

Brazil and Portugal: the Path to Military Influence in Politics Via Coup or Election

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Abstract

Utilizing a conceptual framework that requires analysis of democratic civilian control and military effectiveness, the article compares and contrasts Brazil and Portugal. In Portugal the institutions have been established to achieve democratic civilian control and military effectiveness, mainly international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. In contrast, in Brazil neither institutions ensuring democratic civilian control nor military effectiveness have been established. The article argues that the differences in strategic culture are key to understanding the contrasting experience of these two countries.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations; Democratic Civilian Control; Military Effectiveness; Brazil; Portugal; Strategic Culture.

Resumo

Brasil e Portugal: o caminho da influência militar na política via golpe de Estado ou Eleições

Utilizando uma estrutura conceitual que requer análise do controle civil democrático e a eficácia militar, o artigo compara e contrasta Brasil e Portugal. Em Portugal, as instituições foram criadas para alcançar o controle civil democrático e a eficácia militar, principalmente na manutenção da paz internacional e assistência humanitária. Em contraste, no Brasil não foram estabelecidas instituições que garantam o controle civil democrático nem a eficácia militar. O artigo argumenta que as diferenças na cultura estratégica são fundamentais para entender a experiência contrastante destes dois países.

Palavras-chave: Relações Cívicas-Militares; Controle civil democrático; Eficácia Militar; Brasil; Portugal; Cultura Estratégica.

This article compares and contrasts the experiences of two “Third Wave” democracies: Portugal, which initiated the Third Wave by a military coup on 25 April 1974, and Brazil, where the highly negotiated democratic transition began in 1974, ten years after the military coup that brought the military into power, and was formally concluded in 1985 with a civilian president taking office. Currently in Brazil, however, there is a tremendous influx of active duty and retired senior military officers into the Jair Bolsonaro administration, causing concern that the military is returning to power. The resolution of the relationship of the military to civilian power was settled in Portugal by the early 1990s, and there is no doubt regarding democratic consolidation. In Brazil, in contrast to Portugal, the main issues of civil-military relations were never resolved, and the massive involvement of active duty and retired officers in the government raises questions about democratic consolidation. In this paper, the author attempts, utilizing a framework, to assess the causes and implications of the influx of military officers into government positions. The author contrasts both the democratic civilian control and the military effectiveness of the two countries. Whereas in the conclusion to his recent book, co-edited with Aurel Croissant, *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness Across Regimes* they found from the analysis of case studies for civil-military relations in ten countries ranging from democracies to autocracies that the relationship between control and effectiveness is variable, in a more recent study on Colombia the author and a colleague found that control and effectiveness were achieved simultaneously (Bruneau and Croissant, 2019; Bruneau and Goetze, 2019). The framework, based on research on civil-military relations in new democracies in South America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and East/Central Europe seeks to provide a basis for comparative analysis. The data utilized in this chapter comes from published books and articles, official documents, on-line resources, and personal interviews by the author who has conducted research and published over several decades in both countries.

Introduction

Superficially, the only feature common to Brazil and Portugal is the Portuguese language, as Portugal was the colonial power and Brazil its colony, which entitles them to be members of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries – Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP). Portugal, with a population of 10.3 million, is located in Europe, is a charter member of NATO, and, upon democratization in the 1970s, joined the European Community – EC, later EU – and a myriad of other European-specific organizations. Therefore, there are security, economic, and social frameworks that influence and constrain Portugal on every imaginable dimension. Brazil, with a population of 215 million, is located in South America, and, in contrast to Portugal, has pretensions for big power status given its

population, area – both make it the 5th most populous and largest country in the world –, and its rank among the ten largest economies. It is commonplace to state, as President Lula did in 2003, that Brazil is ready to “assume its greatness”. Before the recent political and economic problems, there was a great outpouring of reports and documents giving evidence of Brazil as a regional, if not global, actor, a BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) member, an important interlocutor with the United States, and more. For example, the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates and Brazilian Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, signed a Security of Military Information Agreement on November 21, 2010. Significant and recent U.S. government documents highlight Brazil’s importance. As President Barack Obama’s second and last *National Security Strategy* stated, “We welcome Brazil’s leadership and seek to move beyond dated North-South divisions to pursue progress on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues” (Obama, 2010, p. 44). In a twenty-year prospective, the U.S. National Intelligence Council stated, “Brazil will play an outsized role on the region’s future. Its resources and scale could offer benefits and insulation others lack” (National Intelligence Council, 2012, p. 82). In addition to the Congressional Research Service, which issues periodic reports on Brazil, many important U.S. and European think tanks and non-governmental organizations publish reports heralding Brazil’s emergence into greatness. However, in a recent analysis by two U.S. researchers of Brazil on its global role they raise the issue of whether Brazil can aspire to global prominence if it lacks “hard power” which the author seeks to deal with analytically here via his focus on military effectiveness (Mares and Trinkunas, 2016). Most importantly for this article, however, analytically, these countries hold in common two main characteristics that make them relevant for analysis of civil-military relations. First, both militaries have had a preeminent role in politics; and, second, the negotiated transition between 1974 and 1985 in Brazil was at least in part stimulated by the totally unexpected military coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974, and subsequent political instability and radicalization. As Samuel P. Huntington states in *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* regarding “Demonstration Effects”, “The upheavals and social conflict in Portugal in 1974 and 1975, for instance, stimulated democratization leaders in Spain and Brazil to attempt ‘a process of managed political change to avoid precisely the discontinuity that Portugal suffered’” (Huntington, 1991, p. 101).

The Framework

The framework the author employs for this analysis focuses on requirements and institutions. That is, what is required in order for civilians to have control and what is required for military effectiveness in view of the many roles and missions

militaries currently are tasked to fulfill. The article will first deal with the classic question, raised in the 1st century by Juvenal: Who will guard the guardians? From this perspective, CMR is generally about power and politics of an organization with a monopoly in arms exercising political power. It is, then, easy to understand why politicians and scholars have focused on civil-military relations exclusively from this one perspective since any armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take over a government, possibly by staging a coup. For one American author, Peter Feaver (1996), this issue is termed *problematique*.

