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THE CHANGING NATURE  
OF THE US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

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## THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

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I have been asked to speak on the general topic of the changing nature of the US-European relations, and in doing that I would like to focus my remarks more specifically on US policy towards Europe and US perspectives on Europe.

I would do this for two reasons. First of all because I feel that the United States will continue to have an important impact on European security. This is a view that many people, not just in the United States, but in Europe, would subscribe to.

Second I would like to focus on US policy and US views because I feel, having travelled about in Europe a fair amount, that American attitudes are not fully understood in many parts of Europe, and I would like to try to give you at least my assessment of how those views are evolving.

What I would like to try to do more specifically is to identify areas of continuity and areas of change in US foreign policy, and in doing that I would like to focus on two important transitions. The first is the end of the cold war and the second is the end of the Bush administration, or to put it in another way, the arrival of the Bill and Hillary Clinton administration in Washington.

My main argument is that I think there will be a great deal of continuity in US policy towards Europe with the arrival of the Clinton administration and I feel that this is true for a couple of reasons. I guess the most important of those is that I believe there is a very strong consensus in the United States about what US national interest are, what the US role in world affairs should be. I would argue that consensus has existed for approximately fifty years, since the early day of the World War II. I believe that this consensus has survived the end of the cold war, and I believe that this consensus will still be in place now that we have a new administration in Washington. Indeed, in Bill Clinton's first press

conference after winning the presidency in November last year, he went out of his way to emphasize that America's fundamental interests have not changed.

Let me just take a few moments now to explain what I feel those interests are. The first American national interest I think is relatively simple and straight forward, and that is to make sure that the United States does not come under direct military attack.

The second interest is to make sure that indirect threats to American security not develop in Europe or Asia. And there are a couple of potential problems there that American foreign policy makers keep in mind. One potential problem is the possibility of one country trying to establish a dominance in Europe or Asia, and we have very strong interest in making sure that does not come to pass; indeed, the was the conceptual foundation of America's containment policy which was the guiding American foreign policy for over forty years from the end of the 1940's until the end of the cold war, just a couple of years ago. The United States also has an important national interest in making sure that a war between and among the great powers in Europe or East Asia does not take place. If such a war did take place, the winner of that war might find himself in a dominant position which would be contrary to American interests.

Alternatively, it is possible that the United States could become involved in such a war which would not be in US or American interests. Twice in this century already the United States has been drawn into European and Asian wars; it is not inconceivable that that could happen again in the future. So, in these respects, I think you can see how Europe plays a very important role in American thinking about potential threats that could affect American national security.

Now, there is a third national interest that the United States has, that also I think directly relates to US/European relations, and the third general interest is to promote American economic prosperity. You can see I am putting things in a very narrow American perspective, because when Americans look at American national interests these are the kind of things they have to keep in mind. Developments in Europe, again, will affect American economic prosperity. It is important, from America's perspective, that things stay peaceful in Western Europe, in particular, because if

countries in Western Europe and East Asia go to war, American economic prosperity will suffer, even if the United States does not become involved militarily in the war.

It is also widely believed in the United States that it is imperative that international order be maintained. It is widely believed in the United States, contrary to the impression you might get if you pay too much attention to the protectionists, who sometimes get a great deal of attention in the media that the free movement of goods, services and capital is something that is very much in the US interest.

In the United States people also believe that there are instrumental objectives that the United States should try to pursue. One of those is the promotion of democracy. Democracy, if you look at it from a narrow national security perspective, is an instrumental objective because democracies are less likely to try to establish dominance over their neighbours and they are less likely to succumb to very intense nationalism. They are also just less likely to go to war with each other, and all of these things are good from America's standpoint.

The United States also has an interest in trying to promote market economies, because countries that develop market economic systems become heavily interdependent or interconnected with other economies in the world, are less likely to go to war with each other; the economic costs of going to war are simply too high.

And so, for all of these reasons, the United States has a deep and abiding interest in what goes on in Europe. What goes on in Europe will affect America's security and American economic well being in a variety of ways, and this is why the United States has a very deep national interest in being involved in European affairs in general, and European security in particular. This is why the United States is very interested in maintaining a military presence in Europe to help keep the peace and promote stability in the European continent.

Now, as I said there is a very strong consensus in the United States, in my opinion, about these interests in general, but in particular how they relate to Europe. I believe that there is a very strong consensus in the Clinton administration, that the United States has continuing good reasons for being involved in European affairs and doing whatever it

can to promote security and stability in Western Europe and Europe as a whole.

