the shortest time in which such a force could be brought from England and landed on the peninsula would be one month after the Russian occupation had been effected. Moreover, the dispatch of an army corps from England to Gallipoli would be conditional on our possessing complete command of the sea, and being free from anxieties in other parts of the world. The proposal to risk the seizure of the Gallipoli Peninsula with a force of only 5,000 men presumably contemplated the troops required being obtained from the Mediterranean garrisons.

Gibraltar is eight days from Gallipoli, and has a garrison of 5,500 all ranks.

Malta is four days from Gallipoli, and has a garrison of 10,500.

Egypt is two days from Gallipoli, and has a garrison of 5,500.

The garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar are fixed at the minimum necessary to defend those fortresses. It is an accepted principle that the garrisons of naval bases abroad should be maintained at their full strength in peace, and it would certainly be extremely imprudent to withdraw any portion of those garrisons at a critical period. As regards Egypt, Lord Kitchener was recently instructed to inquire into the sufficiency of its present garrison, in consultation with Lord Cromer, the General Officer Commanding the British garrison, and the Sirdar. He has reported that the present garrison is inadequate to safe-guard that country from an over-sea raid of 5,000 European troops.

It may, therefore, be concluded that 5,000 men could not be withdrawn at a critical time from any of the Mediterranean garrisons to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula, even were it considered wise to risk its occupation by so inadequate a force.

W. G. NICHOLSON, *D.G.M.I.*

Intelligence Department, War Office,
February 23, 1903.

SECRET.

2–B. III.

MEMORANDUM BY THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,* FEBRUARY 1903.

WHAT would be the effect on our naval position in the Mediterranean, of :—

1. Freedom of ingress and egress in respect of the Dardanelles for the Russians?
2. The occupation of Constantinople by the Russians?

The effect of 1 and 2 would, as far as we were concerned, be practically identical, for Russia would gain no naval advantage by merely occupying Constantinople, and it must be taken for granted that she would seize the Dardanelles at the same time, and hold them and the shores of the Sea of Marmora, thus insuring the command of the entire sea communications between the Black Sea and the eastern basin of the Mediterranean.

This would, therefore, mean free ingress and egress between these seas for all Russian ships in either case. In case 2 Russia would, however, have the additional advantage of being able to establish an advance base for coaling and other replenishing purposes inside the mouth of the Dardanelles, where there are several good anchorages, both above and below Chanak, Similar facilities, on the other hand, would probably be granted by Turkey if Russia were made free of the Dardanelles by friendly arrangement with that Power.

The conditions indicated under 1 and 2 would undoubtedly improve Russia's position in a war with England, and render our task correspondingly more difficult.

At present Russia's naval bases in the Black Sea are some 800 miles from our lines of communication with India, viâ Malta and Port Said–Suez. The mouth of the Dardanelles is rather more than half-way along this distance, and Russia would, therefore, with her fleet just within these Straits, be about 440 miles nearer Egypt, or a point of junction with her French ally, than she is now. Moreover, her fleet would, in case of defeat, or being chased back by superior force, have a secure refuge near at hand.

Should we, in the case of Russia occupying the Dardanelles, at once militarily occupy and fortify Lemnos, Mytilene, or any other conveniently situated Turkish islands?

From a purely naval point of view, the answer must be in the negative.

It is a mistake to suppose that the mere possession of additional fortified naval bases must necessarily strengthen our naval position. Under certain conditions it may even become a source of weakness, for unless absolutely able to take care of themselves and to be self-supporting as regards supplies for a considerable time, such island bases would be a source of anxiety to the Admiral, and hamper his movements if it should at any time be expedient to move his force elsewhere.

On the other hand, so long as ours is the superior naval force in the Levant, these harbours would be open to us as anchorages and places of rendezvous for colliers, supply-ships, &c.

It may be urged that if we were not to occupy these islands Russia would do so. This is improbable, seeing that they possess hardly any naval advantage over the Dardanelles anchorages, whilst the force occupying them would run grave risks of being cut off by our superior fleet.

There can also be no doubt that the seizure of any of these islands by us in time of peace would stir up much ill-feeling against us on the Continent.

The next question which arises is whether Russia is likely to be in active alliance with France at the moment supposed or not. If Russia thus cleared her way into the Mediterranean it could only be done with some ulterior object, and it is inconceivable that she would be prepared to pit her Black Sea squadron against our Mediterranean fleet. It may therefore be taken for granted that we should have to reckon with France at the same time. The fleet of that country would then remain, as before, the main objective of our fleet, and until that force had been accounted for, we should not be able to do more than watch the Russians in the Levant.

* Captain H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg.

To consider now the effect upon such a situation if we found ourselves in alliance with one or other of the European Powers:—

Germany, *Austria*, and *Italy*—the Triple Alliance—might possibly be on our side as against the "Dual" Alliance. This would materially affect the naval situation in the Mediterranean, as the co-operation of the Italian fleet against the French forces in the western basin would enable us to detach sufficient ships, together with the Austrian fleet, to paralyse the Russian Black Sea forces. The Austrian army would also, no doubt, be able to act against any Russian forces advancing from Constantinople. Germany would have her hands full on shore, and her fleet would have to be kept in her home waters.

However, such a big combination against France and Russia appears extremely unlikely. Germany alone certainly would not run such risks for the mere purpose of frustrating Russia in her endeavour to improve her naval position in the Near East, where the former has no real interests; besides which her position between Russia and France compels her to keep on good terms with the former at any price.

Austria alone would not be of any material assistance, as her fleet is not even equal to coping with the Russian Black Sea squadron.

Italy's help would, as has been said, be very valuable; how far we could count upon it, it is not for the Admiralty to say.

Supposing that Russia had somehow secured the waterway between the Black Sea and the Levant, was firmly established in the narrow waters at either end of the Sea of Marmora, and that the general peace of Europe had not been disturbed, what would be the further development? Would Russia extend her power along the shores of Macedonia in one direction, and of Asia Minor in the other? The former must bring her into conflict, sooner or later, with Austria, whilst the latter might embroil her with Germany over the Bagdad Railway, and certainly with France as Syria was approached.

However, these are speculations somewhat outside the scope of this Paper.

To sum up:—

It may be stated generally that a Russian occupation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, or an arrangement for enabling Russia to freely use the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, such as her dominating influence can extract from Turkey at her pleasure, would not make any marked difference in our strategic dispositions as compared with present conditions. It is true that the enemy would, at the outset, be nearer the theatre of war. But he requires now, quite as much as under the altered conditions, a close watch by our ships. He may attempt a raid by one or two fast ships on Port Said, in hopes of damaging the Suez Canal. This is not probable, as such a deed would bring Russia in conflict with all maritime Powers. The real point to remember is that in either case Russia cannot hope to effect anything serious, be it in Egypt or elsewhere, until her fleet has fought and beaten our fleet. Anything undertaken by the Russian Black Sea Admiral in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean whilst our main fleet was occupied with the French to the westward could, unless we were defeated by the French, only end as did Admiral Persano's attempt upon Lissa in 1866, even if a repetition of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt in 1798 were considered too much to hope for.

February 1903.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY C. R. HARRISON.—12/3/1915.

Anexo XI: *Discussion of a division of the yet unacquired spoils of war,* 25 de março 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 37/126/27

Descrição:

Descreve a distribuição de todos os territórios como possíveis despojos de guerra entre a Grã-Bretanha, França, Itália (se por esta altura entrar no lado dos Aliados), Austrália, Nova Zelândia e Japão.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Cabinet. *March* 1915.

SECRET.

MISCELLANEOUS
146
RECORDS

"THE SPOILS."

WE seem to be forced by the possible capture of Constantinople into a premature discussion of a division of the yet unacquired spoils of the whole war.

As I am specially concerned with German colonies, I am drawn into the consideration of the whole question.

The following observations are based on the presumption that the Allies are completely successful and able to dictate any terms they choose to Germany, Austria, and Turkey.

1. I assume that we shall retain some part of Mesopotamia, possibly as far as from the Persian Gulf to Bagdad, mainly on the ground stated by Lord Crewe that this fertile land would give an outlet for Indian emigration.

2. If Persia became involved in the war it would be desirable that part of the neutral zone containing the oil fields and the province of Fars should pass under British control.

3. It would also be an advantage, in view of Russian predominance in Northern Persia, if the capital and seat of Government could be transferred from Tehran to some more southern or eastern town.

4. It has been suggested that, if Russia is at Constantinople, we should occupy Alexandretta—

(*a.*) to command the Bagdad Railway terminus,
(*b.*) as a naval base to protect Egypt and our sea route to India from Russian attack.

5. (*a*) Seems to necessitate our control or occupation of all Mesopotamia and the Bagdad Railway, which would be a costly and onerous obligation, though with great expenditure on irrigation the valley of the Euphrates would probably be made very fertile and perhaps remunerative.

6. As to (*b*), Alexandretta does not seem by any means an ideal naval base for the protection of Egypt against Russian attack.

It is an open roadstead and the cost of a harbour would be considerable.

For purely naval purposes the fine harbour of Marmarice on the mainland due north of Rhodes, or the island of Mitylene, with its great land-locked inlets, would seem to be preferable. Mitylene commands the exit from the Dardanelles and the Gulf of Smyrna.

But I am very doubtful whether we should be wise to add to the number of our hostages to fortune in the Mediterranean.

7. France claims Syria and the Taurus, but it is not certain that this is intended to include Alexandretta.

I think it would be unfortunate if France became the guardian of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine.

I should like to see them in British hands, (and perhaps governed from Egypt), or, if that is impossible, I have heard a suggestion that they might be under the protection of the United States.

8. If Italy comes into the war it might be possible, and would be advantageous to us, to exchange British Somaliland, which is contiguous to Italian Somaliland, for the Italian Erithrea, on the Red Sea, which adjoins the Soudan and Abyssinia. We might, if necessary, give them some accommodation at Solum on the frontier of Tripoli and Egypt for this object.

9. All the German possessions in the Pacific have now been taken from her.

Samoa is under the control of New Zealand, Japan is temporarily in occupation of all the islands north of the equator, and Australia all the islands south of the equator. It is out of the question to part with any of the territories now in the occupation of Australia and New Zealand.

Japan evidently intends to claim the possession at the end of the war of all the islands she is now occupying, with the possible exception of Yap.

I fear that this will cause great trouble with Australia, especially as regards the Marshall Islands, the trade of which has been, even under German rule, exclusively with Australia.

The United States is not likely to be pleased at Japanese extension eastward in the Pacific.

10. There remain the German colonies in Africa, all of which I assume we shall have captured by the end of the war.

11. If German South-West Africa is occupied by the Union Government, it must obviously be retained as part of the British Empire, unless the Union Government and Portugal were willing to exchange it for the Portuguese possessions on the east coast of Africa, including Delagoa Bay, Beira, and Mozambique. This exchange would effect a consolidation of Portuguese and British territory, and probably be to the advantage of each; but it is not likely to be acceptable to the Portuguese, who would be incapable of governing the German population.

12. German East Africa forms the missing link in the chain of British possessions from the Cape to Cairo.

It would make an admirable colony for Indian emigration of the class which wants to trade and not to cultivate, assuming that the latter will be provided for in Mesopotamia.

The German railway, now complete, from Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika to Dar-es-Salaam on the coast, will in future tap and carry a large part of the trade of the Belgian Congo, and will deprive our Uganda Railway of much of the traffic which it now obtains from Ruanda and the southern half of the Victoria Nyanza.

13. Togoland is in the joint occupation of French and British forces.

It could be—

(*a.*) divided: approximately half going to the British Gold Coast and Ashantee, and the other half to French Dahomey; but, in any division, it

would be difficult to allot the only port, Lomé, and the single railway up to Kamina ;

(*b.*) given to the French ;

(*c.*) given to the British, in each case in consideration of some advantage elsewhere.

If it was retained by the British, a deal might be made with the French to obtain also the part of Dahomey which separates Togoland from Nigeria, so as to form all our possessions in the Gulf of Guinea into a solid and continuous territory.

14. The Cameroons are being invaded, and presumably captured, by a joint French and British force. France is employing, and will probably continue to employ, a larger land force than ours. But we provided the whole of the naval assistance which alone made possible the initial capture of the capital, Duala, and the railway.

It might be assumed that we should equitably be entitled to half the Cameroons, but at the most I do not think we should require or could usefully occupy more than one fourth of it.

The French will undoubtedly desire a large share of it, and especially that part which was taken from them by Germany at the time of Agadir.

We might ourselves retain very much less than one-fourth of the area, but what it is essential that we should have is the northern railway (about 80 miles) from Duala to Baré ; Mount Cameroon on the coast, which will make a perfect sanatorium for the whole of West Africa ; and the town and harbour of Duala, which in enemy hands could easily be made an impregnable and menacing naval base against our West and South African commerce.

15. We want from France two things—

(*a.*) their share of the Condominium in the New Hebrides ;

(*b.*) their small settlement of Jibuti opposite Aden, which controls the mischievous arms traffic to Abyssinia and Central Africa.

To obtain these we can offer France—

(*c.*) three-fourths of the Cameroons (instead of one-half), *plus* our half share of Togoland ;

(*d.*) or, if we wish to retain all Togoland and acquire Dahomey, we can offer France *all* the Cameroons except Mount Cameroon and Duala, and in such a wide settlement we could throw in the Gambia, which is an object of great desire by the French ; but the cession of the Gambia would be very unpopular in this country, and arouse much public and Parliamentary criticism and agitation.

16. Alternatively we might surrender to France *our* share of the New Hebrides Condominium as compensation, with nearly the whole of the Cameroons, for our possession of Togoland and Dahomey.

This would be an impossible suggestion in ordinary times of peace, owing to Australian prejudices, but as Australia is now to acquire such a large amount of new

Pacific territory she might at this moment be induced to agree to it.

In order to sweeten the pill, I should not object to giving Australia also the German island of Bougainville and our adjoining islands of the Solomon Group.

17. And, lastly, we might take this opportunity of restoring to China, with or without a consideration, the costly folly of Weihaiwei.

L. H.

March 25, 1915.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY C. R. HARRISON.—27/3/1915.

Anexo XII: *The Dardanelles. Memorandum on the situation,* 30 de agosto de 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 42/3/19

Descrição:

Descreve a situação na Campanha de Galípoli, os passos a tomar em caso de prolongar-se pelo inverno (considerando janeiro e fevereiro de 1916), a possibilidade de planear uma retirada total da península e os riscos associados (refere também que a Rússia perderá todo o interesse na guerra se perder a esperança de reclamar para si a cidade de Constantinopla e os estreitos).

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. August 1915.

SECRET.

G.-19.

11

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

THE DARDANELLES.

Memorandum on the Situation, August 30, 1915.

(Prepared by the Secretary after a personal visit.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
August 30, 1915.

SECRET.

Part I.—THE TACTICAL PROBLEM.

THE tactical situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula is as follows: There are two distinct theatres of operations, viz., the southern theatre at the toe of the peninsula, and the northern theatre at Anzac, which has recently been extended northwards across the Suvla plain to the ridge of hills running parallel to and close to the Gulf of Xeros in an easterly direction from Suvla point.

Southern Theatre of Operations.

2. In the southern theatre of operations the deadlock is just as complete as it is along the whole of the front in France and Flanders. Both sides are thoroughly entrenched with the usual elaborate system of fire and communication trenches, dug-outs, barbed wire, machine-gun emplacements, saps, mines, &c. In places the trenches are not more than 15 yards apart, and probably nowhere are they separated by much more than 300 yards. Continuous and active trench warfare is carried on by both sides. The Allies have the advantage of more artillery and more ammunition, and are better provided with such accessories as trench mortars and sand-bags, but even after the most elaborate artillery preparation they are unable to make any serious advance. Here and there, it is true, they take a trench at considerable cost, but as often as not they are driven out of it the same night. The Turks have plenty of machine guns, and use them well; their snipers are as good as ours; and they are past-masters in the art of bomb warfare. Even after the terrific artillery preparation of the 6th August, when a large quantity of ammunition, including much high-explosive shell, was expended, even though it was supported by heavy fire from the men-of-war, including the 14-inch guns of the Monitors; even though it was assisted by every modern accessory—aeroplanes and balloon-ships—on front and flank; and even though the observers reported it to be the most successful bombardment we had carried out—notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding that the Turkish artillery was soon silenced and was never effective, the Allies failed to obtain any substantial advantage. Krithia is still almost 1,000 yards from the nearest trenches, and Achi Baba still provides an ideal observation post from which the whole of our position—corps and divisional headquarters, reserves, rest camps, base lines, artillery positions, communications, beaches, and anchorages—can be overlooked, and artillery fire directed. From the Asiatic shore cross observation can be made and cross fire brought to bear into the flank and rear of our position, though latterly two Monitors at Rabbit Island and some heavy French howitzers at De Tott's battery have succeeded in limiting the activities of the Asiatic batteries. On the whole, however, the advantages of the Allies in material are outweighed by the advantages of the enemy in position.

3. The situation in this southern area is thoroughly uncomfortable, and might become untenable if the Turks had a large supply of ammunition, but, as things are, it can be held. Considerable daily wastage is inevitable, and a very high morale and élan is hardly to be expected from troops who have been continually subjected for long periods to such trying conditions, and have besides been fighting for many months on the offensive. From this, and as an inevitable result of the heavy losses incurred in the recent fighting, it follows that for the present at any rate all expectation of a decisive victory in this theatre has been abandoned, and the plan of capturing Achi Baba and mounting heavy guns and howitzers behind it to shell the forts and clear the way for a naval advance up the Straits is in abeyance.

Northern Theatre of Operations.

4. In the northern theatre of operations the deadlock is less complete. It is true that before the 6th August both sides were, and for weeks had remained, entrenched almost more elaborately than at Cape Helles. On the night of the 6th–7th, however, our force there surprised the Turks, captured many lines of trenches and redoubts with double rows of barbed wire, with the result that they trebled the area occupied, effected a junction with the troops newly landed to the northward, and gained the position on the ridge, their main objective, both at Koja Chemen Tepe and Chunuk Bair. The former position was held only for a short time owing to the accidental bursting of some shells from our own Monitors among Indian troops, who had fought splendidly, but lost heavily. The Chunuk Bair ridge was held for three days by the New Zealanders who had captured it, but was subsequently lost by two battalions of the XIIIth Division, who relieved them, and were attacked by the enemy in huge masses; great slaughter was inflicted on the enemy, but, overwhelmed by superior numbers, our troops were driven a short distance down the ridge, where they are entrenched and hold their own.

5. While on the ridge enough was seen from both points to demonstrate the importance of occupying it, for the whole of the country up to and across the Straits could be viewed. In our hands the ridge would provide an artillery observation station from which the enemy's communications, both from Bulair by land and from Asia Minor across the Straits could be most seriously menaced by artillery fire, and it would form a splendid starting point for a further advance against the enemy's line of communication and retreat. Conversely, while it remains in the enemy's hands it forms a second and superior Achi Baba. From this ridge the enemy can not only direct his artillery against nearly every part of the Anzac position, including all the piers except one recently constructed, which up to the 19th August had remained unmolested, and snipe parts of the beaches with machine-gun and rifle fire, but he can also direct fire against the ships and beaches in Suvla Bay and observe all that is taking place in this district. Koja Chemen Tepe and Gaba Tepe occupy a tactical position in the northern area at least equivalent to that of Achi Baba and the Asiatic shore in the southern. Here also, if the enemy had a larger supply of ammunition, our position could be rendered untenable, and our advantages in material and personnel (for Anzac has a marked advantage over the enemy in personnel) are cancelled out by the enemy's advantages in position.

