


**Without Imago
Mundi,**



**A Random
Diversion
Instead**

Contents

2	Curatorial text Eduarda Neves		
	<i>Chapter one – Exhibition: Without Imago Mundi, A Random Diversion Instead</i>		
12	Nuno Ramalho	64	Daniela Angelucci
16	Celeste Cerqueira	72	Orazio Irrera
22	Ana Guimarães and Tiago Veloso Dias	78	Marcus Steinweg
26	João Tabarra	84	Carlos Vidal
32	Daniel Moreira and Rita Castro Neves	92	Daniel Folha
38	Thiago Rocha Pitta	96	Miguel Gonçalves
44	Sérgio Leitão	100	Bios
52	Alexandra Costa	106	Colophon
56	Nuno Vieira		
			<i>Chapter two – International Conference Cycle: In fact, nothing is more difficult than to distinguish plain things from doubtful ones</i>

Without Imago Mundi, A Random Diversion Instead

Eduarda Neves

Without Imago Mundi, A Random Diversion Instead, takes as a critical reference the work of Lucretius¹ *On the Nature of Things* [*De rerum natura*], a philosophical poem divided into six books and considered one of the founding texts of Western culture. An ill-fated author, inspired by the atomism of Democritus and the moral philosophy of Epicurus of Samos, Lucretius declares man is present in a universe without gods and distances himself from an anthropocentric vision. He proclaims liberation from the fear of death by asserting that the gods are no more than the illusions of fearful men. As Gilles Deleuze emphasized, the importance of this text is so great that after it appeared, it no longer made sense to ask what purpose philosophy serves. Moreover, he says: "with Epicurus and Lucretius the real noble acts of philosophical pluralism begin".²

Introducing the idea that atoms have no fixed direction, that chaos, imponderability and chance are part of the universe, that everything can be created from everything and everything can be created from nothing, Lucretius confronts us with the idea that the universe has no end or goals. No hidden force influences existence because everything ends with death. After death, nothing else exists. All that surrounds us results from the continuous movement of infinitely small particles, which we call atoms, and therefore creation is not a divine work. It is a source of happiness for man to know himself free and aware of the potential of imagination and passion.

To think of the diverse, or the heterogeneous as such, is the task in which the philosophies that preceded him failed, argues this Roman philosopher. Reflecting upon astronomy, matter, energy and emptiness, the natural history of the Earth, relativism of perception versus the real, the notion of simulacrum, bodily functions, or passionate and overwhelming love, Lucretius leads us to one of his main assertions: everything that constitutes the universe is formed by the same matter, be it the oceans, stones or men, and each one integrates this cosmos in continuous movement. He contested the knowledge grounded on the authority of the ancients, and various modern authors such as Erasmus, Machiavelli, Spinoza, Montaigne, Marx, Nietzsche, Calvino, Serres and Deleuze became generous readers of his work.

On the Nature of Things is also a classic in the sense that Italo Calvino attributed to this notion: "A classic is a book that has never finished saying what it has to say (...) A classic is a work which constantly generates a pulviscular cloud of critical discourse around it, but which always

shakes the particles off.”³ We wish to reflect on the present day but starting from and with Lucretius. As Nietzsche warned, to think actively is to act in a non-actual manner, against time and therefore in time, in favour of a time that is to come.

Within the scope of the curatorial programme, one of the books out of the six that structure Lucretius’ work as mentioned above was proposed specifically to each artist. These texts are the basis of reflection for the exhibition project, but they only constitute the starting point. This project does not objectify itself in any representation of the world, an *imago mundi*, but rather in a random diversion, without any form of redemption. In the *Centro de Ciência Viva* of the Porto Planetarium, particles of dust, vortexes and invisible matter all swirl around on a battlefield. They allow the atoms “unpredictable deviations from the straight line, thereby ensuring freedom both to atoms and to human beings.”⁴ They venture into lightness and into the void, they exalt the *clinamen*, they celebrate the nature of things.

Referring to Book 1 of this philosophical poem, which announces the constitution of the universe, Ana Guimarães and Tiago Veloso call upon Lucretius’ lesson that nothing comes from nothing and that nothing transforms itself into nothing. In the words of the poet, if everything “came from nothing, anything could be born from anything, with no seed required. (...) In fact, were there no procreant bodies for each thing, how could there be a specific mother for anything?”⁵ A cocoon, energy, rocks and earth, seeds and trees, living beings that journey through a moving world, all give form to the outcome of the installation that combines a vacuum with solid bodies. The installation entitled *Pelo que se pode ter a certeza de que cada coisa vai crescendo e ganhando corpo a partir da sua matéria específica* [So that you can be sure that each thing goes on growing and getting larger

starting from its specific matter] indicates a space void of power, unlimited and light, dissolving in invisible atoms, eternal and immutable. Multiple images of nature and the city or an impressive spider’s web projected through a window mobilise our gaze and invite us to draw back when the moon appears. Between the infinity of matter and space, we are called to a contemplative life, to the slow passing of time, like the work of a spider or the coming and going of the sea. Let the sky, like Paul Éluard’s earth, be “blue as an orange”. This is what the glorious muses announce.

Celeste Cerqueira appropriates images captured and transmitted by satellite through which she establishes a deep interaction between gravity, movement and human action. We are confronted with technological images, disseminated by the media, that not only mediate our instrumental relationship with nature but also foresee marks of destruction. Configuring the movement and form of the atoms, the gravity Lucretius evokes in Book II finds a correspondence in *Sapiens, Sapiens*, seven drawings which materialise the view from above, movements from the sky to the Earth, from the gods to men. The classic representation of power. However, faced with the indifference of divine actions, between unstable speeds and continuous movements, what gains momentum are the infinite number of worlds, the storms of nature and of men. *Turbantibus aequora uentis*. Meteorites, stars, fires, wars and typhoons are projected towards what is most distant and as low as possible; they circulate in the energy of the infinite layers of graphite atoms: “So do you not see that, although outside forces drive many men and often make them move forward against their will and be carried off, yet there is in our heart something that is able to struggle against that motion and resist it.”⁶ *Clinamen*. The meeting of atoms. Every hero flies, with no limit and no defined measure.

In Book III, Lucretius, expounding the arguments of the old materialists, shows us that the soul, being made of incorruptible matter, perishes with the body, thus obeying the universal law of the transformation of matter. By constructing a sculptural form, an observatory, Daniel Moreira and Rita Castro Neves return to these philosophical premises via this large-scale structure. The visual and sound landscape of the installation *Alguns argumentos, 24 para sermos mais precisos* [A few arguments, 24 to be precise] presents us with a continuous succession of photographic images of 24 hand gestures, with 24 understood as the measure of all things, for the 24 letters of the alphabet and the 24 frames per second that make up a video in animation format. As it is in the combinatorics of the alphabet that Lucretius finds the immaterial atomic structure of matter and as he believes it is on Earth that the destiny of man is fulfilled, the artists likewise invite the spectator to be part of the work. By placing themselves inside, looking up from bottom to top, from the Earth to the sky, and contemplating all the “past space of immeasurable time”, the observer will believe that “these same particles (...) often already existed before. (...) Since dying prevents this and ends existence for the man who could be swamped by troubles, we can know that there is nothing to fear in death.”⁷ In this anthropomorphic poem what we continue to find is that higher good with which everything ends. Death.

The poet speaks to us of sensorial nature, atoms that want to join others and become bigger. In Book IV, however, Lucretius evokes overwhelming love. As if dealing with an ode to Venus, Nuno Ramalho retrieves a love letter received in times gone by. What must have happened to the intense emotions and rhythms that swept through it at that time? What force can they still have today in the subject who loves and the object who is loved? In *Vénus* [Venus] what remains of the *delectabile sensibile*?

Or, if we use words like Lacan’s, might we say that love is nothing but that of which we cannot speak⁸ and that it is not of sex that we speak when we talk of love?⁹ Presented in the exhibition in the form of Morse code, love assumes a discreet visibility in this representation system. Light and memory become the trail for a new language, for another text: “in fact, in the very moment of possession, lovers’ passion fluctuates, it wavers, undecided, not knowing where pleasure should be taken first, if with the eyes or with the hands.”¹⁰ Venus, the object of philosophical worship in Lucretius’ work, corresponds to the fertile power of nature that spreads and preserves life. In this love letter whose writing permeates the space, the word is both deviation and return. The listening to myself in the other that I am. Perhaps love is not old-fashioned. Perhaps it is necessary to take the risk.

Giving form to the legacy of Epicurus, in Book V the poet describes the movement of the stars, the celestial bodies, the appearance of living beings and the cycle of nature. Using video projections inside the Planetarium’s dome, Sérgio Leitão establishes an analogy between these phenomena and the account of the origin and development of Western human civilisation. The installation entitled *INGIRUM III – the beginnings, the diversions, the fallout and the promise* confronts us in a critical way with binary dualities in light of which we reflect upon the world, underlining the potentially totalizing nature of the great narratives: “it is thus that the Babylonian doctrines of the Chaldeans seek to refute the claims of the astronomers, as if it were not possible to have both of the two rival hypotheses, or if there were some reason why we might desire to embrace one theory rather than the other.” Foucault asked his students at the University of California, Berkeley, why a light bulb or a house are art objects while our life is not. Thus, appropriating objects from the context such as chairs and desks, a telescope, copies of Book V and sound,

Leitão invokes the natural history of the Earth as narrated by Lucretius. Men learnt that with one thing another thing can be explained, one *declines* the other, says the poet. The Sun and the Moon illuminate everything. Matter is born and dies. Thus is the nature of the world.

Meteorological phenomena and the world in all its heterogeneity are described by Lucretius in Book VI. Searching for the *clinamen* in thunder, its speculative diversion, João Tabarra displaces it to the territory of the self-portrait. In *Self Portrait-with-Thunders* we identify the same turbulence which the meeting between atoms engenders: “in this way too, all things struck by heavy thunder often appear to tremble, and the mighty walls of the spacious world in an instant seem to burst and split apart.”¹² In the unexpectedness of the winds and the swirling eddies that bind the film together, identity becomes an errant event, a noisy forest, the sign of the force that propels the atoms. Shaken by the passing of time, the self-portrait establishes, as Gilles Deleuze says apropos the eternal return, “an eternally excentric circle, the decentred centre of difference”.¹³ The multiplicity that constitutes nature, in which Lucretius says he finds things which differ from each other and various senses in the beings that inhabit it, is the same as that which we find in the body born with the face of man. So, if the force of the storm impels us to choose one single direction, then it will be the thunder that shakes all the effects of this. Given the immensity of the world, the shining light of the powerful ray, gyrating everywhere, will draw the trajectory – that of the freedom of all paths.

Mapas temporais de uma costa não definida [Temporal maps of a non-defined shore] by Thiago Rocha Pitta is a work that also developed out of Book VI and appears to instil a type of tranquillity or Epicurean impassivity. It deals with the lightness that in both Lucretius and the words of Italo Calvino¹⁴ is a way of looking at the world based on philosophy and science. However, if the poet also sees the objects of physics in weight, fluids and heat, the artist gives more importance in the video he presents to the solidity of the earth and the fluidity of water, understood as primordial materials that structure the dynamics of the universe. But where these maps ultimately lead us is to the mud, that mixture of earth and water that supports and preserves structures: “Besides, I have taught that clouds also take away a great quantity of water, absorbed from the vast surface of the ocean, and that they scatter it all over the Earth’s orb, when it rains on earth and winds bring clouds.”¹⁵ A communicating vessel on an inclined plane, it

**All that surrounds
us results from
the continuous
movement
of infinitely small
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which we call atoms,
and therefore
creation is not
a divine work.**

is the mud that becomes the image of this eternally open cosmogony, always ready to receive, to recommence. Between the stillness of men and the pleasure of the gods, an organised semantics of the universe floats through a triptych of screens in a suave, restrained, albeit differentiated, movement. Being adrift, do atoms not ultimately veer towards what is stable?

With the participation of two comets

Alexandra Costa and Nuno Vieira, reindicating Lucretius' vitalist naturalism, present their respective installations in the outside space of the Centro de Ciência Viva of the Porto Planetarium.

In Alexandra Costa's intervention entitled *Estudos sobre a entropia. Para uma hipótese de arte como sintropia III* [Studies on entropy. For a hypothesis of art as syntropy III], the artist has created a garden marked by the diversity of natural species. The intentional human scale appeals to the idea of the garden as a space of harmony, encounters and exchange with the mutual relationship between rest and work also contemplated within it. A block of ice containing frozen flowers, placed on the earth the day the exhibition opened, slowly melted with the flowers remaining as the place of passing and the transformation of the state of matter – art as syntropy (negentropy) that restores the balance and development of the system of living beings, a place for producing energy. Contrary to entropy, it thus asserts, like Lucretius, that everything can be created from everything and from nothing. Colourful, fruitful, fragrant plants; regenerating beginnings that ensure the heterogeneity of the senses since “in truth, earth's soil is on fire underneath and burns in many places while violent Etna rages on with flames from down below. But earth also contains elements which enable her to raise pastures and trees laden with shiny fruit for mankind”.¹⁶ A garden for a planet.