Control

In this article, the author identifies in both countries the following control mechanisms: (1) institutions, (2) oversight, and (3) professional norms promoted through professional military education. Institutional control mechanisms involve providing direction and guidance for the security forces, which may be exercised through organic laws and other regulations that empower the civilian leadership and civilian-led organizations, most often a civilian – led ministry of defense with professional staffs. Oversight must be exercised by the civilian leadership to keep track of what security forces do, and to ensure they are in fact following the direction and guidance they have received from civilian decision-makers. Professional norms are institutionalized through legally approved and transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and promotion in the armed forces in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected civilian leadership. For purposes of analysis here the focus is on education as it can serve to internalize the previous two control mechanisms of institutions and oversight. These three sets of control mechanisms can be, and are, utilized by democratically elected civilians to exercise control over security forces.

Effectiveness

Contemporary armed forces implement at least six major roles and missions. They are: (1) fight and be prepared to fight wars; (2) fight and be prepared to fight internal wars; (3) counter-terrorism; (4) support police forces in fighting crime; (5) peace support and humanitarian missions; and (6) support for civilian leaders in times of natural disasters. The difficulty of proving effectiveness can be seen in the example of the Cold War, which never became ‘hot’ between the United States and the Soviet Union thanks to the mutual deterrence imposed by the two sides’ nuclear arsenals. Effectiveness in other roles and missions is virtually impossible to measure. Internal wars have deep historical, economic, political, and social causes that cannot be resolved by force of arms alone. Fighting tends to drag on, and it is all but impos-

sible for either side to ever declare “victory”. The fight against global terrorism, which differs from internal conflict in that terrorism is a tactic and has no finite locale such as a state to defend or defeat, can be considered successful when no attack occurs. It is impossible to know, however, whether there was no attack due to effective security measures or because the terrorists chose not to attack. Nor is there a clear moment when it will be safe to say, “Terrorism is defeated”. Fighting crime is ongoing, as is the provision of humanitarian assistance. Neither criminals nor natural disasters are going to disappear any time soon. With regard to peace support operations, the problem is similar. If conflicts between parties arise due to religious, ethnic, or political grievances, and require intervention by foreign security forces, the troops’ presence in itself will not resolve the fundamental causes behind the fighting. Rather, they may provide some stability, separate the antagonists, and allow space for negotiations.

Based on comparative research of what is necessary, but maybe not sufficient, for the security forces to be effective in fulfilling any of the six roles and missions, the author posits three basic requirements. First, there must be a plan, which may be termed a strategy. Second, there must be structures and processes to formulate the plans and, just as importantly, to implement them. These include ministries of defense and joint or general staffs that facilitate cooperation between civilians and the military. Third, a country must commit resources, essentially money and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained forces, and other assets to implement the assigned roles and missions. Lacking any one of these three components, it is difficult to imagine how a country could implement any of these roles and missions. These two sets of institutions, which first allow for democratic civilian control and then effectiveness, will be described and analyzed in the following section of this article.

Political and Military Background

Portugal

The “Third Wave of Democratization” began on April 25, 1974, when the Movimento das Forças Armadas – MFA, Armed Forces Movement –, composed of some 200 junior and mid-level officers, overthrew the regime that had been founded almost 50 years before (Huntington, 1991, p. 3). Portugal was not under a military regime, but rather a civilian authoritarian regime in which the armed forces played a central role in attempting to keep the colonies in Africa – Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique – once independence movements emerged there in 1961. Following the coup, according to some the main motive of which was to end the colonial wars, there was a serious struggle for power over the next two years between different political and military factions (Bruneau, 1976; Rodrigues, Borga and

Cardoso, 1974). A transition to democracy finally and problematically did occur, but it was one in which the armed forces would assume a very large role. The Constitution of 1976 grew out of a political pact between the MFA and the four main political parties, and it enshrined in law a continuing role for the military in a non-elected, exclusively military Revolutionary Council – Conselho da Revolução (CR) –, which held the ultimate authority regarding the armed forces and defense policy. Additionally, it was the constitutional court. In its capacity as a constitutional court, the CR found several laws that had been passed by the parliament, the Assembly of the Republic (AR) unconstitutional. In short, while Portugal was not a military regime during the long period of authoritarian rule, the nature of its transition to democracy inserted the armed forces as a central element of political power. The military also enjoyed powers and privileges because the cabinets of civilian governments after 1976 included military officers. Further, the popularly-elected president, first elected in 1976 and re-elected in 1981, was General Ramalho Eanes, who combined the role of head of state with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMGFA) and chairman of the CR. In short, newly-democratic Portugal initiated the Third Wave of Democratization with a large military component: a situation very different from other, subsequent, democratic transitions in that it was the MFA that initiated the transition from authoritarian rule rather than civilian opposition elements.

Of fundamental importance to the future of civil-military relations, democratic consolidation, and accession to the European Economic Community – EC, later European Union, EU – was the revision of the 1976 Constitution in 1982. The main focus in the revision was the role of the Council of the Revolution. It was probably important to have the institution in the period of tremendous political instability, 1974-76, and in an interview with the author on February 10, 2015, General Ramalho Eanes stressed the importance of the Revolutionary Council to allow the military and the political parties to “sort things out” from that revolutionary period. Revision was an extremely hard-fought issue as those benefiting from the 1976 Constitution, including elements in the military, the Portuguese Communist Party, and political parties to its left were opposed to revision. Revision finally happened, however, which was probably mainly due to the desire to join the EC, formally proposed in 1978, and revision decreased the power of the military, increased the role of the political parties, and decreased the power of the directly-elected president (Bruneau and Macleod, 1986, pp. 118-126).

From the first parliamentary elections in 1976 until 1987, no single political party received a majority of the vote, and there were ten governments and five general elections during this eleven – year period. As a semi-presidential system, with a relatively powerful and popularly – elected president, overall stability was maintained while governments came and went. And, while the governments were

temporary and unstable, the military remained mainly stable as an institution during this eleven-year period.

Initial Reforms in the Early 1980s

In the context of the negotiations for accession to the EC, and the creation of a Ministry of National Defense (MDN) in 1982 under the leadership of a very powerful politician, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, of the conservative Democratic and Social Center (CDS), there were some initial reforms which whittled down the prerogatives arising from the military-led origins of the democratic regime and the initial years of political radicalism and military factionalism. These reforms dealt extensively with civil-military relations. Also in 1982 the *Lei de Defesa Nacional e das Forças Armadas*, elaborated by Minister Diogo Freitas do Amaral, redefined the structure of the armed forces and changed its relationship to the elected civilian government. The 1982 law, consisting of 74 articles, included all imaginable aspects of civilian control and structures of the armed forces (Freitas do Amaral, 1983). It took six years, and the commitment of a great deal of political energy and resources, before the armed forces were tentatively brought under formal democratic civilian control (Bruneau and Macleod, 1986, pp. 12-25).