That said, there are important changes taking place in American foreign and defense policy, specifically as they relate to Europe. And the main reason that changes are taking place in American foreign policy is simply because the world has changed in fundamental ways in the course of the past three to four years. Although American interests have not changed, the threats to those interests have changed, with the withdrawal of Soviet power from Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in the end of the cold war; the threats to American security and to Western European security have changed in important ways. No longer, in the United States, do policy makers stay up late at night loosing sleep over the possibility of a direct Soviet attack taking place on Western Europe. For several decades the most likely scenario that could have led to direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was a conventional war in Western Europe breaking out, that could have led to a nuclear attack or a nuclear exchange between Washington and Moscow. That possibility is virtually non-existent, at least at the present time. Instead, we now worry about maintaining proper command and control over nuclear forces in the former Soviet Union. It is possible that renegade units of one kind or another could use nuclear forces perhaps even against the United States. Those who worry about direct military threats to the United States also now worry a great deal more about proliferation, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in the developing world.

As far as indirect threats to American security are concerned, no one worries about the Soviet Union trying to establish a hegemony over Europe. No one worries about Russia now, trying to establish a hegemony over Western Europe. It is an unlikely possibility, at least at this stage. Instead, people in Washington and in Western European capitals worry about instability in Europe, possibly leading to inter-state warfare which in turn could lead to great powers in Western Europe or the United States to become involved in these conflicts.

So the threats to American security interests in Europe have changed and as a result, American foreign and defense policy is changing in important ways. Instead of having a confrontational relationship with Moscow,

people in Washington are now very interested in trying to develop a cooperative security relationship with Moscow. It is widely recognized that we have common security interest with Moscow, that relate most specifically to trying to reduce the size and instabilities associated with our nuclear arsenals. Even in the United Nations, where they have started to develop more cooperative relationship with Moscow, and that was reflected most notably in Moscow support by and large for the American led efforts to deal with the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

We have also seen dramatic changes in how the United States has gone about configuring its military forces and how it has dealt with Moscow on forces structure issues. As far as nuclear forces are concerned, for example, the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union have entered into a variety of agreements in the past eighteen months or so. If these agreements are fully implemented in the next couple of years, the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union will reduce their combined nuclear arsenals from a grand total of 47 000 nuclear weapons to around 13 000 nuclear weapons, reductions of over 70%, a reduction which is totally unprecedented in the history of nuclear arms control efforts. 13 000 nuclear weapons is still an awful lot of nuclear weapons, but substantial progress has been made, progress that would have been inconceivable during the most tense periods of the cold war. By the same token the United States and Moscow are in the process of trying to reduce their conventional forces — in some respects this is being done through the formulas that were put into place in the CFE treaty — but the two sides are also reducing their conventional forces unilaterally. And the United States, for example, the Bush administration planned to reduce the size of the US military force structure from 2.1 million soldiers to 1.6 million soldiers; also planned to reduce the number of American troops deployed in Western Europe from 325 000 to 150 000; and also made plans to reduce American defense spending. In fact, the US defense budget has been shrinking in real terms every year since the mid-1980's. The Bush administration expected that by 1997 the US defense budget would have shrunk by one third in real terms compared to what it was in the mid-1980's at the height of the Reagan administration's defense build up.

So you can see that American defense policy in particular is changing in important ways, ways that are very tangible, but American foreign

policy in general is changing in that we are now trying to develop more cooperative relationship with Moscow in particular. I would argue that all of these changes are very important. It is important to keep in mind that they precede the arrival of the Clinton administration in Washington DC. These developments, as I have suggested earlier, can be traced to developments that took place in the international scene in the 1989 to 1991 period. These development preceded the arrival of the Clinton administration.

Now, I believe that Bill Clinton and his advisors support these general policy directions, and that is why I do not think there will be any radical change in American policy towards Europe. That said, the Clinton administration undoubtedly will shape American policy in some respects.

And with that I would like to turn to some areas where we can expect to see some changes in American policy towards Europe. One general change that I am sure you are all aware of is that this President, unlike the last one, will devote most of his time and energy to the many domestic problems that the United States faces. Bill Clinton, throughout the course of the campaign in 1992 emphasized that he would try to address the social problems, and more specifically the economic problems that the United States faces; indeed, in the campaign, he promised the American people that he would focus like a laser beam on the economy in the first months and years of his administration.