Nuno Vieira in *Aquilo que em si mesmo se não pode tocar também não pode tocar coisa nenhuma* [That which in itself may not be touched can also not touch anything at all] transforms a ladder into a solar clock in the space where the installation is set up. This clock dialogues formally and conceptually with a photographic image in trompe l'oeil. Only the branches of a tree are recorded on the image but, thanks to the effect of the sunlight, the shadows of real leaves of trees in the garden are projected onto it. Between the mirror and the image, “many simulacra are produced in a short period of time, and we can say, and rightly so, that their origin is swift and that, just as the sun must send out numerous rays in one instant, (...) the same must also happen with things.” Domination of time over the referent – the dualism that separates us from the other side of the world. The same image is called upon to be present and to be absent, to be there, to be in the world, since it is of death that life speaks to us. During the exhibition, the work will go through a gradual process of deterioration: thus, accompanying the action of time, the image will be transformed into an accepted state of oblivion.

1 Titus Lucretius Carus, Roman poet and philosopher who lived in the 1st century BC [94 BC – 50 or 51 BC]. For a full recent English translation of his work, see johnstoniatexts.x10host.com/lucretius/lucretiustofc.html

2 Gilles Deleuze – *Lógica do Sentido*. São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 1998, p. 274.

3 Italo Calvino – *Porquê ler os clássicos*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1993, pp. 11–12. [Why read the classics?]

4 Italo Calvino – *Seis propostas para o próximo milénio*. Lisboa: Editorial Teorema, 1990, p. 23. [Six proposals for the next millennium]

5 Lucrecio – *Da natureza das coisas*. Lisboa: Relógio d'Água, 2015, p. 27. [Lucretius – On the Nature of Things]

6 Ibid., p. 93.

7 Ibid., p. 183.

8 Jacques Lacan – *Le Séminaire*. Paris: Seuil, 1975, p. 27.

9 Ibid., p. 17.

10 Lucrecio, op. cit., p. 253.

11 Ibid., p. 303.

12 Ibid., p. 349.

13 Gilles Deleuze, op. cit., p. 270.

14 Italo Calvino, op. cit., cf. nota 4, p. 24.

15 Lucrecio, op. cit., p. 373.

16 Ibid., p. 107.



Nuno Ramalho



Vénus

Nuno Ramalho

Love letter in morse code, electronic components, light source, 2018




Celeste Cerqueira



Sapiens Sapiens


Celeste Cerqueira
Drawing, 2018



Sapiens Sapiens
Celeste Cerqueira
Drawing, 2018

Ana Guimarães and Tiago Veloso Dias





**Pelo que se pode ter a certeza
de que cada coisa vai crescendo
e ganhando corpo a partir da sua
matéria específica**

Ana Guimarães and Tiago Veloso Dias
Installation, 2018

João Tabarra





SelfPortrait-with-Thunders

João Tabarra
Film, 2018




SelfPortrait-with-Thunders

João Tabarra
Film, 2018

Daniel Moreira and Rita Castro Neves





**Alguns argumentos,
24 para sermos mais precisos**
Daniel Moreira and Rita Castro Neves
Installation, 2018



**Alguns argumentos,
24 para sermos mais precisos**
Daniel Moreira and Rita Castro Neves
Installation, 2018



Thiago Rocha Pitta



**Mapas temporais de uma costa
não definida**

Thiago Rocha Pitta
Video, 2018




**Mapas temporais de uma costa
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
Thiago Rocha Pitta
Video, 2018

Sérgio Leitão

Without Imago Mundi, A Random Diversion Instead



Exhibition



**IN GIRUM III _ the beginnings,
the diversions, the fallout
and the promise**

Sérgio Leitão
Installation, 2018





**IN GIRUM III _ the beginnings,
the diversions, the fallout
and the promise**

Sérgio Leitão
Installation, 2018



**IN GIRUM III _ the beginnings,
the diversions, the fallout
and the promise**

Sérgio Leitão
Installation, 2018

Alexandra Costa





Estudos sobre a entropia. Para uma hipótese de arte como sintropia III

Alexandra Costa
Installation, 2018




Nuno Vieira



**Aquilo que em si mesmo
se não pode tocar
também não pode
tocar coisa nenhuma**

Nuno Vieira
Installation, 2018

Sem Imago Mundi,



Antes Um Desvio Aleatório

- AC** **Alexandra Costa**
Estudos sobre a entropia. Para uma hipótese de arte como sintropia III
Instalação, 2018
- A+T** **Ana Guimarães + Tiago Veloso**
Pelo que se pode ter a certeza de que cada coisa vai crescendo e ganhando corpo a partir da sua matéria específica
Instalação, 2018
- CC** **Celeste Cerqueira**
Sapiens Sapiens
Desenho, 2018
- D+R** **Daniel Moreira + Rita Castro Neves**
Alguns argumentos, 24 para sermos mais precisos
Instalação, 2018
- JT** **João Tabarra**
SelfPortrait-with-Thunders
Filme, 2018
- NR** **Nuno Ramalho**
Vénus
Carta de amor em código morse, componentes electrónicos, fonte de luz, 2018
- NV** **Nuno Vieira**
Aquilo que em si mesmo se não pode tocar também não pode tocar coisa nenhuma
Instalação, 2018
- SL** **Sérgio Leitão**
IN GIRUM III _ the beginnings, the diversions, the fallout and the promise
Instalação, 2018
- TRP** **Thiago Rocha Pitta**
Mapas temporais de uma costa não definida
Video, 2018

Exposição
12.10.2018
—16.11.2018

Inauguração
12.10.2018, 18h

Horário
Segunda a Sexta: 14h-19h
Sábado e Domingo:
15h-18h

A obra de Sérgio Leitão projectada no interior da cúpula do Planetário, será apresentada de Segunda a Sexta-feira, às 17h - Sábados e Domingos, às 17h30

Planetário do Porto
Rua das Estrelas
4150-762 Porto

www.semimagomundi.weebly.com

Sem Imago Mundi,

Exposição 12.10.2018 - 16.11.2018

Curadora Eduarda Neves

Inauguração 12.10.2018 - 18h

Artistas
Ana Guimarães
e Tiago Veloso
Celeste Cerqueira
Daniel Moreira
e Rita Castro Neves
João Tabarra
Nuno Ramalho
Sérgio Leitão
Thiago Rocha Pitta

com a participação de duas famílias:
Alexandra Costa
Nuno Vieira

Planetário do Porto

www.semimagomundi.weebly.com



Antes Um Desvio Aleatório

Sem Imago Mundi,

Ciclo Internacional de Conferências

Curadora Eduarda Neves

19.10.2018 - 14.12.2018 - 18h

Oradores
Miguel Gonçalves e Daniel Folha 19.10
Orazio Irrera 02.11
Marcia Steinweg 16.11
Daniela Angelucci 30.11
Nuno Grego 07.12
Carlos Vidal 14.12

Moderação
Juan Luis Toboso
Nuno Faleiro Rodrigues

ESAP

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Antes Um Desvio Aleatório

Naturalism, cinamen and the image of thought. Lucretius and Deleuze

Daniela Angelucci

In the text *Lucretius and the simulacrum*, from 1961, collected some years later in the book *Logic of sense* (1969), Deleuze comments some Lucretian concepts, that will be fundamental for his entire work. Why has Deleuze chosen Lucretius and his poem for a comment? In which way does this encounter between the two philosophers take place? We can find an explanation in a book by Francois Zourabichvili *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event*, which, by offering a key to understand Deleuze's philosophical commentary, individuates its peculiarity in the original usage of 'free indirect discourse'.

The reference here is to Pasolini's notion of free indirect discourse in literature and *free indirect subjective* in cinema (*Cinema of poetry*, 1965). Pasolini refers to the relationship between subject and object in cinema, where objective stands for what the camera sees, and subjective for the point of view of the character. There is the possibility of an encounter of the two points of view, that makes impossible any definite identification. Writing about the directors Michelangelo Antonioni, Jean-Luc Godard and Bernardo Bertolucci, and a certain cinema of Sixties, Pasolini talks about the possibility of a free indirect subjective, precisely the moment in which the objective and the subjective images blends together and contaminate each other.

It is with this expression stolen from Pasolini that Zourabichvili described the continuous confrontation of Deleuze with all the authors he comments on: rather

than a re-elaboration of the thought surveyed, what takes place is an exchange, a process of giving and borrowing. Both in the case of the quotation of thinkers in his texts, and in the one of the monographs dedicated to a specific philosopher (Bergson, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Kant, Leibniz, Hume) or to a particular artist (Francis Bacon, Marcel Proust, Kafka) it emerges in fact the presence of a common cause between the commentator and the one commented, which makes their thoughts rather indiscernible. This kind of friendship based on the sharing of the same goal, of the same preoccupation, is also the moving reason for Deleuze to engage Lucretius. What is then their common cause? The Lucretian idea of nature.

In *De rerum natura* Lucretius proposes a definition of nature as "production of the diverse". Nature is a field of production of differences, in which every individual is different from every other, in which every individual is composed by heterogeneous parts. The aim of such idea of nature, that Lucretius and Deleuze share in their philosophical friendship, is the affirmation of Pluralism, that is the impossibility of a totalisation: "there is no combination capable of encompassing all the elements of nature at once".¹ There is no identification of a unitary principle, diversity cannot be thought under the concept of the One, as did the predecessors of Epicurean philosophy. The One and the Whole, writes Deleuze, "are the obsessions of the mind, speculative forms of belief in the fatum, and the theological forms of false philosophy".²

Such idea of diversity and multiplicity of Nature brings at the same time an important implication: the affirmation of immanence and the rejection of transcendence. Thinking nature and life as immanence means thinking of an infinite movement and horizontality, a superficial becoming which does not imply any unified theo-

ry, any extrinsic principle, any hierarchical criteria, any transcendence. There is no fixed plane, no governing concept or transcendent idea under which subsuming the collection of forces that is Nature. Our world – seen without the illusion of the possibility of a closed and unitary picture, without the illusion of the determination of a Whole – is a “pure emission of singularities” (as Deleuze will affirm some years later, writing on Leibniz), a dynamic collection of atoms, their immanent movements in the void, their collisions with other atoms. Such movements and collisions of the atoms are described as ever new connections without a predetermined purpose, without predetermined order. The Nature is a distribution that doesn’t follow any totalising logic, it is non-linear, open-ended, dynamic. In such an image of life, organised bodies are just temporary local unities. “Neither identity nor contradiction, [Nature] is a matter of resemblances and differences, compositions and decompositions”. It is “coordination and disjunction”. Under this point of view, that one of the philosophical pluralism, Lucretius is a conceptual persona, a philosophical friend, an ally in the project of reversing Platonism, that is the struggle against the transcendence.⁴

“Lucretius is a conceptual persona, a philosophical friend, an ally in the project of reversing Platonism, that is the struggle against the transcendence.”

Thus, Lucretius described a nature composed by two elements: atoms – the minima of thought, that cannot think anything smaller – and void – smooth, pure space, crossed, traversed by the atoms.

When some order emerges, it emerges from the interaction of the matter with itself, there is no intervention of something external of the matter, of something transcendent. Nature is an “Arlequin’s cloak, made by solid patches and empty space”,⁵ made by atoms and void. It is in such situation that Lucretius proposes the concept of *clinamen*, considered by someone, for example Cicero, a strong weakness of Lucretius thought. The *clinamen* is a non predetermined shift of movement, that is the reason of the encounters of the atoms, it is an ontological difference, a swerve that relates the different with the different. *Clinamen* is a “quasi causa”, writes Deleuze, even if a non linear and non mechanical cause. However, Deleuze insists to underline that Lucretian *clinamen* is not something random, casual, is not a random occurrence.⁶ *Clinamen* is rather necessary, because it is the conatus and the destiny of the atom, even if not in a deterministic sense: “We must conceive of an original direction for each atom, as a synthesis which would give to the movement of the atom the initial direction, without which there will be no collision. This synthesis is necessarily accomplished in a time smaller than the minimum of continuous time”.⁷ As the ground, as the first and original direction of the atom’s movement, *clinamen* is the *lex atomi*, but it is a *lex* that doesn’t imply the totalisation of a unified picture. *Clinamen* is “the irreducible plurality of causes, of causal series, and the impossibility of bringing causes together into a whole”.⁸ By virtue of the *clinamen*, matter can organize itself with no other criteria, maintaining its immanent diversity.

According to Lucretius, matter has its infinity: it is the infinity of the atoms, of the sum of the atoms and their fortuitous combinations. But there is also a false infinity, against which Lucretius (and Deleuze with him) struggles: that one of the immortality of the soul af-

ter death. Such false infinity is the cause of a lot of pain, is a terrifying illusion, the fear of infinite punishments after death. Obviously, demystifying such idea is an enterprise that concerns ethics as well as physics (another philosophical friend with a *common cause* concerning such ethical enterprise here is Spinoza): the aim is an ethic of joy. This is the opening of Book Two of *De Rerum Natura*: “Do you not see that nature is barking for two things only, a body free from pain, a mind released from worry and fear for the enjoyment of pleasurable sensations?” (II, 18–19)

“Simulacra are the elements that the bodies “never cease to emit” and that produce our perception.”

How comes such illusion, if there is nothing external to matter? It is at this point that Deleuze introduces another Lucretian concept, strictly connected with the theory of *clinamen*, that of *simulacrum*. The French philosopher here strongly underlines the beauty and the difficulty of such a concept, one of the conceptual inventions (sometimes paradoxical, sometimes monstrous) that, according to Deleuze, is the main task of philosophy. Simulacra are the elements that the bodies “never cease to emit”⁹ and that produce our perception. They are subtle, small, fluid and tenuous, detached from the object and most of all they are fast: if the *clinamen* is a swerve that occurs in a time smaller than the minimum thinkable time, the emission of simulacra occurs in a time smaller than the minimum sensible time. For such a reason, for their size and speed, simulacra are our access to the object, but they are not perceivable and discernable in themselves.

