

IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC COMPASS UNDER THE EUROPEAN UNION COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – IMPLICATIONS FOR PORTUGAL¹

A IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DA STRATEGIC COMPASS (‘BÚSSOLA ESTRATÉGICA’) NO ÂMBITO DA POLÍTICA COMUM DE SEGURANÇA E DEFESA DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA – IMPLICAÇÕES PARA PORTUGAL

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Abstract

The Strategic Compass (SC) is a project centred on four pillars that is being developed from 2020-2022, during the European Council Presidencies of Germany, Portugal, Slovenia and France. It will allow the European Union (EU) to implement its Global Strategy and adapt to the international context, and will address the need to review the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to make its civilian and military missions and / or operations more robust and with more flexible mandates. Thus, this study aimed to propose Strategic Guidelines (SGs) that Portugal can follow to make the most of the opportunities provided by the SC in the framework of the CSDP. The study uses inductive reasoning, a qualitative strategy and a case study research design based on a literature review and on interviews with 12 experts from the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System, the EU, the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the academic milieu / Portuguese universities. The results were based on a list of five strengths, three weaknesses, five opportunities and five threats, and on a scenario analysis (projected scenario) that enabled the identification of 12 SGs, which correspond to the five CSDP priorities defined by Portugal during its Presidency.

Keywords: Strategic Compass, Strategic Guidelines, Common Security and Defence Policy, Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

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Resumo

A *Bússola Estratégica (BE)* é um projeto que está a ser desenvolvido em quatro pilares, entre 2020-2022, nas Presidências do Conselho Europeu da Alemanha, de Portugal, da Eslovénia e da França, baseado na pretensão da União Europeia (UE) em operacionalizar a sua *Estratégia Global* e adaptar-se ao contexto internacional, sustentada na necessidade de reavaliar a *Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD)*, tornando as suas missões e/ou operações civis e militares mais robustas e com mandatos mais flexíveis. Assim, esta investigação teve por objetivo criar *Linhas de Orientação Estratégica (LOE)* que maximizem, para Portugal, as potencialidades da BE no contexto da PCSD. Alicerçou-se num raciocínio indutivo, associado a uma estratégia qualitativa e a um desenho de pesquisa de estudo de caso, e na análise documental e das entrevistas realizadas a 12 especialistas, ligados ao Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa, UE, Ministérios dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Defesa e meio académico. Os resultados, ancorados em cinco potencialidades, três vulnerabilidades, cinco oportunidades e cinco ameaças, e numa cenarização (com o cenário mais provável), permitiram elencar 12 LOE, associadas às cinco prioridades da PCSD definidas por Portugal na sua Presidência.

Palavras-chave: *Bússola Estratégica, Linhas de Orientação Estratégica, Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, Presidência Portuguesa do Conselho da União Europeia.*

1. Introduction

When it is approved in 2022, the Strategic Compass will be the most relevant policy document for the Common Security and Defence Policy for several years (Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2021).

This study explores the field of Military Sciences, specifically the area of “Crisis and Armed Conflict Studies”.

The Strategic Compass (SC) project is one of the goals of the German Presidency of the Council of the European Union (GPEU) (Auswärtiges Amt, 2020), one of the three presidencies during which it will be developed, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 – “Strategic Compass” Project

The European international context in terms of Strategic Security (SS) is currently influenced, on the one hand, by the Corona Virus Disease (COVID); on the other, by Brexit and by former US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw 9,500 troops from Germany (Lange, 2020). As the European Council’s strategic agenda for 2019-2024 stresses, the European Union (EU) is in need of a unified voice (Council of the European Union [CEU], 2019).

Europe has become vulnerable (Advisory Council on International Affairs [ACIA], 2020) to the pressures exerted by new threats, the evolution of the geopolitical climate and changes in transatlantic relations, and a decision must be made on whether the EU should review its external action strategy (the latest version was approved in 2003). In a speech at the Munich Security Conference (MSC), Steinmeier (2020) stressed the importance of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that enabled effective action, as this would be the only way to make a credible effort to preserve the international order.

An important step had already been taken in June 2016 with the drafting of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). On 16 June 2020, following a proposal by Germany, the EU defence ministers decided that developing the SC was vital. The initiative aims to “[...] enhance and guide the implementation of the Level of Ambition agreed in November 2016 in the context of the EU [European Union] Global Strategy and could further contribute to develop the common European security and defence culture [...]” (CEU, 2020, p. 3).

According to Major and Mölling (2020, p. 1), the EU is essentially focused “[...] on coping with the health, economic and social consequences of the pandemic [...]”, and the focus on defence has decreased at a time when “[...] the security and defence environment around Europe seems to require the European Union to think even more about its role [...]”. Indeed, over recent years, the military component of defence has not been a priority for some European countries, and the substantial budget cuts due to the pandemic could make matters worse (Koenig & Stahl, 2020). Figures 2 and 3 show the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) allocated to this Defence component.




Figure 2 – Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) allocated to Defence (in 13 out of 27 countries)

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2020).




Figure 3 – Percentage of GDP allocated to Defence (in 14 out of 27 countries)

Source: SIPRI (2020).

During the PPEU, Portugal is in charge of leading the so-called “Strategic Dialogue” (Major & Mölling, 2020). This alone justifies the relevance of this study, but that is not the only reason. The project could prove critical to create a common European culture of Security and Defence (SD) (Fiott, 2020; Koenig, 2020; Major & Mölling, 2020). While defining a list of common threats and the measures required to “minimise them” is extremely important for Portugal, and for the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) in particular, it would also be of interest to predict, insofar as this can be done, the implications of the SC.

As the European strategic paper will not have been published by the time of conclusion of this study (Figure 1), its practical contribution will be to produce knowledge on national defence, which Portugal can use to contribute to Europe’s objective, that is, to build the EU’s capacity for concrete, rather than theoretical action (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2020; Mölling & Schütz, 2020).

To narrow the scope of the study topic – the implementation of the Strategic Compass –, the following temporal, spatial and content delimitations were defined, as advised by Santos and Lima (2019, p. 41):

- Temporal delimitation - the study covers the period from 2016 (when the concept was introduced in the paper on the EUGS) (EU, 2016) to 2022 (Figure 1), the year the SC project is expected to be completed;
- Spatial delimitation - although the SC concept affects the EU, and thus its 27 Member States (MS), as the title indicates, the study focuses on the national territory;
- Content delimitation - the study addresses the national defence policy and its role in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The General Objective (GO) of this study is to propose Strategic Guidelines (SG) that Portugal can follow to make the most of the opportunities provided by the SC in the context of the CSDP. The GO was divided into three Specific Objectives (SO) (Table 1).