The evolution from the coup, subsequent radicalization, and finally political stability under a democratic regime can only be understood by including external relations, mainly NATO and other nation's militaries as well as eagerness to join the EC, in conjunction with domestic political dynamics. (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008, pp. 3-20).

It took another decade, beginning in approximately 1992, and a stable government under one political party – in this case the Social Democratic Party, PSD – before civilian control was consolidated. Starting in 1990 under then Minister of National Defense Fernando Nogueira, who led a broad public campaign involving a series of public meetings nationally and several short publications, civilians finally consolidated their control over the armed forces. It is extremely important to note that Nogueira, who was MOD until 1995, was an important politician, with an independent basis of political power, who became president of his party, the PSD, in 1995.¹ It was in 1993 that the organic laws defining the powers of the MDN in relationship to the three services and the CEMGFA were passed by the AR. The several and extremely detailed laws transferred powers from the armed forces to the civilian-led MDN, greatly enhanced its ability to control the armed forces, and strengthened

1 The situation in Spain was similar in that Minister of Defense Narcís Serra, 1982-91, Michele Bachelet in Chile, 2002-06 and Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia, 2006-09, were extremely important politicians, the latter two becoming presidents of their countries.

the service chiefs to the detriment of the CEMGFA. Therefore, only in 1994, twenty years after the military coup, did civil-military relations assume a model similar to other NATO and EC (later EU) countries.

Control

Institutions

While the groundwork had been laid by the early 1990s, a set of reforms commencing in 2006 began to fully implement the MDN's role, the operational structure of the armed forces, and joint professional military education. Under the leadership of then Minister of National Defense Nuno Severiano Teixeira, between July 2006 and July 2009, the Ministry was modernized and further strengthened in terms of control and oversight, and a joint operational command structure (EMGFA) was recreated. The AR passed three basic laws in 2009 on the new structures of the MDN and the EMGFA. In an interview with the author on March 11, 2010, Nuno Severiano Teixeira explained the reasons for the package of new laws. First, with the post-9/11 threats and challenges, different roles and missions were required of the armed forces. Second, Portugal, now a member of the entire European economic, political, and security and defense architecture, needed to change the domestic legal framework to adjust to these external, which reach internally, realities (Severiano Teixeira, 2009). The most important changes, following from these two reasons, are also twofold: first, to provide the legal basis whereby the armed forces could legally cooperate with domestic security actors, including the Guarda Nacional Republicana – GNR, or *gendarmerie* – and the Polícia Judiciária, or judicial police; and second, to clarify in clear and explicit detail the precise powers of the different institutions of government – parliament, government, and the presidency – in terms of national security and defense. In the process, the powers of the MDN were increased. In short, the institutional mechanism for control was reinforced. More recently, in late 2014, all of the above-mentioned aspects of civilian control were further defined and elaborated in a series of organic laws modifying the laws of 2009 (Parlamento, 2015). Again and again the Organic Law number 5/2014 of August 29, 2014 defines the primacy of the MDN. In a meeting with the author on February 10, 2015, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, while no longer Minister, but still very much involved in national defense and security issues, emphasized in particular control over budgets. This was a common theme in other interviews as well: that the need to economize on all, and to rationalize all costs, greatly enhanced the control of the ministries of National Defense and of Finance, headed, as are all cabinet ministries, by civilians.

Oversight

In addition to the MDN, interviewees emphasized that the Ministry of Finance reviews funds for the purchase and modernization of equipment, and even funds for cadets entering the military academies. The AR also has a role in oversight. The Chairman of the Defense Committee in 2015, José de Matos Correia, emphasized to the author that despite the presence of five parties in the Committee, a consensus had been established whereby the Committee is an active protagonist in issues of national security and defense. In updating this information in May 2019, the author was informed that the consensus continues, and all of the parties in the AR are represented on the Defense Committee in accord with their percentage of deputies in the AR. Regarding oversight, José de Matos Correia noted that by law, the Minister of National Defense must appear before the Defense Committee a minimum of four times a year for questioning, but generally appears much more often, including when the Committee discusses important issues such as the *Lei de Programação Militar* (law on acquisitions) or the status of negotiations with the United States regarding Lajes airbase in the Azores. The Committee also holds investigations into particular issues, which take the form of a *comissão de inquérito* (Correia, 2015). In short, oversight is conducted by the MDN, the Ministry of Finance, and by the Defense Committee in the AR.

Professional Military Education

The reform of professional military education (PME) in Portugal is part of a European-wide reform of education driven by the “Bologna process”, giving PME equivalence to education in civilian institutions. In Portugal, professional military education was transformed by reducing the number of schools for each of the three services into one academy for each of the services and a senior joint school. The results were to eliminate the so-called ‘technical’ level of education between the academies, of which there are still three, and the war college. Thus, instead of nine separate PME institutions there are now four, with the Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares – IESM, Portuguese Joint War College –, assuming the role at the pinnacle of the PME system with courses for officers at all ranks. There are proposals to merge the three service academies into one. There would be, then, one joint service academy and one joint war college for all of the services. A further institution of civilian control, similar to ones in the U.S., Brazil, and Chile, is the requirement that all degrees have to be accredited by an Agência de Avaliação do Ensino Superior – Agency for Higher Education Evaluation – that then makes a recommendation to the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education ultimately decides. In short, since approval of all aspects of military education first

depends on the civilian accreditation body, which then makes a recommendation to the civilian minister, civilian control over military education is absolute.

Effectiveness

Strategy

In April 2013, the Government of Portugal published a *Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional* – Strategic Concept of National Defense (Ministério da Defesa Nacional, 2013). It replaced the previous concept of 2003. This fifty-page document is comprehensive, making it very clear that any strategy of national defense must be part of a larger government strategy. Before dealing with the armed forces, the document highlights that diplomacy takes priority. It then highlights the main purpose of the armed forces, which is to “consolidate Portugal in her position as a *co-producer* [co-producer] of international security”. More specifically, it states: “Military means are a fundamental component of security of the State and an element to project the international prestige of Portugal” (Duarte, 2014, pp. 63-89). The civilian officials and military officers interviewed by the author emphasized that the process leading to the publication of the *Conceito* required a huge amount of involvement by various experts and presentations throughout the country. The final document was discussed in the AR and approved by the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers on March 21, 2013 (NA, 2013, p. 511).