In Lucretius, Deleuze underlines, there are three species of simulacra: the first one are the simulacra emitted from the surface, that produce forms and colors; then, there are the simulacra emitted from the depth, that have to cross a distance, but still are related to the object, for example the voice. Then, “There is yet a third species, distinct from the emanation issued from the depth and from the simulations detached from the surface of things. These are phantasm, which enjoy a high degree of independence with respect to objects and an extreme mobility”.¹⁰ There are three main varieties of this third kind of simulacra: theological, oneiric, and erotic.

Therefore, simulacra are the cause of our illusion, of the myth, they produce sensible images that explain the appearance of fantastic creatures as the images of the dead, sometimes wrongly taken as the object in itself. But in this way Lucretius puts the sources of the false infinite, of the superstition against which he struggles, everywhere but the transcendence: the metaphysical illusions are actually caused by two differentials (*clinamen* and *simulacra*) internal to the nature itself. Transcendence is an illusion produced in the nature. So Naturalism (From Lucretius to Spinoza, to Nietzsche, to Deleuze himself) has the physical and philosophical task to denounce the perceptive illusion and the mystification, and at the same time the ethical and political task to denounce everything that causes pain and sadness, used to exercise the power. The darkness can be dispelled “only by an understanding of the outward forms and inner working of Nature” (*De Rerum Natura*, II, 60–62). Naturalism refuses the power of the negative and deprives it “the right to speak in the name of philosophy”.¹¹

Ryan J. Johnson at the end of his article about the use of the concept of *Simulacrum* briefly suggests two gestures in which Lucretius plays an important

role in the entire Deleuze's thought: first of all, the atomism and the pluralism return in the construction of a philosophy of difference, in *Difference and repetition* (1968) and many others books. But, secondly, and less obviously, he proposes another question: "the encounter with simulacra in perception resonates in Deleuze's story, of the violent, seemingly paradoxical, encounter with the being of the sensible", only from which thought can emerge, or, better, "erupt".

I would like to develop this idea, showing how not only simulacra resonate with an image of thought that emerges from the encounter with the sensible, but also how the "contingent necessity" of clinamen – necessary and fatal direction of the atoms – resonates with the particular modality of such encounter. I will develop such question with another philosophical and literary ally: Marcel Proust. In fact, if there are a lot of passages in Deleuze's work where we can find this resonance, the book *Marcel Proust and signs* (1964) maintains a priority, first of all for its earliness.

In his work on Proust, Deleuze recovers a very ancient inspiration, that one of the antagonism between literature and philosophy, both in search of the truth. But the French philosopher overturns Plato's ontological critique by assigning victory to literature, and not to philosophy. Classical rationalist philosophy, which believes that it is possible to arrive at truth through a voluntary exercise, through a reflexive method, instead leads only to abstract and conventional truths. Deleuze replaces this idea with that one of the involuntary nature of thought, that is provoked primarily by casual encounters, by contingent signs. Literature is able to grasp non-arbitrary or non abstract truths, by virtue of fortuitous and inevitable encounters with signs. This is in particular the model of Proust's work, which can not but remember (be-

yond the absence of explicit references) what we have said about Lucretius, that is the necessary but not predetermined movement of atoms and the intervention of simulacra in the perception.

The first move of Deleuze is to clear away the field from the most obvious interpretation of Proust's work, the one that considers the theme of time as the fulcrum of the *Recherche*. The sense of Proust's works is not the memory, neither voluntary nor involuntary. This new description identifies in the first place the story of an "apprentissage", the apprenticeship of a writer, a path full of revelations and delusions. Memory is only one of the tools used in this training: it is a tool that has people, things, places as its objects, in order to decipher them, to interpret their signs. Each world described in the *Recherche* – that one of Guermantes and that of the Verdurin; that of Albertine's imprisonment, or of Swann's love for Odette; or again, that of the meeting between Jupien and Charlus – consists of specific signs, variously emitted and sometimes intertwined. Here Deleuze proposes a distinction between signs which recalls the three species of Lucretian simulacra.

The worldly signs constitute the first circle of Proustian work. They are empty signs, which substitute actual actions and thoughts, but precisely in their not referring to nothing they get a ritual perfection. The love signs emitted by those we love lead us to a continuous silent interpretation, thus opening at the same time other possible worlds, referring to the past, or places where we were not, paradoxically expressing everything from which we have been excluded, even when they are addressed to us. They are therefore always misleading, like the erotic signs of Lucretius' third species of simulacra. The third world that of sensuous signs, and it is the best known, the one that resonates most with the clas-

Literature is able to grasp non-arbitrary or non abstract truths, by virtue of fortuitous and inevitable encounters with signs.

sic interpretations of Research: the sensitive quality of a material object, a consistency, a perfume, a shape, becomes a sign for something completely different, in a line of memory that leads from the madeleine to Combray, and so on. However, despite the joy that accompanies the meeting with these signs, which are not empty or false like those of high society and love, Deleuze still identifies their inadequacy, as they remain material signs.

Only with the appearance of the signs of art, at the end of the long journey of *Recherche*, the protagonist understands what was missing to the sensitive signs: in the last volume, during the matinée at Guermantes, reviewing his aged friends after years, the narrator realizes that the end of his personal research, what gives him pleasure under the sensitive qualities, was the common point between one being and the other, the ideal essence.

But what does Deleuze mean when he talks about ideal essences? Why should the immateriality of the signs of art establish its superiority? Certainly, it is not a matter of recovering the Platonic idea of an ascending path towards ideas. Essences are not transcendent ideas but impersonal, timeless elements, in order to avoid the couple subject-object, decisive challenge for Deleuze in comparison with the work of Proust. In deciphering the worlds of signs of the *Recherche*, the first mistake is in fact that of objectivism, of attributing to the object itself the signs it emits (one of the Lucretian illusions). This tendency – which is the spontaneous direction of perception – is the basis of the continuous illusions and disillusionment of the protagonist: the great disappointment of the narrator for the first time at the theater to see the great actress Berma, or seeing the church of Balbec. Equally erroneous, however, according to Deleuze, the attempt to compensate for these disappointments with subjective compensation, made of associ-

ations, of meanings discovered elsewhere by the subject, as in the case of Berma's recitation that the protagonist fills with his own cultural memories and knowledge.

The attempt to escape the object-subject dualism finds in Deleuze's thought a movement of difference, a radical move: the ability to reveal something that goes beyond the subject and the object, which reveals the dimension of impersonal life, is and will remain for Deleuze the precise task of the work of art. Art makes us see something unthinkable, beyond the intentions of the author and the experiences of the subjects who use it. Art, even literary art, has nothing to do with communication, signification, representation, but with the possibility of non-mediated contact with immanence, with the plane of life itself, with the vital forces not organized. The essence revealed by the signs of art is then precisely that "difference in itself" of pluralism, that Deleuze learned from Lucretius' philosophy, it is that passage to the immaterial whose source is still always in Nature, in life itself, it is a quality that is expressed through objects and subjects, but external to them and not reducible to a psychological and subjective state. Essence is not a stable and unitary idea, which collects multiplicity in One and which is placed at the height of a hierarchy, but a superior point of view, a point of view that however exceeds the individual.

Thus, the paradoxical affirmation that begins the Deleuze's text on Proust, according to which the Proustian work does not find its unity in the theme of memory, is more comprehensible. In fact, memory concerns only the first three species of signs, but not the last one. In the world of art signs, memory is not enough, not even involuntary memory with its reminiscences, since these are explained only by pure thought. This is the actual reason of the possibility of an analogy (and therefore a rivalry) between literature and phi-

losophy, and not the use of a particularly suggestive style and on a generic creativity of both.

It is a naturalist Proust, a Lucretian Proust that Deleuze presents us with. A thinker who builds a world of signs and differences (simulacra and clinamen); thinks that is impossible to reach the essences without being forced by a violence, that comes from outside; describes the movement of signs, and their qualities, as contingent and necessary at the same time (clinamen); explains intelligence as a faculty that arrives at a later time, to interpret those occasional signs that are imposed forcefully. Without the capture by a contingent encounter, that compels us to think, there is no possibility of grasping truths that are not abstract and conventional. The goal for Deleuze is instead to arrive at a necessary thought, grounded on the relationship with the Outside.

If in the Proust book Deleuze ascribes to literature the ability to access pure thought, in *Difference and repetition*, the properties assigned to the Proustian search of truth and essences are explicitly attributed to a philosophy of difference. In 1991, in the text *What is philosophy?*, written together with Félix Guattari, the same characteristics will be used to answer the question posed in the volume's title. After almost thirty years, the struggle against the classical idea of philosophy produced a proposal of a radical analogy between art and philosophy.

The character of paradoxical necessity without foundation, achieved only thanks to the fortuitous encounters and involuntary nature of thought, which characterizes the Lucretian clinamen and the Proustian Search, appears at the center of the final book of the Deleuzian work as a condition of possibility of the invention of concepts, definition and ultimate task of philosophical practice. ●

1 Gilles Deleuze – *Logic of sense*. London: Athlone Press, 1990, p. 267.

2 Ibidem.

3 Ibidem, p. 268.

4 See A. Michel, *Le hasard et la nécessité: De Lucrèce aux modernes*, in *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé*, 1971, 2, pp. 253–269. He doesn't agree with Deleuze and considers the Epicureanism of Lucretius not as a simple refutation of Platonism, but as an attempt to synthesis between the One and the Multiplicity.

5 Gilles Deleuze – *Logic of sense*. London: Athlone Press, 1990, p. 267.

6 About the clinamen as quasi causa, see R. J. Johnson, *Another Use of the Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze, Lucretius and the Practical Critique of Demystification*, in *Deleuze Studies*, 2014, 8, in particular pp. 76–78.

7 Gilles Deleuze – *Logic of sense*. London: Athlone Press, 1990, p. 269.

8 Ibidem, p. 270.

9 Ibidem, p. 273.

10 Ibidem, p. 275.

11 Ibidem, p. 279.

12 R.J. Johnson – *Another Use of the Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze, Lucretius and the Practical Critique of Demystification*, in *Deleuze Studies*, 2014, 8, p. 89

La connaissance du monde et la subjectivisation de la vérité: Michel Foucault et les *veridica dicta* de Lucrèce

Orazio Irrera

Les premières traces de la place de Lucrèce dans le “*trip gréco-latin*”¹ de Michel Foucault remontent à l’année 1982, et apparaissent d’une manière assez inattendue et énigmatique, mais qui néanmoins mérite une certaine attention, d’autant plus que personne, parmi les interprètes et les lecteurs de Foucault, ne semble s’y être jamais arrêté. Après avoir consacré dans son Cours au Collège de France de 1982, *L’herméneutique du sujet*,² des analyses très fines et détaillées autour d’Épicure et de l’épicurisme sans cependant évoquer nulle part Lucrèce, dans le *Résumé du cours*, où les professeurs du Collège de France sont censés de jeter un regard rétrospectif sur chaque cours venant s’achever, apparaît pourtant une référence à Lucrèce et à la notion de “*veridica dicta*”.³ Cette référence assez étrange et tardive (du moins par rapport aux leçons effectivement prononcées dans le cours sur *L’Herméneutique du sujet*) pose deux ordres de questions, l’un en amont et l’autre en aval de cette référence.

Commençons par ce qu’il y a en aval, en remarquant que l’importance que Foucault accorde à Lucrèce semble d’ailleurs attestée par le fait que, durant l’année 1982, cette référence revient avec une certaine insistance à l’occasion des conférences que Foucault donne, entre la fin mai et le mois de juin, à l’Université Victoria de Toronto (publiées en français en 2017 sous le titre “*Dire vrai sur soi-même*”⁴) et, en octobre, à l’Université du Vermont (publiées pour la première fois en 1988 en anglais avec le titre “*Technologies of the self*”⁵). Les *veridica dicta*

de Lucrèce mentionnés par Foucault tant dans le *Résumé* du cours de 1982 que dans les conférences de Toronto, se retrouvent dans le *De rerum natura* de Lucrèce et, plus exactement, dans le livre VI qui débute, comme on le sait, par l’éloge d’Athènes et d’Épicure. La première a assuré aux hommes: “les douces consolations de la vie, en engendrant l’homme au vaste génie [c’est-à-dire Épicure], dont la bouche véridique (*ex veridico ore*) a donné réponses sur toute chose”. À noter, tout d’abord, l’expression “bouche véridique”, sur laquelle on reviendra plus loin, en ne nous limitant ici qu’à souligner qu’elle ne se réfère pas seulement au fait que de cette bouche sortent des choses vraies, donc à l’objet d’un discours, mais aussi et, sans doute principalement, à l’attitude subjective, à la manière dont on dit quelque chose qui est vrai, ce qui renvoie davantage à un dire-vrai.

Mais c’est juste quelques hexamètres après cette citation qu’apparaissent les *veridica dicta* qui intéressent Foucault. Le passage en question fait évidemment allusion à Épicure, et se réfère à la fois à ce qu’il dit, ce dont il parle, mais aussi à la manière dont il le dit, dont il parle, lorsqu’il dit le vrai:

“Par les vérités qu’il répandit (*veridicis dictis*), il purifia donc les cœurs ; il fixa des bornes au désir comme à la crainte ; il nous fit connaître la nature de ce souverain bien auquel nous aspirons tous, et nous montra la route la plus courte, la ligne la plus droite pour y parvenir ; il nous fit voir tout le mal répandu dans la destinée humaine, et comme il se produit et s’envole sous des formes diverses, par l’effet d’un accident ou d’une cause naturelle, selon l’ordre établi dans l’univers ; il nous enseigna par quelles portes il fallait s’élancer pour repousser ses assauts, et sut démontrer que le plus souvent c’est sans raison que le genre humain roule dans son cœur les flots amers de ses tourmentes.”