Table 1 – Specific objectives

SO1	To create a projected scenario for how the SC will be implemented in the framework of the CSDP.
SO2	To analyse how the SC's implementation in the EU will affect Portugal's external environments.
SO3	To analyse how the SC's implementation in the EU will affect Portugal's internal environments.

To achieve the research objectives, the study will answer the following Research Question (RQ): “Which SGs will allow Portugal to make the most of the opportunities provided by the SC in the framework of the CSDP?”

2. Theoretical and conceptual framework

This chapter briefly presents the literature review, the relevant concepts and the analysis model.

2.1. Literature review

The key concept of this study is the SC. However, as the study also covers the CSDP, it will also be explored. Naturally, other concepts are also broached, such as that of “Strategic Autonomy”, which will be briefly explained for the sake of clarity.

2.1.1. Common Security and Defence Policy

The SC process, which was formally initiated with the GPEU, aims to help develop a common European SD culture (CEU, 2020). Thus, it should address some gaps in the CSDP (CEU, 2020), such as the differences in MS’ perceptions regarding threats (e.g. Russian actions, climate change, cyber-attacks, disinformation), which not only delay the decision-making process but have other consequences. Furthermore, all CSDP processes require unanimity (Mix, 2003), as set out in Article 31(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) in 2016.

The aim of the CSDP, an integral part of the CFSP, is to enable the EU to keep the peace in its neighbourhood (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012). According to the German Government (Bundesregierung, 2020), an appropriate response to external crises and conflicts can only be achieved through cooperation between MS under the CFSP.

The origins of the CSDP date back to 1992 and to the famous Petersberg Declaration by the Western European Union (Coelmont, 2019). But it was only in 1999, with the Helsinki Headline Goal, that a specific Level of Ambition was established for the CSDP: the ability to deploy between 50,000 and 60,000 persons, naval and air capabilities for operations (covering the full range of Petersberg tasks), within two months, and to sustain the operation for at least one year (European Parliament, 2006). However, this ability remained theoretical, and most capability-related goals were only implemented at the 2001 Laeken European Council (European Capability Action Plan). Further progress would come later, in June 2004, when the 2010 Headline Goal was adopted at the Brussels European Council

(External Relations Council, 2004).

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) was another milestone for the CSDP, as the treaty included the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the possibility of assigning crisis management tasks to a group of MS, and clauses on mutual assistance and solidarity (Pérez, 2017).

The EUGS (2016) redefined the CSDP, and the protection of Europe was added to the existing goals, which concerned crisis response and capability building in third countries. These three goals (tasks) form the basis for an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) (CEU European External Action Service, 2016). Formally, the EUGS remains the basis for much of the EU's capability development efforts. However, there is no strategy for the CSDP that clarifies which SD responsibilities MS are actually willing to take on², to what ends, through which types of operations, at what scale and how often (Biscop, 2020).

The EU is committed to enhancing its ability to act as a security supplier through its operational involvement in CSDP missions and operations (Grevi & Ivan, 2020). These missions and operations are vital to protect European values and interests, and thus contribute to a certain Strategic Autonomy, which has been described as “[...] political, institutional and material ability of the EU and its member states to manage their interdependence with third parties, with the aim of ensuring the well-being of their citizens and implementing self-determined policy decisions [...]” (Helwig, 2020, p. 4).

However, according to the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU,

To achieve this, the EU and its Member States should allocate the necessary financial resources for security and defence both at EU level, as well as at national level following Member States' budgetary processes, which could also strengthen the economic recovery in particular in critical sectors in the EU. (CEU, 2020, p. 2)

Understandably, the EU's focus in terms of SD is on its current missions and operations to contain conflicts in neighbouring countries (from Ukraine to the Western Balkans, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel), which serve to protect Europe's interests (ACIA, 2020).

Furthermore, these missions and operations reveal that, over the last 20 years, the EU has made efforts, through the CFSP, to achieve greater autonomy and acquire more credible military capabilities. However, the EU still depends on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Defence matters (e.g. strategically, in military terms and in terms of internal security) and is still a long way from reaching the political and military Level of Ambition defined in the 2016 EUGS. At the Munich Security Conference, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (2020) stated that, in the current decade, the main task for European policy when building an EU based on SD is to make Europe a strong pillar of NATO. Moreover, 21 of the 27 MS are also members of the Alliance (Cravinho, 2021).

² National interests related to different factors (e.g. social, economic, and natural concerns regarding sovereignty).

2.1.2. Strategic compass

As the German proposal for the GPEU stated (Federal Foreign Office [FFO], 2020), the goal was to develop the CSDP, and in fact the German presidency guidelines (FFO, 2020, p. 24) confirm that, in cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS), Germany wished “[...] to drive forward the development of the so-called strategic compass”. According to its Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [BmVgi], 2020a), the general goals were to foster resilience and strengthen the EU’s ability to act, essentially through three projects: the SC, intensifying EU-NATO cooperation, and cooperation between European health services.

The Slovenian Minister of Defence Matej Tonin declared his commitment to the project, stressing that “[...] the most important political steering document for the common security and defence policy, the Strategic Compass will be a priority during Slovenia’s EU presidency in the second half of the year” (The Slovenia Times, 2021).

When the project is concluded, the expectation is that the SC will help align Europe’s strategic orientation and overall capabilities (BmVgi, 2020b; Bundesregierung, 2020).

During the GPEU, the main threats (see Figure 1) to the EU were identified in a 360° model, that is, a model where all 27 MS are represented. This model will likely have included contingencies and possible scenarios (EEAS, 2020). However, this phase was conceived as an “intelligence paper” rather than a “policy paper” (Wächter, 2020). The threat analysis was carried out as a joint process by the intelligence services of each MS and the EEAS in Brussels (classified paper).

The European Global Strategy (EU, 2016) already contains some of the threats that are expected to appear in the final document, partly or in full (e.g. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorist Action, Organized Crime, Armed Conflict). But MS have also defined in their National Strategies what they consider to be threats (see Strategic Concept of National Defence [CEDN]). An analysis of the Strategic Concepts of 25 MS (including Portugal) can be consulted in a scientific article (Fiott, 2020), including a visual representation of the threats to their national security (among other data), in which a number is assigned to each threat, which corresponds to the number of times that threat is mentioned in the documents. Figure 4 shows some broad notions that MS consider relevant for security.