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMGFA)

Previous to the 1993 basic laws, the CEMGFA, who is the CHOD, enjoyed extensive powers in all aspects of defense. The 1993 laws transferred all powers, but for those directly related to operations and war planning, to the MDN. Further, the 1993 laws limited the CEMGFA’s operational role to situations of war and states of siege or emergency (Bruneau, 1997, pp. 174-175). These cases are few and far between, but what are fairly common are decisions on sending troops abroad to participate in peace keeping or humanitarian relief missions. In the newer law of 2003, the CEMGFA has explicit powers in both war and peace. The law of September 2014 expands these powers. Now, all that is operational, which means almost everything, has to be done by the CEMGFA. Before the most recent law, the missions largely depended on the service chiefs. To increase the powers of the CEMGFA was a difficult political challenge as the service chiefs were not eager to lose power to one superior official, who, in two thirds of the cases, would be from another military service. Before the September 2014 law, he was *primus inter pares*. The Chief continues to have operational command when Portuguese troops are deployed

abroad, and the 2014 law reinforced his powers. It should be noted that all of the interviewees emphasized that the CEMGFA is responsible to the civilian minister. Indeed, the Organic Law Number 5/2014 of August 29, 2014 states, in Article 23, 1, "The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces depends directly on the Ministry of Defense in terms of the competences defined in law". In his analysis of the decision-making systems of Portugal and Spain Arteaga highlights the similarities in the two countries regarding civilian control, via the ministries of defense, and operational control via the chiefs of general staff (Arteaga, 2018, p. 143).

Resources

According to *Jane's Defense Budgets*, Portugal committed 1.1% of GDP to defense in 2019 (Jane's Defense Budgets). Some 50% of this figure went to personnel costs. The percentage is not surprising considering the severe economic crisis the country under the financial and economic tutelage of the "troika" of the EU, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, and continuing austerity after the tutelage. The figures are even lower in Spain, with 1.2% vs. Portugal with 1.9% in 2015 (Arteaga, 2018, p. 146). The predominant operational activities of the Portuguese Armed Forces are peacekeeping and humanitarian missions abroad (Carreiras, 2014). These are conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, NATO, and the EU. Of the three, only the UN reimburses the country, and, according to the officials interviewed by the author, at the rate of approximately 60%. In short, in line with the Portuguese Armed Forces' role as "coproducer" of international security, the country is probably as effective as it can be, given the very limited resources available. Arteaga uses the term "symbolic character" as a consequence of the economic crisis (Arteaga, 2018, p. 151). This assessment seems too severe to the author of this article.

Incentives for Civilians to be Interested in and Involved in National Security and Defense

A fundamental supposition of the author regarding civil-military relations, at least in newer democracies, is that civilians make the main decisions regarding both control and effectiveness. Based upon the ten country case studies in the book co-edited by the author of this essay, the same applies to both democracies and civilian-led autocracies (Bruneau and Croissant, 2019). The author utilizes the concept of incentives. That is, how and why are civilians motivated to deal with military issues? It should seem obvious why civilian decision-makers would want to exercise civilian control; it is clearly in their interest as decision-makers to reduce military prerogatives and exert control over the armed forces (Hunter, 1997).

However, interest is one thing, but creating, staffing, and resourcing institutions to do so requires time and effort. Normally, the phrase that captures the attitude of civilians in newer democracies most of the time is – “No coup, no problem”. When it comes to effectiveness, the necessary effort to create, staff, and resource institutions is made far more difficult by the need for resources; for money. Although the author had his early and well – documented academic differences with David Pion-Berlin regarding the armed forces’ roles in some Latin American countries, he believes Pion-Berlin is generally correct in his article “Political Management of the Military in Latin America”, where he states that militaries in the region “...occupy rearguard positions waiting for the occasional call to assist other forces” (Pion-Berlin 2005, p. 24).² In Portugal, and as will be seen later in this article, Brazil, the incentives may be framed in terms of strategic culture. In the effort to develop explanations through comparative analysis, the author has followed the recommendation of Mark I. Lichbach, drawing upon Max Weber, in combining culturalist-strategic culture – with the rationalist-incentives of politicians in elections – approaches to enter into a dialogue among these different approaches to attempt to explain civil-military relations (Lichbach, 1997, pp. 273-274).

This particular culture concerns a sense of what is involved with a country, its armed forces, and other states or international institutions that define the general parameters within which the political decision-makers operate. The U.S. Southern Command, which has contracted out for a series of reports on strategic culture in Latin American and Caribbean nations, defines strategic culture as follows: “the combination of internal and external influences and experiences – geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political, and military – that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship to the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international community” (Bitencourt and Vaz, 2009, p. 1; Katzenstein, 1996). In Portugal and Brazil, there is scholarly literature specifically on “strategic culture”, and its contents results in diametrically opposed implications for civil-military relations.

Portugal

There are excellent scholarly articles on Portuguese strategic culture – e.g. Reis (2013) and Robinson (2016). The author personally began to get a sense of Portuguese strategic culture in his interviews while on sabbatical leave in Lisbon in 1992 and 1993. At that time he was studying “Iberian Defense Policies,” which turned out to be the study of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain, as he had to first

2 For the argument and evidence from four South American countries see (Bruneau, 2013, pp. 143-160).

determine who, or what, was in fact developing and implementing the policies. After 1975 and decolonization, Portugal could no longer rely on the colonies to demonstrate that Portugal was not a small country on the Atlantic, but a huge country including its *Ultramara* – literally the land beyond the seas, Cynics would use the term “colonies”. In this context then, NATO was not just a military alliance; rather a key element for Portugal’s engagement with the United States. Based upon the author’s interviews with Portuguese civilian decision-makers, he found that the base access issue in the Azores with the United States was more than a way to generate rent for access and keep locals employed, but was in fact a key element to involve the United States in Portugal and to diversify Portugal’s political options. The institutional reforms in Portuguese civil-military relations, and indeed the configuration of its forces to engage in a wide spectrum of roles and missions, is best understood as being similar to other democratic countries in order to more easily relate and maintain close contact with NATO, and specifically the United States (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008; Reis, 2013). In a more recent analysis of Portuguese strategic culture, Steven Robinson emphasizes that NATO remains extremely important for Portugal, despite the country’s membership in the whole gamut of European economic, political, and military institutions (Robinson, 2016, pp. 134-158). It should be noted that the Portuguese seek to maintain, with a force of 33,000 officers, enlisted personnel, and contractors, capacity across a wide spectrum of military capabilities. These relationships involve territorial defense – with F-16 fighter jets for example –, Meko frigates involved in NATO operations, and currently the emphasis on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions under the aegis of the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union. To implement its role as a “co-producer” of international security is obviously very difficult for a small and relatively poor country, but the Portuguese have so far continued their efforts to do so in order to sustain diversified external relations.