6. On the 6th and 7th August, while Anzac was extending its position as already shown, a new landing was taking place to the northward at Suvla Bay and south of Nibrunesi Point. The intention, and indeed the paramount necessity, was to surprise the Turks, and pushing on to seize the range of hills at the back of the bay roughly north and south through Anafarta Sagir. Although in a strategical sense the surprise was complete, the troops failed to push on for reasons which have been explained in Sir Ian Hamilton's telegraphic reports. The result was that, instead of occupying the ridges, the troops were held up in the middle of the flat plain at the back of Suvla Bay, on a line roughly north and south through a point some 3,000 yards from the head of the bay. This position was practically unaltered a fortnight after the original landing, for, in spite of several attempted but half-hearted attacks in force greatly superior to the enemy, the troops had barely held their own.

7. Since that date another attack has been made, but apparently without achieving any permanent improvement in our position.

8. The importance of obtaining the Anafarta Sagir ridge is very obvious. In our hands, considered particularly in conjunction with Koja Chemen Tepe, these hills form an excellent point of assembly for a further advance on the enemy's lines of communication, and probably a good artillery observation station for harassing the enemy's communications; they also enable us to screen the landing place at Suvla Bay from artillery fire. Conversely, in the enemy's hands they provide observation stations commanding Suvla Bay, the Nibrunesi landing-places, and the whole of the flat plain where our troops are entrenched. The deep ravines and gorges, which intersect the ridge, and the narrow gap between the Anafarta ridge and the Sari Bair range also

provide concealed artillery positions and rallying places for the concentration of troops to attack our position.

9. The importance, then, of Sari Bair and the Anafarta ridges must be considered together. Either of them in our hands constitutes a serious menace to the very existence of the Turkish army in the southern area. Either of them in the enemy's hands is a danger to us, for it enables him to harass our communications to an extent only limited by the quantity of artillery ammunition available, and exposes us to the constant threat of a surprise attack.

Prospects in the Northern Area.

10. At present both these vitally important tactical positions remain in the enemy's hands. What prospect is there of wresting them from him? It seems not unlikely that the Sari Bair ridges may be recaptured. The previous surprise attack was so admirably conceived and dashingly executed that it inspires the utmost confidence both in the General, the staff, and the troops. The losses were very heavy, the disorganisation and mixing up of units great, and the exhaustion of the troops considerable, and the further attack is not likely to succeed until drafts have been incorporated and reorganisation completed. The morale of the troops, however, high as it was before the battle, has been raised by their success. Men have been heard to offer 5*l.* to their comrades for a place in the front trenches! It is unlikely that we shall again be driven out by sheer weight of numbers. Our failure on the last occasion was due to the difficulties attendant on the organisation of a proper defence with disorganised units, exhausted by protracted fighting in difficult country, with a long and new line of communication to establish up steep and trackless slopes. On the next occasion we shall start from a few yards below the crest. On the whole, therefore, there is good ground for hoping for another success in the Anzac region.

11. At Suvla the prospects are far less bright. It is too much to expect that troops who have completely failed to achieve success when pitted against an unentrenched rearguard probably not exceeding as many battalions as they themselves had brigades, will be more fortunate when the enemy has had time to bring up reinforcements and artillery and to dig himself in. It is true that the previous attack followed close on a night landing, where the units had become mixed up, and the troops somewhat bewildered and exhausted by the novelty of the operation, and harassed by their first experience of shrapnel fire; it is true that the local staff arrangements and the leadership were defective; it is true that new generals of proved capacity have been substituted, and that a powerful artillery has been landed; it is true that a converging fire will be brought to bear on the enemy from Anzac, Nibrunesi, Suvla Bay, and Suvla hills, and from ships at and beyond Ejelmer Bay—in short, from front, flank, and rear—and that elaborate arrangements have been made for the proper observation and direction of the fire; it is also true that the troops have been reinforced by a brigade of the redoubtable XXIXth Division from the southern theatre, and by General Paton's yeomanry division from Egypt. Notwithstanding all these changes in the conditions, it must be doubted whether the ridges will be won, and it seems more probable that the history of the attacks on Achi Baba will reproduce itself at Anafarta ridge and on Suvla plain.*

The Tactical Outlook.

12. To sum up, the most reasonable expectations as regards the purely tactical prospects are that we shall be able to hold on to our position in the southern area without achieving a substantial advance; that at Anzac we have a really good prospect of gaining a footing on the Sari Bair ridges, from which we shall be able almost immediately to harass the enemy's communications, and before long to organise a further advance; and finally, that at Suvla we are unlikely to achieve any considerable success, and may find ourselves obliged to hold on in a position of some difficulty.

* The failure of the local attacks which have taken place at Suvla since this was written confirm these impressions. On the other hand, the success of the recent minor attacks at Anzac give ground for hope that when the big attack is made on the ridges it will succeed.

13. Thus it seems unlikely that an early and complete success can be looked for. We have to envisage the fact that before decisive results can be looked for certain tactical positions have to be won, which can only be secured at great cost. If final success is to be achieved, we must make preparations to make good the losses, and to reinforce the troops at Anzac and Suvla, in order that they may follow up their successes; and at the same time we have to enable the troops to maintain themselves in the positions they have won in both the northern and southern areas under weather conditions far less favourable than those which have hitherto prevailed. This will call for still greater efforts, the nature of which will now be examined.

Part II.—THE MEANS NECESSARY FOR A CONTINUANCE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

14. Of the two requirements, the offensive and the defensive, the former is by far the more immediately important. If a successful offensive can be maintained there is a decent chance that the campaign in the Dardanelles may be successfully concluded this autumn.

Drafts.

15. One important requirement is drafts to replace casualties. The average loss in an offensive action, such as that of the 6th August, is 25 per cent. of the infantry engaged. In some units it is much greater, and in others much less, but 25 per cent. is rather below the average. Under the normal system it takes a few days to ascertain what the losses are—in fact, this is not accurately known until it has passed through what is known as the "third échelon" at Alexandria a fortnight after the event—these losses then have to be telegraphed to England, and probably, owing to shipping and other difficulties, six weeks from the date of the action elapse before all the drafts are received; by this time still further casualties have been sustained. The net result is that, even before a great attack such as that of the 6th August, the units are below establishment, and after the attack their strength is so reduced that they are immobilised for offensive purposes for some considerable time. So much was this felt that, in the case of the recent landing at Suvla and Nibrunesi, the new battalions were deliberately put into the line at 75 per cent. of their establishment, the remaining 25 per cent. being kept back for incorporation after the battle as drafts.

16. As a policy of perfection our aim should be not only to make good all past casualties, but also to supply *in advance* 25 per cent. of drafts for anticipated losses, but it is understood that lack of shipping and other considerations render this impossible. The greatest possible effort in the replacement of losses is specially important, because in this matter the Turks, being close to their base, have a great advantage over us, and latterly their casualties have been made good in three or four days, even if by inadequately trained raw material.

Ammunition.

17. The second requirement is an ample supply of ammunition, but it is unnecessary to dwell on this. It is fully recognised at the Dardanelles that their demands for ammunition have been met in the most generous possible manner.

18. A point of detail which may perhaps be mentioned here is that good results would probably follow if the fleet at the Dardanelles, and particularly the Monitors and "bulged ships" and destroyers, would be supplied with a considerable proportion of shrapnel for guns of *all* calibres. Such, at any rate, is the view of the Royal Artillery authorities, and, so far as is known, the Navy is not disposed to dispute it.

19. It should be noted that without regular and ample supplies of ammunition it may be impossible to follow up a success and convert it into an overwhelming victory.

Reinforcements.

20. The third requirement is for reinforcements, and this is perhaps as much a defensive as an offensive need. There is no suggestion that the force supplied for the recent offensive operation was insufficient in numbers. It was quality and not quantity that was lacking. Five brigades were held up probably by a less number of battalions; and there is no reason to suppose that any excess of men, unless composed of experienced troops, would have made up for the deficient military qualities.

21. The position, however, has now changed considerably since the first landing. The extent of the position in the northern area from the sea on the north to the south of Anzac is little less than 18,000 yards long, and the number of divisions available is barely eight. In the southern area a position nearly 6,000 yards long is held by rather less than six divisions.

22. It will be seen from this rough calculation that the number of troops in the northern area for the double operation of holding in some parts and taking the offensive in others is relatively small. Yet it is difficult to reduce the length of the line. To abandon any part of Anzac would be to surrender to the enemy positions from which they would overlook and enfilade us. To abandon Suvla Bay would be to give up landing-places which may be regarded as indispensable if the campaign is prolonged into the winter. If it were practicable, it might be preferable to abandon the southern and concentrate all our forces in the northern area, but this is on all hands agreed to be a tactical operation of great difficulty, entailing very heavy losses in men, guns, munitions, stores, and morale. Moreover, this course would result in a corresponding withdrawal of Turks, and the hope we have at present of cutting off the Turkish army in the southern area could not be realised if we ceased to contain it there. The enemy, it is true, has not an army of unlimited size in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and, having regard to his preoccupations elsewhere, and to the ever-increasing harassment of his communications by our submarines, and latterly by our seaplanes, it is doubtful if he can increase his forces very much. The extension of his line must put him in a position of great difficulty, more particularly since the offensive has now definitely passed to the Allies. In fact, the solution of the question depends on which side can develop a *successful* offensive. If the Turks can do it we shall be driven into the sea, and our army will suffer a disaster almost unparalleled in the history of the British race. If we can do it the Turks will find themselves in a similar position. The fate of two Empires hangs on the possession of two or three miles of territory.

23. Given drafts, ammunition, and the reinforcements for which Sir Ian Hamilton asks, there is no doubt that we have a reasonable prospect of achieving success. Throughout this campaign the Turks have attacked again and again with the utmost bravery and vigour; but, though often successful in local counter-attacks, they have no considerable victory to their credit. The Allies, on the other hand, have gained a total of 6,500 yards at Cape Helles, have won many tactical victories, and have usually succeeded in carrying successfully the object of their attack. An equal advance from Anzac would secure Boghali and Mal Tepe, and would place the whole of the Turkish communications at our mercy. Half an equal advance from our present positions at Suvla would secure the Anafarta ridges, and (more particularly in conjunction with the capture of the Sari Bair ridge) would go far to render Suvla free from serious molestation.

24. It would be a mistake to be disheartened by the comparative failure of the new troops in the Suvla landing. Many of the troops on the peninsula, who have since shown sterling qualities, acquitted themselves poorly at first.

25. In short, the only chance of bringing this campaign to a successful conclusion this autumn is to continue a vigorous offensive, and for this it is necessary to send drafts in anticipation of requirements, to continue to send ample supplies of ammunition, and to furnish reinforcements.

The Need of Preparation for a Winter Campaign.

26. Nevertheless, having regard to our previous experience of warfare of this kind, and the slow rate of advance possible in trench warfare—and at Suvla the

position is rapidly approaching trench warfare, even if that stage has not definitely been reached—it would be highly dangerous to gamble on the likelihood of an early success, and it is necessary to contemplate the possibility of a winter compaign. This brings us face to face with the administrative difficulties involved.

27. In making our administrative plans it is necessary to assume the worst reasonably probable conditions, viz., that the situation remains stationary at Helles, Anzac, and Suvla. Better conditions, it is hoped, will supervene, but it would not be prudent to reckon on this as certain. The arrangements for the contingency of a winter compaign are in course of active preparation by the D.Q.M.G. in consultation with the Navy, and the necessary demands will no doubt shortly be put forward, where this has not already been done. All that it is proposed to attempt here, therefore, is to sketch some of the difficulties that will have to be faced, and some of the steps which will probably be required.

Preparations in the Trenches.

28. In most parts of the peninsula there is a tendency for the soil to hold water—even on the heights of Anzac. Careful drainage will therefore be necessary. At Anzac and Helles, where the land lies high, there ought to be no great difficulty about this. At Suvla, however, if our troops do not succeed in reaching at least the lower slopes of the Anafarta ridges, the position will probably resemble that of the trenches in the low-lying districts of Flanders. Already in summer it is found that the trenches cannot be dug deep in the plain without filling with water, and once the autumn rains set in this difficulty will be accentuated, and breastworks may have to be substituted for trenches.

29. The communication trenches also will become soppy, and probably planks and hurdle work will be required to ensure rapid communication.

Roads and Tramways.

30. The roads by which the communication trenches are approached, sometimes (at Helles) leading through deep and winding nullahs, the bottoms of which may be expected at times to become rushing torrents, will require close attention. These roads are for the most part incompletely metalled; and tracks which in summer provide good going may in winter be wellnigh impassable unless carefully prepared. In the southern theatre it is understood that the difficulty is to be got over by the employment of tramway and railway material.

31. At Anzac, where the roads are in some places sunk deep in communication trenches and in others lead up steep slopes, the position will be particularly difficult. The sunken roads may be expected to become quagmires and the steep slopes slippery, whether for man or mule. It seems desirable, as soon as possible, to relieve the situation by the construction of aerial cable haulage, such as is constantly met with in a primitive form in the mountains of North Italy, and is to be seen in a more elaborate form at Gibraltar. It is odd, indeed, that this very obvious method of transport has not already been adopted at Anzac, as it would relieve the heavy fatigue duties which have so taxed the strength of this command. One difficulty is the comparative isolation of and lack of communication between the upland portions of this extraordinary district, which necessitates the provision of a large number of cables.

32. At Suvla it should be possible to establish road or railway communication between the shore and the communication trenches, but it is rather early to express a definite opinion on this.

It is probable also that Suvla Bay will be connected with Anzac by a railway or tramway running along the shore, in order that Anzac may be supplied from that relatively sheltered anchorage when bad weather puts its own piers out of action.

Accommodation for Reserves.

33. Another point which will require careful consideration will be the provision of accommodation for the reserves, who live at present in "dug-outs" behind the line

for protection against shell fire. At Anzac the existing dug-outs should remain habitable, as they are mainly dotted on the steep slopes of the ravines. At Suvla also it may be found possible to accommodate the reserves on the hill-sides. But in the southern area it seems probable that the existing reserve dug-outs, which consist in some parts of holes in the ground, will become mere tanks of water, and that some other system will be necessary. Huts would be too conspicuous, and it may be necessary to solve the problem by cutting out caves in the cliffs or in the sides of the nullahs, if this is practicable.

Heating and Warm Clothing.

34. During January and February, when snow and really cold weather may be expected, some form of heating for dug-outs and trenches will be essential, as well as the provision of warm clothing.

Cleanliness and Recreation.

35. Sea bathing, the one recreation of the men, will before long become impracticable. The problem of keeping the men clean will then present difficulties, and some system of baths will become an indispensable necessity in all parts of the peninsula where troops are located.

36. It will also become necessary to provide some form of recreation to compensate for the loss of sea bathing if the men are to be kept in good fettle. There is no doubt that the absence of anything in the nature of a canteen is already keenly felt, more particularly by the Australians and New Zealanders, who have a good deal of money to spend. "I don't want to talk about this campaign," a private was heard to say, "I want to go somewhere where I can spend a bob now and then." This observation illustrates a real want. In every part of the peninsula, as well as on the islands, it would be a boon if canteens could be established where the men could buy such things as sweets, cakes, potted and tinned meats, sardines, pickles, writing paper and envelopes (very important), toilet paper, tobacco, &c., and a few recreation tents (such as are supplied in France by the Y.M.C.A.) would be most welcome, if they could be secured against shelling. All these things are needed now, and their provision would be good business. In winter they will become even more urgently required.*

Water.

37. The one unmixed advantage which winter is likely to bring will be the solution of the water problem. Throughout the summer months the naval and military officers in command have had no greater preoccupation than the supply of water to the army ashore. Even in the Helles area, where a good many springs were discovered, it has been found necessary to land 300 tons a day. At Anzac the problem was one of great insistence, for not only was very little water found, necessitating the carriage by sea and landing under shell fire of nearly every drop consumed, but for a long time it had to be conveyed by hand to the heights above. It is only recently that a pump (apparently rather an inefficient one!) has been installed, which raises the water direct to reservoirs in the hills, and the system of distribution is perhaps still rather in embryo. The seriousness of the problem may be gauged from the fact that a few days before the battle of the 6th August General Birdwood was compelled to suggest the possible evacuation, or partial evacuation, of the position for the lack of water. When the extent of the position was trebled, and water had to be conveyed up trackless ravines to a greatly increased number of troops, some of whom are now entrenched some 800 feet above the sea, the difficulties assumed great proportions, and it is a tribute to those concerned that the supplies of water, food, and ammunition were successfully maintained—mainly by the use of mules, though this tended to complicate the problem by increasing the amount of water and forage that had to be landed. Already some water has been found in the extension of Anzac territory, though it tends to dry up quickly, and it is hoped to carry on until the rains relieve the situation.

* Since this was written a telegram has been received to the effect that canteens have been established at Helles and Anzac. They will, however, need extension to Suvla and the Islands.

38. At Suvla also water has proved, and still proves, a difficulty. Inland on the plain there is plenty of water to be obtained by sinking wells, but on the beach there is none. The failure of the troops to push inland after landing on the 6th August placed a great strain on the resources at the beach. It is said that men mad with thirst deserted the firing line to return to the beach and fill their water-bottles, only to drain them dry before getting back, and distressing stories have been told of the sufferings of wounded men from thirst. This was certainly one of the principal secondary factors to account for the failure of this great opportunity. At Suvla, however, the water situation, if not entirely satisfactory, is improving. In the neighbourhood of the troops on the plain there is ample water. On the hills of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and at the beaches, water-borne supplies are still necessary. As late as the 18th August, however, no reservoirs were seen, except a few canvas and metal tanks improvised by the Navy at the original landing.

39. A great strain was thrown on the naval authorities by the non-arrival of tank vessels, which they had expected would arrive from England in August, and, owing to the loss of tank vessels by shell fire, a certain amount of improvisation had to be resorted to in the supply of water.

40. As already mentioned, however, the water problem should be solved by the advent of winter, when there is far more likely to be too much than too little.

Supplies.

41. The discussion of the water question, however, brings us straight to the heart of the vital problem which confronts us, viz., is it possible to supply our armies on the peninsula in late autumn and winter, when frequent north-easterly gales, accompanied by a good deal of sea and swell, varied by occasional south-westerly gales, must be anticipated?

42. Until the failure of the surprise attack at Suvla was definitely recognised, so great were the hopes aroused by this plan that it was difficult to get either naval or military officers to discuss the prospects and possibilities of a winter campaign. Latterly, however, both the Vice-Admiral, the G.O.C.-in-C., the C.G.S., and the D.Q.M.G. expressed the general opinion that it should be possible to maintain our armies on the peninsula in winter. It would not, however, be fair to pin them down to this until their examination of the question is complete. Nevertheless, some statement of the difficulties involved may be useful.

43. These difficulties arise originally from the fact that all the daily requirements of the army—munitions, food, forage, most of the water (up to the present), and fuel —have to be brought in by sea, as the portion of the peninsula in our occupation produces practically nothing of use for man or beast.

44. Even when the large transports could lie off the peninsula and discharge their cargoes straight ashore the problem was sufficiently complicated. But with the advent of the submarine this became impossible, and it was only the fortunate circumstance that considerable numbers of destroyers and trawlers were available (the latter having been sent out primarily for mine-sweeping) which averted a catastrophe. Since this occurred the large men-of-war and transports have remained in the more or less secure harbours of Mudros (in Lemnos Island), Kephalos, and more recently Suvla Bay, and have discharged their cargoes into small craft for conveyance to the peninsula.