I think this will inevitably affect both policy formulation and policy implementation in Washington. It will affect policy formulation because if the President devotes most of his time and energy to domestic issues, it simply means that he is not going to have as much time to devote to foreign policy issues. That means that more responsibility and more decisions will be made by his advisors. I think this focus will affect policy implementation primarily because as Bill Clinton and his advisors try to spend more money to correct America's domestic problems, it will quite simply have less money to devote to foreign assistance programs of various kinds. There will not be much money to devote to some of the foreign problems that Clinton would like to address.

Now with than I would like to turn to what I see as the main items on Bill Clinton's foreign policy and defense policy agenda, with respect to Europe, and I would divide these problems into three broad categories.

The first category of problems are those that are both urgent and important. The second category of problems are urgent but somewhat less important, at least from the standpoint of American national security interests. And the third category of problems are issues that I would argue are both less urgent and less important.

Let me start with the first category: Issues that are urgent and important. The first issue in this category is the whole basket of economic issues. During the campaign, Bill Clinton, as I noted, stressed that he would put a great deal of emphasis on trying to improve the performance of the American economy. I believe that Bill Clinton's number one foreign policy objective, and this is something that he and his advisors have themselves stressed, is to restore America's economic competitiveness abroad. I think this is their top priority. They want to raise exports, and they want to reduce the balance of trade deficit that is very high and has been very high for some time.

Bill Clinton and his advisors recognize that the sources of America's economic problems are complex, there is certainly a wide variety of domestic sources, and Clinton and his advisors will spend a great deal of time trying to address the domestic roots of America's economic problems. But they also believe, and I think this is a view that is widely shared in the foreign policy community in Washington, they also believe that America's economic problems have international sources, more specifically, they believe that some countries in the international economic system in Western Europe and East Asia are engaged in unfair trading practices, and they make it very difficult for the United States to export its goods, and they make it very difficult for the United States to close its balance of trade deficit. During the campaign Bill Clinton said that he would «take steps to make sure that countries open the doors of their economic houses» otherwise he felt partnerships would be in danger.

Now, even if we discount some of his campaign rhetoric as being campaign rhetoric, I think it is very clear that Bill Clinton will push very hard on this economic agenda. Indeed, we have already seen signs in just the first four weeks of the Clinton administration — and today is the 4th week anniversary of the Clinton administration — that they will push very hard whenever they perceive unfair trading practices are being pur-

sued. One example of this was the Clinton administration's announcement that punitive sanctions or penalties would be imposed on nineteen East Asian and Western European countries for dumping subsidized steel in the United States. The Clinton administration also announced that it would impose penalties on the EC if it went ahead with its policy that would make it harder for American companies to bid on telecommunications and power generating contracts in Western Europe. The Clinton administration has also complained about subsidies for the airbus project.

I believe that these steps are more of a tactical nature than anything else. I believe that Clinton will pursue very challenging, very tough tactics in dealing with Western Europe and East Asia on economic issues, but I believe that the Clinton administration's long term strategy is nonetheless to open up the international economic system. I do not think Bill Clinton is a protectionist. I do not think his advisors are protectionists. But they do feel that there are some things that need to be rectified before we can move ahead with completion of the GATT negotiations. I think that Clinton would like very much to move ahead with the GATT negotiations and complete them in the next couple of months, but he wants to see that a couple of problems are addressed before those negotiations are fully concluded.

The second issue that Clinton has to address, that is both urgent and important, is the former Soviet Union, more specifically Russia. During the campaign I feel that Bill Clinton said all the right things about Russia. He recognizes that it is important for the United States to do everything that it can to help consolidate the process of democratic and economic reform in Russia. He recognizes that the United States will not be able to cut defense spending and spend more money, devote more money to domestic issues, unless Russia continues down the path that is on. So the United States has a vital national interest in making sure that this reform process in Russia continue.

The problem is, there are already indicators, that Bill Clinton will find that he does not really have much money to devote to Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. During the campaign he gave every indication that he would like to spend more money on Russia than the Bush administration had been doing. I think Clinton is going to find that he simply does not have many resources to draw on.