Terrorism including radicalisation, extremism and returnee fighters	26	11	6	1	2		2
Technological uncertainty including cryptocurrencies, AI, 5G, data use and the weaponisation of space	7	7	6		2		4
Supply disruptions including food, water, energy, electricity and raw materials	22	18	8	3	5	6	7
Public insecurity including civic order and decreasing national demographics	3	2	7	3	1	2	1
Proliferation including the spread of WMD, weapons, missiles and CBRN	17	12	1	1	1		
Organised crime including corruption and drug and human trafficking	23	10	8	1	4		3
Instability in the EU eurozone fragility, Brexit and instability in the Aegean and the Western Balkans	1	2	13	4	4	4	2
Insecurity in the Middle East including insecurity in the Persian Gulf and Sunni/Shi'a rivalry	1	2	4	1	2	1	2
Insecurity in Eastern Europe including Russia, frozen conflicts, the Baltic Sea region and Black Sea region	8	7	6	10	1	3	
Insecurity in Asia including the rise of China, North Korea's nuclear aims and the South China Sea	1	3	4	2	2		1
Insecurity in Africa including instability in North Africa, the Sahel, Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa		4	6	1	3		1
	Threat	Risk	Challenge	Tension	Problem	Pressure	Vulnerability

[Cont.]




Figure 4 – Priority threats, risks, challenges, tensions, problems, pressures and vulnerabilities

Source: Fiott (2020, p. 7).

Therefore, as expected, the SC may have enabled the identification of civilian and military threats at different time horizons. However, other factors could have a multiplier effect on those threats, in some cases simultaneously (e.g. climate change, pandemics, demography, extremism).

During the PPEU, Portugal is in charge of leading a “Strategic Dialogue” (see Figure 1) centred around four pillars (EEAS, 2020): crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships.

MS should establish common priorities for each threat and build the capabilities required to address them (EEAS, 2020). It is likely that some of these capabilities are already, or could be, part of PESCO projects and are, or could be, financed through the European Defence Fund (EDF). One of the EU’s goals is to make the AAF of its MS more interoperable and avoid duplication in research and development (Csernaton, 2020).

One possible difficulty is precisely prioritising threats according to their importance. This would mean that MS would have to either interpret each threat in exactly the same way, or reach a (possibly artificial) consensus. Such consensus may be impossible to achieve due to historical and economic factors, but also to geographical and even diplomatic factors (e.g. bilateral relations outside the EU). However, the key will be to accept that there are different perceptions regarding the degree of a threat, that is, there are multiple dimensions in a security environment that is itself complex. This hierarchy of threats will likely be decided at national level, after which national policies will determine the capabilities each MS wishes to, or can invest in and / or develop (Koenig, 2020).

The final document (fourth phase, see Figure 1) should be used to implement the EU’s strategic objectives for the SD sector and make the EU’s activity faster, more effective and easier to plan, in compliance with the 2016 EUGS on the CSDP (Biscop, 2020). According to the Director General for German Defence Policy, Detlef Wächter (2020), an EU that acts globally lacks clear, achievable strategic objectives.

The document should help strengthen Europe’s resilience against both old and new challenges and become the foundation for a CSDP. According to the German MD (BmVg, 2020), the SC should be supported by a broad political consensus and a firm political will to take action by all 27 MS.

That is, the goal of the SC is to align the EU’s strategic, operational and capability needs, in order to prepare it for strategic action. As such, even if it is still an embryonic concept, when it becomes a reality, it will provide political and strategic guidelines for the EU’s SD (Biscop, 2020).

2.2. Analysis model

An analysis model was prepared based on the literature review (Table 2).

As described by Sarsby (2016), External Factors (EF) are divided into Threats (A) and Opportunities (O) and Internal Factors (IF) are divided into Weaknesses (W) and Strengths (S).

Table 2 – Analysis model

GO: To propose SGs Portugal can follow to make the most of the opportunities provided by the SC in the framework of the CSDP.			
SO	RQ: Which SGs will allow Portugal to make the most of the opportunities provided by the SC in the framework of the CSDP?		
	Concept	Dimension	Data collection
SO1 - To create a projected scenario for how the SC will be implemented in the framework of the CSDP.	Strategic Compass	Implementation	Literature review
SO2 - To analyse how the SC's implementation in the EU will affect Portugal's external environment.		Opportunities	Semi-structured interview
SO3 - To analyse how the SC's implementation in the EU will affect Portugal's internal environment.		Threats	
		Strengths	
	Weaknesses		

3. Methodology and method

This section describes the methodology and method used in the study.

3.1. Methodology

The study used a qualitative research strategy based on inductive reasoning and a case study design.

3.2. Method

3.2.1. Participants and procedure

The literature review included 26³ documents and the study sample consisted of experts who could address all the issues raised by the RQ. Fourteen interviews were conducted. Two interviewees only answered the questions that directly related to them (e.g. capabilities pillar).

The study used a non-probability purposeful sample, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3 – List of interviewees

Code	Position	Holder
I1	Visiting Professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the Portuguese Catholic University	Lieutenant General António L. Fontes Ramos (retired)
I2	Advisor at the Strategic Defence Planning Services of the Directorate General of National Defence Policy (DGPDN)	Colonel Rocha
I3	Head of the Military Strategic Planning Division	Brigadier General Rui Ferreira
I4	Deputy Director General for National Defence Policy	Brigadier General Nuno Lemos Pires
I5	Minho University	Professor Ana Paula Brandão
I6	Head of the Multidisciplinary Team of the Centre for Studies and Research of the National Defence Institute	Professor Isabel Ferreira Nunes
I7	Member of the Portuguese Permanent Representation to the European Union	Dr Mafalda Pinheiro Alves

³ Published between 1 June 2020 and 30 March 2021, that is, from the start of the GPEU to the first trimester of the PPEU.

[Cont.]

Code	Position	Holder
I8	Policy advisor to the Minister of National Defence	Dr Bruno Reis
I9	General Directorate for Armaments and Defence - Planning and Programming Division of the Directorate-General of National Defence Resources (DGRDN)	Commander Rodrigues Correia
I10	The Deputy Political Director-General for Defence and Security (MNE) and the Director for Defence and Security (MNE)	Dr Ana Paula Moreira + Dr Jorge Aranda
I11	European Union - Brussels	Anonymous
I12	Defence Minister's Office	Dr Noémia Pizarro – Defence Minister's Office
I13	Assistant Professor at the Beira Interior University	Professor Liliana Reis Ferreira
I14	Former Portuguese Permanent Representative to the EU Political and Security Committee	Ambassador Graça Mira Gomes

Only one interviewee asked to remain anonymous, and is therefore cited as Interviewee 11 (I11).

3.2.2. Data collection instruments

Two instruments were used to collect the data:

- A literature review (e.g. articles, laws and speeches) for SO1;
- Semi-structured interviews for SO2 and SO3.