As these harbours occupy a very important position in the system of supply, a short description of them and the landing-places in the peninsula may be useful.

Mudros.

45. Mudros has from the first been and remains the principal advanced base of these operations, where most of the large warships and transports lie. The harbour is protected by two anti-submarine nets and some light guns, searchlights, submarines, and patrols. A heavy net has been supplied, but it has not yet been found possible

to lay it out owing to technical difficulties. It is a large harbour affording safe anchorage in all weather, though in heavy gales trans-shipment may be interrupted for a short time.

Kephalos.

46. Kephalos, which is the headquarters of the G.O.C.-in-C., and the normal anchorage of the flagship ("Triad"), was originally used as an advanced base, mainly for the supply of water to Anzac and frozen meat both to the northern and southern areas. Since the arrival of the reinforcements for the battle of the 6th August and the occupation of Suvla Bay it has obtained enhanced importance, and has gained a position almost comparable with that of Lemnos. Most of the monitors, bulged cruisers, seaplane ships, kite balloon ships, and other vessels for the artillery support of the army both in the northern and southern areas lie there, and it has not been unusual for large transports containing water, mules, and even troops and ammunition for Suvla Bay to be sent there, in order to be at hand, if required, at short notice.

47. The objections to Kephalos are that it is not very strongly defended, and is entirely open to the north-east wind, which sometimes renders trans-shipment and even movement within the harbour impossible. In winter it is to be feared that this will often be the case. Even during the operations of the 6th August the hospital ships were obliged to go round to the other side of the island in order to render trans-shipment of wounded possible. Some ships, however, have been sunk on the west side of the bay to form a breakwater, which provides some shelter for lighters and smaller craft.

48. The defences consist of an anti-submarine net, without a gate, but with a large overlap between the two portions, and of indicator nets run out into deep water for a distance of some miles on either side of the bay. Men-of-war are relied on entirely for gun defence, and the "Exmouth" (usually between two colliers) and a French torpedo-proof battleship, as well as several monitors and cruisers are generally in harbour.

Suvla Bay.

49. During the recent operations in the northern area, Suvla Bay was at first used by large men-of-war and transports, an anti-submarine net being drawn across the bay for their security. Owing, however, to the failure of our troops to occupy the Anafarta and Sari Bair ridges, artillery was soon brought to bear on the bay. First field-gun fire drove the ships, including even the battleship "Triumph," to the very edge of the net, and a few days later (10th August) a 4-inch and heavy howitzer fire had succeeded in driving many transports by day out of the bay to seek refuge in Kephalos.

50 When Suvla Bay was selected as a landing-place it was hoped to find there an anchorage for large vessels, and to create facilities which would enable it to be used in almost all weathers. It was hoped by connecting it to Anzac by rail to make up for, or at any rate to supplement, the inadequate landing facilities there. The failure to gain the ridges has largely defeated these hopes. Ships at Suvla are between the devil (as represented by the guns ashore if they entered the bay) and the deep blue sea with its submarines, which have already found the bay and attacked balloon ships there, though fortunately without success. By day, at any rate, large ships run great risks inside the bay, though they might go in by night, if it was thought worth while.

51. At Suvla, therefore, until the ridges are won, as at Anzac and Cape Helles, we are faced with the probability that the work of disembarking stores, &c., will have to be performed mainly at night and by small craft, trans-shipping at Mudros, for it is doubtful whether Kephalos will be a practicable trans-shipment harbour in winter, when the north-east gales set in.

52. The contingency has therefore to be faced that both at Helles and Anzac periods of days, and even weeks, may elapse when it will be impossible to land or embark anything at all.

Landing Places in the Southern Area.

53. In the southern area several ships have been sunk at "W" beach (Lancashire landing) and a pier has been run out alongside them. Similarly at "V" beach (Sedd-el-Bahr Bay) the "River Clyde," with a pier alongside, provides landing facilities. It is hoped that these ships will afford sufficient shelter for disembarkation purposes in a north-east wind, though they are entirely exposed in a south-west wind, and it is understood they are to be filled with sand to increase their durability. They are, however, in the nature of an experiment, and it remains to be seen whether they will not break up in really heavy weather, sweeping with them the piers, or whether, even if they remain in place, they will afford sufficient lee in a heavy swell to render landing operations possible.

54. The obvious prophylactic is to build up as large a reserve as possible at Cape Helles. Before the operations of the 6th August it is understood that on one occasion the reserve had reached a month's supplies of food, but had never exceeded a week's supply of forage. Ammunition, of course, depends on the rate of expenditure, and it will evidently be the aim of the Turks to attack with the object of making us expend our reserves when bad weather sets in.

55. A minor, but not inconsiderable, difficulty at Cape Helles will be the evacuation of the sick and wounded, which is, under normal circumstances, carried out daily. If communication is interrupted and heavy fighting takes place there will be uncomfortably large accumulations in the clearing stations, which will have to be enlarged.

56. The moment a spell of fine weather supervenes there will be a rush to make good the drain on reserves and to evacuate the hospitals, and the success of these efforts will depend upon the small craft available and the extent to which the landing facilities remain unimpaired. Here again the Turks will find good opportunities for shelling the beaches.

57. The difficulties of maintaining the army in the southern area would be much reduced if Morto Bay could be used, as it is completely sheltered from the north-east and partially from the south-west. The Asiatic batteries, however, have rendered it altogether untenable for the present. This is the reason why the French General and his Staff are perpetually harping upon the desirability of a landing on the Asiatic shore. If unlimited troops were available this would undoubtedly be desirable, in view of the possibility of a winter campaign, but in existing circumstances it appears impossible.

Landing Places in the Northern Area.

58. At Anzac, before the landing at Suvla Bay, the position in winter threatened to be very precarious. For not only was there every probability of all communication with the shore being cut off, but it was feared that at times the sea might become so heavy as to wash away the piers and damage the piles of stores on the narrow beach.

59. It is hoped, however, that, provided the position at Suvla can be maintained, it will be possible to victual Anzac from Suvla. As already mentioned, it is proposed to run a narrow-gauge tramway, and eventually a motor railway from Suvla to Anzac. Until it can be protected by earthworks it will be liable to shelling and sniping, but should be sufficiently safe by night.

60. At Suvla itself piers have been constructed in two coves on the north side of the bay, where complete shelter is obtainable in north-east winds. Their principal objection is that reefs jutting from the land and covered by water restrict the approaches, and may prove inconvenient in a swell. A landing pier is also proposed for the south side of the bay, where there is deep water, and it is hoped to find shelter from south-west winds in cover not shown on the map. The possibility of utilising some small sandy coves north-east of Suvla Point in south-westerly winds is also under consideration. South of Nibrunesi Point the coast is steep-to, and provides admirable landing facilities in fine weather, well sheltered from the north-east, but the swell will

perhaps render these impracticable, even in north-easterly gales, and there is no protection from the south-west. These landing-places, like those at Suvla Bay, are exposed to shell fire.

61. Although the question was still under investigation at the time of my departure, the general opinion of experts seemed to be that the occupation of Suvla Bay, if properly followed up, would go far towards solving our difficulties in the northern area in the event of a winter campaign.

62. The policy of the G.O.C.-in-C. was understood to be to build up reserves everywhere for a minimum of thirty days' supply, to be raised, if possible, to forty-five days.

63. If the large transports continue to be shelled out of Suvla Bay the difficulties of this will be greatly accentuated, for the duty, not only of maintaining the considerable forces in this area, but also of building up the initial reserve, will fall on the small craft, and this difficulty will be still further increased whenever offensive operations are undertaken, for this throws much additional work on to the small craft both immediately before the attack in the accumulation of reserves of ammunition and in the transport of troops, and after the attack in the removal of wounded. In fact, if the reserve supplies are to be properly built up, it would seem almost indispensable that (if the enemy permits) there should in all areas be a period of quiescence before winter sets in.

64. It is impossible to read the foregoing remarks without realising the importance of pushing out ample reserves of ammunition and supplies of all kinds in order that they may be landed as soon as possible, and proper reserves of munitions, supplies, forage, ordnance stores, engineer stores, &c., built up ashore. No complaint, however, was heard as to the punctuality of the arrival of supplies, though of course all armies like to have as large a reserve of ammunition as possible.

Ships for Sinking.

65. It is also desirable that, if any old vessels are available for sinking, they should be sent out, as more ships are needed at Suvla and Kephalos to provide a lee. Any men-of-war or other ships suitable for this purpose that are earmarked for the "scrap heap" would be warmly welcomed by the Vice-Admiral.

Small Craft.

66. The main requirement, however, which perhaps transcends all others is small craft—*i.e.*, small cargo steamers, tugs, trawlers, motor-lighters, picket boats, seaworthy lighters, and motor-boats. It is to be feared that the wear and tear on this kind of craft may be very great indeed in the winter months. Even at the present time, whenever there is a moderately strong north-easterly gale, the shore at Kephalos is strewn with lighters, and a proportion of them cannot be salved. Similarly the wear and tear at the beaches on the peninsula is considerable, both from gunfire and bad weather, and salving under fire is very difficult. Wrecks are to be seen at all the beaches.

67. The Vice-Admiral is understood to consider that his immediate requirements in small craft will be met when those already on their way have arrived, and it is believed that these will suffice even if the reinforcements asked for by the G.O.C.-in-C. are given. But the Admiralty must be prepared for further demands to replace losses, and it is suggested that these, if available, should be sent to the station in advance, and before the winter gales render their transport difficult.

Floating Dock.

68. Another urgent requirement is a floating dock to take destroyers; and the Vice-Admiral lays great stress on this, having failed to obtain one on the station. It

is impossible to overrate the work of the destroyers, which have been veritable "maids of all work," being employed indifferently in anti-submarine work, patrol, mine-sweeping, transport of troops, supplies and water, artillery support to the troops, reconnaissance, despatch carrying, and many other duties. They have stood the test splendidly, and it is remarkable how high a proportion is maintained at a time fit for service. With the prospect, however, of a winter campaign, the provision of a floating dock is very important, if their efficiency is to be maintained—as it must be.

69. A dry dock capable of accommodating destroyers would also be available for the ketches.* The duties carried out by ketches are as important as those of destroyers. They have been employed on nearly all the same services as destroyers, and, in addition, are utilised for laying, maintaining, and towing the indicator nets, and for blockade and anti-submarine patrol work. They are based in the port of Kondria in Lemnos Island (next to Mudros), and have hitherto been looked after, as regards repairs, &c., mainly by the "Isis." They are under the immediate orders of Captain Heneage, R.N., on the "Hussar." The indicator net depôt is the old castle at Tenedos, where it is looked after by a R.N.R. officer who has some hired Greek refugee labourers to assist him. The supply of nets and floats is amply sufficient at present, and in excess of the number which the drifters can cope with.

70. If these vessels are to be maintained in an efficient state, as is highly desirable unless a much larger number are to be supplied, the provision of a dry dock is important.

Hulks.

71. Another urgent desideratum for a winter campaign is the provision of hulks for use in Mudros and perhaps in Kephalos. At present, when a transport arrives at Mudros, every endeavour is made to unload her as rapidly as possible and to despatch her contents to its destination. It sometimes occurs, however, that a portion of the cargo cannot be utilised at once, and when this portion happens to be on the top (as is sometimes unavoidable, particularly when the ship is sent direct from England to Mudros without being rearranged at the depôt at Alexandria) it is very awkward to get at the cargo underneath, which may be urgently required. For example, a case (merely an everyday one) came under notice where some engineer stores (picks, shovels, &c.), which were urgently required, were buried among a mass of mining timber, which at the time could not be be utilised; there was nowhere to put the latter, which eventually had to be pitched into the harbour and tied into rafts to await the time when they would be required. A much more extreme incident occurred some weeks ago, when some stores urgently required in the peninsula were found to be underneath some railway trucks; there was nowhere to deposit the latter, and eventually the ship was taken to sea and the trucks were dropped into deep water!

72. As Mudros does not lend itself to the construction of deep-water quays on a large scale, or piers of such size that bulky stores could be accommodated on them, and as Alexandria is rather far off to ensure the final rearrangement of cargoes being correct (besides which in times of pressure ships do not invariably call at Alexandria), it would be a great economy if hulks or large barges, or perhaps landing stages such as are used at Liverpool or even on the Thames, could be sent out to serve as dumping spaces or warehouses for stores that cannot immediately be utilised.

73. There is another reason for doing this, especially in winter. As already mentioned, there may be long periods when the peninsula cannot be regularly supplied. Unless the transports can be unloaded into hulks, &c., they will perforce have to stay in Mudros until the advent of better weather renders it possible for the small craft to discharge to the peninsula, and the lock-up of shipping will be worse than ever. As it is, good seagoing transports such as the "Arragon," "Minnetonka," a ship allotted to one of the seaplane ships, and possibly other ships are locked up doing nothing but indispensable depôt duties, which seems almost an outrage with the present shortage of shipping. Both economy and efficiency, and perhaps actual necessity, therefore demand the supply of hulks or landing stages for a winter campaign, if it is possible to procure them.

* Ketch is a generic term employed at the Dardanelles to indicate either a trawler or a drifter, the more technical term only being employed when a ship of that particular class is referred to.

Motor Boats.

74. Mention must also be made of the urgent need for sea-going motor boats for use in the harbours. As the Admiralty have been fully informed as to the vital urgency of this, it is not proposed to traverse the ground again here.

Packing.

75. One point to which attention may perhaps be drawn here (though it is not a "requirement" to be supplied for a winter campaign) is the need for very careful packing at home. In all parts of the command instances were given of waste of energy due to faulty packing, *e.g.*, a machine would arrive without the bolts and nuts required to piece it together. In no branch was this more conspicuous than in the aeroplane service.

Aircraft.

76. It is not proposed to discuss the aerial services here at any length. They are in a state of reorganisation by Colonel Sykes, who has only recently taken up his duties, and every confidence is felt in the future. A great many new machines are being provided, and the great defect of the past, viz., the multiplicity of types (eleven different types were seen in twenty-five machines), is being corrected as far as possible. The unsatisfactory aerodrome at Tenedos, which was altogether too remote from G.H.Q., is being left to the French, who have an admirable and well-equipped service there, forming a contrast not flattering to our own. Already the British aerial services are in course of concentration at Kephalos, which, though not an ideal place (at present none exists) is preferable to Tenedos.

77. The main need of the aerial service is more aeroplane pilots. Those at present available have, many of them, been continuously employed since the beginning of the operations at the Dardanelles and before that in Flanders, and are very worn out. Several have done an average of over 200 hours in the air at the Dardanelles alone. Some have sustained accidents, with the result that they cannot fly at all.

78. Apart from pilots, motor-boats are the main requirement. At present if an aeroplane falls into the sea it often cannot be salved, merely for want of a fairly fast motor-boat.

79. The seaplanes had proved rather a disappointment up to quite recently, as they could not fly high enough, owing to the weight of their floats, to reconnoitre or "spot" for artillery over the land without being within effective range of the enemy's guns and rifles. The recent exploit, however, of torpedoing ships in the Dardanelles and Marmora has aroused great enthusiasm, and the possibility is being discussed of mounting machine-guns in seaplanes to enable them to emulate and supplement the exploits of the submarines by holding up and sinking the caiques, which avoid the submarines by hugging the coast in shallow water. Colonel Sykes is fully alive to these possibilities, and he has among the sea-planists some very enterprising and intrepid officers, who only ask for opportunity to undertake any risk.

80. The balloon ships are a great asset, and are the pet aversion of the enemy, who ceases fire the moment they ascend (sometimes with "dummy" men!), and they are the continual object of his attacks by gunfire, aeroplane, and submarine. It would be as well to anticipate some losses and be ready to replace them.

81. One airship had been landed by the 19th August, and the construction of a shed was well advanced, but no flights had taken place. Some doubts are entertained as to the probable utility of these airships so late in the season, owing to the suddenness with which squalls are wont to arise.

Summary of Administrative Requirements.

82. To sum up, then, if the Dardanelles operations are to be pushed to a successful conclusion, two main heads of policy must be adopted to guide our administrative

preparations. Firstly, preparation must be made for a sustained and vigorous offensive in the early future, and this necessitates the provision of drafts and ammunition in advance of requirements, as well as reinforcements on a generous scale. And secondly, the possibility of a winter campaign must be faced, and this will probably involve the provision of heating appliances for the trenches, improved roads, tramways, and railways, and probably aerial cable tramways at Anzac, warm clothing, baths, canteens, large supplies in advance of requirements in order that reserves may be built up in the peninsula, enlarged hospital accommodation in the peninsula, condemned men-of-war and other vessels to be sunk as breakwaters, small cargo steamers, tugs, trawlers, motor lighters, picket boats, ordinary lighters and motor-boats in advance of requirements to replace casualties (N.B.—A certain number of tugs and lighters are being taken up at the Piræus); a floating dock for destroyers and trawlers, hulks or landing stages to act as dumping places for gear which cannot be landed at once, and, in addition, there will be ever-increasing demands for Greek and Egyptian labour. For the aircraft service more aeroplane pilots and motor-boats must be supplied, and additional balloon ships should be got ready.

83. Notwithstanding the enormous administrative difficulties of a winter campaign it is not too much to hope that they will be successfully surmounted if all demands are promptly met, and, so far as possible, prepared for in advance at home. Admittedly the dangers of the situation are very considerable, but much is to be hoped from those who have already surmounted such overwhelming obstacles.

Part III.—THE CONDITION OF THE RIVAL ARMIES.

84. The tactical situation and the administrative needs of the army for a continuance of the campaign have now been explained. Before discussing the future policy of this campaign it may be useful to pass some comments on the fighting value of the Allied and Turkish armies.

85. If the Intelligence Department reports are to be believed, the *morale* of the Turkish troops should be very low. In regard to the strength of the forces to be encountered, their distribution, the number of guns, and the defensive preparations, the intelligence service has been, on the whole, satisfactory. But on the question of the *morale* of the enemy's troops it has been misleading, though not necessarily inaccurate. There is evidence of the best kind—prisoners captured, orders, diaries, &c., which have proved accurate in most questions of fact—that the Turkish troops are now composed of second-rate material; the territorial system of recruiting has ceased to apply, and the prisoners in one captured regiment were found to be drawn from all parts of Turkey; officers are rarely captured, which tends to confirm the prisoners' accounts that they disappear before an action, and trained officers are known to be scarce; the men are warned that they will be fired on if they evacuate their trenches or try to surrender, and this has been known to occur. The physique of prisoners taken lately is below that of earlier days; untrained and half trained men are often brought into the ranks; prisoners are contented after capture, and unwilling to return; the war is unpopular, and our submarine officers have boarded a hospital ship and drunk damnation to the Germans with the Turkish officers; service in the Gallipoli Peninsula is notoriously unpopular, and the losses have been tremendously heavy. Perhaps in these circumstances the Intelligence Department hardly deserves censure if it anticipated an enfeebled resistance to our last onslaught.

86. Nevertheless, the incontestable fact remains that the Turkish troops are not in the least demoralised, and in the recent actions have fought as they never fought before. Not only did they defend themselves bravely, but their counter-attacks were delivered with the utmost vigour and were often crowned with success. Except at Anzac, where they are completely dominated, they hold their own in everyday trench warfare, and they are particularly proficient in warfare with hand grenades.