Now, one change that I think we can expect in Clinton's policy is a change in the amount of attention he devotes to some of the other republics of the former Soviet Union. George Bush, in my view, is very much oriented towards Moscow, a very Moscow-centric point of view; you might recall that he supported Gorbachov long after it became clear to many people that the Soviet Union was about to break up. He supported Yeltsin and paid a great deal of attention to Yeltsin in the last year or so of his administration after the Soviet Union had broken up. Now, many leaders in the former Soviet Union, they were neglected by the Bush administration. I suspect that Bill Clinton, as part of his overall diplomatic effort to improve relations with several republics in the former Soviet Union, will take steps to spend a little bit more time focusing on the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and some of the other republics.

And the reason for this is quite simple, and this brings me to the third issue that is both urgent and important, and that is the problem of the nuclear arsenal in the former Soviet Union. Important steps have already been taken to bring this arsenal under control, and to make sure that command and control will be preserved in the future. In the first four months of 1992, approximately 6000 tactical nuclear weapons were removed from all of the republics of the former Soviet Union that had tactical nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. All these weapons were moved back to Russia. This is quite an accomplishment, but much remains to be done. These tactical nuclear weapons, many of which are scheduled for dismantlement, have to be moved into central storage facilities where they can be watched carefully. There are also problems with strategic nuclear weapons, as I am sure many of you know, there are still four republics, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belorussia and Russia itself that have strategic nuclear weapons deployed on their soil. Approximately 3000 strategic nuclear weapons are in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia, and people in Washington are very concerned about them. Now, I expect the Clinton administration to move very aggressively in the first year of its time in office to try to address these various nuclear problems.

As far as strategic weapons are concerned, I think the priorities are very clear. The first step is to make sure that all four of those republics ratify the START I Treaty. So far all of them have, with the notable excep-

tion of the Ukraine, which has promised repeatedly to ratify the START I Treaty but has not yet done so.

The second step will be to get the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belorussia to join the NPT, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, as non-nuclear states. Again, all three of these republics have repeatedly promised to do so, but have not yet done so.

The next step will be to move very quickly to accelerate the terms of the START I Treaty on an accelerated basis. START I Treaty, as many of you undoubtedly know, calls for nuclear forces to be reduced substantially over a seven year period. The Clinton administration will try to get most of these weapons disarmed and deactivated in six months, not seven years. They will try to move very quickly with that.

Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union still have some 29 000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in various parts of the countryside. Some 22 000 of these weapons are scheduled to be dismantled in the not too distant future. Unfortunately Russia only has the capacity to dismantle about 2000 weapons per year. A simple arithmetic tells us that it will take Russia and the other republics ten or eleven years to dismantle all of these weapons, if they can only dismantle 2000 a year. And nobody in Washington or Western Europe is really happy with the idea of 29 000 nuclear weapons being stationed in these republics for the foreseeable future. The situation there, is simply too unstable. So one of the Clinton administration's priorities is to accelerate this dismantlement process. They would like to complete it in three years, not ten years. This will probably mean building an extra dismantlement facility in Russia, but that is a price worth paying.

So those are the three issues that I feel are urgent and important. The second category of issues are issues that are quite urgent but somewhat less important, at least from the standpoint of American national security, and both of the issues that I would put into this category have to do with the former Yugoslavia.

The most important of the two, in my opinion, has to do with making sure that the war in Yugoslavia does not spread to Kosovo or Macedonia. If the war was to spread to those republics, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, could very

easily become involved in the war. Russia itself could become involved in the war. There have been indications in the past few weeks that Russian nationalists are deeply concerned about the pressure that is being put on their fellow Slavs in Serbia. I think the key, not just for the United States, but for Western Europe as a whole, is to focus every effort on trying to keep the war from spreading. One of the lessons that we seem to have learned from our inapt handling of the conflict in Bosnia is that it is much more efficient and effective to try to prevent conflicts from breaking out than to try to resolve them. Conflict prevention is easier than conflict resolution. And it is important to take steps to keep the war from spreading now while it is still possible to do so. I hope that the Clinton administration will consider the possibility of deploying large numbers of American troops in Kosovo and Macedonia, and I hope that Western European countries will take aggressive steps as well, to keep the war from spreading. So far the Clinton administration seems clearly interested in a diplomatic approach to the conflict. I think as far as Macedonia and Kosovo is concerned that might not be enough.