Before the interviews were conducted, the semi-structured interview script was reviewed and improved on two occasions: first, it was validated by two experts from the Military University Institute, who provided suggestions for improvement, after which a pre-test was conducted with two interviewees with expertise on the topic. As a result, some minor changes were done.

3.2.3. Data processing technique

The data analysis technique used in the study was content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), specifically category analysis.

SO1 was explored by associating emergent categories (Bardin, 2013) to their corresponding properties, which were derived from the category analysis performed on the data extracted from the 26 documents, creating an organized whole. To qualify, emergent categories had to appear in at least four documents, as adapted from Fachada (2015, p. 116).

SO2 and SO3 were also explored using emergent categories (Bardin, 2013), which had to be mentioned four times during the 14 interviews (Fachada, 2015, p.116).

4. Data analysis and results discussion

This chapter presents a projected scenario for the implementation of the SC under the CSDP and proposes Strategic Guidelines.

4.1. Projected scenario

Six categories were derived from the content analysis performed on the 26 documents. These categories were combined to create a projected scenario (Figure 5). This study proposes that context (20 documents contained contextual references, in 96 Recording Units [RU]) is

what creates the conditions for a European ambition (25 documents had contextual references, in 169 RU) that is reflected in a strategy (12 documents had contextual references, in 45 RU). Implementing this strategy should result in an end product. However, it may prove to be simply one more paper that does not add anything to the ones that already exist (risk) (eight documents contained contextual references, in 11 RU). This risk stems from the fact that the document must be formally accepted by MS, and given their historical and political differences, this will be difficult to achieve without resorting to a Lowest Common Denominator (LCD) with a low level of ambition. Notwithstanding this, the main strategic paper, that is, the output (20 documents contained contextual references, in 58 RU) of the SC, can benefit (14 documents had contextual references, in 35 RU) the EU (e.g. contribute to the DTIB by identifying the capabilities required to address a list of threats that have been previously defined and accepted).




Figure 5 – Projected scenario

4.2. Background for the external and internal factors

To confirm the results obtained in the previous section, this section will analyse the interviewees' perceptions through their answers to question 1.1 of the interview: "In your

opinion, by the end of the French Presidency of the European Union, what will have been achieved in terms of the SC?” For the interviewees, the SC:

- Will result at least in an LCD paper that MS collectively agree on, with a list of threats and how to mitigate them (I6, videoconference interview, 22 February 2021, A.P. Brandão videoconference interview, 26 February, 2021). That is, which “[...] defines a common vision of threats and challenges and expresses MS’ common determination to take, jointly, any actions they consider necessary” (A.L.F. Ramos, videoconference interview, 10 February, 2021), an opinion shared by R. Ferreira (videoconference interview, 19 February, 2021);
- It will provide “[...] guidelines on what we will be doing in terms of Security and Defence” (A.L.F. Ramos, op. cit.), that is, “a kind of EU Strategic Concept for Security and Defence” (N. Pizarro, op. cit.) that will operationalise the “four dimensions” (I. F. Nunes, op. cit.);
- It will lead to “[...] closer civil / military relations, [to] a broader vision of the problems” (L. Pires, videoconference interview, 9 February 2021).

However, some interviewees also expressed concerns that the SC may turn out to “[...] be just another paper [...]” (A.L.F. Ramos, op. cit.). These concerns were shared by B. Reis (videoconference interview, 16 February 2021) and A.P. Moreira (videoconference interview, 2 March 2021); according to L. Rocha (op. cit.) “[...] we have yet to see how it will be operationalised and how effective it will be”. This confirms the scenario presented in 4.1.

4.3. External factors that may affect Portugal as the SC is developed in the EU

4.3.1. Emergent categories

Six main emergent categories were extracted from the content analysis of the interview data: public opinion, EU policy, capabilities, partnerships, crisis management and resilience. The last four categories correspond to the SC pillars.

4.3.2. External factors - threats

Public opinion. This category revealed property A3 (71%), which refers to concern with **citizens’ lack of interest / awareness** regarding SD issues. I11 (videoconference interview, 25 February 2021) stated that “Today’s youth draws its adrenaline from football games and is not concerned with SD issues”. Regarding Portugal, L. Rocha (op. cit.) stated that if “[...] we wanted to talk about the CSDP [...] we would not get five minutes of public attention”. The situation is even worse when it comes to issues such as disinformation, which, G.M. Gomes (face-to-face interview, 23 February 2021) acknowledged, “is a problem, as it is often used to discredit and hinder the actions of the EU and its MS”.

Capabilities. This category obtained two main properties A1 (100%) and A2 (50%):

- A1 - A **weak European DTIB** due to powerful companies with an established reputation lobbying for their own interests. As stated by B. Reis (op. cit.) the “economic interests of one or two companies from one or two countries”. R. Correia (videoconference interview, 19 February 2021) warned of concerns “that the process may be ‘biased’, particularly with regard to military capability building, as some MS have substantially larger DTIB”. Furthermore, other European projects have not yet been implemented. As N. Pizarro (op. cit.) pointed out,

“PESCO and the EDF are only now entering into force, and their results are not yet visible”.

- A2 - The **national DI has a weak presence in Europe** and has not participated in many European projects. I11 (op. cit.) noted that “the industry woke up late for the opportunities PESCO can bring” because, as I. F. Nunes (op. cit.) confirms, “some companies have not yet grasped the full potential of this whole process of promoting European security and defence”.

Crisis Management. The main property in this category was A4 (64%), which refers to **European mechanisms to deal with threats**: “There is also an admitted failure to implement measures to increase European resilience through the CSDP, which depends on MS’ acceptance” (A.P. Brandão, op. cit.). N. Pizarro (op. cit.) confirms that the mechanisms exist, but that “there is a need to [...] reflect on what is already being done”.

Resilience. The main property in this category was A5 (43%), which concerns the **risk to critical infrastructures**, which usually belong to the private sector, as mentioned by I. F. Nunes (op. cit.): “In the case of critical infrastructures, some are administered by the private sector, rather than by the public sector”. Moreover, A.P. Moreira (op. cit.) recognised that “We can be very effective in traditional SD, but we will not solve [the security problem] if we do not guarantee the security of this type of essential critical infrastructures”.

4.3.3. External factors - opportunities

EU policy. The main properties obtained in this category were O1 (86%) and O2 (79%):

- O1 - **Comprehensive approach**, which refers to the instruments available to MS. For B. Reis (op. cit.)

The CSDP insists on this idea that the greatest advantage for the EU is having an integrated response to crises and emergencies, for which the military dimension is indispensable. But the greatest advantage is coordination, closer civil / military cooperation, which we want to strengthen and make more effective.