87. As already mentioned, drafts are furnished regularly and absorbed quickly. The troops are very fairly equipped (boots are rather a weak point), well led, and, so far, sufficiently supplied, the monotony of their service rations being eked out with dainties supplied by some patriotic society. Like ourselves, they have their water

difficulties. There is no evidence of serious sickness among them. They appear to possess unlimited supplies of small-arms ammunition, judged by the reckless prodigality with which they blaze it away at night, though their orders often warn them to be more sparing. In fact, the one indication of shaky *morale* is their "jumpiness" after dark. They are not exactly lavish in their expenditure of gun ammunition, but they appear to have ample supplies for field-guns. There are signs that the heavier guns are running rather short of ammunition, and most of the recent long-distance shelling has been with high-velocity naval (4·1-inch) guns. Recently also a large proportion of their shells have failed to burst. They rarely waste ammunition, and only fire at obvious targets, but these are so numerous as to be positively disconcerting to the enemy gunner, owing to the commanding positions occupied. During three weeks' stay no single instance occurred of a Turkish artillery preparation for an attack on a scale comparable with that adopted by the Germans, French, or ourselves. Yet there was a continuous and discriminating fire every day—that is, rather harassing, if not very deadly.

88. The Turks fight absolutely straight, and give and take hard knocks without descending to the abominable methods of the Germans. Poison gas and poison bombs are conspicuous by their absence. Hospitals and hospital ships (which lie comparatively close in shore) have been respected, and, so far as our submarines have been able to ascertain, the Turkish hospital ships have been used only for their legitimate purpose. There is a certain respect, and almost liking, in all ranks of the British army for their opponents, which is believed to be reciprocated, and the bitterness and hatred for the enemy so often met with in France is not conspicuous.

89. On the whole, then, the Turk must be taken very seriously as a fighting-man.

90. The British troops vary considerably. The Australians and New Zealanders have a splendid *morale*, and their discipline, if unorthodox, appears to produce satisfactory results. "Their's not to reason why, their's but to do or die" has no place in their military system. The Australasian troops are perpetually discussing the situation in all its bearings, and like to know the reasons for operations before they undertake them. Their recent successes are the best guarantee of their efficiency. Their health is satisfactory on the whole, but in Egypt last winter they were found to be rather susceptible to pulmonary complaints, and this causes some apprehension as to their health in the severe winter which sometimes sets in in the north-eastern Mediterranean. They consume very large quantities of drugs, and go sick for rather trivial causes. Their principal needs are rest, canteens, and recreation.

91. The troops in the southern area consist mainly of divisions which have become acclimatised and inured to the hard conditions of this war. Some, notably the Naval Division, are very exhausted, and have not much fight left in them, unless they are thoroughly rested and refitted. Others, however, and notably the redoubtable XXIXth Division, even though tired, are still full of fight. Latterly very little progress has been made by the Allies in this section, and not much is to be expected, at any rate, not until the battalions are completed up to full strength.

92. The French troops are kept better up to strength than the British, and are in every way well found. Their aerodrome, for example, compares most favourably with ours. They have a rest camp at Tenedos, and there is a regular turnover of their troops, just as is aimed at in the case of our own troops in the rest camps at Lemnos and Kephalos.

93. The newly arrived British troops have varied very much in quality, and it is perhaps too early to pass judgment on them. The XIIIth Division, which was the first to arrive, and spent some time in the trenches, performed most brilliantly on the 6th August. The XIth Division, which arrived second, and part of which was tried in the trenches, and the whole of which was exercised as a division at Lemnos, fought creditably. The Xth Division, one brigade of which was detached to Anzac, and which had no opportunity before the action to exercise together, did not distinguish itself. And the LIIIrd (Territorial Welsh) Division, landed straight from the transports, failed altogether. Thus the military qualities shown by the troops were in direct proportion to their opportunities for obtaining local knowledge and

experience, and justify the policy always insisted on both by Sir John French and Sir Ian Hamilton, when opportunity offers, to accustom the troops gradually to fighting conditions.

94. It would be difficult to exaggerate how much the efficiency of a unit depends on its commander. Again and again this has been demonstrated in the peninsula, and the success of the Australasians must be largly attributed to their admirable leaders. A policy of ruthless weeding-out of inefficient commanding officers would probably be fully justified in the result if more efficient officers could be found to take their place. Warfare at the Dardanelles requires exceptional stamina and nerve, qualities which are most likely to be found in young men. It is better to employ men who have reputations to make than those who have reputations to lose. Sir Ian Hamilton has called for the names of Lieutenant-Colonels and even Majors who are recommended for service as Brigadiers, and it is to be hoped that this policy will produce good results. The difficulty is that so many of the most promising young officers are killed or wounded. Even Brigadiers sustain heavy casualties—no less than five were placed *hors de combat* during my stay of three weeks.

95. The D.M.S. described the health of the army as a whole as good. There is some diarrhœa, dysentery, and influenza, but it is diminishing, and apart from this there is very little serious disease. Nearly all the troops have been inoculated against cholera and enteric.*

96. The discipline of the troops as a whole, though perhaps not of the highest order, mainly owing to the lack of experienced officers, is not a cause for misgiving. Regulations as regards bathing, &c., are rather difficult to enforce. In the battles following the 6th August there was a certain lack of discipline among the new troops, some of whom left the firing line to seek for water.

97. If the question was asked as to whether the Turkish army in Gallipoli or the Allied force was the better fighting machine, the answer would be difficult to give. The Allies are better equipped and supplied with all the accessories of war – artillery, ammunition, aircraft, supplies, naval co-operation, &c.; the leadership is about equal; but the super-excellence of the Turkish soldier in defence, his superior staying power in this climate, and his local knowledge, bring the forces man for man to about an equality.

* Since this information was obtained the secret telegrams show a serious increase in the rate of sickness. Possibly this may be in part due to a reaction after the recent great efforts, the failure of which produced great disappointment.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY C. R. HARRISON.—1/9/1915.

VERY SECRET.

PART IV.

REMARKS ON FUTURE POLICY.

98. The Government may well ask themselves whether they are justified in continuing a campaign which makes so tremendous a toll on the country in human life and material resources. "How much longer," they may ask, "is this running sore to continue to sap our strength? We were asked for three Divisions in order to secure success, and we gave five. We deprived France of ammunition and poured it into the Dardanelles. Yet success has never come. Why should we succeed any better if we provide what is now asked?" It is evident that every alternative must be examined before we are committed to so dangerous and speculative an operation as a winter campaign in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

99. Apart from the scheme already sketched out, the different courses open to us would appear to be as follows:-

(a) To resume the naval attack on the Narrows.

(b) To find a pretext for withdrawal from the campaign.

(c) To arrive at an arrangement with the Turks after obtaining the consent of Russia.

NAVAL ATTACK.

100. A few responsible naval officers are to be found at the Dardanelles, who were present at the abortive naval attack on the Narrows, and who are convinced that, if renewed on the following day it would have succeeded -- though even they admit that in all probability the Fleet, if it had effected a passage, would have failed to achieve any great success.

101. These same officers now hold that the Fleet, in order to relieve the army, should renew the attempt. They point out that, whereas submarines can never entirely interrupt the water-borne communications of the Army in Gallipoli, two or three battleships, with a few destroyers and mine weepers to protect them against submarines, provisioned for a month, could do so, and in addition could combine with ships in the Gulf of Xeros to interrupt the Turkish communications across the isthmus of Bulair. In making the passage of the Straits they would destroy all the boats, and the Gallipoli Peninsula, entirely isolated, would fall. This group of officers has worked the operation out in detail and believes that with proper preparation and a surprise their object could be achieved.

102. Attractive though this bold proposition is, and capable and brave though its adherents have shown themselves to be, it must be admitted that the overwhelming majority of naval officers in the Eastern Mediterranean are utterly opposed to it. The Vice-Admiral is not lacking in dash or courage, and he has the confidence of the Fleet. If he proposed the plan -- and he has considered it earnestly and long -- the Government would be obliged to give it their earnest consideration and might be justified in sanctioning it, provided they felt satisfied that the possible loss of the whole force engaged would not unduly weaken our naval superiority.

103. It would, however, be a mistake for the Government to order an attack of this kind except in the last resort, or in any way to urge the Vice-Admiral to a course to which he is opposed.

WITHDRAWAL FROM GALLIPOLI.

104. Two questions arise in connection with the second proposal. Is it tactically possible? Is it politically possible, having regard to the place that prestige occupies in our system of Imperial Defence?

105. Tactically it would be a matter of the utmost difficulty, but plans for it have been considered as an emergency arrangement.

106. The general view of responsible military officers who have considered the question appears to be that, with the exception of wounded men and perhaps of rearguards the bulk of the actual troops could be withdrawn if very careful preparations were made. It appears to be considered however that many guns could not be withdrawn, and that, besides the guns and wounded, a large booty would have to be left behind or destroyed.

107. The answer given above to the first question affects the answer to the second. The Turks in announcing the withdrawal would not underrate the captures of prisoners, guns, and booty, and would represent that we had been driven into the sea. Anyone can judge as to the effect of this on India and Egypt.

108. It is conceivable that some means might be found of "saving our face" in the event of withdrawal, e.g. to explain that it was done to save Servia from Austria and Bulgaria. The difficulty about this is that the Army in Gallipoli is not equipped with land transport, and a great deal of preparation would be required to render it mobile, even if it could

be maintained by the Salonica railway, a point regarding which misgivings are permissible. Probably it could not arrive in time to save a disaster in Servia.

109. An attractive alternative would be to make a dash into Syria, to capture Damascus, cut the Hejaz railway, and occupy Syria. The Powers which had conquered both Bagdad and Damascus would hardly be without prestige in the East, even if they had failed to take Constantinople itself. The capture of Damascus should be a comparatively easy business, but it would involve the assembly and transport of a quantity of suitable land transport.

110. With Russian troops on the western side of Lake Van, and with British troops nearing Bagdad, and with an Anglo-French force in occupation of Syria, some progress would have been made in the dismemberment of Turkey.

111. This idea, however, does not commend itself to Sir Ian Hamilton, and there would be great reluctance among the Staff at the Dardanelles to face the tremendous tactical difficulties of a withdrawal.

AN ARRANGEMENT WITH TURKEY.

112. The third proposal is, while making all preparations for a winter campaign, to enter into negotiations with Turkey. First, however, it would be necessary to obtain the consent of Russia, to say nothing of France, and Italy, and one almost hesitates to mention the subject until this has been done.

113. At first sight it would seem most dangerous to the cause of the Allies to make such a proposal to Russia.

Badly beaten in her main theatre of war, with her army in full retreat, it may seem that Russia has nothing to look for politically from the war except the acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits. To deprive her of this prospect would, it may be urged, cause her to lose all interest in the war and drive her into a separate peace despite treaties to the contrary.

114. On a strategical view of the situation, however, it would seem more in Russia's interest to obtain the opening of the Straits at once than to wait for the definite collapse of Turkey, which may be delayed indefinitely. If the Straits were opened Russia could start to re-equip herself, which it is impossible for her to do effectively otherwise instead of waiting for the collapse of Turkey.

115. The question would have to be discussed very frankly with the Russian representatives and might be stated in terms somewhat as follows:-

"When the Western Allies decided to attack the Dardanelles they had two main objects in view; the first, strategical, to open a line of communications to the Black Sea, in order that Russia might equip herself from the Western markets and export her grain; the second was political and aimed at rallying the Balkan States to our cause. Russia then at once represented that, in the event of success, her national aspirations demanded that Constantinople and the Straits should fall to her. This demand was quite outside the strategical objects for which the Allies entered on this operation, and involved on the part both of Great Britain and France a great concession of principle and a reversal of previous policy; from this concession of principle

neither country has any desire to recede. The practical question now arises, however, as to whether the political objects which Russia seeks to gain at Constantinople can be achieved without jeopardising the cause of the Allies, not only in the West, but in Russia itself. The Dardanelles campaign has proved a far more formidable enterprise than was originally anticipated, and has cost the Western Allies very heavy losses both in men and material. After a very exhausting summer campaign they find themselves faced with the prospect of an even more arduous and exacting winter campaign, the result of which it is difficult to foresee with certainty. If the campaign is continued the Allies will do their best to achieve success at an early date, but they cannot conceal from their Ally that it involves uncertainties from which the possibility (even if a remote one) of a great disaster, cannot be excluded. Such a disaster would, they believe, have a most far-reaching and prejudicial effect on the cause of the Allies throughout the world. Moreover, the Western Allies,are bound to admit that the conquest of Constantinople may, even under favourable conditions, take many months to achieve, and they must point out that in the meantime the urgent need of Russia for the re-establishment of communication with the outside world cannot be met. In these circumstances they have felt bound to discover whether there is any method of achieving the strategical and political desiderata for which they commenced this enterprise without the dangers, delays, and terrible drain on their resources involved in a winter campaign. At this point it should be made clear that no overtures of

any sort or kind have yet been made to Turkey, which would prejudice Russia's political interests, or will be made without Russian consent. At the same time it should be pointed out that the great obstacle to the early realisation of our original strategical and political aim is absolutely barred by the Russian insistence on the occupation of Constantinople. There is some reason to hope that, if Turkey could be guaranteed the retention of Constantinople, or possibly even its internationalisation under Turkish suzerainty, she might throw over the Germans, make peace, and open the Straits; but, so long as Constantinople is in jeopardy there is no prospect of this, and the Turks will obstinately continue their step by step defence, and will even face a winter campaign in Gallipoli, which is as full of difficulties and uncertainties to them as to the Allies. Similarly in the Balkans the whole attitude of the nation would change if an assurance were given that Constantinople and the Straits were not to pass into Russian control. It should be represented to Russia that it is more important for her to open the Straits immediately, in order that she may re-equip herself and bring the war to an end next year, than to wait for a solution of the problem, which if reached would satisfy her political aspirations, but may never come about, and is fraught with the possibility of irretrievable disaster to the cause of the Allies. In short, Russia should be asked to postpone to some future date her political aspirations in Constantinople, in the interests of winning the war.

116. Such should be the main lines of the communication to Russia, but it might also be insinuated tactfully that Russia,

owing to her great exertions elsewhere in the cause of the Allies, has not been able to give the practical assistance at the Dardanelles which was hoped for, and that it is hardly reasonable to expect the Allies to take such tremendous risks and make such sacrifices for a cause which is solely to the benefit of Russia, when all strategical advantages can be obtained without them.

117. So far as Turkey is concerned the difficulties of opening a negotiation do not appear insuperable; they should, of course, be timed to follow some success to the Allied arms such as the capture of the Sari Bair Ridge. The position of the Allies is difficult, but that of the Turks is far from enviable.

118. The harrassment of their communications become ever greater. The number of submarines normally in the Marmora has been raised from an occasional one to a continuous one and an occasional two; very soon there will always be two and occasionally three. The seaplanes are also beginning to worry their seaborne communications. Very recently a systematic attack of their communications over Bulair, by Monitors supported by balloons and seaplanes has been substituted for the comparatively ineffective destroyer patrol. It is desirable that the importance of this should continually be impressed on the local command. When winter comes their roads both in Europe and Asia will become impassable for heavy traffic. And, as has been pointed out in this paper the Allies at Anzac are almost within a stone's throw of points from which they menace the communications of the Gallipoli army very seriously. In these circumstances, though the Turks may be able to hang on, if inspired by the thought that they are dying in the last ditch for Constantinople, it is difficult to believe that they

would not welcome a peace, if guaranteed possession of their capital. The economic isolation of their country, and the position in Mesopotamia and the unrest in many parts of the country should further urge them to such a course.

119. They would have a further inducement to come to terms if Russia could only interrupt their coal supply more effectually in the Black Sea, as the Turkish Navy, sea transport, railways, munition factories, bakeries, etc., are absolutely dependent on it. In spite of our many representations on the subject Russia has never succeeded in an effective interruption and further requests should be made to her on the subject.

120. The doubt, of course, remains as to whether the Turkish Sinbad can shake the German old man of the sea off his back, but many versed in Turkish affairs believe this to be possible.

121. Summing up, the steps to carry out this proposal would be somewhat as follows:-

(1) To come to an arrangement with France:

(2) To discuss the question very frankly with Russia:

(3) If Russia consents, and only on this condition, to open a negotiation with Turkey through some very informal channel(suggestions on this head can be made, if required):

(4) Meanwhile to make unceasing preparations for a winter campaign.

(5) Italy would also have to be settled with.

122. Both the Vice-Admiral and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief stated they would have no objection from their respective points of view to such a negotiation, provided that

no initiative in the matter was expected to come from them or from the forces under their command, and provided that preparations for a winter campaign were continued simultaneously. If this plan was adopted it would be advisable to keep them both in ignorance.

123. It should be noted that all authorities on the Balkans and on Turkey, with whom the writer had opportunities of conversation, insisted on the objections which all Balkan States have to a Russian occupation of Constantinople. These included Sir Francis Elliott, Sir Rennell Rodd, Sir Valentine Chirol, Mr. Gregory, and others.

---

124. Such then are the main alternatives to a sustained offensive at the Dardanelles. It has not even been thought worth while to mention further efforts in the Balkans. If Bulgaria can be induced to march, so much the better for the Allies, but it is difficult to believe that she will do so while the Russian reverses continue, unless we ourselves obtain a great success on the Gallipoli peninsula. Meanwhile our offers to Bulgaria are causing exasperation in Greece and Servia. Moreover, there is no question that they have lowered the prestige of the Allies in the Balkans. Both British and Greek residents in Greece remarked this. (A Greek officer in the train was overheard to say that of course the Allies needed Bulgaria or Greece at the Dardanelles, because their army there was "a mere rabble.") At any rate our plans must clearly be made quite independently of Bulgarian co-operation.

125. Another alternative, which has not been considered seriously here, is a policy of "holding on." Nearly as many troops are required for this as for a renewed offensive, and the amount of ground to be gained, at Anzac at any rate, to place us within reasonable distance of a big success, is so small that it would be preposterous not to make the attempt.

126. The materials for the decision, so far as local considerations are concerned, have been set forth above as fully as possible, but, if any further details are required, they will be furnished. The final decision, however, must depend on a wider appreciation of the situation than is possible to one who for some weeks has been almost wholly out of touch with news of world-wide affairs.

. . . . . .

Anexo XIII: *Preparations for a winter campaign at the Dardanelles,* 23 de outubro de 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 42/4/16

Descrição:

Memorando que explica todas as condições e necessidades para continuar a campanha de Galípoli no inverno.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. *October* 1915.

SECRET.

G.-29.

31

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

Preparations for a Winter Campaign at the Dardanelles.

Second Memorandum by the Secretary.

(Previous Memorandum, G.-22.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
October 23, 1915.

SECRET.

PREPARATIONS FOR A WINTER CAMPAIGN AT THE DARDANELLES.

1. THE following progress report, to show the developments which have occurred since the last report dated the 22nd September, has been prepared for the information of the War Committee.

Detailed comments on the latter report (G.–22) have been received from officers at the Dardanelles, and their corrections have been embodied in this Memorandum.

At the 32nd meeting of the War Committee, held on the 24th September, 1915, the Secretary was directed to call the attention of the Admiralty and War Office to the importance of pushing on with the arrangements for the winter campaign in the Gallipoli Peninsula. Correspondence on this subject is printed in the Appendix. From this it will be seen that the War Office expect to be able to meet all the requirements mentioned in the previous report (G.–22), with one minor exception.

General Headquarters.

2. The General Headquarters have been moved from their exposed position on the west side of Kephalos Bay to a more sheltered situation at the foot of the hills at the opposite side of the bay.

Meteorological Conditions.