The second problem that I would put in the urgent but somewhat less important category is Bosnia. And I say it is less important simply because American, and I feel Western European interests, are not as importantly engaged there as they are in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. As you know, the Clinton administration last week announced its new plan for trying to resolve the conflict in Bosnia. I was struck by two things in the Clinton announcement which was made by Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, and the first is that it really does not represent a radical departure from the policy the United States have been pursuing in the past couple of months. The emphasis will still be very much on diplomacy, the United States does not intend to deploy military forces in Bosnia until a negotiated settlement has been put into place, and the United States will not use even American air power to put more pressure on Serbia. So I think by emphasizing diplomacy rather than military deployments or military solutions to the conflict, the Clinton administration is very much continuing the basic policy line that has been taken for some time, although it appears now that the United States will become more actively engaged in the negotiations themselves.

The second thing that struck me about the Clinton-Christopher plan is that it is still vague in many important respects. Christopher talked

about putting more pressure on Serbia but he was not specific about how he would do that. He talked about taking steps to make sure that the no-fly zone is enforced, but he did not say what those steps would be. He suggested that humanitarian aid should be pushed through but he did not say how that would be done. And he said that steps would be taken to keep the conflict from spreading to Macedonia, but again he did not specify what those steps would be. So I think there is still many details that have to be sorted out and announced before we have a clear idea of what the Clinton administration will do on this.

So far they seem to be taking some steps to become more actively involved in what is going on, but they have not yet given us all the details that we need in order to fully evaluate what they are doing.

Now, the final category of issues that the Clinton administration has to think about is just what I would call the less urgent and less important. One of those, I think, is arms control in general. With the notable exception of the nuclear arsenals of the republics of the former Soviet Union, I feel that arms control as far as Europe is concerned will be very much on the back burner, will be a low priority, for at least the next year or two. Nuclear issues are going to be dealt with mainly on a bilateral basis between the United States on the one hand, the republics of the former Soviet Union on the other. The chemical weapons convention, which was signed a couple of weeks ago in Paris, is an international effort and will be dealt with in that international or multilateral context. It is not a purely European issue. As far as conventional forces are concerned, I think what we are going to see in the next six to twelve, or perhaps, for the next year or two, are a series of unilateral steps taken by various countries to reduce their conventional forces.

As I said, the United States and Russia have already taken unilateral steps to reduce their forces above and beyond what they were called on to do by the CFE treaty. Germany last weekend announced that it would reduce its forces, and according to the reports that were published in the newspapers, Germany plans to reduce the size of its military from 500 000 to 300 000 troops. I suspect that in Eastern and Central Europe in particular we will see similar kinds of reductions in the next couple of years.

My own view is that it is highly unlikely that we will see a new CFE Treaty that outlines new equipment levels and new troop levels in the next year or two. No one really knows how to organize such a treaty or what the guiding principles should be. It would be much more difficult to put into place than the original CFE Treaty, which of course was essentially a bloc to bloc negotiation. So as far as European arms control is concerned, specifically European arms control, I would expect to see comparatively little attention paid to this issues in the next year or two.

A second and final issue that I think is both less urgent and less important is the whole set of institutional issues that has been so prominent in the US-European discussions over the course of the past year or two. Now, as you know, there has been a long, agonizing debate in the United States and Western Europe over what the new relationships should be between NATO, the Western European Union, and the European Community. I believe that this debate has already gone a long way towards resolving itself. If you look at the communiqués that have been issued by the EC, by the Western European Union, at Nato summits in the past year or so, you find that they have all come to say the same general thing about the relationship between the Western European Union on the one hand, NATO and the EC on the other. I think they have gone as far as they can go to develop broad guidelines for these relationships in the future. In general I think things will be decided on a case by case basis; as we have seen in Bosnia, the Western European Union has been involved in sending some ships to help monitor the embargo on the republics of the former Yugoslavia, but these things almost always have to be dealt with on a case by case basis. It is just as the Persian Gulf and the Gulf War was a unique case, Yugoslavia is a unique case, whenever the next issue comes up, that will also have to be dealt with on an «ad hoc» or case by case basis.

So I do not expect to see a whole lot of debate in the United States or in Western European capitals over the question of what the proper role of the Western European Union and the EC should be with respect to NATO.

One issue that does have to be addressed in the not too distant future is NATO and the continuing justification for NATO. If you look at what the Bush administration said over the course of the past couple of years,

in trying to justify NATO, you see that the rationale for NATO has changed dramatically in the past couple of years. Of course for a long time that was to prevent the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact from trying to establish hegemony in Western Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush administration shifted to an argument that said that the purpose of Nato and the purpose of having US troops in Europe was to make sure that Russia does not try to re-establish hegemony at some point in the future. They argued that there was a residual threat that needed to be dealt with. They also argued that NATO was needed to promote stability in Western Europe.