From the perspective of Portugal, for A.P. Moreira (op. cit.) “[...] resilience in military or internal security is not enough; there must be a comprehensive approach”. A.P. Brandão (op. cit.) recalled that there has been an “[...] official narrative of a comprehensive approach for many years” in the EU.

- O2 - The **relevance of the Atlantic and MS** was mentioned by A.P. Brandão (op. cit.), who stated that “This maritime component is very relevant. The Mediterranean has proved important in the relationship with NATO, and it is important for Southern Europe, but also for Europe as a whole”. R. Ferreira (op. cit.) added that “The strategic environment has changed significantly over recent years, and this has increased the strategic importance of the Atlantic. We ‘woke up’ to the Atlantic because more global powers are using those waters”. Specifically with regard to Portugal, A.L.F. Ramos (op. cit.) argued that “It is becoming clear that the EU needs to play a more significant role in the Atlantic, with a more defined strategy. This is important for Portugal”.

Capabilities. The main properties in this category were O3 (100%) and O4 (79%):

- O3 - **Joint procurement / production / development** (aligned and integrated with NATO) through existing EU mechanisms (e.g. EDF, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence [CARD], PESCO). For L.R. Ferreira (videoconference interview, 12 February

2021), “For the first time, it is being acknowledged that, in practice, the capabilities that MS have to develop must be developed for both organizations”. R. Correia (op. cit.) noted that this is expected to “inspire MS to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by PESCO, CARD and the EDF, in order to close critical gaps in all capabilities”. A.L.F. Ramos (op. cit.) suggested that “major systems could be produced jointly and acquired in full by the EU, bringing together all European companies that have the ability to do participate and enabling them to collaborate. This will be very important for Portugal”.

- O4 - **Portuguese companies are versatile and innovative**, as highlighted by I11 (op. cit.): “We have several interesting Portuguese startups”. A.P. Brandão (op. cit.) stated that “[...] we have the means to do this nationally. [...] One of our strongest areas is innovation”. A.L.F. Ramos (op. cit.) mentioned that “Portugal has versatile capabilities and companies in the area of innovation”.

Partnerships. The main property in this category was O5 (100%), which refers to **extended missions/ operations to third countries and the possibility of partnerships**, which will contribute to a more efficient CSDP. N. Pizarro (op. cit.) stated that “We believe that third countries can help make these missions more robust”. L. Pires (op. cit.) described it as an opportunity because “Portugal has links to countries that need bridges, such as Brazil”. R. Ferreira (op. cit.) confirmed this: “In my opinion, this can be an advantage for us because partnerships are not limited to the EU and NATO, they can be with third countries”. B. Reis (op. cit.) referred to the involvement of international organizations, stating that “What is expected is a strengthening of these partnerships (NATO, EU, OSCE, ECOWAS...)”.

4.4. Internal factors that may affect Portugal as the SC is developed in the EU

4.4.1. Emergent categories

With regard to IFs, the analysis of the interviews revealed five emergent categories: capabilities, national policy, image, resilience and partnerships.

4.4.2. Internal factors – weaknesses

Capabilities. The main property in this category, V1 (71%) refers to **limited material resources**, as A.L.F. Ramos (op. cit.) explained: “Portugal only has one single set of forces, which has some limitations”. L. Pires (op. cit.) confirmed that “Portugal wants to be a security supplier, and for that we need a wider range of capabilities”, but acknowledged that “we cannot take advantage of every opportunity”. Along the same lines, R. Ferreira (op. cit.) recalled that “The biggest problem in Portugal is that there is a technology gap and a downturn”.

National policy. The main properties in this category were V2 (50%) and V3 (71%):

- V2 refers to **poor strategic communication**, mentioned, for example, by L. Rocha (op. cit.) who stated that “Strategic communication does not reach citizens”. M.P. Alves (videoconference interview, 9 February 2021) also acknowledged that “Although efforts are being made to develop a SD narrative [...] there is still a long way to go”.
- V3 refers to **low investment**, which, “in the case of some new technologies [could make it] difficult to find effective investment” (B. Reis, op. cit.). This is compounded by the

pandemic, which makes it hard to “justify transferring funds from traditional domestic policies to Defence” (L.R. Ferreira, op. cit.). For R. Correia (op. cit.), the situation could become even worse, as “the impact of COVID19 on defence budgets is still uncertain”.

4.4.3. Internal factors - strengths

National policy. The main property obtained in the context category was P1 (93%), which refers to **Portugal’s features**, such as the relevance of its Atlantic side, its presence in Europe, the Portuguese language and history, which were mentioned in statements such as: “However, with the UK leaving, Portugal is the main promoter and provider of International Relations with the United States of America (USA) because it is the most Atlantic [European] country and has historical ties to the UK” (L.R. Ferreira, op. cit.). I. F. Nunes (op. cit.) mentioned Portugal’s “Atlantic, African and continental ‘vocation’ [...] which has always enriched the more traditional dimensions of its Foreign Policy”.

Image. The main property in this category, P2 (64%), refers to the **credibility** that Portugal has acquired through its participation in missions and operations, as A.L.F. Ramos (op. cit.) exemplified: “Moreover, our determined, and sometimes decisive, participation in EU operations has garnered Portugal a positive reputation worldwide, and especially in Africa”; but also through the PPEU, as M.P. Alves (op. cit.) pointed out: “The success of our presidencies is also a source of prestige”.

Partnerships. The main properties in this category were P3 (93%) and P4 (50%):

- P3 - The **role of Defence diplomacy** is perceived as important in all its aspects, as exemplified by G.M. Gomes (op. cit.), who stated that “Domestic and foreign diplomatic work is essential”, and A.P. Brandão (op. cit.), who stressed the “importance of the military and Defence agenda in the broader sense”.
- P4 - There is a **political commitment to involve the “idD - Portugal Defence”**⁴, and the MDN has several initiatives to promote it internationally, as highlighted by B. Reis (op. cit.): “For Portugal, the message has been to empower institutions [...] to defend smaller companies [...] and to create the conditions for a more inclusive and diversified market”. I11 (op. cit.) agreed that “The Portuguese State is aware of what is at stake. There is a desire to help define the rules so they can benefit our industry”.

Resilience. The emergent property in this category was P5 (29%), which refers to the **capabilities and responsibilities of MDN bodies** such as the National Defence Institute (IDN), as I. F. Nunes (op. cit.) exemplified: “Universities, think tanks, institutions such as the IDN, have a civic duty to provide training products that enhance those dimensions of resilience by providing cognitive and intellectual tools to distinguish what is disinformation or hostile propaganda”.