3. The probable weather conditions during the next six months were summarised in the last report. For convenience of reference, however, it may be well to repeat them for November and December. These are as follows :—

—	November.	December.
Mean temperature F.	52·7	46·4
Mean daily minimum temperature ..	40·3	43·2
Mean of absolute minimum of month F...	36·1	33·4
Days of snowfall	..	..
Rainfall—		
Kavala	2·72	3·23
London	2·34	2·20
Mean rainy days	8	9
Average number of days of strong winds.	4·3	3
Maximum number of days of strong winds in any year—		
North	5	4
South	5	3
Maximum number of moderate and strong winds from the south in any year ..	7	7
Maximum number of gales of over two days' duration in any year	1,	3,

4. Up to the end of September hardly any rain fell, except for one or two storms about the middle of the month. This is in accordance with expectations, and is fortunate, since the weather-proof material for trenches

and dug-outs had not been landed at the Peninsula. With hardly an exception, the wind during September was a steady blow from the north, with consequent calm weather on the beaches. From the 27th to the 29th September there was a blow from the south, and the Vice-Admiral reports that the piers and other arrangements on the beaches stood well; traffic was interrupted, but not to the extent anticipated. The nights have been cold, and officers speak of requiring three blankets at night.

5. On the night of the 8th–9th October a sudden southerly gale arose which did some damage to the piers and lighters at Anzac and Suvla. The Vice-Admiral reports, however, that he will be able to maintain during the winter the force now on the Peninsula with all units at full strength.

Supplies on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

6. The state of progress as regards the accumulation of supplies on the Peninsula may be gauged from the two following tables:—

RATION Strength on the Peninsula.

—	Men.		Animals.	
	8th September.	6th October.	8th September.	6th October.
Cape Helles .	27,294	30,000	6,400	6,400
Anzac ..	33,152	31,000	2,300	2,200
Suvla ..	45,404	46,000	4,200	3,700

ACCUMULATED Supplies.

—	Supplies.		Hay.		Grain.		Wood.	
	8th Sept.	6th Oct.	8th Sept.	6th Oct.	8th Sept.	6th Oct.	8th Sept.	6th Oct.
	Days.	Days.	Days.	Days.	Days.	Days.	Days.	Days.
Cape Helles	30	43	13	12	13	17	9	14
Anzac ..	15	35	5	4·5	8	11	1	4
Suvla ..	18	30	6	10	8	16	5	..

There were also on the same date at Lemnos 36,000 men and 2,500 animals, and for these there were on shore 8 days' supplies and forage.

At Imbros there were 6,000 men and 250 animals, with 40 days' supplies and 40 days' forage.

In Egypt there were nearly 27,000 men and 33,722 animals.

The total ration strength, therefore, of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (excluding French and 7,000 Indians on the Peninsula) was 180,000 men and 45,800 animals.

7. From the above it will be seen that as regards all essentials, such as meat and biscuits, the reserves at Cape Helles have surpassed the original 30 days' standard, and this standard has been reached at Anzac

and Suvla. As anticipated in the last report, the standard to be aimed at has been raised and is now fixed at 42 days. Considerable leeway still has to be made up as regards forage and wood; and hospital reserve supplies on the Peninsula (but not on the station) are reported to be rather short.

8. The principal difficulties in building up the supply reserves are still those of labour and small craft, which will be discussed further on in this report. Some idea of the magnitude of the task of transporting, landing, and distributing the supplies for the army on the Peninsula may be gained from a recent expert calculation, according to which for Anzac and Suvla a daily tonnage of 120–130 tons has to be landed for supplies alone, and ordnance and other stores raise this to 150–180 tons daily at the very least. Although the Turks can probably subsist on a far lower scale than our men, the calculation is also suggestive as to the enemy's difficulties, when the perpetual harassment of his communications is taken into account. One important item of information recently received is that Anzac and Suvla are now both supplied mainly from ships lying inside the net at Suvla Bay (notwithstanding the shelling) and not, as has been indicated, wholly from Mudros and Kephalos.

Canteens.

9. There is information that on the 23rd September the canteen stores were coming along well, and by the 29th September 6,000 packages had been sent up to Imbros, where the big wholesale canteen has been opened. Branches were to be opened at the various beaches in the second week in October and supplies can already be obtained from Kephalos by units.

Water.

10. The anxiety regarding water has not yet been wholly removed, as sufficient rain has not yet fallen to affect the situation very materially. The position, however, has materially improved, and a full five days' reserve in tanks over and above what is procurable in each of the areas is probably by this time available.

11. At Mudros the water situation is now satisfactory.

12. At Imbros the position has always been fairly satisfactory, and the Navy have commenced the erection of two sets of distilling plant which will ensure an ample supply of pure water in all circumstances.

13. At Helles it is anticipated that the troops will very shortly be quite independent of sea-borne water. There is reported to be plenty of water about, reservoirs have been constructed, and the matter of distribution is in hand.

14. At Anzac the reserve in tanks is now reported to be 80,000 gallons, as compared with 75,000 gallons in the last report. Water is reported to be scarce on Anzac's right flank, but on the left flank there is a fair

supply. A distilling plant is to be laid at the foot of a cliff, in order to avoid the shelling.

15. At Suvla the water supply has turned out to be rather a more difficult problem than was indicated in the last report. There is reported to be a good deal of water in wells, but distribution is a great difficulty owing to the constant shell fire. At present large quantities of sea-borne water are still being used at Suvla. The erection of a distilling plant is under consideration, but it is difficult to find a spot free from fire. When the rains come these difficulties will cease and there will be too much water at Suvla. If the troops at Suvla could only push on about 2 miles the water question would at once be solved, as it is reported that the whole of the area inland has an abundance.

16. Mr. Becby Thompson's deep well-boring machines left London before the end of September, and should be arriving by this time.

Ordnance Stores.

17. Ordnance depôts have been established at each beach, but it is not possible in case of Ordnance Stores to tabulate supplies on a daily scale. At Helles large excavations have been made for ammunition.

Small Craft.

18. The auxiliary vessels and small craft at the Dardanelles are shown in the following table :—

Type of Vessel.	Now at the Dardanelles.	On Passage or Under Orders:	Total.
Large water service vessels ..	8	2	10
Tank vessels (100 to 450 tons) ..	10	..	10
Motor water tank lighters ..	12	2	14
Auxiliary mine sweepers* ..	7	..	7
Passenger ferry vessels* ..	8	2	10†
Armed boarding steamers* ..	9	..	9
Cargo ferry service vessels* ..	12	6	18
Motor lighters (150 tons) ..	50	24	74
Tugs‡	14	8	22
Ketches (trawlers and drifters) ..	116	6	122
Air service ships	4	..	4
Salvage ships	2	..	2
Motor hospital lighters. ..	2	..	2

* Are all used for transporting troops when required.
† Includes four net-laying paddle steamers.
‡ These twenty-two tugs have been sent out from England. Some others have been obtained locally, but are now nearly worn out.
There are also a large number of lighters, small craft, water tanks, &c., obtained locally.

19. There are still constant complaints on the part of military officers as to the insufficiency of the number of lighters and small craft.

20. The Vice-Admiral has recently asked for a small addition to the auxiliary craft to allow for a margin for the winter, viz., three or four cargo carriers and six or

eight new tugs. Six of the former and eight of the latter have been obtained, and are now on their way out. He also reports that the number of motor lighters would be ample.

Motor and Steam Boats.

21. The approximate number of motor boats at Mudros is sixty, including twenty-six belonging to and maintained by the Army (there are believed to be several other launches, motor and steam, obtained by the R.E. Department and Director of Works, but we have no information about them).

22. There are thirty-nine picket and other steam boats, besides those lent by the Fleet, and five more picket boats are now being sent out to replace casualties.

23. There is a good deal of evidence that the motor boat situation has improved, but it is almost impossible to have too many of such craft, and it is clear that the military officers are not wholly satisfied. All demands made by the Vice-Admiral for motor boats and steam pinnaces have, however, been satisfied by the Admiralty.

Floating Dock.

24. Vice-Admiral de Robeck has applied for a floating dock or pontoon for the use of his smaller vessels. A large floating pontoon of suitable type is being sent from Aden.

Depôt Ships.

25. It is the intention of the Admiralty to replace both the "Aragon" (the staff ship at Mudros) and the "Minnetonka" (the Ordnance Depôt ship at Mudros) when suitable vessels can be found, and to release the former vessels for more useful transport work. Some military officers would prefer to transfer the whole of the administrative offices now on board the "Aragon" to a camp on shore. The difficulty is that the Principal Naval Transport Officer considers it essential to remain afloat in close touch with his work, and the Inspector-General of Communications finds it equally necessary to remain in close personal touch with the Principal Naval Transport Officer.

Piers.

26. At Mudros and Imbros no alteration in the situation as regards piers has been reported, though a contract has been placed for the construction at Mudros for another deep sea pier which will take two vessels drawing 34 feet of water, but which will not be finished until the end of January. At Helles the small ships which bring the supplies from Mudros can now off-load direct on to the pier, instead of having to use lighters as at Anzac and Suvla.

27. For the supply of Anzac two new trestle-piers have been constructed at Walker's Beach, a quarter of a mile north of Anzac Cove. These are immune from shell-fire, and work on them proceeds throughout the day. This is a new factor of very considerable importance, as the old pier at Anzac Cove is still under fire from the south, and lighters

can only discharge to it in comparative safety at night. The new piers will remain free from shell-fire as long as Cape Suvla is in our possession, and for this reason Sir Ian Hamilton has reported that it is essential to retain possession of this point. In the southerly gale on the 8th–9th October, both the piers at Anzac Cove were washed away, but the new piers at Walker's Beach remained safe. A wooden sailing-vessel, full of timber and corrugated iron for use at Anzac, was recently sunk by shell-fire, but fortunately settled down in a position where she protects, to some extent, the Walker's Beach piers, and a second ship is to be sunk to act as a breakwater for these piers. Both vessels will be filled with sand.

28. Excellent work is reported to have been done at A Beach west, on the north side of Suvla Bay. A strong causeway has been run out about 80 to 100 yards along a ridge of rocks, and a steamer has already been sunk as a breakwater for the causeway. Practically an enclosed harbour is thus formed. The Naval authorities hope to be able to use lighters in it throughout the winter.

On the south side of Suvla Bay a trestle-pier has been run out into 9 feet of water, just north of Lala Baba.

Sir Ian Hamilton reported that in the gale of the 8th–9th October the pier head had been washed away and the rails displaced; it is not quite clear to which pier this refers, but probably it is that at A Beach west mentioned above.

29. It has been reported that one of the sand dredgers for filling sunken ships with sand has arrived, from Egypt, and that the sunk vessels at Cape Helles have already been filled.

Labour.

30. Labour is still the greatest difficulty in building up the reserve of supplies on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and the recent epidemic of sickness among the troops has accentuated the difficulty. The withdrawal of the 10th Division and a French division from the Dardanelles to Salonica must also have aggravated it.

31. Eight hundred and fifty Maltese were sent to the Dardanelles for work on the beaches, but though useful at Mudros, it has only been found possible to send a few volunteers to the Peninsula. An effort is being made to increase the number of Greeks at Cape Helles to 2,000, and Egyptian volunteers are being tried again.

32. The garrison battalions are employed mainly at Mudros at present, but detachments of such men as are certified to be medically fit for the work are sent up to assist at the beaches. The India Coolie Corps has, of course, not arrived yet, but on the 29th September it was reported that a labour company of 500 men had been sent to Suvla Bay, 200 for work on supply ships, 100 at the supply depôt, and 200 for duty on the beach under the Military Landing Officer.

33. An expert from Egypt has been sent up to organise a Labour Bureau and to deal generally with the

whole question with regard to organisation, recruiting, pay, and administrative treatment of labourers.

Trenches.

34. It is understood that the trenches in the wet ground at Suvla are to be organised on a somewhat different system, redoubts at intervals taking the place of the continuous line of trenches.

35. No information is as yet to hand as to whether it has been found possible to revet the trenches, which in summer, both at Anzac and Cape Helles, were unrevetted. If the Turks are still short of sand-bags, as they were in August, we ought to possess a considerable advantage in this respect in winter. The shipment of all the necessaries for reducing, as far as possible, the discomfort of the trenches in winter continues.

Shelter.

36. It is understood that not much has yet been done on the Peninsula towards the provision of shelter in the dug-outs, the limiting factor being the transport of the necessary materials from the bases to the Peninsula and their landing. As already mentioned, one ship containing material of this nature was sunk by shell fire off Anzac. According to information, dated the 29th September, the matter is receiving very careful attention.

Warm Clothing.

37. There was a sudden cold snap at the end of September, which created a demand for warm clothing. By telegram, dated the 6th October, from the G.O.C. this demand has been met.

Baths.

38. The Corps Commanders at Anzac and Helles are making arrangements on shore as regards bathing for the troops in winter, and a large quantity of heating apparatus will be provided for the purpose. The possibility of bath-ships in Suvla Bay is being considered locally.

Roads.

39. No fresh information is available since the last report, except that a stone crusher has been sent to Suvla Bay to assist in preparing roads for the winter.

Transport.

40. During the continuance of the dry weather it has been found possible to employ mechanical transport on the Peninsula over short distances, and the following vehicles have been utilised:—

—	Lorries.	Ambulances.	Cars.
At Mudros	35	12	5
„ Imbros	1	..	3
„ Suvla	10	6	..
„ Helles	1	16	..
„ Anzac	..	4	..
Total	47	38	8

41. It is hoped that even in wet weather, by the use of non-skid chains, it will be possible occasionally to employ them. It is proposed to use motor lorries to ply between Anzac and Suvla in case of necessity. There are also 5,524 mules and 2,249 carts on the Peninsula.

Tramways.

42. Beyond short lengths of Decauville tramway, laid from the piers to the depôts and some of the beaches, there is no information available as to the laying of tramways. The materials for the more ambitious projects should be available locally by this time, but their shipment to the beaches and landing must be a matter of considerable difficulty. The project for building a railway between Suvla and Anzac has now been abandoned. It would involve the landing of 1,200 tons of stores at Anzac, and, in view of other pressing needs and the improved position as regards reserves of supplies, the two corps commanders concerned were opposed to its construction.

Aerial Cable Tramways.

43. Materials for these have been shipped since the date of the last report, being despatched direct to Mudros instead of to Alexandria.

Rest Camps.

44. According to information, dated the 10th September, it has been decided to give up establishing the proposed rest camp at Imbros and to place it instead at Mudros. A good deal is being done to provide for the comfort and recreation of the troops in the rest camps. Imbros is not a favourable spot in the winter, owing to the exposure of the bay to the prevalent north-east winds. Books and magazines have arrived and are being distributed to the troops.

Aircraft.

45. One of the small airships has made a trial trip successfully. The whole of the material for the Tenedos aerodrome has now been moved up to Kephalos. Our aircraft have operated with considerable success. The Gallipoli flour-mills are said to have been shelled and broken up. The shipping in the Straits is being very carefully watched, and so harassed that it is reported to have almost deserted the area below Nagara by day. A good deal of night-work has been carried out, and bombs dropped on beach parties, supply centres, and shipping.

Anti-Aircraft.

46. The enemy's aeroplanes have been reinforced and have been active, having made at least one raid on general headquarters at Kephalos, where they killed one man and wounded some others.

47. An anti-aircraft section (two 13-pr. guns mounted on motor lorries) has been sent out, and should be arriving about now. The Navy also have a certain number of anti-aircraft guns mounted on board ship.

Surveying Ship.

48. A fully-equipped surveying ship has been sent out in accordance with the express request of the Vice-Admiral Commanding; the ship, in addition to its full staff of surveying officers, carries a complete lithographic plant and staff for the immediate production of charts and plans.

In addition to her ordinary surveying work, the ship will be of great assistance in fixing by triangulation the exact position of enemy batteries and in carrying out observations to facilitate indirect gunfire.

Hospital Ships.

49. A good deal of anxiety has been felt locally as to the sufficiency of the number of hospital ships, and an increase has been asked for on the ground that there is no margin of safety. The position was not regarded as satisfactory even for the normal rate of sick and wounded during the period of comparative quiet. If offensive operations are resumed it is considered locally that a considerable increase will be essential. Moreover, if the rate of sickness is not reduced before really bad weather sets in, many who are now treated without leaving their units will have to be sent to hospital and evacuated from the Peninsula, owing to the lack of shelter there.

On the 6th October the War Office asked the Admiralty for twenty more hospital ships. The equivalent of this demand has been met by the fitting out of five large liners with a carrying capacity of about 500 each, and of the "Mauretania" and "Britannic," which will each accommodate about 6,000 cases. All these ships are fitted and have left, except the "Britannic," which will not be ready for two months.

Hospitals.

50. The hospital for 1,000 beds at Imbros, referred to in the last report, will not be provided. There will only be a small hospital there with 100 beds. The impossibility of increasing the hospital accommodation on the Peninsula owing to lack of space continues to cause anxiety in view of the near approach of spells of bad weather, when for days together evacuation of the hospitals may become impossible, and great congestion may be caused, even from sickness alone, to say nothing of a serious engagement.

Health.

51. The health of the troops is a matter of the most serious preoccupation.

52. The statistics of preventible diseases week by week are as follows:—

——	Sum Total of Cases up to September 4.	Week ended September 24.	Week ended September 29.	Week ended October 6.	Week ended October 13.
Enteric fever ..	1,568	850	164	396	251
Dysentery ..	2,352	1,015	864	916	543
Small-pox ..	6	..	..	..	..
Typhus ..	1	..	..	..	..

Surgeon-General Babtie reports that on bacteriological examination more than half the cases reported as enteric are found to be dysentery, but only about 40 per cent. of cases are so examined. If cases not not examined bacteriologically are in the same proportion the proper number of cases would be 1,470.

On the 21st October the number of sick and wounded of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in Mediterranean hospitals amounted to 991 officers and 39,791 other ranks. This shows a decrease compared with the previous return (dated the 20th October), which reads 1,000 officers and 41,001 other ranks. These figures do not include men on passage in hospital ships and carriers.

53. Dysentery and diarrhœa are the principal diseases which affect the troops, and in addition to the men reported in hospital a very large proportion of the troops are affected. In September it was reported that 78 per cent. of the troops at Anzac had occasional attacks of diarrhœa, but not enough to place them on the sick list. It is reported that if the men can be put on "soft food" for a day or two they generally recover, but if they continue to live on their ordinary rations they eventually get seriously ill, and have to be removed. This, of course, complicates the supply question, arrowroot, sago, cornflour, &c., having to be supplied out of all proportion to any previous estimate.

54. There seems little room for doubt that the sickness and general debility of the troops is due very largely to their prolonged stay in the trenches. This is shown by the immediate improvement in the health of divisions withdrawn to the rest camps on the islands. The withdrawal of one British and one French division to Salonica can hardly fail to aggravate this very serious difficulty, as it will make the relief of the troops in the trenches less frequent than ever.

55. Even if the cold weather eventually stops the dysentery it is feared that owing to the general debility of the troops other diseases, such as bronchitis and pneumonia, will probably increase. It must be remembered that even in Egypt the Australian troops suffered a good deal from these diseases.

56. From the health point of view the outlook would appear to be very grave unless reinforcements and drafts are supplied in sufficient numbers to enable the troops to be relieved more frequently than at present.

M. P. A. H.

October 23, 1915.

APPENDIX.

(A.)

Copy of a Letter sent by the Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence, to the Secretary, Admiralty, Whitehall, S.W., and the Secretary, War Office, Whitehall, S.W., dated September 25, 1915.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Prime Minister to enclose, for the information of , a copy of a Report on the "Preparations for a Winter Campaign at the Dardanelles," prepared in this Office for the information of the Dardanelles Committee of the Cabinet.

I am directed to say that the Dardanelles Committee of the Cabinet expressed the wish that the various preparations alluded to in this Report for the comfort and safety of the troops at the Dardanelles during the forthcoming winter might be pushed on with the greatest possible activity.