Tant dans le Résumé de son cours sur L'herméneutique du sujet que dans la troisième conférence qu'il prononce à Toronto, Foucault inscrit la notion lucrétienne des *veridica dicta* dans le cadre de ce qui pour lui est "une culture de soi", constituée par "l'ensemble des pratiques désigné généralement par le terme askêsis". D'après Foucault, cette ascèse il faut l'entendre, tout comme l'indique le passage de Lucrèce, comme une préparation "qui nous permettra de résister aux événements qui peuvent se produire" autour de nous. C'est pourquoi "nous devons apprendre à ne pas nous laisser décontenancer par eux, à ne pas nous laisser emporter par les émotions qu'ils pourraient susciter en nous" (DEII, 1178; DVS, 95). Afin de garder cette maîtrise sur nous devant les accidents qui peuvent nous arriver, en nous permettant "d'affronter le réel" et "faire face à l'avenir", il faut s'équiper de certains discours, ou logoi, "entendus comme discours vrais et discours raisonnables". Et c'est justement à ce sujet que Foucault juge que les *veridica dicta* de Lucrèce offrent un exemple parfait de ces discours visant "à conjurer nos craintes et [à] ne pas nous laisser abattre par ce que nous croyons être de malheurs" (ibid.).

Foucault se focalise ultérieurement sur trois questions relatives à ces *veridica dicta*. Premièrement, celle qui concerne leur "nature", notamment à l'égard de "la nécessité des connaissances théoriques [...], [d]es principes qui régissent le monde, la nature des dieux, les causes des prodiges, les lois de la vie et de la mort"; tout cela est "indispensable pour se préparer aux événements possibles de l'existence". Deuxièmement, il y a la question du "mode d'existence" de ces discours vrais, c'est-à-dire le besoin qu'ils soient toujours là sous la main pour nous protéger "lorsqu'un événement imprévu ou un malheur se présente" (DEII, 1179; DVS, 96), donc que ce soient des discours toujours à notre disposition. Cependant, ce mode d'existence n'est

pas celui d'un simple souvenir, c'est plutôt "l'absorption d'une vérité donnée", ce qu'on assimile "jusqu'à en faire une partie de soi-même, jusqu'à en faire un principe intérieur, permanent et toujours actif d'action [...]; on intériorise des vérités reçues par une appropriation de plus en plus poussée" (DEII, 1180; DVS, 97). Troisièmement, on retrouve tout un ensemble de techniques et de méthodes concernant cette appropriation: l'importance de l'écoute, de l'écriture, et des exercices de mémorisation.

Il est néanmoins évident que si Foucault part des *veridica dicta* de Lucrèce, il finit par les insérer dans un cadre plus large et général dans lequel on retrouve les positions des différentes écoles philosophiques de l'Antiquité au sein desquelles ces trois questions (celle de la nature de ces discours vrais, celle de leur mode d'existence, et celle des méthodes pour se les approprier) présentent des nuances diverses et ont un poids et une importance qui n'est pas exactement la même, bien qu'il demeure que ces trois questions représentent les dimensions fondamentales de l'ascèse comme préparation, c'est-à-dire un domaine pratique qui se compose de discours vrais et qui, par l'intermédiaire de ces discours, vise à nous préparer aux difficultés de l'existence.

Toutefois, c'est la référence que Foucault fait au poème de Lucrèce quelques mois plus tard, en octobre 1982, à l'occasion des conférences qu'il donne sur Les techniques de soi à l'Université du Vermont, qui nous fait mieux comprendre le point de vue foucauldien sur la conception lucrétienne (et épicurienne) des *veridica dicta*. Se référant encore une fois aux logoi en tant que préceptes des maîtres, Foucault observe que si "le disciple mémorise ce qu'il a entendu, convertissant les paroles de ses maîtres en règles de conduite [et que] les but de ces techniques est la subjectivation de la vérité", il ajoute que "[s]

ous l'Empire, les principes éthiques ne sont pas assimilables sans un cadre théorique tel que la science, comme en témoigne, par exemple, le *De natura rerum* de Lucrèce" (DEII, 1618).

Or, il me semble que ce passage montre comment, aux yeux de Foucault, la spécificité des *veridica dicta* de Lucrèce, sans n'exclure évidemment ni l'importance de leur mode d'existence, ni celle des techniques pour se les approprier, porte plus particulièrement sur la connaissance du monde et, plus précisément, sur la manière d'articuler cette connaissance du monde avec ce que Foucault désignait justement comme "la subjectivation de la vérité". C'est donc cela qu'on peut trouver en aval de la première référence à Lucrèce présente dans le Résumé du cours de 1982.

Et pourtant, loin de nous satisfaire, cette conclusion nous encourage, au contraire, à nous interroger davantage sur cette articulation de la connaissance du monde et de la subjectivation de la vérité pour mieux saisir l'importance et la spécificité des *veridica dicta* et de la perspective lucrétienne selon Foucault. Et cela nous fait relancer la question posée au début: pourquoi Foucault mentionne-t-il Lucrèce à l'occasion du Résumé de son cours sur L'herméneutique du sujet sans que dans ce dernier il n'ait été évoqué nulle part? Autrement dit, cela signifie de s'interroger, à partir de ce qu'on a trouvé en aval des *veridica dicta*, sur ce qui, sans se référer explicitement à cette notion, se trouverait également dans le cours au Collège de France de 1982, pour ainsi dire en amont de sa formulation explicite, et par conséquent de façon un peu déguisée. Il est clair que la clé pour résoudre cette énigme est justement cette relation entre connaissance du monde et subjectivation de la vérité, relation que Foucault analyse en effet de manière approfondie dans la leçon du 10 février 1982, lorsqu'il s'arrête sur la notion de *phusilogia* telle qu'elle

apparaît chez Épicure au § 45 des Sentences Vaticanes. C'est l'analyse de cette notion qui nous permet de saisir toute la portée philosophique de l'ensemble de vers lucrétiens dont nous sommes partis, ou du moins, celle que Foucault lui attribue après-coup sur la base de l'étude de cette notion dans son cours sur L'herméneutique du sujet.

“Foucault analyse en effet de manière approfondie dans la leçon du 10 février 1982, lorsqu’il s’arrête sur la notion de *phusilogia* telle qu’elle apparaît chez Épicure au § 45 des Sentences Vaticanes.”

La particularité de la *phusilogia* est qu'elle ne renvoie pas seulement à un domaine du savoir caractérisé par la connaissance de la nature ou du monde, mais aussi à un certain mode de fonctionnement de ce savoir, que Foucault désigne comme "éthopoétique" (mais que je crois qu'il serait plus correct de rendre en français, en suivant plus de près l'étymologie grecque, par "éthopoïétique"). Cette fonction est celle qui consiste dans la production de l'éthos, à savoir "modifier, transformer [...] la manière d'être, le mode d'existence d'un individu" (HS, 227). Et ce n'est que "lorsque le savoir, lorsque la connaissance a une forme, lorsqu'elle fonctionne de telle manière, qu'elle est capable de produire de l'éthos, [qu'] alors elle [est] utile" (HS, 227-228). En d'autres termes, la *phusilogia* "c'est la modalité du savoir de la nature en tant qu'elle est philosophiquement pertinente pour la pratique de soi" (HS, 228-229).

C'est, en effet, en ce sens, qu'Épicure opposerait cette connaissance à un autre genre de savoir, celui "de gens qui font étalage de culture" (HS, 229). Cette culture, inutile pour la pratique de soi, pour la fabrication de l'éthos, est définie par l'intermédiaire d'un terme alors très célèbre, mais entendu dans ce contexte dans l'un de ses sens les plus péjoratifs, c'est-à-dire, la paideia. Une culture qui ne revêt donc aucune importance d'un point de vue éthopoiétique, qu'on retrouve chez "les artistes du verbe" ou "les faiseurs des mots", une parole "en tant qu'elle fait du bruit, mais non pas en tant qu'elle est le logos ou la raison" (ibid.) et dont le seul but est "de se faire admirer par la foule" (HS, 230). En opposition à cette conception péjorative de la paideia, il y a la phusiologia, la connaissance de la nature et du monde dont la fonction éthopoiétique est, précisément, de préparer le sujet "pour toutes les circonstances possibles de la vie que l'on pourra rencontrer"; en d'autres termes c'est un savoir visant à équiper (le terme grec correspondant est paraskeuè), à préparer le sujet en le transformant et en lui permettant "de résister à tous les mouvements et sollicitations qui pourront venir du monde extérieur. La paraskeuè, c'est ce qui permet à la fois d'atteindre son but et de rester stable, fixé sur ce but, sans se laisser dévier par rien. La phusiologia a donc pour fonction de paraskeuein, de donner à l'âme l'équipement nécessaire pour son combat, pour son objectif et pour sa victoire" (ibid.).

C'est pourquoi cette phusiologia produit, d'après Foucault, trois effets principaux, strictement liés l'un à l'autre. Premièrement, celui de produire de la hardiesse et du courage, d'une part le courage en mesure d'effacer d'une part les malheurs engendrés par la crainte des dieux et toutes ses multiples croyances, et de l'autre le courage d'éliminer "également les dangers de la vie et l'autorité de ceux qui veulent leur faire la loi" (ibid.). Deuxièmement, la phu-

siologia fabrique des sujets, des individus, qui "n'auront besoin de rien d'autre que d'eux-mêmes; mais en même temps, ils trouveront en eux-mêmes un certain nombre de ressources, et en particulier la possibilité d'éprouver plaisir et volupté dans ce rapport plein qu'ils auront à eux-mêmes" (HS, 231). Troisièmement, la phusiologia permet à ces individus de faire "à chaque instant et devant chaque chose", un tri ou un partage visant à établir ce qui dépend d'eux et ce qui ne dépend pas d'eux, en ayant sur "ce qui dépend d[eux], une maîtrise totale, absolue et sans limites" (ibid.). Ainsi, pour résumer, Foucault donne une dernière définition très efficace de la phusiologia qui mérite d'être reportée:

"La phusiologia, [...] ce serait la connaissance de la nature, de la phusis en tant que cette connaissance est susceptible de servir de principe à la conduite humaine et de critère pour faire jouer notre liberté; en tant aussi qu'elle est susceptible de transformer le sujet (qui était, devant la nature, devant ce qu'on lui avait appris sur les dieux et les choses du monde, tout rempli de craintes et de terreurs) en un sujet libre, un sujet qui va trouver en lui-même la possibilité et la ressource de sa volupté inaltérable et parfaitement tranquille" (HS, 231). ●

1 M. Foucault, *Le courage de la vérité. Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II. Cours au Collège de France, 1984*, éd. F. Gros, Paris, Seuil/Gallimard, 2009, p. 3.

2 Cf. M. Foucault, *L'herméneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France, 1981-1982*, éd. F. Gros, Paris, Seuil/Gallimard, 2001. Dorénavant les citations tirées de ce volume apparaîtront dans le corps du texte entre parenthèses avec la sigle HS, suivie du numéro de page.

3 M. Foucault, "L'herméneutique du sujet" (Résumé du cours), dans *Dits et écrits, II (1976-1988)*, eds. D. Defert et F. Ewald (avec la collaboration de J. Lagrange), Paris, Gallimard, 2001, p. 1178. Dorénavant les citations tirées de ce volume apparaîtront dans le corps du texte entre parenthèses avec la sigle DEII, suivie du numéro de page.

4 Cf. M. Foucault, *Dire vrai sur soi-même. Conférences prononcées à l'Université Victoria de Toronto, 1982*, éd. H.-P. Fruchaud et D. Lorenzini, Paris, Vrin, 2017. Dorénavant les citations tirées de ce volume apparaîtront dans le corps du texte entre parenthèses avec la sigle DVS suivie du numéro de page.

5 M. Foucault, "Technologies of the self", dans *Technologies of the Self. A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, eds. P.H. Hutton, H. Gutman, L.H. Martin, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1988, pp. 16-49; trad. fr., "Les techniques de soi", dans *Dits et écrits, II (1976-1988)*, op. cit., pp. 1602-1632.

6 Lucrèce, *De la nature*, traduit par A. Ernout, Paris, Les belles lettres, Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé, 1920, p. 239; texte original en latin, *De rerum natura*, VI, 4-7:

"Cum genuere virum tali cum corde repertum,
omnia veridico qui quondam ex ore profudit;
cuius et extincti propter divina reperta
divulgata vetus iam ad caelum gloria fertur".

7 Ibid., p. 240; texte original en latin, *De rerum natura*, VI, 24-35:

"Veridicis igitur purgavit pectora dictis
et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris
exposuitque bonum summum, quo tendimus omnes,
quid foret, atque viam monstravit, tramite parvo
qua possemus ad id recto contendere cursu,
quidve mali foret in rebus mortalibus passim,
quod fieret naturali varieque volaret
seu casu seu vi, quod sic natura parasset,
et quibus e portis occurri cuique deceret,

et genus humanum frustra plerumque probavit
volvère curarum tristis in pectore fluctus".