4.5. Strategic guidelines

The RQ was answered by combining the projected scenario with the emergent EF and IF to create the 12 SGs (according to a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats [SWOT] analysis) presented in the next section (see summary in Figure 6).

⁴ Referred to as “idD” from this point on.

SG1 – PROMOTE and strengthen MS through Coordinated Maritime Presences. Portugal’s strengths in this point are its diplomacy and the credibility of its AAFE, which stems from its participation in numerous missions and operations. N. Pizarro (op. cit.) recalled that “although it is not a permanent CSDP mission, it may become one, and it seems an effective way to enhance and maximise the individual action of MS with naval assets in the region (e.g. Gulf of Guinea)”. A.P. Brandão (op. cit.) recalled that “Coordinated maritime presences are almost a form of burden-sharing. On the other hand, B. Reis (op. cit.) recalled that “Portugal [...] wants to get the message across that it is not only its **partnership** with NATO that is important, but also its partnership with the US”. Strategically, “Maritime Security – it matters to Portugal.”


		IF	
		Strengths	Weaknesses
		<p>S1 Portugal’s features.</p> <p>S2 Credibility and Experience.</p> <p>S3 Portuguese Defence Diplomacy.</p> <p>S4 Political commitment to involve the idD.</p> <p>S5 Capabilities and responsibilities of MDN bodies.</p>	<p>W1 Limited material resources.</p> <p>W2 Poor national strategic communication.</p> <p>W3 Limited investment.</p>
		<p>GROWTH</p> <p>SG1 – PROMOTE and strengthen MS. (O2 x S1S2S3)</p> <p>SG2 – INCREASE the involvement of the idD and the AICEP. (O1O3O4O5 X S3S4S5)</p> <p>SG3 – ENHANCE the EU’s partnerships with Africa and South America. (O5 x S1S2S3)</p>	<p>FOCUS</p> <p>SG4 – OPTIMISE Portugal’s participation in European projects. (O3O4O5 x W1W3)</p> <p>SG5 – STRENGTHEN civil/military cooperation. (O1O2O5 x W1)</p> <p>SG3 – IMPROVE Strategic Communication. (O1 x W2)</p>
EF	Opportunities	<p>O1 Comprehensive approach.</p> <p>O2 Importance of the Atlantic and maritime security.</p> <p>O3 Joint procurement/production/development.</p> <p>O4 Portuguese companies are versatile and innovative.</p> <p>O5 Extended missions/operations to third countries and partnerships.</p>	
	Threats	<p>T1 Weak European DTIB.</p> <p>T2 The national DI has low visibility in Europe.</p> <p>T3 Citizen’s lack of interest/awareness.</p> <p>T4 Lack of European mechanisms and infrastructures.</p> <p>T5 Risk to critical infrastructure.</p>	<p>STREAMLINING</p> <p>SG7 – USE Portugal’s operational experience and credibility. (T4 x S1S2S3)</p> <p>SG8 – INVOLVE the idd in identifying capabilities. (T1T2 X S4)</p> <p>SG9 – INVOLVE government bodies in reducing risks. (T3T4T5 X S2S5)</p>
			<p>IMPROVEMENT</p> <p>SG10 – INCREASE partnerships with Universities, companies and AAFE. (T1T2 x W1W2W3)</p> <p>SG11 – EXPLORE approaches that address the difficulty in implementing measures. (T3T4T5 x W1W3)</p> <p>SG12 – USE dual-use capabilities. (T3 x W1W3)</p>

Figure 6 – Strategic Guidelines

SG2 – INCREASE the involvement of the idD and the Portugal Global Agency for Trade and Investment (AICEP). For I. F. Nunes, as a partner, the AICEP “can identify business opportunities and link them to opportunities in collaborative projects”. As an example, M. P. Alves (op. cit.) mentioned the need “[...] to involve the private sector in these dual-use areas (e.g. cyber)”.

I. F. Nunes (op. cit.) recalled that “the idD [...] is now doing what other MS already did a long time ago: that is, it is creating a list of research centres and identifying [...] who does what and how they can be of use to the Defence Plan”.

I11 (op. cit.) stated that “While there is no question that we need sufficient critical mass to be competitive, it should also be possible to work through consortiums and subcontractors in a way that allow us all to be part of the process”.

SG3 – ENHANCE the EU’s Peace and Security partnerships with Africa and South America. A.P. Brandão (op. cit.) stated that Portugal should play a role as “policy chaper for the African component, as part of an aligned policy (which includes France)”. For N. Pizarro (op. cit.), it would be “important that [...] funding is at least maintained and preferably increased”, but “For that to happen, we need a more regular and structured dialogue with the African Union [AU] and the regional organizations involved”. This was confirmed by B. Reis (op. cit.), who called for “high-level strategic and political dialogue with regional and sub-regional organizations, not only the AU, but also the Economic Community of West African States Commission and others. The fact remains that, for the CSDP missions in Africa to be effective, it will require regular political dialogue with African partners”.

But South America should also be on the national radar because “Portugal has Brazil as a strategic partner” (M.P. Alves, op. cit.), and this country has already successfully participated in EU missions (R. Ferreira, op. cit.).

SG4 – OPTIMISE Portugal’s participation in European projects (and / or review current projects) through joint investment and, when possible, joint procurement, in order to mitigate the low national investment and to allow national companies to participate, as this will boost economic development. Furthermore, L. Pires (op. cit.) added that “What changes [with the SC] is the possibility of building capabilities in a more joint manner. There could be a rather large difference in PESCO in terms of how European technology companies cooperate”.

Referring to CARD, N. Pizarro (op. cit.) stated this type of instruments “are leading to a Europeanization of Defence Policy, [...] this means that our national planning has to integrate PESCO commitments, its goals, [and that] the two levels of national and European planning are becoming linked”.

SG5 – STRENGTHEN civilian / military cooperation in areas such as resilience, and invest on dual use capabilities to bridge gaps in material resources. The relevance of this issue for the EU and the impact of the SC was discussed in section 4.1. For I. F. Nunes (op. cit.), there will be an impact in terms of capabilities because, by “[...] coordinating them with PESCO projects, [we can] make the most of dual-use capabilities, both at the civilian and military level”. L. Rocha (op. cit.) agreed: “Some PESCO projects have visibility in civil society. The industrial sector at the service of society”.

Some interviewees suggested that the lessons learned from the pandemic should be analysed (e.g. A.P. Brandão, L. Pires). For I. Nunes (op. cit.), and that the AAFP can develop

“cooperation initiatives [with private companies] that benefit society and Portugal, such as helping mitigate gaps that still exist at the civilian level (e.g. fast distribution of vaccines)”.