As described above, with regard to the organic laws in 1994 and the Strategic Concept of National Defense of 2013, there was very wide consultation and discussion throughout society. Another indication of the prevalence of a shared strategic culture is the fact that the Defense Committee in the AR works on the basis of consensus. In the 2015 parliamentary elections – which resulted in an “arrangement” of the left, including the PS, PCP, the Left Block, and the Greens – the directly-elected President of the Republic only allowed the government to form after obtaining pledges regarding NATO defense agreements and Eurozone financial rules. That is, to maintain the central elements of Portuguese strategic culture. Further, in the presidential elections on 28 January, of the nine candidates, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, supported by the Right, the PSD, and CDS, won with 52% of the vote. Indeed, in his first speech to the Portuguese Armed Forces, President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa made his support for the armed forces very clear by supporting

increased investment in the armed forces and by promising to continue to implement the *Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional* (Carlos Abreu, March 21, 2016). In short, those election results demonstrated ongoing support for a strategic culture that posits Portugal active in NATO as well as European national defense and security activities.

Political and Military Background

Brazil

Brazil was ruled by the armed forces as an institution (vs. as an individual such as General Pinochet) between 1964 and 1985. Scholars, and decision-makers in their memoirs and oral histories cite a number of factors leading to the political transition that began in 1974. (Skidmore, 1988; Huntington, 1991). There was not, in sum only one cause or reason for the transition.

The Constitution of 1988

The reader should recall that the 1976 Constitution in Portugal was substantially revised in 1982, resulting in greater roles for the political parties and thus the AR, diminished the powers of the president, and diminished the power of the military by abolishing the CR. In contrast and to understand the current political situation in Brazil, including civil-military relations, one must begin with the Constitution of 1988 that marked the formal achievement of democracy after the 21 year military regime. Scholars who study the process whereby the Constitution of 1988 was formulated and the resulting document are extremely critical. In the author's writing he argues that the Constitution did not represent an "elite settlement" ensuring democratic consolidation, as was the case in Spain, for example (Bruneau, 1992, pp. 257-281). Law professor and expert on Brazil, Keith S. Rosenn, states the following: "The process by which Brazil's 1988 Constitution was adopted practically assured that the end product would be a hodgepodge of inconsistent and convoluted provisions" (Rosenn, 2010, p. 458). Despite 20 months of meetings and speeches resulting in a huge document of 245 articles and 70 transitional provisions, the 559 framers were unable to resolve even such fundamental questions as whether Brazil would be a monarchy or republic, and if the latter, a presidential or parliamentary regime. These fundamental decisions were left for a referendum in 1993 that favored a presidential republic. The framers of the Constitution, which were the 559 members of the Brazilian Congress, maintained intact both the institutional defects of the political system and the extensive prerogatives of the armed forces that governed Brazil between 1964 and 1985. Whereas the institutional defects of the political system continue until the present, the prerogatives of the armed forces were subsequently

diminished, but most recently substantially increased, all depending on the political expediency as perceived by civilian decision-makers.

Although the Constitution of 1988 included many items that could lead to an improved socio-economic situation for Brazilians, it changed nothing regarding the political institutions that gave those 559 politicians the political power to write the constitution, and have made only most minimal changes in the intervening 28 years. As Rosenn states “The constituent assembly also did nothing to reform the malfunctioning of the political party system, which is one of the world’s worst” (Rosenn, 2010, p. 458). They did not change the open – list system of proportional representation in which each state is a single, and at – large multi – member district; nor the gross misrepresentation whereby all states, and the federal district, have three senators or the provision stipulating that all states, regardless of population, would have a minimum of eight and a maximum of seventy deputies in the lower house.

There was supposed to be a wholesale revision of the Constitution in 1993 that would require only an absolute majority of the deputies. That revision never happened. Instead, there have been piecemeal revisions. In reviewing the various initiatives to revise the Constitution between 1988 and today, they amount to very little. The Constitution of 1988 was full of contradictions. The issue of parliamentary vs. presidential form of government was never fully resolved, neither in the constituent assembly nor after. On the one hand, the Constitution gave the Congress a role in approving annual budgets and allowed them to overrule presidential vetoes with absolute majorities rather than a two-thirds vote. On the other hand, it gave the presidency the exclusive right to initiate and execute annual budgets and to force 45 day limits on the Congress to review bills defined as “urgent” by the president, the power to appoint a cabinet, and the power to issue executive decrees (*medidas provisórias*) which had the force of law while congress had 30 days to review the measure³. Post-1990 presidents utilized these measures, and other gimmicks, to govern.

Politics as Usual

Foremost among these gimmicks, which arises from the need to assemble a coalition, since no president since the first directly elected, President Collor, in 1989, has belonged to a party with a majority in either house of congress, all presidents would have to obtain the support of other parties. Brazil has one of, if not the most fractured, party system of any democracy. This form of government, commonly called coalitional presidentialism (*presidencialismo de coalizão*), could, and did, easily

3 In 2001 this was changed to 60 days.

evolve into corruption. Alfred Montero has this to say on this topic. “The need to engage in vote – buying emerged from the limited options the Lula administration had for composing the same kind of legislative coalition that Cardoso [President, 1995-2003] enjoyed” (Montero, 2014, p. 43). In short, there was never a Fernando Nogueira, let alone a Michelle Bachelet or Juan Manuel Santos with sufficient power to adjust the balance with the military that initiated the political transition.