8 Cette interprétation, comme on le sait, est très influencée par les études de Pierre Hadot sur les exercices spirituels qui représentent pour Foucault le point d'accès privilégié de sa lecture du corpus des textes des écoles philosophiques de l'Antiquité gréco-romaine (Cf. P. Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, Paris, Albin Michel, 2002). Quoi que, cette "culture de soi", soit-dit au passage, a fait pourtant l'objet d'une des critiques que Pierre Hadot lui-même adressera à Foucault (Cf. P. Hadot, "Réflexions sur la notion de culture de soi", dans *Michel Foucault philosophe. Rencontre internationale*, Paris 9, 10 11, janvier 1988, Paris, Seuil, 1989, pp. 261-270). Et pourtant, en 1988, Pierre Hadot ne connaissait ni les contenus de ses cours, ni celui de ses conférences, et ne se référait davantage qu'au troisième volume de *L'Histoire de la sexualité* (Cf. M. Foucault, *Le souci de soi. Histoire de la sexualité 3*, Paris, Gallimard, 1984). Sur cette critique réinterprétée à la lumière de la publication de *L'herméneutique du sujet*, Cf. O. Irrera, "Pleasure and Transcendence of the Self: Notes on 'a dialogue too soon interrupted' between Michel Foucault et Pierre Hadot", dans *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, vol. 36, n° 9, nov. 2010, pp. 995-1017.

9 Cf. L. Cremonesi, A.I. Davidson, O. Irrera, D. Lorenzini, M. Tazzioli, "Introduction", dans M. Foucault, *L'origine de l'herméneutique de soi. Conférences prononcées à Dartmouth College, 1980*, eds. H.-P. Fruchaud et D. Lorenzini, Paris, Vrin, 2013, pp. 9-27.

10 M. Foucault, *L'origine de l'herméneutique de soi*, op. cit., p. 90.

11 M. Foucault, *Le pouvoir psychiatrique. Cours au Collège de France, 1973-1974*, éd. J. Lagrange, Paris, Seuil/Gallimard, 2003, pp. 86-88.

12 G. Bataille, "Qu'est-ce que le sexe ? Sur Etienne Wolff: Les changement de sexe", dans *Critique*, n° 11, avril 1947; or dans G. Bataille, *Œuvres complètes*, Tome XI, Articles 1944-1949, eds. F. Marmande et S. Monod, Paris, Gallimard, 1988, pp. 201-221. Sur l'importance de cet article pour Foucault, Cf. C.-O. Doron, "Situation des cours", dans M. Foucault, *La sexualité. Cours donné à l'Université de Clermont-Ferrand, 1964*, suivi de *Le discours de la sexualité. Cours donné à l'Université de Vincennes, 1969*, éd. C.-O. Doron, Paris, EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil, 2018, pp. 232-234.

13 Cf. M. Serres, *La Naissance de la physique dans le texte de Lucrèce: Fleuves et turbulences*, Paris, Minuit, 1977.

Reflection and Experiment

Marcus Steinweg

Stage. – Art takes place on the stage of the realities. It plays with them by rearranging their elements so the realities can be seen with a different view. One suddenly becomes aware of their contingency. They are as they are, but without necessarily having to be as they are. Controlling the passions is integral to artistic existence: “The desire to become a useless, harmless thing, quasi a tender smile of the soul when it is alone with itself; to make the soul into something that never thinks about self-actualization or self-expression.” It is the resistance against the temptation of expression that affirms the implication of the subject in its activity. To this belongs the discipline of the gambler, who attends to the progress of the game with a calm gaze *like* – not as – a nonparticipant. His existence is at stake, but he is cheerful nonetheless. He knows that the winner will be only someone who can lose. These categories are ultimately useless. There are neither winners nor losers, only the wing beat of time fleeting into infinity. To respond to this time with words, forms, images or dreams is what art can achieve: “I have never done anything other than to dream.”

Play. – That our realities are fragile means that they are not final as they are. There is scope in the indeterminate. It is this contingency that indicates an open future (a future reducible to its past wouldn't be a future!), i.e., the ontological inconsistency of the world. What is art if not the opening of the subject to this inconsistency, the operating with imponderables, the affirmation of the contingent character of a

reality that continues itself wherever, toward whatever end, for whatever reason, uninterruptedly from the distant past into the unforeseeable future, already today, to its outermost boundaries and, perhaps, beyond them?

Emptiness. – Thinking about emptiness, inconsistency or nothingness cannot itself be empty, inconsistent or nothing. Rather than approaching an infinitely distant object, thought comes nearer to that which is there. Philosophy has nothing to do with approximation ad infinitum or bad endlessness. Rather than asymptotically approaching a withdrawing figure, philosophy has to do with the assessment of that figure's presence. Although Hegel occasionally describes philosophy as a dynamic of approximation, his thinking conceptualizes the absolute not as a (romantically transfigured) remoteness, but as the primordial space of contact of the subject. The absolute has already crossed the boundary to the subject. The task of thinking is to formalize the emptiness that it bears within itself. One can recognize weak thinking because it shuns this labor of formalization – whether formalization of the concept (in philosophy) or of the form (in art) – and seeks refuge in fatuous concretism, contentism or pseudo-political journalism. Genuine thinking confronts nothingness without kneeling before it. Religion, self-protective nihilism, rapturous enthusiasm and romanticism are escape mechanisms to avoid thinking, which true thinking does not allow itself. The vulgar nihilism of coolly asserting nothing turns out to be the infantilism of a narcissistic refusal to think. The pose is indeed nothing but a pose: a nothing that shuns nothingness while pretending to demarcate it.

Way Out. – Art promises no redemptive resolution (*Erlösung*) because it constantly demands new solutions (*Lösungen*) in the instability.

Unstable. – The news about the instability of the subject need not lead to melodrama. Freedom is possible in the space of objective entanglement that is reality, but this doesn't mean exempting human beings from objective unfreedom. Rather, it involves surrendering oneself, differently than heretofore, to the texture of reality and "stitching" oneself to reality in an unforeseeable way. Nothing more is in this than an active stitching with the fabric of the world. But this is not nothing: ultimately, this new stitching means something like a redefinition of one's own existence.

Hand in Hand. – Reflection and experiment go hand in hand. Rather than embodying a contradiction, they generate a tension. The artwork acquires its consistency only through cooperation between experiment and reflection. It remains related to the indeterminate, which is the point of reference of artistic praxis. The vitality of the artwork has to do with its general interminability. It communicates with its surroundings and its viewers behind the artist's back and even after his death. This involves playfulness and allowing uncontrollable moments that cannot be anticipated. Working on a work of art is always characterized by contingent openness to play and experimentation. The enhanced "realism" of philosophic and artistic thought lies in alliance and cooperation with the diversity of its global context, in which the subjects act as though in a situation of reduced overview. Thought exists only as experiment, as experience with indeterminable outcome, so one part of thought is the willingness to reach results that cannot be anticipated. The subject continually seeks new paths – not out of reality, but into it. This requires resistance to the established models of reality. Interpretations of the world are worldviews, are ideology. The dynamism of thought, which is inherently critical of ideology, also breaks with ex-

isting notions of the critique of ideology. It must call everything into question, including the cult of question and critique.

Hole. – Giorgio Agamben writes, "Philosophy is not an academic discipline, but an intensity that suddenly enlivens every area of knowledge and life by forcing it to confront its limits. Philosophy is the declared exceptional state in every knowing and every discipline." Indeed, the reduction of philosophy to a praxis of knowledge is a philosophical problem. Thinking about the terminological difference between knowledge and truth, Agamben writes, "This exceptional state means: truth." Strictly speaking, this involves the point of inconsistency in the fabric of consistency that we call "reality." Part of philosophical praxis is that its extent also includes this point. Philosophy opens this hole in being, which is like an abyss that easily swallows being. Philosophy is an exceptional state because it breaks with the power of habit. The habitual is the familiar after its inherent unfamiliarity or uncanniness has been subtracted. Philosophers are interested in the unfamiliar in the familiar, in its fragility and inconsistency. Whether one addresses the inconsistency as chaos or uncanniness, as monstrous or real, it always marks the point of greatest energetic density, a kind of fire on which one could easily burn oneself. One could talk about the pyro-ontological dimension of thought (as of art), which is already intimated in the Heraclitean fire and the Platonic sun. The academic self-neutralization of thought tries to divest thinking of this dimension, but fails in the attempt. Only that thinking which opens itself to this fire, in order to test its inventory of knowledge in the blaze, is philosophy. Just as every decision must pass through the flames of undecidability, so must philosophical knowing pass through unknowing so it can dare experiences that redefine the existence of the thinker.

"Art promises no redemptive resolution because it constantly demands new solutions in the instability."

Compossibility. – Elias Canetti talks about "dreamlike clarity." What he means by this remains unclear. But one understands nonetheless: this is the ideal of art, of thought, of love – and sometimes it becomes their reality. It has to do with the compossibility of clarity and dream. Those who do not dream deny themselves the speculative excess that belongs to art, thought and love. This involves a surfeit of exactitude, precise mindlessness, meticulous exuberance. The clarity is dreamlike because it coincides with somnambulistic confidence. It has nothing in common with brooding or economic deliberation. This makes it into an economy that transcends economy, that denies itself calculation in order to approach its goals with blindly unerring marksmanship.

View. – Art offers a view of what remains invisible. The artwork resists the consumerist gaze. As strongly present as it must be, it equally strongly demarcates the absence of that which it shows. This does not mean that it would be extrinsic to the sphere of consumption, with which it is irrevocably entangled. Like the fish in the fisherman's net, it still writhes. It dares to try to break through or rend the net, but it cannot escape. There is no "outside" beyond economical, political, social, ideocultural conditions. That the artwork is subject to its conditions does not mean that it bends to their will. Its character as object and item of merchandise is inarguable. It is an object and a commodity in the space of facts. That is why it assaults the power of facts. The resistant and aggressive character of art is what Walter Benjamin meant by the concept of "aura." This is not the expression of a fleeing into the mystical. Just the opposite: it demarcates the entanglement of the artwork in the fabric of fact. But being entangled or enmeshed does not mean succumbing to the entanglement or the enmeshment. The artwork does not dissolve in its conditions. Anyone who identifies this non-dissolution as the remnant of idealism mistakes the idealism that we call realism or positivism.

Magic. – In one of his notes, and with a gaze at Charles Baudelaire, Walter Benjamin talks about the "view in which the magic of the faraway expires." This has to do neither with aesthetic magic nor the positivism of facts. The magic of the faraway is an index of the here and now. It does not point toward distant worlds, phantasms of integrity or any other reveries. A fissure gapes in the center of aesthetic experience. The artwork refuses to allow itself to be possessed: not as if it were magical or endowed with esoteric or religious integrity, but be-

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to dream.”**

cause it demonstrates the inconsistency of factual non-integrity. It is entirely of this world as something that inscribes a resistance into this world. The resistant character of art proves art's worldliness instead of repudiating it. Sorcery is possible only in the universe of blind incredulity. Those who believe that they can distinguish the impossible from the possible will be thwarted by the magic of the faraway. Their dreams of consistency unravel. They begin to comprehend that they have been duped by an illusion of nearness or presence or possession or consumption. This mirage is a powerful ideology that disguises itself as realism. Art has to do with neither realism nor idealism, but with the demystification of such weak categories. They are concepts of a market of ideas that continues to determine the art market. What these two markets have in common is their willingness to shirk the labor of thought by fleeing into cheap labels. Everything is tuned to economy and profit. Herein lies the real dreaming: in a value-added metaphysics upon which active non-thinking builds its consistencies. These brittle architectures are mistakenly assumed to be close to reality. One must think and see beyond them. The magic of the faraway is not a romantic magic. It implies no sort of yearning or narcissistic enthusiasm. Hegel and Adorno have already said all that can be said about this. The fabric of the evidential, which we call "actuality," is torn apart in the magic of the faraway: reality. Art can be an index of its fragility. Art demarcates the nothingness in being, the fluid emptiness that undermines all things. But this demarcation of nothingness is not nothing. This means responding to the inconsistency of the texture of being with marks of consistency, which confirm it by resisting it. The consumerist gaze cannot bear this resistance because that view counts on docile gliding. If nihilism is to be more than the illustration of its own inconsistency, nihilism must dare

intelligence. Art does not dissolve in art, nor does reality dissolve in reality. Views exist that go beyond the consumerist fear of emptiness, which mistakes itself as coolly affirming nothing. The "view in which the magic of the faraway expires" is the gaze of angst. Heidegger writes that distance is "making the faraway disappear" and that nothingness is the object of angst. Angst does not vanish when one flees from nothingness into nothingness. Art begins the moment one denies oneself this flight without regressing into the metaphysics of consistency. ●

Razão e mistério: religião, arte e sentido da visão

Carlos Vidal

Começamos de um modo algo introdutório aos conceitos ou ao termo que dá parte (a parte substancial) do título destes encontros: *imago mundi*. O propósito seria passar deste termo, que também é, como veremos, um título de um específico livro (de Pierre d'Ailly,¹ teólogo, cientista e filósofo), para uma *marca* ocidental que pressupõe uma necessidade de explicação, entendimento ou representação (supostamente racional) do mundo. Ora esta pressuposição é inerente à racionalidade e o indicativo ou "operador" desta racionalidade, claramente desde Descartes, é o sentido da visão. Portanto, a ocularidade; resumindo, o ocidente é logocêntrico e ocular – logo é logocularcêntrico.

Voltando ao início: *imago* é, naturalmente, imagem. No Iluminismo (e não há termo ou período mais "ocular" que este, tão posteriormente desprezado por poetas românticos como Novalis), a ideia platônica – no *Fédon*, por exemplo – ou seja, a ideia (aquilo que é "em si") reduz-se a uma imagem na mente. Vejamos como Voltaire define "Ideia" no seu *Dictionnaire Philosophique* (1764):

O que é uma ideia?

É uma imagem que se imprime ela mesma no nosso cérebro.

Portanto, todas as nossas ideias são imagens?