SG6 – IMPROVE strategic communication capabilities to keep citizens informed, in order to prevent disinformation and increase resilience. G.M. Gomes (op. cit.) emphasised that it is “Important to provide useful information to citizens”. For A.P. Brandão (op. cit.) “there is a lack of training”, and I. Nunes (op. cit.) pointed out that, to understand and react to situations of risk or threat, it is crucial to understand how “public and private actors communicate contents”. For A.P. Brandão (op. cit.) “These challenges and opportunities must be communicated in a straightforward way, as a call to action, to stir interest and commitment in the public”.

L. Rocha (op. cit.) added that “there must be an effort to improve communication to make citizens aware that Portugal’s investment in SD [...] corresponds to the country’s global needs, and to its ambition of being fully integrated in the international system”.

I11 (op. cit.) added that this requires “[...] outside the box thinking: for example, using influencers because they reach that [young] fringe”.

SG7 – USE the operational experience and credibility acquired by Portuguese organizations (or through national experiences, such as the colonial war) to identify crisis response mechanisms and infrastructures (planning, strategic review of CSDP missions and military operations). During the PPEU, the emphasis was on “improving planning and operational command capabilities (investing in military staff in different organizations)” (B. Reis, op. cit.).

In the case of hybrid threats, the EU already acts in a “joint manner through a set of instruments that require multi-agency, multi-purpose and multi-domain cooperation” (e.g. strategic communications, cyberspace) (Ferreira, op. cit.).

I. F. Nunes (op. cit.) argued that “[...] we have to exploit what we are especially good at [...] we have accumulated experience, for example, in mitigating hybrid threats [...]”.

SG8 – INVOLVE the idD in identifying capabilities that can be used to develop the DTIB. According to I. Nunes (op. cit.) “The MD will inform the branches, encourage them to participate [in the process of defining capabilities] and make them aware of the opportunities for collaboration at European level”. J. Aranda (op. cit.) stressed that the process should “involve, from the outset, the Defence Industries through the idD, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Defence [in PESCO commitments]”. The idD can also identify those cooperation opportunities (companies) that can collaborate with our AAF to develop certain Defence products”. For R. Correia (op. cit.), “The obvious starting point is to ensure that the mechanisms that already exist are aligned for the next wave of projects”.

Another relevant aspect is that the idD already has an “inventory of companies”, which “will benefit the technological and industrial sector” (I. Nunes, op. cit.). M. Alves (op. cit.) stated that “great opportunities are being created in the maritime area (PESCO projects), which should not be missed”. However, “the idD must take action to exploit those opportunities”. R. Correia (op. cit.) suggested that the PESCO projects “already in progress” should be reviewed “instead of creating new ones, to provide new contributions and improve the end product”.

SG9 – INVOLVE government bodies in reducing the risks associated with threats. Some critical infrastructures are in the private sector, which “[...] largely [...] depends on the State to have that ability to prepare / adapt [...] in financial terms, but also in terms of access to information” (G.M. Gomes, op. cit.). B. Reis (op. cit.), referring to cyber defence, stated that

one possibility would be “to create a European unit [...] to help coordinate, supplement and strengthen the national capacity”.

A. Brandão (op. cit.) warned that “There is a lack of training”, which I.F. Nunes (op. cit.) confirmed, adding that “Universities, think tanks, institutions like the IDN have a civic duty to provide training products that strengthen those resilience dimensions by providing cognitive and intellectual tools to distinguish what is disinformation and hostile propaganda”.

L. Pires (op. cit.) suggested that “[...] it is not only civilian emergency planning, but an entire Database that must be consolidated to include all vulnerabilities: water, electricity and energy sources, critical infrastructures, food and medical autonomy”.

SG10 – INCREASE partnerships with Universities (research), **companies** (development and production) **and the AAFP** (identifying needs). As F. Nunes (op. cit.) stressed: “This cooperation between the idD and the AICEP with Universities, laboratories and companies is vital for the country’s technological development”. L. Rocha (op. cit.) pointed out that “[PESCO] should be looked at in a global way – technology, research, defence, science, development – to ensure it does not remain simply a military instrument”.

SG11 – EXPLORE approaches that increase resilience (e.g. response to complex emergencies and crises caused by climate change) and how they can be used to manage limited resources more efficiently. For R. Ferreira (op. cit.) “The situation [private sector] is the same in many European countries. [...] But it is also in the interest [of the private sector] to be able to rely on the support of the State and, through it, gain access to European organizations and to protection and regulation in the area of communications and energy, for example”.

Portugal “proposed the creation of an industry advisory group (similar to NATO’s), which specified that this group would have to include regional organizations and companies, and that they would be able to contribute to develop a European policy at this level” (B. Reis, op. cit.). Ferreira (op. cit.) recommended “[...] for example, having threat detection mechanisms, having an awareness picture, having a situational awareness system”.

SG12 – USE existing dual-use capabilities (which should be interoperable) to address the identified threats. To address this list of weaknesses, as B. Reis (op. cit.) stated, it is important to “convey the message that this dual-use of capabilities is not only useful for traditionally military roles”. In fact, “We also need dual-use capabilities and capacities at the civilian level” (A.L.F. Ramos, op. cit.). G.M. Gomes (op. cit.) suggested that “Dual use is an appropriate strategy (even in terms of communication) to justify an increase in investment, as it enables economic recovery”.

4.6. Conformity and compliance

According to two experts on the PPEU, the SGs are in line with the GO and obtained a degree of agreement of 100% (Sarmiento, 2013, pp. 60-61).

4.7. Linking the SGs to the PPEU priorities for the CSDP

In Figure 7 of this subchapter, the SGs are linked to the five priorities for the CSDP defined by Portugal during the PPEU (see 3.2.3), and a Responsible Agency (RA) for implementing them is proposed. The goal was to contextualise the SGs that resulted from the implementation of the SC within the framework of the CSDP. Most SGs focus on “Pr. 5”, which is in line with

the fact that “resilience” is one of the priorities of the PPEU. M.P. Alves (op. cit.) referred to this, stating that “As a country, we invest on the four pillars, but especially on resilience”, and N. Pizarro (op. cit.) added that Portugal can take advantage of the “opportunities in this pillar”. However, she warned that obtaining results would be difficult, as this will depend on “the success of PESCO, which is instrumental to automate capabilities and interoperability”.