Control

Ministry of Defense (MOD)

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was established 14 years after Brazil’s democratic transition, with the passage of Complementary Law 97 on June 9, 1999. Indeed, of the 12 MODs since its creation in 1999, only one, Nelson Jobim 2007-2011, evidenced any interest in national security and defense. For example, in an interview Jobim called attention to the importance of Narcis Serra’s book (Jobim, 2012). None of them, not even Jobim, who was fired by President Rousseff in August 2011, went on to any higher position. According to informed experts, Jobim was fired due to his, relative to other ministers, independent base of political support. However, even under Minister Jobim a civilian cadre of advisors or defense specialists was never established within the ministry. There is no career track within the MOD with the result that the role of civilians in the MOD is minimal. A constant theme in defense publications, such as the influential Strategy Research Paper by Colonel Skora Rosty as well as in the author’s interviews with officers in Brazil, is the supposed lack of prepared civilians to deal with security and defense in Brazil (Skora Rosty, 2011, pp. 8, 13 and 21). There probably are sufficient civilians with expertise in security and defense issues, but there is a vicious circle in that if civilians cannot find a career in the MOD there is no way to determine if they are prepared. Since 2000 when the author led a seminar program for civilians on these issues, none of them ever obtained regular employment in the MOD. “Because the ministry had no career path for civil servants, civilians rarely served more than four years before leaving” (Dreisbach, 2016, p. 4).

The Role of the Public Ministry, Ministério Público (MP)

In Brazil, as national security and defense are not considered relevant issues worthy of attention by elected representatives, there is no attention or oversight by the Congress over either national defense or the intelligence agencies (Madruga, 2015). The MP has received much attention in Brazil as a mechanism to counter the well-known tradition of elite and government impunity. Albert Fishlow, a respected foreign observer of Brazil, citing Fabio Kerche, a highly-regarded Brazilian political

scientist, writes, "...the Public Ministry plays an important role in Brazilian political life and 'is singular because it combines elements – autonomy, instruments of action, discretion and full array of attributes – that are not common in institutions with few characteristics of *accountability*'". This structure has become an integral part of the institutions undergirding an evolving democracy" (Fishlow 2011, p. 23). The MP is extremely powerful and autonomous in defending the public interest. This institution is almost unique in the world, and must be taken into consideration when analyzing the autonomy and activities of any public institution, including the armed forces and intelligence agencies. Its remit, however, is not specifically directed towards the military – there is a military public ministry that deals mainly with crimes involving the military.

Professional Military Education

Professional Military Education (PME) is considered high quality in Brazil, and is provided through an elaborate system at several levels. As a recent report states: "Brazil counts upon an impressive, well-articulated, and comprehensive education system with a myriad of institutions that provide military education at all levels and for all services." (Bittencourt, 2018, p. 18). Unlike the U.S. military, for example, where performance in many tasks, including combat, determines promotions, in Brazil promotion is mainly based on achievement in education as the Brazilian military is not involved in combat per se. The three service academies concentrate on technical training. Further professional training, as well as education in policy and strategy, is offered at the intermediate schools. A higher level of education is available at the war colleges of the three services, and at the Escola Superior de Guerra – ESG, Higher War College – in which senior military officers mix with civilian officials.

But for the postgraduate level of education, in which the civilian – dominated Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES), Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel – is responsible for accreditation, the level of civilian control over PME is minimal. The MEC does have overall jurisdiction, but has allowed the military to maintain control through specific legal arrangements. In the MOD there is a Secretariat for Personnel, Education, Health and Sports, (SEPESD) which has formal responsibility to regulate and audit the military educational institutions' curricula. However, the official responsible for the SEPESD in the MOD has always been a military officer, and recommendations to install a civilian university professor have been rebuffed. Thus, in theory the SEPESD should regulate and audit the military educational institutions, but it never has.

Effectiveness

Strategy

In December 2008, the MOD formulated, and President Lula then decreed, the *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* – END, National Defense Strategy. However, because the END was created by decree, and thus, according to the Brazilian legal-administrative system, did not go through the Brazilian Congress, there was no initial requirement for congressional funding. Only on September 12, 2013 did the Brazilian Congress approve the END, National Defense Policy – Política Nacional de Defesa (PND) –, and *Defense White Book* (Ministério da Defesa, 2013). The END does not include any reference to implementation beyond purely bureaucratic measures. The more recent Defense White Book (*Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*) of 2012 is a 275 page review of the institutions, roles, and missions of actors in the defense sector. Lastly, the PND is a ten-page statement on goals, institutions, and the international environment. The fact that the Brazilian government did, under the Workers' Party presidencies (2003-2016), elaborate and published these three documents is noteworthy, and also in accord with Complimentary Law 136/2010 which requires the input of the Brazilian Congress every four years, but publication does not imply sufficient resources or implementation.

To what extent do these documents reflect a strategy? Hew Strachan, in his article "The Lost Meaning of Strategy" published in *Survival*, states: "In the ideal model of civil-military relations, the democratic head of state sets out his or her policy and armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. The reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is iterative, a dialogue where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to implement it" (Strachan 2005, p. 52). If we use Strachan's formulation as a guide, the three Brazilian documents do not amount to a strategy. There was no iterative process and only minimal attention to the ends of policy, let alone military means, to implement them. To be fair, in a meeting with the author of this essay, Strachan reported that only Australia in 2009 had developed what he would consider a strategy (Strachan, 2017).

In a very sophisticated and nuanced empirical analysis, Professor Octavio Amorim Neto has demonstrated the involvement of civilians in defense policy in Brazil. As he states, "However, in terms of defense policy implementation, there are varying degrees of success" (Amorim Neto, 2019).

Maybe the most convincing observation on the lack of a strategy in Brazil is from the recent book by João Paulo Alsina Jr. in his book on Brazilian strategy where he states "... the grand strategy of the Country continues to be chaotic and completely unable to bring together synergistically the capacities of national power in support of a realistic project of achieving sovereignty in the world" (Alsina Jr., 2018, p. 106).