Seguramente; porque mesmo as ideias mais abstractas são consequências de todos os objectos que eu percepcionei. Em geral, eu pronuncio a palavra «ser» apenas porque cheguei ao conhecimento de seres em particular. Eu uso a palavra «infinito» apenas porque eu alcanço os limites, e porque prolongo esses limites no meu entendimento o mais que posso.

Tenho ideias apenas porque vejo imagens no meu cérebro.

E por quem é esta pintura realizada?

Não é por mim, pois eu não sou um bom desenhador. Aquele que me fez, fez as minhas ideias.

Portanto, acreditas em Malebranche, que disse que tudo vemos em deus?

Estou quase certo de que se não vemos as coisas em deus ele mesmo, vemo-las pela sua todo-poderosa acção.

E como é que essa acção opera?

Disse-te centenas de vezes na nossa conversa que não tenho a mais pequena ideia, e que deus não contou os seus segredos a ninguém.²

Portanto, para Voltaire, deus não se revela e nada se sabe dele, não é incluído na esfera do conhecimento. É tão vago quanto "espírito", termo que coube também a Voltaire trabalhar ou definir na *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et de métiers* (1751–1772). Deste modo:

ESPÍRITO (Philos. e Belas-Letras), esta palavra, nos termos em que significa *uma qualidade da alma*, é um dos qualificativos vagos, os quais todos os que os pronunciam juntam-lhes quase sempre significações diferentes. Ele expressa outra coisa que difere de juízo, génio, gosto, talento, sagacidade, extensão, graça, fineza; e deve possuir todos esses méritos: podemos defini-lo, *razão engenhosa*.

É uma palavra genérica que necessita sempre de uma outra palavra que a determine; e quando dizemos, *eis uma obra plena de espírito, um homem que possui espírito*, surge sempre a necessidade de questionar *de quê*.³

Continua Voltaire. O espírito sublime de Corneille não é o espírito exacto de Boileau nem o *espírito naïf* de La Fontaine; e o espírito de La Bruyère nada se assemelha ao de Malebranche, que corresponde à imaginação com profundidade.

Mas nunca deixa de existir, no esteio de um pós-cartesianismo ligeiramente *transfigurado* (porque Descartes é o pensador quintessencial da ocularidade, como lhe chama Martin Jay,⁴ mas, no entanto, a sua propensão para a dualidade matéria/

consciência e para o inatismo, revela-o um pensador talvez menos ocular que Voltai- re), nunca deixa de existir aqui uma filiação na imagem ou, desta feita retomando Des- cartes, uma ligação visão-luz (clareza, literalidade pré-iluminista)-imagem-ver- dade-método-evidência.

Portanto, o *espírito* (e deus) partilha com entidades platonistas como a “beleza ideal”, a “bondade”, a “justiça” e a “pieda- de”, ou a “igualdade” e a “extensão”, a con- dição de “ideias” como “imagens na men- te” dependentes das percepções externas, uma objectividade contra qualquer forma de subjectividade.

Aprofundemos pois esta ligação entre ocu- larcentrismo, ou omnipresença da imagem, ocidental e cartesianismo, uma vez que o autor do *Discours de la Méthode* e de *La Dioptrique* (1637)⁵ promove a ideia de que o homem de conhecimento seria como o pintor equipado com uma câmara escura (elemento de registo e simbolizador de uma retina passiva, lugar de impressão – *pictura* – dos elementos do mundo exterior – *imago* em Kepler – ou, tecnicamente, elemen- to promotor de uma retinopassividade, em que conhecer seria registar evidências).

1. Matriz ocidental

A matriz ocular moderna do conhecimento, ou a fixação histórica do ocularcentrismo, prende-se, como se sabe, a uma persisten- te influência (ou antes, *imposição*) carte- siana, considerando-se, como disse, Des- cartes o filósofo da visualidade por sugerir uma relação com o mundo similar à postura de um pintor equipado de uma câmara es- cura para reproduzir, observar e registar o real circundante no contexto de uma estrita analogia entre olho e câmara.

Neste sentido, *La Dioptrique* inicia-se com um elogio à visão como o sentido dos sentidos, facto que não pode ser alheio à

ênfaseção, no mesmo lugar (Discurso I), das invenções que a “melhoram”, assim elevadas à categoria das mais importantes descobertas humanas. A esta centralização da visualidade se chama *perspectivismo cartesiano* (Jonathan Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century*).⁶ O que significa que Descartes postula uma estrutura da mente congruente com o mundo exterior (uma vez que ela o regista), congruência que se efectiva numa via especular, ou numa função eminentemente especular da men- te. Mas uma especularidade dependente do intelecto, como se verá. E neste inatismo- -dualismo a racionalidade cartesiana co- meça a “abrir” algumas fendas, que terei de explorar subseqüentemente. Ainda que sinteticamente.

“Descartes é considerado o filósofo da visualidade por sugerir uma relação com o mundo similar à postura de um pintor equipado de uma câmara escura para reproduzir, observar e registar o real circundante no contexto de uma estrita analogia entre olho e câmara.”

Devemos considerar que, apesar do sujeito ser referido em *La Dioptrique* com faculda- des afins à câmara escura (e parecer que a visualidade tudo determina), também nele é possível detectarmos uma dualidade cen- tral. Ou melhor, há uma dualidade inerente ao cartesianismo não apenas no *Discours de la Méthode* (a famosa separação entre a alma e o corpo), mas também nos seus

estudos de óptica: por um lado, a câmara escura propicia uma visualidade mecânica, registando o mundo e a luz que à nossa frente se coloca; por outro, a “escuridão” da câmara sinaliza um paradoxal afastamento do mundo apontando para uma possível percepção interior ou de “olhos fechados”, afirmando Descartes no Discurso V de *La Dioptrique* que, para se efectivar uma percepção sensorial, a alma não necessita de contemplar nada de semelhante à coisa percebida. O que, supõe-se, Voltaire nunca aceitaria. Mas em Descartes a alma é atreita a perscrutar a insubstancialidade. Ou podemos mesmo considerar que essa insubstancialidade é inerente às coisas, ao mundo e à verdade (mesmo considerada no espaço da relação evidência=método).

No seu volume 2 do longo estudo *L'Être et l'événement (Logiques des Mondes)*, uma das mais impressivas teorias da indiscer- nibilidade e indecidibilidade da “verdade” (universal, não “necessária” e indizível por- que inédita), Badiou utiliza Descartes (como Kierkegaard ou Mao Tse Tung, este por abrir espaço para a irrupção do inédito), pois para ele (e em toda a obra *L'Être et l'événement*) a ligação é entre verdade-acontecimento- -infinito (o inédito é infinito, portanto sem *imago*). Logo, ao contrário destas nos- sas democracias que valorizam os corpos (biopolítica) e a linguagem (na “democracia humanitarista”), Badiou vê uma insubstan- cialidade que supera o actual “materialismo democrático”, pois nele *tem de haver o que não existe*, o acontecimento-irrupção do que escapa ao conhecimento (perpetuação da situação), quase como Derrida dizia não ser possível mas ter de existir a desconstru- ção, e essa possibilidade vê Badiou emergir num excerto de *Principes de la Philosophie* de Descartes, onde o autor de *Discours de la Méthode* distingue verdade (o inédito, em Badiou) de existência (a situação):

Eu distingo tudo o que cai diante do nosso co- nhecimento em dois géneros: o primeiro contém todas as coisas que têm alguma existência, o

segundo género do existir é constituído pelas verdades que nada são no exterior do nosso pensamento.⁷

Há pois em Descartes existências insubs- tanciais (deus? A arte? Uma quimera?...). Reiterando e do mesmo trabalho carte- siano (que, em latim, primeiramente saiu publicado como *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia* e, por vezes, é traduzido como *Les Méditations Métaphysiques*, de 1641):

Agora, no que diz respeito às ideias, se se con- siderarem apenas em si próprias e não forem relacionadas a nenhuma outra coisa, elas não podem, propriamente, ser falsas: pois quer eu imagine uma cabra ou uma quimera, não é me- nos verdade que imagino uma ou outra.

Porque: “Também não se deve temer qual- quer falsidade nos afectos ou vontades; pois ainda que eu possa desejar coisas más, ou até que nunca existiram, nem por isso é menos verdadeiro que as desejo”.⁸

Há, sem dúvida, no racionalismo clássico de Descartes pequenas brechas ou oscila- ções que nos podem conduzir a experiên- cias limite da razão. Além disso, como se lê no início do Discurso IV de *La Dioptrique*, é a alma que percebe e não o corpo (não se trata de uma questão fisiológica somente, a alma não é uma passiva câ- mara escura): “quando a alma se distrai num êxtase ou está numa contemplação profunda, sabemos que todo o corpo se mantém sem qualquer sensação, ainda que tocado por vários objectos”.⁹

Mas, no essencial, a ocularidade reina em Descartes, reforçada pelo conhecido elo- gio, naturalmente deduzido dessa centrali- dade, dos meios técnicos de prolongamen- to ou melhoramento da visão, ou melhor, daquilo que *exossomaticamente* a prolon- ga e amplia o seu alcance. É, aliás, com uma referência à invenção do telescópio que Descartes inicia *La Dioptrique*: aqui se enfatiza a visão como o mais nobre dos sentidos, cabendo-lhes a estruturação da

vida. Descartes é um pensador–fundador do racionalismo clássico, digamos, ainda sensista e ocularcêntrico. Se uma qualquer lente é um prolongamento *exossomático* da visão é porque ela se adapta ao seu funcionamento e fisiologia, com ambas partilha pormenores técnicos e orgânicos; ou melhor, o que há de orgânico no telescópio, por exemplo, se há alguma coisa, ela é proveniente da visão, pois só desse modo um dispositivo mecânico prolonga as nossas limitações fisiológicas. *Exossomático* é aquilo que se adiciona do exterior à fisiologia interior e com ela partilha uma finalidade, uma função, um *modo de funcionar* e um objectivo. O telescópio é uma máquina ou um dispositivo que se liga a um outro dispositivo: o do olho e visão; é um dispositivo com as suas leis próprias e uma “máquina” que Descartes se propõe conhecer e divulgar, tal como antes dele Kepler que foi para o filósofo francês influência a considerar (note–se que Descartes viveu na Holanda entre 1628 e 1649), pois Kepler também tomava o olho como máquina.

Tal influência é referida por Jonathan Crary. Estranha este autor tal não fazer parte das análises de Svetlana Alpers no seu importantíssimo estudo sobre a pintura holandesa do século XVII, *The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century* (1983).¹⁰ Neste livro, Alpers não pode deixar de se debruçar a fundo na história das invenções ópticas em todo o norte da Europa, descrevendo a centralidade da câmara escura na arte holandesa do século XVII. É pela visão e pela possibilidade de *exossomaticamente* ser modificada que se vai interessar Kepler. Há aliás uma relação entre o modelo kepleriano da visão e do olho e a natureza (formal, compositiva, conceptual, etc.) da pintura holandesa. Svetlana Alpers ocupa–se deste tema no capítulo “Ut pictura, ita visio: Kepler’s Model of the Eye and the Nature of Painting in the North” do livro citado.¹¹

Kepler inicia–se no estudo dos problemas ópticos movido por um interesse pelo mecanismo predecessor da câmara escura, concretamente a câmara estenopeica. Trata–se de um mecanismo simples e primitivo de registo fotográfico. Consiste numa pequena caixa completamente negra no interior e onde não pode entrar qualquer tipo de luminosidade; numa das faces da caixa faz–se um pequeníssimo buraco (*estenopo*) – da largura de uma agulha – e coloca–se um pedaço de filme no lado oposto interior; se este ecrã for translúcido, propicia uma observação em tempo real daquilo que está a ser visto, registado ou “fotografado” (considerando–se ainda que, nesta câmara, quaisquer resultados obtêm–se com longos tempos de exposição). Daí provinha grande parte do interesse de Kepler, pois a câmara estenopeica permitia observações seguras, não acarretando perigos para a visão, e em tempo real de fenómenos astronómicos relacionados com o sol, a lua e os eclipses. Aqui podemos ver que o interesse de Kepler é meramente instrumental, a câmara é para ele um instrumento de apoio às suas investigações em astronomia. Mas esse interesse passará de instrumental a óptico, ou seja, detectando alguns problemas nas suas observações Kepler passa a estudar em si mesmos os instrumentos ópticos empregues e a relacioná–los com o funcionamento do olho humano.

Por esse motivo é que Alpers dirá que o interesse de Kepler passa da astronomia para a óptica. Ora, são as suas descobertas no campo da óptica que influenciarão Descartes (um facto não citado por Alpers) e um novo entendimento da visão, que passa de “registo” a “representação”.

Que problema detectou Kepler nas suas observações científicas que o levou a dedicar–se à ciência óptica? Quando era assistente de Tycho Brahe em Praga, em 1600, Kepler reparou que o diâmetro lunar era menor durante um período de eclipse solar que noutros momentos; mas sabia–se

“A similitude dessa câmara com o olho levou-o ao estudo do olho humano. Apoiando-se em descobertas de anatomistas e em estudos com cadáveres.”

que o diâmetro do satélite terrestre não sofria tais alterações, portanto a sua conclusão foi clara: como a alteração do diâmetro lunar não sucede na natureza, ele só pode ser resultado dos meios de observação utilizados. Sabe–se que é um facto que os raios luminosos emitidos pelos objectos no mundo, pelo sol ou pela lua, são intersectados na percepção pelo nosso mecanismo óptico. Ora, esse mecanismo óptico (a íris) sofre alterações conforme a luz que o atravessa. Por isso Kepler concluiu que o diâmetro do buraco na câmara estenopeica era factor determinante para as dimensões das imagens ou fragmentos das imagens observadas. Os erros de construção do aparelho (câmara) provocavam distorções nas formas registadas. A similitude dessa câmara com o olho levou-o ao estudo do olho humano. Apoiando–se em descobertas de anatomistas e em estudos com cadáveres, Kepler definiu a visão como a formação das imagens na concavidade retiniana, aquilo que chamou de *pictura*. Depois Kepler explicou as alterações do diâmetro lunar nas várias observações a partir de uma *deceptividade da visão*.