Figure 7 – SG vs. CSDP priorities

4.8. Brief overview and answer to the RQ

A set of EF and IF emerged from the projected scenario, based on which 12 SGs were defined (see summary in Figure 7). These SGs were validated by two experts, who confirmed that they were in line with the GO and obtained a degree of agreement of 100%. These SGs were linked to the five CSDP priorities defined by Portugal during the PPEU (see 3.2.3) and RAs were proposed to implement them. The goal was to contextualise the SGs that resulted from the implementation of the SC within the framework of the CSDP, thus answering the RQ and achieving the GO. Conclusions

This is our opportunity to make change happen by design – not by disaster or by diktat from others in the world. To emerge stronger by creating opportunities for the world of tomorrow and not just building contingencies for the world of yesterday. (Leyen, 2020)

In 2016, the EUGS set five strategic priorities for the CSDP and, that same year, the IPSD defined the Level of Ambition that would be required to achieve the main objectives in terms of SD when implementing that strategy: response to conflicts and external crises; strengthening partners' capabilities; and protecting the EU and its citizens. However, the sentiment within the EU is that the CSDP should be reviewed to make civilian and military missions and operations more robust and their mandates more flexible.

The robustness of a mission or operation partly depends on whether it is supported by credible resources, such as capable and flexible capabilities to respond to a wide range of threats. Here, the existing mechanisms (e.g. PESCO, CARD, EDF and PESCO) provide an important contribution to development, which should be based on a European DTIB that can boost MS' economies. Naturally, the EU remains committed to strengthening and expanding cooperation between the EU and NATO (21 of the MS are also Alliance members). Therefore, the issue of Strategic Autonomy, which has raised some discussion, is sometimes linked to technological autonomy. Another ambition of MS in terms of capabilities is interoperability between AAFP, which could improve efficiency and effectiveness in joint operations.

As mandate flexibility is linked to the decision-making process, it was necessary to review the CSDP. The decision-making process currently requires unanimity by all 27 MS, which often results in delays in the decision to deploy forces.

The SC is a project that will be developed during four European Council Presidencies (Germany, Portugal, Slovenia and France). The project was formally proposed by Germany at a meeting of EU Defence Ministers in June 2020.

The research phase took place between the GPEU, during which threats were defined by the intelligence services of MS and by the EEAS (classified document), and the first trimester of the PPEU, who was in charge of the "strategic dialogue" phase.

This "strategic dialogue" is structured around four main pillars: crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships.

In July 2021, Slovenia took over the discussion and drafting of the project. It will not be until March 2022, during the French Presidency, that a document formally accepted by the 27 MS is expected to be ready.

The current international context, the perception that the EUGS is not fully operational (2016), the lack of a Common Strategic Culture and a fragile sense of cohesion within the EU have led to some expectations regarding the implementation of the SC and what its impact will be for MS, and for Portugal in particular. Therefore, this study's GO was "to propose SGs that Portugal can follow to make the most of the opportunities provided by the SC in the framework of the CSDP". The topic of this study – the SC – is analysed from 2016 (the year of publication of the EUGS) to the first half of 2022 (the expected date of publication of the SC). The study focuses on the Portuguese territory and addresses the impact of the implementation of the SC for National Defence and for the CSDP.

To achieve the GO, three SO were established and one RQ was defined.

The first SO concerned the creation of a projected scenario for the implementation of the SC under the CSDP. Six emergent categories were obtained by coding 26 documents. The relationships between these categories create the projected scenario.

SO2 and SO3 analysed, respectively, the impact of the implementation of the SC in the EU on Portugal's external and internal environment.

The analysis of SO2 revealed six emergent categories – public opinion, EU policy, capabilities, partnerships, crisis management and resilience –, which were linked to five opportunities and five threats (Figure 8).




Figure 8 – External Environment

As for the internal environment (SO3), five categories were identified – capabilities, national policy, image, resilience and partnerships –, which were linked to five strengths and three weaknesses (Figure 9).




Figure 9 – Internal Environment

By combining the external and internal factors, 12 SGs were obtained, which were confirmed by the interviews and have internal validity and reliability, according to two experts, thus achieving the GO. The SGs were assigned to EPRs and linked to the priorities defined by Portugal for the CSDP during the PPEU:

Pr. 1 – Strengthening the EU-Africa partnership

- SG3 - ENHANCE the EU's Peace and Security partnerships with Africa and South America (EPR: DGPDN).

Pr. 2 – Contributing to a European strategy for MS and Pr. 3 - Increasing the level of ambition for the EU / NATO relationship

- SG1 - PROMOTE and strengthen MS through Coordinated Maritime Presences (EPR: DGPDN).

Pr. 4 – Strengthening the Defence Economy

- SG2 - INCREASE the involvement of the idD and the AICEP (EPR: MDNOFF).
- SG4 - OPTIMISE Portugal's participation in European projects (and / or review existing projects) through joint investment and, when possible, joint procurement (EPR: DGRDN).
- SG8 - INVOLVING the idD in identifying capabilities that can be used to develop the DTIB (EPR: DGRDN).
- SG12 - USE existing dual-use capabilities (EPR: DGRDN).

Pr. 5 – Making Europe more resilient

- SG5 - STRENGTHEN civilian / military cooperation in areas such as resilience (EPR: DGPDN).
- SG6 - IMPROVE strategic communication capabilities (EPR: MDNOFF).
- SG7 - USE Portugal's operational experience and credibility (EPR: DGPDN).
- SG9 - INVOLVE government bodies in reducing the risks associated with threats (EPR: DGPDN).
- SG10 - INCREASE partnerships with Universities (research), companies (development and production) and AAFF (identification of needs) (EPR: DGRDN).
- SG11 - EXPLORE approaches that increase resilience to identified threats (EPR: DGPDN).

This study was based on a thorough, original analysis of the documents published on the SC between 2019 and 2021. The literature review did not find any articles by national author published in a scientific journal, with the exception of an article by Lieutenant General António L. Fontes Ramos for *Eurodefense Portugal* and an article by Commander Dias Correia for *Revista da Armada*, both of which address the SC.

The answer to the RQ consisted of 12 SGs that Portugal can use to make the most of the opportunities provided by the SC in the framework of the CSDP. As this is a prospective study, it may prove useful to predict those opportunities.

The main **limitation** of the study was that, as mentioned above, the work was prepared while the SC was still in the conceptual definition phase. This means that, on the one hand, the results of its implementation were not yet known, and, on the other, that the experts available were few, belonged to the same cycles and / or were involved in the PPEU. As the study used a qualitative methodology and a qualitative analysis, it cannot be used to draw generalisations. Therefore, the results are only applicable to the context that was analysed, which was based on the projected scenario.

Thus, at a **future date** (2023-2024), after the process is completed (March 2022) and the implementation is underway, a quantitative analysis should be conducted to test the results obtained by this prospective study.

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