What does prevail, and Alsina Jr. calls attention to it in this same book, is the role of the military in guaranteeing law and order, or GLO, as stipulated most recently in the Constitution of 1988, in Article 142, and in subsequent laws (Alsina Jr., 2018, p. 172-174). The conditions are defined in Complementary Law 97 of June 9, 1999. Specifically, a state governor, who is responsible for security in the state, can request of the President of the Republic that the armed forces be used to support the police. According to one apparently credible report, the number of GLO's and of the soldiers deployed are substantial. If there were three GLO operations with 15,500 soldiers in 2015, in 2016 – the year of the Olympic Games and elections – there were seven with 89,000 soldiers, and in 2017, there were six with 45,900 soldiers (Victor, 2018, p. 4). Amorim Neto brilliantly summarizes the dilemma involved in the focus on domestic, vs. what he terms “externalism” missions. “Brazil is thus trapped in a vicious cycle. The military has ample prerogatives in internal security; crime rates keep rising; state police forces are deficient; civilians frequently call the armed forces to perform law-and-order operations; the mass public supports these operations; the military appreciates the short-term budgetary and reputational benefits generated by such operations; and the combination of all these conditions weakens civilian resolve to reduce military prerogatives in internal security” (Amorim Neto, 2019, pp. 23-14).

Institutions

In line with the quote from Hew Strachan regarding the iterative process between the civilian decision-makers and the armed forces, the author of this article believes, based on his comparative studies, that there is a need for an institutional basis to bring civilians and the leaders of the armed forces together. While the MOD, as discussed above, formally links the civilian president to the armed forces, in 2010 Brazil established a joint operational military structure as part of a more general reform of national security and defense institutions. The *Lei Complementar* 136 of August 25, 2010 specified the roles of the MOD and created the *Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas* – EMCFA, The Armed Forces Joint Command. So far, in mid-2019, the joint structure does not work autonomously, as the officers at the top-levels of the three services are four-star, their positions mirror to some degree the continuing structure of the services, and the EMCFA does not control budgets. Nor, for that matter, does it control operations on a daily basis, which are run by the individual services. Only on rare occasions, such as the Olympics and the World Cup has it assumed a larger role in joint operations. The conclusion in August 2016 – “...strengthening the institution remained a work in progress” (Dreisbach, 2016, p. 16), still holds today.

Resources

Brazil committed of 1.4% GDP in 2019 to national security and defense. And, at 81%, the country allocates a very high percentage of this budget to personnel costs. (Jane's Defense Budgets 2019) These figures are very low as a percentage of GDP and the percentage for personnel high in comparison to the BRICS and the UN Security Council. Brazil belongs to the former and aspires to belong as a permanent member to the latter. Brazil's high level of personnel costs in the defense budget leave policy-makers with little room for maneuver for non-personnel costs, including procurement.

Incentives for Civilians to be Interested in and Involved in National Security and Defense

Brazil

A, if not the main point for Alsina Jr. to explain the lack of strategy and overall lack of interest by the civilian decision-makers in Brazil is the absence of incentives (Alsina Jr., 2018, pp. 107-181). A highly respected foreign observer of Brazil, Timothy J. Power, clearly demonstrates in a comprehensive review article on Brazilian politics, the armed forces and defense are simply not a political issue, either in terms of consensus – for which Power identifies four issues – or lack of consensus – for which Powers defines another four issues (Power, 2010, pp. 226-238). Rather, there is a wide consensus among the elite and the general population on the country's peaceful vocation, which translates into the lack of a need to develop "hard power", meaning the armed forces. As Luis Bitencourt and Alcides Costa Vaz state in the Executive Summary of their report on Brazilian Strategic Culture, "Peace is thus the strategic and cultural norm; it involves active engagement by the State via alliances, diplomacy, economic developments, and trade partnerships. The Brazilian National Defense Strategy underscores and builds perceptions of security upon peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is remarkable that the first word in the Brazilian National Defense Strategy of 2008 is 'peace'. This 'strategy' document states that 'peace is the main goal of this strategy'. In general, Brazilians believe that they are a peaceful people, and that peace is an ingrained cultural value" (Bitencourt and Vaz, 2009, p. 4).

Brazilians consider their country a "geopolitically satisfied" country with no major border disputes with its neighbors. This is significant, considering Brazil shares a border with ten countries in South America. This globally privileged position is vividly captured in a blunt statement in an interview with then-Brazilian Minister of Defense José Viegas Filho in March 2002. In response to the question, "Is Brazil immune to terrorism?" he stated, "No one can say that they are immune to

terrorism. But if you were to draw up a list of countries that are vulnerable to this problem, Brazil would certainly be in one of the lowest rankings. Brazil has no enemies. There is not one country in the world that hates us or is prejudiced against us” (Correio Braziliense, 2003).

These peaceful perceptions, widely shared by all social strata, hold important implications for the armed forces and other security institutions as well as for civil-military relations in general. There are minimal incentives for civilian politicians to be concerned about national defense and security issues. Internationally, while the country may have vague but ambitious aspirations, there is minimal threat perception that might motivate increased attention to the military. This positive perception of Brazil and its global situation holds important implications for the commitment of resources – attention, political capital, money, and personnel – to the security sector, as evidenced by the discussion on the institutions of control and effectiveness described above.

In contrast to Portugal, where there is a strategic culture that involves using the armed forces as part of a strategy for autonomy in the context of NATO and the EU, in Brazil the emphasis is just the opposite. National security and defense are simply not considered relevant issues by the population or elected decision-makers, so that consequently no attention is paid to these issues beyond the concern captured by the phrase “no coup, no problem.” The government has taken no initiative to create and implement any of the key institutions of either democratic civilian control or military effectiveness. At least one researcher found that the prospects for major reforms in national security and defense policy and institutions at the end of the Lula administration were extremely positive. (Dreisbach, 2016). Unfortunately, these prospects were never fulfilled. This is the situation despite a crisis of security in the country which resulted in the military frequently implementing GLO.