2. Limites racionalistas

Dualista, sensista, teórico da alma, racionalista clássico, céptico, cientista (no tratado de óptica, aqui muito analisado) ou precursor do Diderot *late style*, digamos, aquele que se espanta com o saber sistemático dos cegos,¹² é ou não Descartes um pensador ocular? Temos de considerar que sim, claro, mas a isso acrescentar que a sua ocularidade não tem uma natureza una; porque, por um lado, ela advém de uma compatibilização entre o mecanismo fisiológico do olho e a câmara escura, e, por outro lado, a ocularidade cartesiana supõe um dispositivo em que a visão se autonomiza, tal como o “eu”, do corpo. Recorreremos uma vez mais a *La Dioptrique* para a confirmação destas duas posições. A analogia entre o olho e a câmara escura é por demais conhecida:

Suponhamos uma câmara ou uma sala completamente encerrada exceptuando num único orifício, coloquemos uma lente de vidro nesse orifício e atrás dele, a uma determinada distância, uma folha lisa ou esticada, de modo a que a luz proveniente dos objectos exteriores aí forme imagens. Agora considere–se que o interior da câmara, essa espécie de sala, representa o olho; o orifício, a pupila; a lente é o humor cristalino, ou antes todas as partes do olho que causam alguma refração; e a folha, a membrana interna, composta pelas terminações dos nervos ópticos.¹³

Do mesmo modo, numa outra proposta, uma câmara escura em que a lente é um olho de um animal morto, mas que

permite e serve igualmente a fixação das imagens no *ecrã-retina*, sustenta ainda o primado da ocularidade e a anteriormente referida autonomia da visão em relação ao corpo (“vivo”) e à vontade. O procedimento faz-nos recordar a retino-passividade e a desantropomorfização da visão de que falava Svetlana Alpers, ao mesmo tempo que confirma Descartes como o fundador da ocularidade moderna:

[Certificamo-nos da eficácia da câmara escura] se pegarmos num olho de uma pessoa há pouco falecida (ou, se tal não for possível, no olho de um touro ou outro animal de grande porte) e se cortarmos as três membranas envolventes detrás desse olho de forma a expor a maior parte do humor cristalino sem derrames. Seguidamente, cobrimos o orifício com um pequeno corpo branco suficientemente fino para deixar atravessar a luz (i. e., um pedaço de papel ou um pedaço de casca de ovo) e colocamos o olho nesta espécie de obturador de modo a que a sua frente esteja virada para os vários objectos iluminados pela luz natural, e a sua parte traseira virada para o interior da sala onde estamos de pé. (Nenhuma luz entrará na sala que não aquela que o olho deixa passar.) Construído este engenho, veremos que na folha branca do fundo, não sem maravilhamento e prazer, temos uma pintura representando perspectivamente todos os objectos do exterior.¹⁴

Voltemos ao ponto inicial. À consideração de *imago* (não exactamente num sentido kepleriano) como imagem e de *imago mundi* como o “retrato” de uma época, um momento histórico, sendo “barroco” um momento ou “Iluminismo” outro momento... Será a *imago mundi* uma figura do logocentrismo? Será este uno ou contraditório? E Descartes? Realizou uma *imago mundi*? Ou toda e qualquer *imago mundi* consiste no (num) seu próprio e inevitável desvio? É a razão um convite ou uma situação que a si mesmo se supera? Será pertinente a consideração de Agustina Bessa-Luís num dos seus mais pungentes romances, *Antes do Degelo*?

O homem só à custa de enorme sofrimento suporta a razão e, na quebra desse pacto com

a razão, há como que um acordo com o ser primitivo, mais feliz, como se não houvesse motivo para ser castigado.¹⁵

E se o homem necessita da razão para a “quebrar”, o que é que aí se inicia? A arte? A criação artística? A razão e o mistério da criação? Seja como for, nada se resolve com uma resposta afirmativa. ●

1 Pierre d’Ailly foi um teólogo, cientista e filósofo francês que escreveu um tratado intitulado *Imago Mundi*. Que é, traduzido à letra, portanto, “imagem do mundo”; um texto que sinaliza a obra do prelado e seus domínios, de Deus à ciência cosmográfica. Obra pouco citada, não deixa por isso de ter alguns analistas, como Alice Lamy, *La Pensée de Pierre d’Ailly: Une Philosophe engagé du Moyen Age* (Paris, Champion, 2013) ou Laura Acker Smoller, em *History, Prophecy, and the Stars: The Christian Astrology of Pierre d’Ailly, 1350–1420* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

2 Voltaire, *Philosophical Dictionary*, trad. Theodore Besterman, Londres, Penguin, 2004, pp. 236–237.

3 Voltaire, verbete “ESPRIT”, em *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et de métiers*. Ed. consultada: *Encyclopédie II ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (org. Alain Pons), Paris, Flammarion, 1986, pp. 75–81.

4 Ver Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought*, University of California Press, 1994, pp. 69–82 e pp. 83–147. Uma história de Descartes até à crise do Ancien Régime assumidamente escópico, crise plenamente revelada ou debedada com o campo retiniano como campo de experiências em Bergson e no Impressionismo.

5 Descartes, *La Dioptrique* (1637). Consultado: *Descartes, Optics em The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Volume 1, trad. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff e Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 152–175.

6 Jonathan Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1992.

7 Descartes citado por Alain Badiou, *Logiques des Mondes...*, Paris, Seuil, 2006, p. 13.

8 Descartes, *Meditações Metafísicas*, trad. Regina Pereira, Porto, Rés, 2003, pp. 44–45.

9 Descartes, *La Dioptrique*, ob. cit., p. 164.

10 Svetlana Alpers, *The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century*, University of Chicago Press, 1984.

11 Ibidem, pp. 27–71.

12 Ver o fundamental *Lettre sur les Aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient* (1749), em ed. portuguesa: *Carta sobre os Cegos para uso daqueles que vêem*, Lisboa, Vega, 2007.

13 *La Dioptrique*, p. 166.

14 Ibidem.

15 Agustina Bessa-Luís, *Antes do Degelo*, Lisboa, Guimarães, 2004, p. 161.

Empty Space

Daniel Folha

I am writing this text while sitting on a chair, with my forearms rested on a table and some of my fingers touching a personal computer's keyboard. All of these objects are, essentially, empty space! Maybe you, as readers, stopped at the exclamation mark, reread the sentence and thought: this guy has gone mad!

Leave those daily life objects alone for a moment. This image shows us NGC 1187, a beautiful spiral galaxy located about 60 million light-years from Earth. This galaxy, as all others as a matter of fact, is essentially empty space.



Galaxy NGC 1187. Credit: European Southern Observatory (ESO).

We live inside a galaxy of this type, the Milky Way. For us, here, it is easy to see that the vast majority of space inside a galaxy is empty. It is almost enough to look up to the night sky to understand that. We can, however, quantify it. The greater part of the 400 thousand million stars in the Milky Way are located on the galactic disk: a 1000 light-years thick by 100 thousand light-years diameter "frisbee". As a result, each star has for itself a volume of the order of 20 cubic light-years, that is, a sphere roughly 3.3 light-years in diameter. Each star and everything that surrounds it occupies a very small fraction of this volume. For the Sun, this fraction is of the order 10^{-22} . This is to say, in the solar neighbourhood something like 99,999999999999999999% of all space is... empty space. Give or take another decimal place and we can generalize this result for the whole Galaxy and even for other galaxies.

Isn't the same going on for the chair, table and personal computer? Let's see... Each of these objects, as any other object we know of, is made of atoms. Each atom is formed by a nucleus of protons and neutrons surrounded by as many electrons as there are protons in the nucleus (or thereabouts). For each atom, the size of the nucleus is

**If the atoms
that make up my body
are mostly empty space.
If the atoms that make
the chair I am sitting on,
the table supporting
my forearms,
the personal computer
I am using to write,
are mostly empty space,
why do the chair
and table support me?**

around 100 thousand times smaller than the size of the atom. Imagine the atom is a sphere 100 meters in diameter. The nucleus would be a 1 mm diameter marble right in the centre of that sphere, with a bunch of electrons scattered around the volume of the sphere. The electrons are at least 1000 times smaller than the nucleus. As it is easily understandable, an atom is essentially empty space and, consequently, every object made out of atoms is essentially empty space. This is the main reason why some particles can penetrate matter: energetic electrons go through sheets of paper or even thin sheets of aluminium foil; energetic photons like x-rays go through the body of living beings, or like gamma rays that traverse concrete walls and even walls made out of lead. Neutrinos travel across the Earth, crossing our planet from one side to the other almost as if nothing was on their path. As space probes travelling through interplanetary space in the Solar System, these particles travel through the empty space of the atoms that make up matter.

If the atoms that make up my body are mostly empty space. If the atoms that make the chair I am sitting on, the table supporting my forearms, the personal computer I am using to write, are mostly empty space, why do the chair and table support me? Why can I touch the keyboard? The answer is in a quantum physics principle: the Pauli Exclusion Principle. The laws of physics applying to the (almost) infinitely small things define the phenomena associated to daily life objects.

P.S. – Neutrinos are subatomic particles without electric charge and, probably, with very small mass (even amongst subatomic particles). The Sun emits neutrinos as it produces energy via nuclear reactions deep in its core, allowing it to exist as a star. ●

Newton, Einstein, Gravidade e mágicos

Miguel Gonçalves

Das quatro Forças Fundamentais da Natureza (Gravidade, Electromagnetismo, Nuclear Forte e Nuclear Fraca), a Gravidade é aquela com quem temos uma relação mais familiar, que nos molda fisicamente, que nos prende ao planeta. Talvez fosse expectável que também seria a melhor compreendida mas em boa verdade é ainda hoje um capítulo desafiante da Ciência. A sua intimidade com a Humanidade e o que a torna menos “estrangeira” para com a mesma está bem representada num conto em jeito de anedota sobre o único físico muçulmano até ao momento a ganhar um Nobel da Física – o paquistanês Abdus Salam: “O nosso professor falava-nos da força da gravidade. Obviamente que a gravidade era bem conhecida e o nome de Newton conseguiu penetrar mesmo num local como Jhang [cidade capital do distrito de Jhang, província de Punjab]. Depois, o nosso professor falou-nos do magnetismo. Mostrou-nos um íman e disse: “electricidade! Ah, esta é uma força que não vive em Jhang; vive apenas em Lahore [capital da província de Punjab e a sua cidade mais populosa], a mais de 200 quilómetros para Oriente! E a força nuclear? Essa força vive apenas na Europa! Não vive na Índia, pelo que não temos de nos preocupar com ela...”!

Se hoje associamos Gravidade a Einstein, convém obviamente não esquecer Newton – aquele que até chegou a uma remota cidade paquistanesa. A Ciência é uma empreitada de acumulação de conhecimentos construídos através da substituição ou refinamento de conceitos

anteriores. Einstein destronou Newton? Não. Sim. Bom, depende. A visão que ambos tiveram sobre o que é esta coisa misteriosa e invisível chamada Gravidade é claramente distinta na estética, na matemática, na filosofia. E, sobretudo, nos contextos e dimensões físicas dos actores principais. Não são teorias que se anulam por inteiro e sempre. E sabem dar educada permissão uma à outra, uma espécie de “Alice nos Países das Maravilhas” assim que passa o espelho: enquanto que a Teoria da Relatividade de Einstein tem demonstrado uma eficácia tremenda a explicar a Gravidade, quando estamos perante sistemas de corpos muito maciços e que se deslocam a grandes velocidades (provocando ondas gravitacionais), as Leis de Newton conseguem apresentar resultados muito satisfatórios para a grande maioria dos contextos físicos com que lidamos e observamos no nosso quotidiano – o Homem foi à Lua utilizando Newton, Einstein não foi chamado para tal tarefa. De uma maneira geral, conseguimos compreender e trabalhar cientificamente bem as órbitas dos planetas à volta do Sol usando a concepção numérica da gravidade de Newton – e Einstein só começa a entrar nesta peça teatral da mecânica celestial quando abordamos a órbita de Mercúrio e apenas porque tal planeta está perto de um corpo de enorme massa como é o caso do Sol!

Em Newton e no movimento da sua maçã que caiu da árvore (muito provavelmente uma estória de encantar e apenas isso) e nas suas Leis encontramos uma postura quase “zen” da Gravidade: “Lei I: Todo corpo continua num estado de repouso ou de movimento uniforme numa linha reta, a menos que seja forçado a mudar tal estado por forças aplicadas sobre ele”. Para Einstein, a Gravidade é uma força activa, transformadora, que imprime a sua marca e poder no tecido do espaço-tempo, no tecido do próprio Universo. É como se fosse uma esfera num pano

elástico: quanto mais massa tiver tal esfera maior será a deformação que consegue criar no pano! E tal deformação é que acaba por atrair outros corpos em jeito de decaimento orbital – é uma Gravidade romântica.