I am, &c.
M. P. A. HANKEY, *Secretary.*

(B.)

121/Mediterranean/361. (C. 1.)
(Secret.)

Sir,

War Office, London, S.W., October 15, 1915.

With reference to your Secret Memorandum G. 22 on "Preparations for a Winter Campaign in the Dardanelles," dated the 22nd September, 1915, I am commanded by the Army Council to acquaint you, for the information of the Prime Minister and the Dardanelles Committee of the Cabinet, that they expect to be able to meet all the requirements mentioned in the memorandum, with the one minor exception mentioned below, in so far as the War Office is concerned with their provision.

Moreover, as any detailed estimate of requirements depends largely on local conditions, they have obtained from General Sir Ian Hamilton an assurance, dated the 9th September, that he has arranged for everything needed to secure the comfort and safety of the troops in the Dardanelles during the winter on the basis of their existing strength.

These assurances are of course dependent on the provision of sufficient small craft for the purposes of landing supplies and stores, a matter which is referred to in paragraph 15 of your memorandum quoted above.

Some difficulty has arisen in meeting the requirements of sheepskin coats, mentioned in paragraph 39 of the memorandum, the New Zealand Government having found it impossible to make any supply from that country; but it is anticipated that supplies will be available from this country before the severe weather sets in.

I am, &c.
R. H. BRADE.

The Secretary,
Committee of Imperial Defence,
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY C. R. HARRISON.—25/10/1915.

Anexo XIV: *The future military policy at the Dardanelles,* 29 de novembro de 1915.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 42/5/25

Descrição:

Memorando que fala de vários aspetos militares e políticos sobre a situação no Dardanelos.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. *November* 1915.

SECRET.

G.-43.

42

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

The Future Military Policy at the Dardanelles.

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*,
November 29, 1915.

SECRET.

THE FUTURE MILITARY POLICY AT THE DARDANELLES.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

This Memorandum has been prepared and circulated by order of the Prime Minister. It is a departure from the usual practice of the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who makes it a point not to obtrude his personal conclusions on controversial questions. It has always been felt that for the Secretary of an Advisory Committee to adopt such a course is contrary to his constitutional position, which compels him to keep an open mind. On the present occasion the Prime Minister has decided, at the express request of some of his colleagues, that there are exceptional reasons for departure from the usual practice, owing to the fact that the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence has been present at every meeting of the old War Council, and the present War Committee since the initiation of the Dardanelles operations, and has, in addition, paid an extended visit to the locality. Nevertheless, the opinions in the following Memorandum are advanced with considerable diffidence, the more so, that the writer has no responsibility. An apology is necessary for the prolixity of this Memorandum, which is mainly due to the very short time available for condensation.

2. In seeking to reach a correct appreciation of the numerous considerations bearing on the future of our military operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula it is convenient to begin with an examination of the bearing of this campaign on the operations of the different nations engaged in the war, and this involves an attempt to penetrate the strategical designs and intentions of the enemy, as well as those of the Allies; the latter task being almost as difficult as the former, owing to the absence at present of any clear plan of action.

Strategy of the Enemy.

3. The Germans invariably base their plans on strategical principle. If one strategical principle fails they fall back on another, as has occurred in the present war. Without entering too far into a pedantic dissertation on strategy, it may be said broadly that there are two methods of making war: The best method when means permit is to crush your enemy completely in order to obtain an unlimited result, so that your enemy is compelled to make peace and accept such terms as you choose to offer. The alternative, where the forces of the rival Powers are more evenly balanced and unlimited success cannot reasonably be expected, is to get assets into your hands and to hold them until the enemy has exhausted himself in efforts to recover them, and has to make terms. In 1830 Clausewitz, when drawing up a plan for war against France, proposed that since the Prussian armies were not strong enough to capture Paris they should occupy Belgium and hold it until the French had worn themselves out in their attempts to recover it. Similarly, in 1859, von Moltke's first plan for war against France contemplated the occupation of Alsace and Lorraine with precisely similar objects.

4. In the present war it is plain that Germany, trusting in her superior strength at the outset, originally aimed at a decisive result by endeavouring to crush the Anglo-French armies. Having failed, she sought the same result by an attempt to crush the Russian armies, hoping, no doubt, to obtain a separate peace with Russia, and then to renew her efforts for decisive results in the West with all her strength. Once more she has failed. Foiled in the West and foiled in the East in the hour of her greatest strength, Germany, now that her military power has passed its zenith, can hardly hope any longer to dictate peace on her own terms. In the West it is unreasonable to suppose that she can succeed against Allies who in men and material are incomparably stronger than they were a year ago and will grow stronger every month. In the East, winter has brought a breathing space to the Russians, which

[1277] it. Except when he was in to Dardanelles in Aug.

should enable them to recover and re-equip their great reserves of men before summer enables the enemy to resume the offensive. Although this period may possibly not be of sufficient duration to enable Russia to withstand a renewed attack when weather conditions and a reorganisation of the German communications render it possible for the Central Powers to resume the offensive, at any rate it compels a much greater effort by the enemy and renders a decisive success by the Central Powers in the main Eastern theatre far more doubtful.

5. Germany, therefore, seems to be driven back on warfare with a limited object. She probably reckons that the difficult financial situation, which will confront the Allies in 1916 (due to the apparently inevitable collapse of their American exchanges), will in due course compel them to consider the desirability of making peace. If she can only continue to hold on to Belgium, North France, Poland, and Serbia until then, she will have a good deal in hand to barter against her captured colonies and her loss of access to the open sea. But, with her numbers declining (relatively, to her enemies, at any rate), there is no certainty that she can even hold what she has gained, if her enemies can bring their full strength to bear. It is necessary, therefore, at all costs to compel the Allies to disperse their forces, and, above all, to ensure the continued interruption of free communication between the Western and Eastern Allies, so that the numerical masses of the latter may not be armed and equipped by the ever-increasing industrial activities of the former. Moreover, the more assets she can secure the better bargain will she obtain when peace is discussed.

6. In this spirit, then, the Central Powers have undertaken their Eastern enterprise. Playing on Bulgarian resentment and cupidity, they have brought that country to war with Serbia, and they seek nothing more than to embroil the Bulgarians deeply in war with the Allies. The same stroke has enabled them to bring relief to the Turks, who were becoming anxious and distrustful at their inability to turn the Allies off the Gallipoli Peninsula. Having restored the confidence of the Turks by freeing Constantinople from its menace, and thus given an earnest of her ability to fulfil her promises, Germany may hope to persuade them to undertake formidable offensive operations in the Caucasus, in Mesopotamia, and in Egypt, and it is clearly their design that these manœuvres should react into Persia, Afghanistan, and even India, causing both the British and Russians to divert troops to protect what have hitherto been regarded as essential interests.

7. The subtlety of the plan lies in the fact that it is brought about by a ridiculously small application of force by the Central Powers. It resembles a line of children's bricks standing on end: all that is required is the momentum to upset the first brick, which causes the next one to upset its neighbour. All the force that the Central Powers exert is the bare minimum to enable Bulgaria to conquer Serbia; this establishes free communication between the Central Powers and Turkey enabling the latter to turn the Allies out of the Gallipoli Peninsula; this re-establishes Turkish confidence in German might and induces her to undertake operations against the Allies; this again reacts into Persia, Afghanistan, India, Tripoli, Algiers, and Morocco, compelling the Allies to fall back on the defensive at half a dozen points, dispersing their forces, and preventing a decisive offensive when their military strength reaches its zenith. Although this is the main object of the *Drang nach dem Osten*, it offers important subsidiary advantages. It ensures that Roumania will not for a long time join the Allies, and even opens up the possibility of active co-operation on the part of that country. It enables Germany to draw on the resources of Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and probably Roumania, to make good her economic deficiencies in grain, meat, fats, copper, oil, petrol, and cotton—a subject on which the Board of Trade have undertaken to enlighten the War Committee in greater detail. It safeguards the important commercial enterprises of Germany in Turkey, and opens up the probability of future concessions on a much larger scale whenever the Central Powers are in a position to take advantage of them.

The Strategy of the Allies.

8. Such, then, would seem to be the general strategical plan and the political advantages sought for by the Central Powers. The next step is to consider the means available to the Allies to checkmate them, and more particularly the place which the

Gallipoli operations occupy in their plans. First, therefore, it is necessary to review the general strategical position from their point of view.

9. At the outset of the war the military superiority of the Germans compelled the Western Allies to remain on the defensive. Even so it was only with the utmost difficulty that the German onslaught was held up. The Russians, though able to assume the offensive for a time, both in East Prussia and Galicia, were also before long compelled by lack of munitions to adopt the defensive and to make strategic movements to the rear on a great scale. Now, however, the positions are changing. Although the German strength seems to have passed its zenith, the might of the Western Allies, both in men and munitions, does not approach its maximum until the spring and summer of 1916. On the other hand, their financial resources and their power to carry on the war will be gravely embarrassed, and, in consequence, their economic position will be impaired at about the same time as their military power reaches its maximum. At that time the Russian military strength, it is true, will still be far short of its maximum potentialities (in fact, it is doubtful whether it will ever have time to attain its maximum in the present war unless the calculations of responsible experts regarding the financial powers of endurance of all the contestants are gravely at fault). Nevertheless, it seems probable that by the spring or summer of 1916 Russian military power will be sufficient to contain a very large enemy army. Moreover, it is absolutely essential to the cause of the Allies that this should be the case. As the General Staff point out in their memorandum of the 22nd October, "We cannot afford to do anything that might cause a slackening of Russian efforts."

10. Clearly, then, the spring and summer of 1916 is likely to be the most critical period of the war. A serious mistake now may cause a faulty distribution of our forces then, which may make the success of our main strategical plans impossible.

11. What, then, is the plan of the Allies? The fact has to be admitted that at present they haven't one!

12. The British military authorities, both the General Staff at home and the Commander-in-Chief and his General Staff in France, have no doubts as to what *ought* to be the plan. They are confident that, if all our military resources are concentrated in France, they can inflict a great, and, perhaps, decisive, defeat on the enemy. To the criticism that they have failed again and again in attacks preceded by an equal confidence, they reply that they never before had the men and the munitions on an adequate scale, that the enemy is weaker, and that they have learnt from past experience. This confidence has spread throughout the army to Officers who, until recently, almost despaired of ever breaking the line.

13. The Russian General Staff, on the other hand, seem to have come to the conclusion that frontal attacks against entrenched lines, where the machine beats the man, are hopeless, and that the Allies ought to utilise their numerical superiority by a great turning movement in south-eastern Europe. Whatever might have been the advantages of this method of fighting the war, if the Dardanelles were open, and if the Serbian army were still intact on its own soil, and if Bulgaria had not joined the enemy, it would now seem a chimerical plan. It would involve the defeat of a Bulgarian army of 350,000 men (which otherwise will probably play no part in the war outside Macedonia); it would necessitate a preliminary advance of hundreds of miles through a difficult country where a special form of transport and artillery would have to be provided—a form of transport and artillery, be it noted, which would be useless once the plain of Hungary was reached; it would put an unbearable strain on our shipping, and it would hasten the approach of a financial catastrophe.

14. Nevertheless, there are signs that certain elements, both in France and Italy, have a leaning towards this plan.

15. Whatever the proper policy may be, however, there is no doubt that what causes the principal difficulty in reaching a decision as regards the operations in all theatres of war, and notably in Serbia and Gallipoli, is the absence of any plan at all. It is to be hoped that at the forthcoming conference of the Allies, at General Joffre's headquarters, some plan will be decided on, and subsequently adhered to.

Principles governing our Military Policy in the East.

16. Even in the absence of a general plan, however, it would seem safe to assume that in countering the German *Drang nach dem Osten*, the following principles should be aimed at:—

(1.) The Central Powers, as distinct from the Turks and Bulgarians, should be compelled to expend as much energy as possible in prosecuting it;

(2.) The enemy should be permitted to extend his plan as little as possible—in case our own main plan (whatever it may be) should not succeed and we should eventually be compelled by exhaustion or by the weakening of our Allies to discuss terms of peace while great advantages still remain with the enemy;

(3.) The force employed to counter it should be as small as possible, and this is perhaps the most important.

Serbia.

17. It will be noticed that the ambitious and ingenious plans devised by our enemies could, theoretically, at any rate, be met at many points, *e.g.*, in Serbia, at Constantinople, at Alexandretta, or by acting defensively in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus.

18. As far back as July it was becoming tolerably certain that something of the kind was meditated by the enemy. At that time it might have been possible to defeat the plan in Serbia. The Serbian army was intact; M. Venizelos was in power and Greece was friendly disposed; Bulgaria was not at war and might have been kept from entering the war by decisive action. We were, however, deeply committed to the Dardanelles operation, which then offered good prospects of success; and later, when the Dardanelles offensive of August had failed, we were preparing for a renewed attack in France; the British and French military authorities in France were sceptical regarding the likelihood of an attack on Serbia, and, further, represented that an attack in the West was the proper strategical method of preventing an attack on Serbia by drawing thither the forces destined by the enemy for the Balkans; they further pointed out that this attack in the West could only succeed if all our available resources were concentrated in France. Whatever the results of that offensive movement (and they must not be underrated), the military authorities proved wrong about Serbia. The text-books say that the object of fortification is to set free troops for offensive operations. The Germans relied on their fortifications, repelled our frontal attacks, set free the very moderate forces required, and opened successfully a flank attack against our position in the East. When it was too late, a force was sent, under compelling political pressure from our Allies, to Serbia—much against the advice of all our military authorities. The detachment of this force has, indeed, probably exerted absolutely no influence on the result of the war, and all British and, it is believed, most French military authorities are agreed that the sooner we are quit of it the better.

19. Although it is too late to counter the enemy in Serbia, it is clear that every effort should be made to keep the Serbian army intact. Even a guerrilla force, based on inaccessible mountains in Montenegro and Albania, may compel the Austro-Germans to detach some forces to guard their communications to the eastward.

20. This brings us, then, to the second point at which the German threat to the East may be met, namely, at the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

The Dardanelles.

21. Before coming to the more local aspects of the question, it is necessary to advert to one politico-military aspect, which is of very first importance, viz., the attitude of Russia. The General Staff states that: "Russia has hoped and probably still hopes much from the Dardanelles operations"; and further on: "We have grounds, however, for believing that in Russia, even if the Government and the military authorities appreciated the reasons for withdrawal, the people would be greatly disappointed and disturbed by it."

22. It really does seem essential, before evacuation is decided on, that this political consideration should be definitely cleared up and an understanding reached with Russia. Information has been received that M. Sazonof, in a conversation with Captain George Lloyd, M.P., now on his way back from Russia, expressed most emphatic opinions in favour of continuing the operations at the Dardanelles. General d'Amade, whom I met at dinner on Friday, and who was passing through England on his way from Russia, was emphatic on the point that in Russia, where public opinion is badly informed, little was known of the difficulties of the Dardanelles operations, and that it was generally believed that success would attend our efforts.

23. Never before can Russia have realised so overwhelmingly the long-felt disadvantage under which she has so long laboured of want of access to open water unencumbered with ice. She has made great sacrifices and sustained huge losses for the cause of the Allies in this war. The only advantage she really hopes to recompense herself by is the coveted possession of the Straits. So long as we remain on the Gallipoli Peninsula she will not relinquish her efforts, as she will continue to hope, and perhaps to believe, in our success. Will she continue to hope this after we have abandoned the Peninsula? Will she continue her efforts? These are the questions to which answers are required. Of course, if Germany were beaten to her knees, Russia might attain her desires, perhaps only at the cost of a difficult and arduous campaign; this she might not be in a position to undertake, particularly if Germany succeeded in rendering Turkey in any sense independent of external assistance in her supplies of munitions. But if peace comes without the utter defeat of Germany to which the Allies aspire, Russia will probably get nothing she desires.

24. It would be an irretrievable disaster to lose the co-operation of Russia in this war, and perhaps to breed hostility and mistrust for generations to come. Notwithstanding the objections to delay (a subject which will be discussed later), it is submitted that, before the final decision is made, a clear understanding should be arrived at with Russia. Perhaps the best method would be for a British military or political representative to approach the Tsar direct and in person in order to limit, as far as possible, the number of persons to be consulted; but others will be a better judge of this than I.

25. Leaving Russia for the moment, it will now be convenient to examine the position of the Dardanelles operations in the light of the three principles postulated above in paragraph 16.

26. The immediate evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula would clearly be a violation of the first principle, for it would enable the enemy to attain his object without any expenditure of German or Austrian energy at all. At the Paris Conference on the 17th November, 1915, Colonel Girodon was quoted as holding the view that the Allied troops, if properly relieved, could never be driven out by the Turks, however much they were supplied with guns and munitions, and it was only Germans who could drive them off the Peninsula. By evacuating we present an Oriental Power with an overwhelming victory, which he could, perhaps, never achieve with his own resources, only, in fact, by rendering himself more than ever dependent on an ally who is more feared than liked.

27. Evacuation is also a violation of the second principle, since it enables the enemy to extend his plan to its extreme limits at once.

28. A more doubtful point is whether or no the third principle, namely, that the force employed by the Allies to counter the *Drang nach dem Osten* should be as small as possible, is satisfied best by holding on at or by evacuating the Peninsula.

29. On this point the calculations of the General Staff tend to show that, so far as the defence of Egypt is concerned, a considerable saving of men for the main plan of operations will be achieved by evacuating, and thus avoiding the heavy wastage involved in holding on, to say nothing of the probable loss if we should be driven off the Peninsula. It should be noted, however, that this is on the assumption that the attack on Egypt will be relinquished in April, whereas General Maxwell (No. I.G. 133, dated the 22nd November) has since reported that there is no reason why the Turks should not maintain their position after March.

30. Moreover, the question cannot be judged from the standpoint of Egypt alone. So long as we remain on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and more particularly if we can take the offensive there, we threaten the very heart of the Turkish Empire, and great forces must always remain in the vicinity of the capital. Even a tactical defensive on the Peninsula is a strategical *offensive*, and as it always conveys the threat of a tactical offensive it must lock up large enemy forces. On the other hand, by withdrawal (since the Alexandretta project has been condemned by British and French military opinion) we fall back on the circumference of a circle of which the enemy occupies the centre. We cannot tell where the enemy's blow will fall, owing to the inadequacy of our intelligence service, of which we had recent experience in Mesopotamia. Consequently, if evacuation is decided on and the enemy is free to exert his full strength, we have to be strong enough at each point to meet the largest possible force that the enemy can bring to bear.

31. For the *defence* of Egypt Lord Kitchener has suggested a force of fourteen divisions. A total of more than four divisions is now earmarked for the *defence* of the positions we have won in Mesopotamia, and who can say that they may not eventually have to be increased, if the Gallipoli Peninsula is abandoned? For the *defence* of India we have already had to issue orders for reinforcing the garrison with drafts, and no one can tell what will be the situation there or the extent of the call for troops, if the repercussion of the evacuation of Gallipoli causes fighting on the frontier combined with internal sedition. Russia has, it is understood, already a cavalry division in Persia. The latter country is seeking an alliance on the basis of an undertaking by the Allies to *defend* her against Turkey, failing which she unmistakably threatens to ally herself to the enemy. This may induce Russia to send still more troops to Persia. Russia again, the moment she learns of an intention to evacuate the Peninsula, will almost certainly feel herself obliged to reinforce her troops in the Caucasus to *defend* her interests there, since she will not be able to say definitely that the main Turco-German effort will not be directed against that sector of the defensive circle. Abandonment of the Peninsula is to pass from the *offensive* to the *defensive* with all the usual objections to that procedure. Finally, there is the serious danger already alluded to that, unless Russian assent to evacuation is secured, that Empire may withdraw from the war, or, at any rate, lose the moral driving power behind its efforts. Either eventuality would prove calamitous to the cause of the Allies.