The Current Situation

Even before Jair Bolsonaro was elected president and assumed office on January 1, 2019, the government sought the support of the military to buttress its minimal legitimacy. As ex-president and distinguished sociologist, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was quoted as saying in March 2018 “it is mainly weak governments that end up appealing for military [support]” (Valente and Uribe, 2018). Vice-President Michel Temer became president on the impeachment of President Rousseff on 31 August 2016. Already accused of corruption, he was finally arrested after he left office, on 21 March 2019. It is not surprising, therefore, that the legitimacy of the government, and even of the democratic regime, suffered. For example, in a 2014 World Values Survey whereas 58.6% stated they had confidence in the armed forces 41% had confidence in the government (World Values Survey, 2014). Further,

according to a very credible poll by Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), when asked about using the military for public security, whereas 92% said always or in some situations (47% + 45%) only 8% said never (IPEA, 2012, p. 6). Since public (in)security became the leading issue in Brazil, Michel Temer attempted to draw on the military to embellish his legitimacy. For example, in February of 2018 President Temer named General Braga Netto as *interventor* for security in the State of Rio de Janeiro. This was the first intervention under the constitution of 1988, and President Temer could have named a civilian. The intervention is distinct from, and far more serious, than the frequent deployment of the Brazilian armed forces under Article 142, of the 1988 Constitution, which provides for the military to guarantee law and order (GLO). Also, as a first, this time since it's founding by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in June 1999, a retired army general was named Minister of Defense. The Secretariat for Institutional Security – GSI, Gabinete de Segurança Institucional – was recreated under President Temer, and was also headed by an army general, and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency – ABIN, Agência Brasileira de Inteligência – is under the GSI. Another army general was named to head the Civilian Household (Casa Civil) of the President of Brazil. In addition to these important changes in leadership of key security and domestic policy institutions are changes in the legislation whereby military personnel accused of crimes that occur in pacification programs will be judged by military justice rather than normal, civilian justice. Again, it must be reiterated that all of these important security positions could have been filled by civilians.

The Coming of President Bolsonaro

The conclusion of two of the most widely respected academic observers of Brazil, Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power is definitive. “In the end, the meteoric rise of Brazil’s next president [Jair Bolsonaro] was made possible by a combination of fundamental background conditions (economic recession, corruption, and crime), political contingencies (most notably, the weakness of rival candidates), and a shakeup in campaign dynamics produced by the strategic use of social media” (Hunter and Power, 2019, p. 20). In all that which concerns civil – military relations, President Jair Bolsonaro, in his election campaign and even more once in office, has prioritized security and placing active duty and reserve officers into key and not so key positions in his administration. Attempting to analyze anything, including civil-military relations, with regard to President Bolsonaro is all but impossible since as a populist and demagogue his policies are impossible to predict. Lest the author be judged a biased foreign observer, he must hasten to add that the author and the co-editor state something very similar in our recent co-edited book on President Trump. (Bruneau and Croissant, 2019, p. 238). And, in the author’s

opinion, the anxiety arising from President Bolsonaro filling his administration with active duty and retired military officers is not very different from the concern in the United States when President Trump had General Mattis as Secretary of Defense, General Kelly as Director of the Department of Homeland Security and then Chief of Staff, and Major General McMaster as his National Security Advisor. If anything, in the opinion of the author of this article, they were a moderating force on President Trump.

The Implications of President Bolsonaro's Reliance on the Military

There is no doubt but that President Bolsonaro has filled his administration, at all levels, with active duty or retired military officers. There are, however, at least three primary considerations regarding this situation. First, President Bolsonaro was popularly elected President of Brazil. The situation in which he was elected is succinctly and, in the author's view, correctly analyzed in the article by Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power cited above. Second, virtually the whole political class in Brazil is discredited. The military, in contrast, has very high credibility in Brazilian society in general. Third, President Bolsonaro's former political party, the Social Liberal Party, PSL, was a very minor party (having won one deputy in both the 2010 and 2014 elections), but rode on Bolsonaro's coattails winning 52 seats, out of 513 in the lower house, Câmara, in the October 2018 elections. There are two implications arising from this fact. First, the PSL lacks a cadre of qualified officials to occupy government positions. And, second, in order to pass any legislation the PSL has to establish coalitions, which impedes the implementation of Bolsonaro's campaign promises. It follows, then, that the military, as individuals, have stepped in to support President Bolsonaro both politically and administratively.

Consequently, the author agrees with Luis Bitencourt that "...the military is disinclined to seize power" (Bitencourt, 2018, p. Executive Summary). And also with the position of Professor Maria Celina D'Araújo, in an article from 4 March of 2018, that the military do not have a project or plan to take power (Celina D'Araújo, 2018). He also agrees with the article by Andres Schipani and Bryan Harris that the military are viewed as a voice of moderation in a populist government (Schipani and Harris, 2019). The result is, again in agreement with Mac Margolis in the title to a recent article: "Bolsonaro Is a Risky Bet for Brazil's Military" (Margolis, 2019). All of this leads the author to the incisive analysis of the foremost student of civil-military relations in Brazil, Professor Octavio Amorim Neto of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro in which he takes as a given that the military are in government to support the Bolsonaro administration. He then goes on to analyze three different scenarios, focused first on the democratically elected president, and the degree to which he is more or less successful, and the implications for the military according

to each scenario (Amorim Neto, 2019, pp. 21-22). One could also add an emerging (from mid-2019) tension between the “military group” in the government and an “ideological group”, led by President Bolsonaro’s son, Carlos, which have been resolved to the detriment of the military. These tensions, and their resolution, give some indication of the place of the military in the political calculus of President Bolsonaro.

Conclusion

In utilizing a comparative framework involving both democratic civilian control and military effectiveness, this article has concluded that civil-military relations in Portugal and Brazil are extremely different. The Portuguese, as the oldest nation in Europe with the same borders, and the only part of Iberia to not have come under the control of Castile, have always had to think strategically to survive. After the loss of the African colonies in the mid-1970s, they turned even more to NATO, involving the United States, and Europe, to maintain their sovereignty. In this context, particularly in light of the MFA in overthrowing the authoritarian regime in 1974, the role of the military has always been extremely important. It is no surprise, then, that the political-decision makers and the military themselves have been concerned and active in establishing the necessary institutions for democratic civilian control and military effectiveness; the latter in terms of a “coproducer” of international security. Brazil, in contrast, given its size and location in a “zone of peace” has never paid much attention to the role of the military in strategy. Following the 21-year military regime, the saying “no coup, no problem” has been the defining characteristic of civil-military relations. Consequently, the politicians who framed the Constitution of 1988, and subsequent laws, paid scarce heed to anything beyond ensuring their own powers and enriching themselves. The main role of the military became enforcing security domestically through operations in support of the GLO. While institutions, including the MOD and the EMCEFA were created, and strategy documents including the END drafted, they were never fully implemented; nor did the country invest much of national wealth in the military. The “perfect storm” of economic crisis, public insecurity, and corruption led to the election of a demagogic populist to the presidency in 2018 lacking a basis of political strength or technical expertise to in fact govern. In this situation active duty and retired military officers have joined his government, with the result that they have so far provided some stability in the midst of chaos and confusion.

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