Well, with the collapse of the Russian economy, no one really feels that there is even much of a residual military threat to Western security right now. It is possible that Russia could rebuild itself at some point in the future, it is possible that Russia could build up its conventional forces, but given that Western Europe and the United States have a stronger economic base to draw on, the United States and Western Europe would be able to rebuild its conventional forces faster than Russia. We can also redeploy more nuclear forces in Europe if that is necessary.

As far as NATO promoting stability in Europe I think NATO has the same problem that the EC has, and as long as people can look at war raging in Yugoslavia, it is hard for people to say that NATO has a force for promoting stability in Europe, if these kind of conflicts are going on. My point here is that I think in the long run an effort needs to be made by the Clinton administration to explain why NATO is needed, to explain why an American presence in Europe is needed, and I think this needs to be stated explicitly, not just for the American people but for people in Western Europe.

I think in the foreign policy community, certainly in a group such as this, I think people understand the main reasons why it is important for the United States to be involved in European affairs. I think this needs to be explained to the general public. both the United States and the Western Europe, it needs to be done much more effectively, and it needs to be done by the President of the United States. And I hope that will be done sooner rather than later.

With that, let me make just three concluding observations.

The first general observation is that the United States has important national interests, as I have said, in retaining a military presence in Europe, and having an active role to play in Europe. I believe that this is a view that is widely accepted in the United States, and I also believe that is widely accepted in Western Europe. I think there is a consensus across the Atlantic that it is important for the United States to play this role, and that is why I am quite optimistic that, at least in the immediate future, the United States will continue to be an active player in Western European affairs. At least in the near future I do not see the United States packing up and going home. The United States does not want to take all of its troops home, and Western Europe for its part does not want the United States to go. Even France wants the United States to stay.

The second general observation I would like to make is, I think that with the end of the cold war and with the demise of the Soviet threat to Western European security, and with Western Europe no longer being dependent on the United States for its security, a cooperation between the United States on the one hand and Western Europe on the other, will be more problematic. And the reason for that is that during the cold war we had a compelling requirement to cooperate, we had to cooperate on security issues, we had to cooperate on economic issues. If we did not, and we fell apart, it would be much easier for the Soviet Union to exercise its influence in Western Europe. So we had to cooperate for a long time. Well, that compelling requirement to cooperate no longer exists. And as a result, I think disagreements between the United States and Western Europe will probably increase, I think they will probably be sharper in the future than they have been in the past, I think they probably will be more public in the future than they have been in the past, and I think they will be harder to resolve in the future than they have been in the past. I do not think they will be impossible to resolve, but I think they will be more difficult. Cooperation, I think, will be more problematic in the future, and it is something that we are going to have to work at a lot harder if we want to preserve it.

Now, the third and final general observation I would like to make is that I think that leadership will be as important, perhaps more important in the future, than it has ever been. In many cases, I think, this leadership will have to come from the United States. We saw in the Persian Gulf,

the United States really had to take the lead diplomatically and militarily if the coalition was to have an impact on developments there. My own view is that the EC has been totally ineffective at dealing with the conflict in Yugoslavia, and again demonstrates that an American leadership role is important in many cases. I think though that leadership will be more problematic in the future than it has been in the past, in part because Europe is no longer dependent on the United States for security, it will no longer automatically defer to the United States simply because the United States is the biggest of the Western powers. I think in the future if the United States is to play a leading role, and to play this leadership role, much will depend on the quality of American ideas. If the United States comes up with good ideas, and has constructive ideas for helping to lead the Western Alliance, then I think it is still possible for the United States to play that catalytic role. It is still unclear at this point though, just how effective the Clinton administration will be at developing these ideas and playing this leading role. I think it is entirely possible that the Clinton administration could play this role very effectively. I think that Bill Clinton is a very smart guy. He has a good background in international affairs, contrary to what many people think, and I think some of his advisers are among the best and the brightest of the foreign policy establishment in the United States. So I think that if the administration pulls together and devotes a fair amount of its energies to foreign affairs, we could see the United States play this kind of role in the future. It is possible though that if Bill Clinton devotes most of his energies to domestic affairs, if his advisers fight amongst themselves, and if the United States fails to develop a real strategy for US-European relations, and for US foreign policy in general, that we could see drifting American foreign policy, drifting US-European relations, and considerable turmoil between the United States and Europe. Which of these scenarios we will eventually see only time will tell.

*Michael Brown*