32. From the above it would seem that, the third of the principles postulated in paragraph 16 no less than the first and second, would be violated by evacuation, if the position is reviewed from the standpoint of the total Allied forces likely to be diverted from the main theatre by that cause.

33. If this appreciation of the situation is correct, it would seem that the certain tactical disaster, which all agree is inevitable to the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, may involve also political results which may prejudice the whole of our military efforts in the forthcoming crucial campaign of 1916. From the standpoint of pure strategy, it is true, this might be obviated by simply allowing the situation in the East, in Persia, India, Afghanistan, even in Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus, to take care of itself, trusting to our ability to restore it later on after the enemy has been crushed in the main theatre. Is it probable, though, that either the British or Russian Governments will have sufficient confidence in our military prowess to stake all in this way on a supreme effort in the main theatre, where so many promising attempts have ended in stalemate?

34. Failing this heroic course, the best plan would seem to be to hold on at the Gallipoli Peninsula, or, better still, to take an immediate offensive there with the forces set free from the Salonica enterprise. Of course, though, either of these courses may be impossible, and this is the next point to examine.

The Tactical Position.

35. It would not be becoming for an officer of junior rank with scant military experience to set forth personal views on a tactical question on which the greatest experts on the spot have evidently felt grave doubts, and there is no intention here to do any such thing. It is necessary, however, to allude to one opinion expressed in my report (C.I.D. Paper, No. G–19) on my return from the Dardanelles, which has

often been quoted in the War Committee, and, it is understood, in the Cabinet as well, The actual text is as follows :—

> "The situation *in the Southern Area** is thoroughly uncomfortable, and *might** become untenable if the Turks had a large supply of ammunition; but, as things are, it can be held."

It is desired to draw attention to the facts that this remark applies only to the Southern Area (the position in the Northern Area was not sufficiently settled at the time of my visit to justify a similar statement); also, the words "*might* become untenable" were purposely used instead of "*would*" because opinion on the spot was divided on the subject. Since that time, General Davies seems to have expressed the view that he could hold on in the Southern Area. General Birdwood has always believed in his ability to hold Anzac under any conditions. The principal doubt seems to be as regards Suvla, although, curiously enough, it is at Suvla that the prospects of a successful offensive appear to be considered the brightest.

36. Without venturing to express any personal opinions as regards the prospects of holding on, it is submitted that, if the question of evacuation were put to the local Commanders in a somewhat different way, they might give a different answer. It must be remembered that up to now, and from the day of the first landing, the Dardanelles operations have suffered from want of drafts. Not even the usual 10 per cent. to allow for casualties was taken to the first landing, with the result that units have never overtaken their loss and been at full strength. This has aggravated the evils due to the strain of this trying campaign, with resultant increase of sickness and low *moral*. The defence of the positions is very largely a matter of digging, and worn-out men cannot dig properly, particularly when their officers are few and inexperienced. Supposing the Generals at the Dardanelles were told that the tired divisions would be relieved by the experienced regular divisions from France, that henceforward drafts would be forthcoming in sufficient numbers, that the tired divisions would be rested and re-equipped in Egypt, and that thereafter there would be a systematic interchange of divisions between Egypt and the Dardanelles. Supposing they were told that they would have ample supplies of ammunition; that smoke candles and 250 Stokes guns, with trained crews, are now ready for them, with more to come; that flame throwers, water apparatus for washing away trenches and other little surprises for the Turks will be forthcoming in the near future; that they are to harass the Turks by every means in their power, to prepare to take the offensive whenever feasible, and that all ranks are to be told that the whole cause of the Allies and the future of the British Empire depends upon their endurance and their efforts, the alternative being a disastrous and ignominious retreat. It would be interesting to hear what their reply would be.

37. It is the boast of our army in France, that, since the poison-gas attack in May, for which we were totally unprepared, the Germans, with all their masses of guns and men and gas and elaborate lines of communication, and proximity to their sources of production, have failed to gain a single substantial success. Yet there are many positions where they possess the advantage of tactical position, notable the Ypres salient, and the new salient between Loos and the Hohenzollern redoubt, where the communications are understood to be almost as exposed as those on the Gallipoli Peninsula. If they have failed here, why should they inevitably succeed at the Dardanelles, at the end of a very long line of communications, the last stages of which are extremely precarious and difficult, and where the main instrument must always be the Turkish army, which is indifferent in the attack, however strong in the defence?

The Date of Evacuation.

38. Another question which merits further examination is the proper date for evacuation. It is generally assumed that the sooner this takes place the better, since the Turks are probably not yet fully supplied with ammunition and the shell-fire at the beaches will probably be less. There is force in this argument, but it must be pointed out that the Turks have always maintained a sufficient reserve of ammunition for a battle, and in any case they will probably have enough to bring a heavy fire on the beaches during the whole period of evacuation, and they will not hesitate to use their last round for the purpose, once they see that we are set on evacuation.

* The italics are not in the original.

39. Moreover, there is another side to the question. We are already long past the time when the continuance of fair weather can be counted on, and several considerable spells of bad weather have already occurred. One of the most dreaded eventualities must be the sudden advent of such a spell of bad weather when the evacuation is half completed. With the original positions evacuated, many troops congregated on the beaches, quantities of wounded men, for whom there is no proper accommodation, and possibly an insufficiency of water and supplies, it is difficult to see how a surrender could be avoided, if stormy weather supervened. It is possible, however, that the meteorologist attached to the expedition may be able to choose a spell of good weather.

40. Nevertheless, it should be noted that by holding on until the end of April good weather could be almost relied on, and further, by that time all danger of an attack on Egypt on a great scale would be past, for no one has suggested that an attack could be initiated after the end of March, even though General Maxwell has suggested that a force which had crossed the desert might maintain itself on or near the Canal. To hold on even for two months would diminish the risk of an attack on Egypt, since some time will be required to move a Turkish army from the Dardanelles to Syria; but on the other hand it must be admitted that in two months' time the weather will be nearing its worst. At any rate, if it be true that four months are required to prepare for an attack, as stated by many officers of high rank in France, where communications are of the best, there would appear to be no imminent danger at the Dardanelles, where munitions and German troops have to be brought for great distances, and where communications are indifferent.

41. The recent telegram received from the Senior Naval Officer in the Mediterranean and circulated to the Cabinet would seem to indicate that it is already too late in the season to carry out the desperately difficult operation of evacuation without a strong probability of tactical disaster. If this is the case would it not be better to go down fighting, if we must go down, or better still to stick it through?

Summary.

42. Summing up the foregoing considerations, it would seem that the German Government has formulated a plan with the object of drawing off our military forces in 1916—the crucial year—from the main theatres of war; of strengthening her own economic position; and of sowing distrust among the Allies by compelling the British and French to relinquish the prize on which the Russian gaze is fixed. This plan is based on a "snowball" principle, and is calculated to gather fresh and active enemies to us as it proceeds. Bulgaria is gone over to the enemy; Roumania is now uncertain; Turkey, already hostile, will pass from the defensive to the offensive; the Arabs will be lost the moment the Gallipoli Peninsula is evacuated; the Senoussi and Persia will immediately follow suit; and India may be affected. The moment we withdraw from the Gallipoli Peninsula, the whole plan, carefully fostered by German agents, is put into execution, and the Allies are compelled to lock up great forces awaiting attack on the circumference of a circle of which the enemy occupies the centre. As it is too late to meet the plan in Serbia, and the Alexandretta project has been ruled out, the arguments in favour of holding up the plan in the Gallipoli Peninsula appear overwhelming, *provided that it can be done*, and this is the crux of the whole question. The decision on this point, however, is an appalling one, for it involves a choice between a certain disaster* involved in evacuation, and the possibility, or, as some think, the probability, of greater disaster involved in being driven out. It so happens, however, that good divisions are about to be set free from Salonica, and the main plea of this Paper is that the question may be reconsidered from the point of view of their possible use to save the position on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and, if possible, to take the offensive. A second, and scarcely less important, plea is that the Russians shall be sounded in the most secret manner that can be devised before a final decision is reached.

M. P. A. HANKEY, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
and Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

November 29, 1915.

* The term is used here in the sense of political and strategical rather than tactical disaster, though the latter is probable enough.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY C. R. HARRISON.—29/11/1915.

Anexo XV: *Progress of the War; Russia and Constantinople,* 1 de agosto de 1916.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 42/2/5

Descrição:

Uma descrição, ou relatório, do decorrer da guerra, com números das forças em campanha e situação operacional, durante o mês de março de 1915 por parte de: *Lord* Kitchener, *Sir* Edward Grey, Churchill, *Lord* Fisher, Balfour e outros.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. *August* 1916.

SECRET.

5

SECRETARY'S NOTES OF A MEETING OF A WAR COUNCIL HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, MARCH 10, 1915.

Present:

The PRIME MINISTER (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. the Viscount HALDANE OF CLOAN, K.T., the Lord High Chancellor.

The Most Hon. the Marquess of CREWE, K.G., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon. L. HARCOURT, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. R. MCKENNA, M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Admiral of the Fleet the Right Hon. the Lord FISHER OF KILVERSTONE, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir A. K. WILSON, G.C.B., V.C., O.M., G.C.V.O.

The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. Sir E. GREY, Bt., K.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.

The Most Hon. the Marquess of LANSDOWNE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.M.G., &c.

The Right Hon. A. BONAR LAW, M.P.

Field-Marshal the Right Hon. Earl KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for War.

Lieutenant-General Sir JAMES WOLFE MURRAY, K.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel M. P. A. HANKEY, C.B., *Secretary*.

PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

Caucasus.

LORD KITCHENER said that the Russians were making good progress in the Caucasus. Otherwise there was little to report.

Egypt.

In Egypt some Turks were still reported at Bir Saba and Gaza.

Mesopotamia, reinforcements for.

There was no definite news as to the strength of the Turks in Mesopotamia. In order to secure the position there one brigade was being sent from Egypt and one brigade from India.

Strength of expeditionary force in France.

He then gave the following figures as to the forces sent to France:—

—	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Total.	Guns.
Original Expeditionary Force	5,807	157,000	162,807	543
Casualties	..	..	113,000	106
Present force in France	15,282	431,185	446,467	1,105 and 1,011 machine guns.

Forces available against Constantinople.

The following was the approximate strength of the forces available against Constantinople :—

——	All Ranks.	Guns.	Horses.	Remarks.
Naval Brigade	11,000	6	1,266	
Australasian infantry ..	30,600	64	9,370	
„ mounted troops ..	3,500	12	4,000	No transport at present available for these.
XXIXth Division	18,000	56	5,400	
French Division	18,000	40	5,000	
Russian Army Corps.. ..	47,600	120	10,750	Provided they are at full strength, which is doubtful.
Grand total.. ..	128,710	298	35,786	

He proposed to send General Peyton's Territorial Mounted Division to Egypt as a reserve. In round numbers the grand total might be regarded as 120,000 men and 250 guns. He felt that the situation was now sufficiently secure to justify the despatch of the XXIXth Division. There were some signs of the beginning of a movement of German troops from East to West.

Lemnos.

SIR EDWARD GREY said he hoped that no more troops than were absolutely necessary would be landed at Lemnos. In the present state of politics in Greece it might be very inconvenient. Up to now Turkey had not recognised the Greek annexation of Lemnos, and Greece had not proclaimed it as Greek territory. We had arranged for the withdrawal of Greek troops before our arrival at Port Mudros, and no difficulty had arisen. If, however, Turkey were now to recognise the Greek annexation of Lemnos, the position would be difficult. We must avoid being put into the position towards Greece that Germany occupied as regards Belgium.

LORD KITCHENER said that no troops would be landed. The water supply was insufficient at Lemnos for a large force.

MR. CHURCHILL said that our troops were sufficiently well placed in Egypt.

LORD FISHER said that in Egypt they would be within three days' steam of the Canal.

Transport.

THE FIRST LORD said that the transport for the XXIXth Division would be ready on the 15th March, but the transport for General Peyton's Mounted Division would not be ready until later.

MR. BALFOUR asked the strength of the Turkish forces.

LORD KITCHENER said that, according to the best available information, there were supposed to be about 60,000 men in and about the Dardanelles, and possibly another 120,000 men for the defence of Constantinople.

MR. BALFOUR asked if the road across the Bulair isthmus was watched.

MR. CHURCHILL said a cruiser was always there, and nothing could pass.

LORD KITCHENER said that the normal communication between Constantinople and the Gallipoli Peninsula was by water. This route was still open.

Progress of bombardment of Dardanelles.

MR. CHURCHILL said that there was not much news from the Dardanelles, as the bombardment had been interrupted by thick weather. On the afternoon of the 8th March the "Queen Elizabeth" had entered the Straits and fired at Fort No. 13 (Rumilie Medjidieh Tabia); eight rounds had been fired from the 15-inch guns, three of which struck the fort. The light had then failed. On the 9th the weather had been too misty for long-range bombardment, and the only action had been the destruction by two battleships of the bridge over the Menderé River. Admiral Carden had promised to send an appreciation of the situation, but it had not yet been received. The only indication of his views was that he wanted to send the "Inflexible" to Malta to change the guns in the fire-turret. These guns had been used a great deal, first in the Falkland Island battle, and then in the bombardment. This operation would take six days. It must be remembered that the "Inflexible" had been sent to the Dardanelles for one purpose only, to engage the "Goeben." It was therefore evident that Admiral Carden did not expect to get through the Straits for a week or

two. The forts must first be thoroughly broken up; there was no hurry; and some time might still be necessary, particularly if thick weather was encountered. He drew attention to the German report that none of the mines had yet been swept up. In regard to this Admiral Carden said that he could not undertake this until the batteries were smashed up. Once this was accomplished, the clearing of the minefields would, Admiral Carden said, only take a few hours. The Admiralty still believed that they could effect the passage of the Straits by naval means alone, but they were glad to know that military support was available, if required.

RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the principal business for which this meeting had been called, and for which Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law (whom he cordially welcomed) had been invited, was to consider the political, as well as the strategic, questions likely to arise after the fall of Constantinople.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that some months ago it had become clear that Russia wanted to know how she stood with Great Britain and France in regard to the questions of Constantinople and the Straits. The economic pressure on Russia had become great owing to the closing of the Straits on the intervention of Turkey in the war, as the Baltic entrances were closed by the German fleet; and Archangel and Vladivostok, both of them liable to be ice-bound, were the only available ports. We then gave a general assurance that a settlement of the question of the Straits in the Russian interest was necessary. The question had recently been raised again, and M. Sazonoff had furnished an *aide-mémoire** setting forth the Russian demands. In dealing with this question it had to be remembered that Germany was very desirous of concluding a separate peace with Russia and France; he had been informed by a neutral that Herr Jagow had admitted this, and had said that Germany quite expected to settle with France and Russia on the basis of concessions, and would give an indemnity to Belgium, but that there would be no peace with England except on terms of a German victory. As regards France, he had no apprehensions. They were as anxious as we ourselves to see the business through to a final conclusion, and was as determined as we ourselves. When the question had first been discussed M. Sazonoff had expressed his personal opinion that Russia would be content with the possession of the Bosphorus and the neutralization of Constantinople. Now, however, they put forward a claim for Constantinople, the Straits, and Turkey in Europe up to the Enos–Midia line. In making this claim their principal idea was to obtain an outlet to the sea. Russia had already so much territory that the acquisition of German Poland or Galicia would not confer any great advantage, but one of her principal hopes from this war was to obtain an outlet to the sea. It had to be remembered that at one time Russia had absolutely vetoed Greek co-operation, though she had now somewhat modified this attitude, but she still was apprehensive of the effect of other Powers, such as Italy, Roumania, and Bulgaria, joining the Allies. She feared that Bulgaria, Greece, and Roumania might prejudice her claims for Constantinople, and, remembering our historical attitude towards this question, was suspicious that we might again check her aspirations. The urgency of the question was to remove Russian suspicions as to our attitude and to get rid of the Russian objections to the participation of other nations. It was therefore essential to the progress of the war that Russia should know where she stands, more especially as the occupation of Constantinople might be imminent.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Russian *aide-mémoire* referred to a *final* settlement, and not to an interim arrangement.

MR. BALFOUR said that he personally had no objection to an assurance being given to Russia for the realization of her aspirations as regards Constantinople and the Dardanelles, provided that the other Allies received similar assurances as regards their own wishes. The sentiments of the Russians, he said, were probably a good deal more moved by Constantinople than by Poland. If they obtained what they wanted now, they might slacken their efforts in the main theatre of war. We ought to consider what we wanted, for example, in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Russians were so keen to obtain Constantinople that they would be generous in regard to concessions elsewhere. It was vital for us, if we made concessions, to say what we wanted in return.

* Telegram No. 249, dated the 4th March, 1915, from Sir G. Buchanan to Foreign Office.

LORD LANSDOWNE suggested that the matter depended to some extent on what each of the Allies had accomplished in the war. Supposing, for example, that the Allies in the West were very successful and crushed Germany, while the Russians in the East were to fail, ought we still to give an undertaking as regards Constantinople?

MR. BALFOUR replied that each of the Allies would have to do its share of the war, and that it would be invidious to differentiate between their efforts.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that, in any case, Russia might claim that the sacrifices she had made in East Prussia in the early days of the war had saved the Allies from defeat.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, when Russian proposals were first put forward, the naval and military advisers were asked to consider them on their merits. They were asked if there was any objection on naval and military grounds to granting Russian claims? Their reply was that there were no objections. The naval authorities appeared to think that the establishment of Russia at Constantinople, and the granting of all she asks, would make it desirable for us to have an additional naval base in these waters, viz., Alexandretta, the probable terminus on the Mediterranean of the Baghdad Railway.

LORD KITCHENER agreed in the naval view. Alexandretta, he said, had a military, as well as a naval importance.

MR. BALFOUR thought it injurious to our interests to allow Russia to occupy a position on the flank of our route to India, but considered that this would have to be accepted.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that M. Sazonoff could now rely on French support to his proposals, as the French Government had agreed to them in principle, and wished to have a conference on the subject. He thought it probable that the Russians had communicated to the French their suspicion of the British attitude, and he (Sir E. Grey) had sent a reassuring telegram to our Ambassador in Petrograd, for communication to M. Sazonoff, to the effect that we had asked for the French views without making any comment. M. Sazonoff had expressed great satisfaction with this.

MR. BONAR LAW suggested that we ought not to give Russia exactly what she wants immediately. He was in favour of taking up an attitude similar to that adopted by the French, that is to say, to tell Russia that she can count on the entire goodwill of the Government for a satisfactory settlement in regard to Constantinople on the conclusion of peace.

LORD LANSDOWNE agreed with Mr. Bonar Law. He suggested that, if Russia was granted all she wished for now, the result might be to choke off Italy and the Balkan States. This would be very unfortunate.

SIR EDWARD GREY pointed out that it would be still more disastrous if we conveyed the impression to Russia that we intended to join with the Balkan States and Italy in preventing her from obtaining Constantinople. He was inclined to suggest to Russia that they should offer Bessarabia to Roumania in the event of Russia herself obtaining Constantinople, as an inducement to join the Allies.

LORD KITCHENER did not think there was any chance that Bulgaria would fight Russia for Constantinople. Religious sentiment was too strong.

MR. BONAR LAW said that perhaps the best plan would be to say we would not oppose Russia, provided that we and France obtained what we wanted.

SIR EDWARD GREY agreed. Our acquiescence should be conditional on a successful termination to the war.

THE PRIME MINISTER read out the last sentence of the Russian *aide-mémoire*, as follows:—

"Imperial Government likes to hope that above consideration will meet with sympathy of the two Allied Governments. Said Governments are assured of meeting with, at the hands of Imperial Government, the same sympathy for realization of desiderata which they may form in other regions of Ottoman Empire and elsewhere."

LORD LANSDOWNE asked if we were to formulate these desiderata now.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hoped we should do so.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that France would of course ask for Alsace and Lorraine, and perhaps for Syria. He proposed that we should agree to the Russian claims on some such terms as the following: "Subject to the war being prosecuted to a victorious conclusion, so as to enable Great Britain and France to realize the desiderata referred to in the last sentence of the Russian *aide-mémoire*."

MR. McKENNA expressed a preference for the French reply referred to above by Mr. Bonar Law.

MR. BONAR LAW and MR. BALFOUR both expressed a preference for Sir Edward Grey's form of words.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pressed that our desiderata should be formulated at once.

MR. CHURCHILL agreed. After the war there might be mutual jealousies and heartburnings. He suggested it was very desirable to block in the general lines of the terms we required. As regards Alexandretta, we had already been hampered by French susceptibilities.

Proposed Conference.

THE PRIME MINISTER read a telegram sent by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russia, proposing a Conference at Paris on the question of the ultimate terms of peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that any interchange of views ought to be between the Foreign Ministers themselves, and not through the medium of Ambassadors. He suggested that they should meet either at Salonica or Lemnos or on board a British man-of-war in those waters, which could easily be reached from either country. He suggested also that a hint should be given to Italy, and perhaps to Greece and Bulgaria, that the fate of Asia Minor would probably be settled at the Conference. By this step we might perhaps bring in all the hesitating neutral States.

SIR EDWARD GREY said he did not want to prejudge this proposal or to negative it, but he would put some of the objections. It nearly always happened that allies quarrelled over the spoils, and this might happen in our case. It would be very difficult, and perhaps very risky, to discuss such delicate questions now as were involved. For example, we might have serious friction with France if we put in a claim for Alexandretta. It would also be very difficult to all the Foreign Ministers to absent themselves from their own countries for two or three weeks.

Alexandretta.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the reason for friction in the division of the spoils was usually that the nations concerned did not discuss the matter beforehand. He felt considerable misgivings about the expediency of occupying Alexandretta. He suggested Palestine as an alternative owing to the prestige it would give us.

LORD KITCHENER said that Palestine would be of no value to us whatsoever. He saw no reason why the French should oppose our occupation of Alexandretta, provided it was put to them in the right way. Alexandretta was beyond the French sphere of influence in Syria.

MR. BALFOUR asked what was the military case in favour of an occupation of Alexandretta.

LORD KITCHENER said it was a question of communications. Troops could be sent rapidly by rail from Alexandretta to India and Mesopotamia.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the German Admiral Suchow, when on a visit to Alexandretta, had made a statement to the effect that Germany would have gone to war in order to secure Alexandretta alone, as it was the only good harbour between Smyrna and the Suez Canal.

LORD FISHER said that Alexandretta had a special importance as an outlet for the oil supplies of Mesopotamia and Persia.

MR. McKENNA said that the question hinged largely on that of the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean after the war. A naval base would be of no value without command of the sea. We ought, therefore, to consider what we are committing ourselves to. In 1912 the whole question of our naval policy in the Mediterranean had been reviewed, and we had deliberately come to the conclusion that we could not simultaneously retain command of the Mediterranean as well as of the North Sea. He suggested, therefore, that in return for concessions made to Russia at Constantinople and the Straits we should ask for compensation outside the Mediterranean.

LORD KITCHENER said it was essential we should retain command of the sea in the Mediterranean.

MR. CHURCHILL said that in 1912 we had been justified in reducing our peace strength in the Mediterranean owing to our concentration of naval force in the North Sea and our close friendship with France. After the war he hoped that our naval position would be very strong. If we succeeded in shattering German naval power we ought to be able to build a Mediterranean fleet against France and Russia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE questioned whether it was worth while to press the question of Alexandretta up to the point of a quarrel with France.

LORD KITCHENER laid great stress on the importance of Alexandretta. With Russia in Constantinople, France in Syria, and Italy in Rhodes, our position in Egypt would be untenable if any other Power held Alexandretta.

MR. BALFOUR said he was somewhat loth to oppose on a point on which the Admiralty and War Office appeared to be in complete agreement. He wished, however, to point out that, from a military point of view, the natural line of communication with the Persian Gulf was maritime. If we come to defend on a line of railway communication from Alexandretta to Mesopotamia we should be in an embarrassing position in the event of its interruption in war.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that if we acquired any territory on land we should have to be prepared to defend it against someone. We ought to determine first whether we require a harbour, and, second, whether we want any more territory.

LORD KITCHENER said that we could not count on holding Egypt if Alexandretta were in the hands of some other Power.

MR. CHURCHILL asked if we were to give Constantinople to Russia, and Syria to France, and to receive nothing in return? He reminded the War Council that at the end of the war our naval and military strength ought to be very great indeed.

German Colonies.

SIR EDWARD GREY asked what would be the fate of the German colonies?

LORD KITCHENER said it would be a mistake to acquire more of these than we could avoid, as it would more than anything else interfere with the future establishment of goodwill between Germany and ourselves after the war.

SIR EDWARD GREY agreed. He was strongly opposed to the acquisition of German colonies, but feared that South Africa and Australasia would never allow us to cede German South-West Africa and the Pacific colonies.

German East Africa.

MR. HARCOURT agreed. He suggested that German East Africa might be acquired in order to settle the question of Indian emigration.

Egypt not part of the bargain.

MR. CHURCHILL was strongly opposed to the acquisition of German East Africa. He also said that Egypt ought not to form part of the bargain. The question of Egypt had been decided long ago when it was bartered for Morocco. We ought not, as it were, to have to buy in over again.

MR. BALFOUR said that Lord Lansdowne and he had practically arranged the question of Egypt as part of the general settlement leading up to the *Entente cordiale* with France.

LORD LANSDOWNE agreed. He thought it possible that France had welcomed the Russian claim to Constantinople as a set-off against our occupation of Egypt.

The German fleet and Kiel Canal.

MR. CHURCHILL asked what was to happen about the German fleet and the Kiel Canal? The destruction of the fleet and the removal of the Canal from German control were great objects of British policy. It was essential that we should not come out of this war leaving Germany the power to attack us again in a few years' time. He also pointed out the enormous strategic value of the Kiel Canal, which enabled Germany to transfer her fleet within a few hours from the Baltic to the North Sea and *vice versâ*. Ought we not, he asked, to demand the surrender or destruction of the German fleet?

MR. BONAR LAW said that, in his opinion, the first condition of peace was the elimination of the German fleet.

MR. BALFOUR drew a distinction between the destruction of the German fleet and the neutralization of the Kiel Canal, as the fleet could be rebuilt in a few years.

LORD LANSDOWNE pointed out that both these desiderata were as important to Russia as to ourselves.

LORD FISHER said that if, after the war, Germany started to build a new fleet, we ought to go and smash it at once.

LORD KITCHENER said that the question of armaments was entirely one of finance. The way to stop Germany from building a new fleet was to inflict an indemnity to be paid over a long term of years.

LORD HALDANE said he hoped that the possibility of some agreement for the restriction of armaments would not be abandoned.

The reply to Russia.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this discussion made him somewhat apprehensive. Russia had made a definite proposition with primary reference to the Ottoman Empire, which was the main subject of the present meeting. The discussion of this proposition had raised every subject which would arise at the end of the war. The conditions at the end of the war, however, could not be foreseen, and the present discussion ought to be limited to the Ottoman Empire. The question which really had to be decided immediately was the reply to be given to Russia. Personally, he advocated the adoption of Sir Edward Grey's formula. If the desiderata were to be formulated, they should be confined for the present to the Ottoman Empire.

Alexandretta.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that this practically confined the issue to the question of Alexandretta.

MR. HARCOURT said that he was not agreed at present as to the desirability of acquiring Alexandretta. He asked whether it was required as a harbour, or as the terminus of a railway from Mesopotamia. He suggested that Marmaris was a better harbour.

MR. BONAR LAW suggested that we should put off Russia with a statement that we should at the end of the war give them what they asked for, provided that we obtained what we wanted, without any attempt at present to define our desiderata.

LORD CREWE said that then Russia would be completely dealt with. Early in the war the Russians had said what they wanted with regard to Germany and Austria, and now they had stated their requirements from Turkey. If we did not block out what we want we might get left in the lurch. He added that he thought we ought to consider the expediency of leaving some territory to the Sultan of Turkey as the head of the Khalifate. The Mohammedans of India, for example, had in no way diminished their reverence for the Sultan by reason of the war.

LORD KITCHENER said that the location of the Khalifate was solely a question for the Mohammedan world.

SIR EDWARD GREY said he proposed to suggest to Russia to keep secret for the present the arrangement proposed as regards the future of Constantinople, otherwise the Balkan States might be alienated. There were three other stipulations which he considered necessary :—

1. Free passage of the Straits to the commerce of all nations.
2. Constantinople to be a free port for goods in transit.
3. Arabia and the holy places to remain in Mussulman hands.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested also that a hint should be given to Russia that we are abandoning a traditional attitude and that a large section of public opinion in this country would be opposed to it. Also that Russia should be asked to interpose no obstacle to the intervention in the war on the side of the Allies of other nations.

Conclusions.

1. *A reply to be sent to Russia in the sense that we should agree to the proposals put forward in the Russian* aide-mémoire, *subject to the war being prosecuted to a victorious conclusion, and to Great Britain realizing the desiderata referred to in the last sentence of the Russian* aide-mémoire. *These desiderata will be put forward by the British and French Governments as soon as there has been time to consider them.* (*A telegram in this sense was sent in March* 1915.)

2. *The War Office to prepare a memorandum setting forth the strategical advantages of Alexandretta.*

APPENDIX.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, March 4, 1915.*
(No. 249. Secret.)

I READ to Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon your telegram No. 298 of 2nd March, and his Excellency begged me to assure you that he had never doubted your sympathy, and that he was much touched with terms in which you had referred to Russian aspirations.

He thought, however, that the time had come for preparing public opinion in Great Britain and France for their approaching realisation. French Government were, equally with His Majesty's Government, fully acquainted with the views of Russian Government on Constantinople and the Straits, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed himself in entire sympathy with them except on one point which, as a matter of fact, Russian Government never raised. French Minister for Foreign Affairs had been under the impression that Russia intended to claim both shores of the Dardanelles. This was a mistake, as she had never intended to ask for the Asiatic shore, provided it was left in the possession of Turkey, and on the understanding that no fortifications were to be erected on it.

On my way to Ministry for Foreign Affairs with French Ambassador, latter had told me that in the audience in which he had presented General Pau yesterday to the Emperor His Majesty had in conversation himself said that there was one question—that of Constantinople—on which he must speak with precision. Passions of his subjects with regard to its possession were deeply stirred, and he had no right to impose on them the tremendous sacrifices entailed by the war without securing for them in return the realisation of a secular ambition. His decision was taken, and he must insist on a radical solution of the question of Constantinople and the Straits. He asked French Ambassador to call on Minister for Foreign Affairs the same afternoon and to repeat to him what he had said. Minister for Foreign Affairs had in the meanwhile received a [group omitted: ? message] from the Emperor informing him of above conversation and desiring him to come to Tsarskoe Selo to see His Majesty this morning.

This afternoon Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to me and French Ambassador *aide-mémoire*, of which translation follows, embodying result of his Excellency's conversation with Emperor and definitely recording Russian claims. His Excellency does not ask us publicly to announce our approval of these claims, but I gather that he would be grateful for an assurance that we would not raise any objections to them. [? Subsequently] public opinion might be gradually prepared for desired solution.

Aide-mémoire begins:—

"Course of latest events leads His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas to think that the question of Constantinople and the Straits must be definitely solved in accordance with traditional aspirations of Russia.

"Any solution would be unsatisfactory and precarious if it did not incorporate henceforward in Russian Empire the city of Constantinople, western shore of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmora, and of the Dardanelles, as well as Southern Thrace up to the Enos–Midia line.

"*Ipso facto* and by strategic necessity, part of Asiatic shore included between the Bosphorus, River Sakharia, and a point to be fixed on the Gulf of Ismid, islands of the Sea of Marmora, islands of Imbros and Tenedos, ought to be incorporated in the empire."

Special interests of France and of Great Britain in the region above described will be scrupulously respected.

Imperial Government likes to hope that above considerations will meet with sympathy of the two allied Governments. Said Governments are assured of meeting with, at the hands of Imperial Government, the same sympathy for realisation of desiderata which they may form in other regions of Ottoman Empire and elsewhere.

o

Anexo XVI: *Agreement regarding Constantinople,* 1 de abril de 1917.

Código do arquivo:

CAB 24/9/69

Descrição:

Documento impresso para o *British War Cabinet*, com a transcrição de telegramas referentes aos acordos feitos em Petrogrado a 4 e 12 de março de 1915, que acordava a entrega dos territórios de Constantinopla, a península de Galípoli e outras partes da Turquia, à Rússia, no fim da guerra e com a paz entre a *Triple Entente*.

277

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1917.

CONFIDENTIAL.

WAR CABINET G.T.366 2 WHITEHALL GARDENS

Télégramme circulaire russe du 4 mars, 1915, au sujet de Constantinople et des Détroits.

LE cours des derniers événements amène Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas à penser que la question de Constantinople et des Détroits doit être résolue définitivement, selon les aspirations séculaires de la Russie.

Toute solution serait insuffisante et précaire si la ville de Constantinople, la rive occidentale du Bosphore, de la mer de Marmara et des Dardanelles, ainsi que la Thrace méridionale jusqu'à la ligne Énos–Midia, n'étaient désormais incorporées à l'Empire russe.

De même, et par nécessité stratégique, la partie du littoral asiatique comprise entre le Bosphore, la rivière Sakharia et un point à fixer sur le golfe d'Ismid, les îles de la mer de Marmara, les îles d'Imbros et de Ténédos devront être incorporées à l'Empire.

Les intérêts spéciaux de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne dans la région ci-dessus désignée seront scrupuleusement respectés.

Le Gouvernement Impérial se plaît à espérer que les considérations ci-dessus seront accueillies avec sympathie par les deux Gouvernements alliés. Lesdits Gouvernements alliés sont assurés de rencontrer auprès du Gouvernement Impérial la même sympathie pour la réalisation des desseins qu'ils peuvent former en d'autres régions de l'Empire ottoman comme ailleurs.

Pétrograde, le 4 mars, 1915.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Russian Government.

SUBJECT to the war being carried on and brought to a successful conclusion, and to the desiderata of Great Britain and France in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere being realised, as indicated in the Russian communication herein referred to, His Majesty's Government will agree to the Russian Government's *aide-mémoire* relative to Constantinople and the Straits, the text of which was communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador by his Excellency M. Sazonof on the 4th March, 1915.

Petrograd, March 12, 1915.

Memorandum.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to make the following observations with reference to the *aide-mémoire* which this Embassy had the honour of addressing to the Imperial Government on the 12th March, 1915.

The claim made by the Imperial Government in their *aide-mémoire* of the 4th March, 1915, considerably exceeds the desiderata which were foreshadowed by M. Sazonof as probable a few weeks ago. Before His Majesty's Government have had time to take into consideration what their own desiderata elsewhere would be in the final terms of peace, Russia is asking for a definite promise that her wishes shall be satisfied with regard to what is in fact the richest prize of the entire war. Sir Edward Grey accordingly hopes that M. Sazonof will realise that it is not in the power of His Majesty's Government to give a greater proof of friendship than that which is afforded by the terms of the above-mentioned *aide-mémoire*. That document involves a complete reversal of the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government, and is in direct opposition to the opinions and sentiments at one time universally held in England and which have still by no means died out. Sir Edward

[462—3]

Grey therefore trusts that the Imperial Government will recognise that the recent general assurances given to M. Sazonof have been most loyally and amply fulfilled. In presenting the *aide-mémoire* now, His Majesty's Government believe and hope that a lasting friendship between Russia and Great Britain will be assured as soon as the proposed settlement is realised.

From the British *aide-mémoire* it follows that the desiderata of His Majesty's Government, however important they may be to British interests in other parts of the world, will contain no condition which could impair Russia's control over the territories described in the Russian *aide-mémoire* of the 4th March, 1915.

In view of the fact that Constantinople will always remain a trade *entrepôt* for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, His Majesty's Government will ask that Russia shall, when she comes into possession of it, arrange for a free port for goods in transit to and from non-Russian territory. His Majesty's Government will also ask that there shall be commercial freedom for merchant-ships passing through the Straits, as M. Sazonof has already promised.

Except in so far as the naval and military operations on which His Majesty's Government are now engaged in the Dardanelles may contribute to the common cause of the Allies, it is now clear that these operations, however successful, cannot be of any advantage to His Majesty's Government in the final terms of peace. Russia alone will, if the war is successful, gather the direct fruits of these operations. Russia should therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, not now put difficulties in the way of any Power which may, on reasonable terms, offer to co-operate with the Allies. The only Power likely to participate in the operations in the Straits is Greece. Admiral Carden has asked the Admiralty to send him more destroyers, but they have none to spare. The assistance of a Greek flotilla, if it could have been secured, would thus have been of inestimable value to His Majesty's Government.

To induce the neutral Balkan States to join the Allies was one of the main objects which His Majesty's Government had in view when they undertook the operations in the Dardanelles. His Majesty's Government hope that Russia will spare no pains to calm the apprehensions of Bulgaria and Roumania as to Russia's possession of the Straits and Constantinople being to their disadvantage. His Majesty's Government also hope that Russia will do everything in her power to render the co-operation of these two States an attractive prospect to them.

Sir E. Grey points out that it will obviously be necessary to take into consideration the whole question of the future interests of France and Great Britain in what is now Asiatic Turkey; and, in formulating the desiderata of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Ottoman Empire, he must consult the French as well as the Russian Government. As soon, however, as it becomes known that Russia is to have Constantinople at the conclusion of the war, Sir E. Grey will wish to state that throughout the negotiations, His Majesty's Government have stipulated that the Mussulman Holy Places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under independent Mussulman dominion.

Sir E. Grey is as yet unable to make any definite proposal on any point of the British desiderata; but one of the points of the latter will be the revision of the Persian portion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 so as to recognise the present neutral sphere as a British sphere.

Until the Allies are in a position to give to the Balkan States, and especially to Bulgaria and Roumania, some satisfactory assurance as to their prospects and general position with regard to the territories contiguous to their frontiers to the possession of which they are known to aspire; and until a more advanced stage of the agreement as to the French and British desiderata in the final peace terms is reached, Sir E. Grey points out that it is most desirable that the understanding now arrived at between the Russian, French, and British Governments should remain secret.

Petrograd, March 12, 1915.

Note verbale remise par M. Paléologue à son Excellence M. Sazonof, le 12 *avril*, 1915, *en réponse au précédent.*

LE Gouvernement de la République donnera son agrément à l'aide-mémoire russe remis par M. Isvolsky à M. Delcassé, le 6 mars dernier, et relatif à Constantinople et aux Détroits, à condition que la guerre sera poursuivie jusqu'à la victoire et que la France et la Grande-Bretagne réalisent leurs desseins en Orient comme ailleurs, ainsi qu'il est dit dans l'aide-mémoire russe.