Pode-se argumentar que Newton trouxe também um outro romantismo: transportou as leis do Universo para a Terra, argumentando com sucesso que o movimento de Júpiter à volta do Sol tem a mesma natureza e princípios da queda da maçã no solo terrestre, contrariando um mui antigo dogma higiênico que defendia que os Ceús e as suas Leis são puras demais para a suja realidade da Terra e dos seus habitantes.

“Newton e Einstein foram e ainda são disruptivos nas ideias e até mesmo nas personalidades. A esse nível tocam-se, se fossem contemporâneos a sua convivência seria algo digno de se registar e estudar a muitos níveis... ”

Newton e Einstein foram e ainda são disruptivos nas ideias e até mesmo nas personalidades. A esse nível tocam-se, se fossem contemporâneos a sua convivência seria algo digno de se registar e estudar a muitos níveis... Mark Kak, um conhecido matemático polaco / americano do século passado dizia que existem dois tipos de génios: os “normais”, acessíveis aos comuns mortais mas com o dobro da sua inteligência e, depois, temos os “mágicos”, aqueles a quem é

impossível fazer uma ligação de mentes. Newton e Einstein pertencem a essa segunda categoria e tal é mais facilmente reconhecível através das cenas anedóticas (em que é tão difícil descobrir a sua veracidade) ou claras dificuldades dos mesmos em enquadrarem-se no contexto físico e relacional com o mundo que ocorre fora das suas mentes. Por isso, e em tais “mágicos”, há uma fina linha que separa uma suposta arrogância e o desconforto íntimo social que tantas vezes se torna paranóico para os próprios e trilhando caminhos que quase parecem infantis. John Flamsteed, contemporâneo de Newton e reconhecido astrónomo, teve profundas discussões com o mesmo e não hesitou em confidenciar que “tinha sonhado com a morte de Newton”; Leibniz, o seu maior rival matemático, ficou severamente afectado emocionalmente com a querela que teve com o génio inglês a propósito da paternidade do Cálculo Diferencial. E, no meio da animosidade social e pessoal, chegaram também aos nossos tempos relatos de um Newton que adorava pregar partidas: era frequente lançar papagaios de papel com pontas inflamáveis e que, quando acesas e o papagaio era colocado no ar nas noites cerradas de inverno, pareciam cometas a assombrar os terrestres (os cometas sempre tiveram má reputação)! Ou, como indicador da sua absorvente vivência no e para o seu interior intelectual, convidou o seu amigo Dr. Stukely para um jantar e, quando sentados à mesma mesa, Newton não se apercebeu minimamente da presença do seu convidado enquanto o próprio e sem o perturbar devorou o jantar de Newton... Quando o mesmo despertou da sua viagem mental, olhou para o prato repleto de restos alimentares e terá dito: “Francamente... se não fosse pelas provas presentes diante dos meus olhos, eu poderia jurar que ainda não teria jantado!” Aliás, a necessidade alimentar era algo claramente secundário para Newton pois há relatos (plural!) das suas intenções de se dirigir para a sala de

jantar do Trinity College e em vez de entrar para a mesma dirigiu-se para a porta de saída do edifício! E, quando se apercebeu do sucedido, regressou não para a sala de jantar mas sim para o seu quarto... Os “génios mágicos” definitivamente têm algo a resolver (ou não) com as questões alimentares pois também Einstein terá tido episódios em tudo semelhantes.

Sobre Einstein, encontramos também nesses seus momentos de transe intelectual uma salvação para a conturbada situação e perseguição política e xenófoba que o Governo do seu país natal lhe moveu. Pelo menos é essa interpretação que Arnold Toynbee (amigo e colega de Gilbert Murray que por sua vez se tornou amigo próximo de Einstein) faz de um episódio que lhe ficou na memória: certo dia, Murray encontra Einstein sentado e possuído por aquele seu olhar distante. Este sorria. Murray, curioso, perguntou-lhe o que pensava e Einstein apenas disse: “estou a pensar que, afinal... orbitamos uma estrela muito pequenina”. Toynbee mais tarde percebeu o significado de tal enigmática frase: Einstein, por entre a desolação de um crescente nazismo no seu país, achava que o Universo não tinha colocado os ovos todos no mesmo lugar e que para um “cosmosonhador” a esperança por algo superior à Humanidade teria de residir noutra qualquer lugar do Cosmos.

Aliás, Einstein encontrou também uma forma de conforto espiritual e moral na sua própria Teoria da Relatividade, na sua própria concepção de Tempo e de Eternidade, num claro empréstimo do racional e científico à alma: “para um físico crente, a distinção entre passado, presente e futuro é uma mera ilusão”, escreveu na parte final da sua vida.

Génios mágicos... tão raros e necessários! E não apenas na Ciência. ●

Alexandra Costa

Artist. Graduated in Visual Arts – Photography at ESAP – Oporto Art School (2015). Postgraduate in Contemporary Art, in this same institution (2016). She participated in several collective exhibitions, namely: "Diferenças Convergentes" (2014), with the work "Arquivo", and in "Volvox" (2015), with the work "s/t, 2015". She also participated in the 18th International Biennial of Vila Nova de Cerveira, with the work "Um lugar comum", at ARTS Sevilla (2016) and at the 19th International Biennial of Vila Nova de Cerveira. In 2017 she integrated the collective exhibition "Projectos_Processos_Propriedades", at Espaço Mira and "A alguns passos como se estivesse muito longe", Palacete Viscondes de Balsemão, Encontros da Imagem, with the project "Estudos sobre a entropia. Para uma hipótese de arte como sintropia". She participated at ARTS Sevilla (2017) with this same project.

Ana Guimarães & Tiago Veloso

Artists with an autonomous path, they started working together in 2016. Ana Guimarães is Postgraduated in Contemporary Art, ESAP. She participated in several exhibitions and, recently, as a collective, with Nuno Faleiro Rodrigues and Tiago Veloso Dias at the conference "Assemblies: Acts of Social Urgency and Imagination", University of Athens, Greece. In this context she developed the exhibition "The Meeting Room For How Assemblies Matter",

integrated in the program of the Athens Biennial – OMONOIA, with the project "An Interview With The Anarchist Banker". She is producer of the Ci.CLO Photography Platform. She integrated the collective exhibition "Projectos_Processos_Propriedades", Espaço Mira, July, 2017, and, with Tiago Veloso, she also participated in the exhibition project "A alguns passos como se estivesse muito longe" [A Few Steps Away As If Very Far], Palacete Viscondes de Balsemão, Encontros da Imagem, Porto, September–October, 2017. Tiago Veloso holds a Degree in Cinema and is Postgraduated in Contemporary Art, ESAP. His most recent work, as a collective with Ana Guimarães, focuses on the project "Mais vale que sejam uma e a mesma coisa" [They Better Be One And The Same Thing], framed in the project "A alguns passos como se estivesse muito longe", a collective exhibition curated by Eduarda Neves as part of the Encontros da Imagem de Braga Festival programme, 2017. He participated in several exhibitions, namely, as a collective, with Nuno Faleiro Rodrigues and Ana Guimarães, at the conference "Assemblies: Acts of Social Urgency and Imagination", Athens University, Greece. In this context he participated in the exhibition "The Meeting Room For How Assemblies Matter", included in the program of the Athens Biennial – OMONOIA, with the project "An Interview With The Anarchist Banker". He took part in the collective exhibition "Projectos_Processos_Propriedades", Espaço Mira, July, 2017. He directed the short-length documentary film "Névoa", presented at several festivals, including the "10th International

Panorama of Independent Film and Video", Greece, or the "XXVII VGIK International Student Festival, Moscow. Currently living and working from the city of Porto.

Carlos Vidal

Artist and teacher. Degree in Painting from FBAUL, where he teaches Painting, Composition, Art Criticism, Installation, Contemporary Art (Master in Painting) and PhD seminars. He has a doctorate in Fine Arts / Painting, with the thesis "Invisibilidade da Pintura: História de uma Obsessão (de Caravaggio a Bruce Nauman)", published. (Spanish translation, Brumaria, Madrid, 2018). Vidal participated in the most significant exhibitions of the 1990s, such as "Imagens para os Anos 90" (Serralves, 1993) and several editions of the Encontros de Fotografia, Coimbra. He reintroduced Guy Debord's study in Portugal with the collective exhibition "Espectáculo, Disseminação, Deriva e Exílio: Um projecto em torno de Guy Debord" (Beja, 1995). He is represented in private and institutional collections (Serralves Museum of Contemporary Art [Porto], MEIAC [Badajoz], CAV [Coimbra], etc). He is correspondent of several international magazines and has written several chapters of collective books. He published several books, the most recent being: "Deus e Caravaggio: A Negação do Claro-Escuro e a Invenção dos Corpos Compactos" (1st edition: Lisbon, Vendaval, 2011; 2nd edition: University of Coimbra Press, 2014; 2nd spanish edition with 3rd reprint, 2018). Recently published, from the Portuguese original (Lisbon, Vendaval), "La Sombra Total: Arte, Amor, Ciência y Política en Alain Badiou" (Brumaria, Madrid, July, 2018).

Celeste Cerqueira

Develops work in the field of visual arts. She holds a Master in Visual Arts – Intermedia from the University of Évora, with the

thesis "A interdisciplinaridade em algumas obras de arte contemporânea" (2007). In this context, her theoretical-practical production encompasses new resources and artistic practices such as the revitalization of the "What is Watt?" Group (since 2001), the co-production of the Virtual Biennial, presented at Vila Nova de Cerveira, and the Douro Printmaking Biennial. She has been invited to participate in several exhibitions, some of which stand out, such as the individual show "Paraíso", Uma Certa Falta de Coerência Gallery (2014), the collective exhibition "Bienal da Maia Lugares de Viagem", Maia Forum (2015), where she presented the installation works "As Nossas Arestas" and "Paraíso", as well as the collective show "Desobedoc – Mostra de Cinema Insubmisso", Batalha cinema, curated by José Maia, where she presented the work "Quando é Amanhã?". In 2016, she participated in the following exhibitions: "Um Par – Um Impar", with the artist Silvestre Pestana, Teixeira Lopes Museum; "Em Construção", with the artist Pedro Ruiz, Espaço Mira, curated by José Maia; and at the collective exhibition "Caminhos da Floresta: Sobre Arte, Técnica e Natureza", CIAJG, Guimarães, curated by Nuno Faria. She participated in the Biennials / International Editions "Incisione Al Feminine 2017" (Naples), curated by Verónica Longo; "O Livro de Artista" (Bahia), curated by Daniela Stelle; and "Di Carta / Papermade Art Work (Schio), curated by Valeria Bertesina.

Daniela Angelucci

Associate Professor at Università Roma Tre, main editor of the magazine *Lebenswelt. Aesthetics and philosophy of experience*, board member of *Fata Morgana. Quadrimestrale di cine e visioni* and of the editorial board of the *Estetica e critica* series (Quodlibet). In 2016 she organized the 9th *Deleuze Studies Conference*. Published several books: *Arte e Daimon* (ed.), Quodlibet, Macerata, 2002; *L'oggetto po-*

etico, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2004; *Estética e cinema* (ed.), Il Mulino, Bolonha, 2009; *Deleuze e i concetti del cinema*, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2012 (english translation: *Deleuze and the Concepts of Cinema*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2014); *Filosofia del cinema*, Carocci, Roma, 2013.

Daniel Folha

Degree in Physics / Applied Mathematics from the Faculty of Sciences of the Oporto University (FCUP), in 1992. He obtained his Master's (MSc) in Astrophysics from the University of London (United Kingdom) in 1993 and his PhD in 1998 from the same university, having conducted the work leading to both degrees in the Physics Department of Queen Mary & Westfield College (now Queen Mary, University of London). Astronomer at the Center for Astrophysics at the Oporto University (CAUP), since 1998, and at the Institute of Astrophysics and Space Sciences (IA), since the beginning of 2015, when this research unit was created from CAUP and the Center for Astronomy and Astrophysics of the University of Lisbon (CAAUL). Since 2005 he has been Assistant Professor at the University Institute of Health Sciences (IUCS), being responsible for the curricular units in the area of Physics at its different undergraduate and master (integrated cycle) degrees. He has been, since October 2014, Executive Director of the Porto Planetarium – Centro Ciência Viva.

Daniel Moreira & Rita Castro Neves

Portuguese artists who live and work in Porto. Although with autonomous exhibition paths they have been working collaboratively since 2015. Daniel Moreira holds a degree in Architecture. In 2000 he began a multidisciplinary path between architecture, illustration and fine arts. Rita Castro Neves, after finishing the Advanced Photography

Course at Ar.Co, Lisbon, and the Master in Fine Art at the Slade School of Fine Arts, London, started a regular artistic activity, a teaching practice (currently at the Oporto Faculty of Fine Arts) and also curatorial work (mainly in the area of performance). With "Laking", presented in 2015 at the invitation of the Finnish art space Oksasenkatu 11, they began a long project concerning landscape representation, in which they reflect, through drawing, photography and video, in the form of installation, on different artistic techniques and cultures, territory, scale and pathway. They presented their projects at the Bang Bang gallery (Lisbon, 2016), Oitavo gallery (Porto, 2017), José Rodrigues Foundation (Porto, 2017), Sputnik The Window (Porto, 2017), Image Museum / Braga Image Meetings (Braga, 2017), Colégio das Artes (Coimbra, 2017) and at the Bolsa de Arte gallery (São Paulo, 2017). In August 2017 they were in artistic residence at the Paulo Reis Residence of Ateliê Fidalga, São Paulo, where they presented a collective exhibition. In the following month they made a study trip to Japan, under a Orient Foundation Short-Study Scholarship. They are preparing individual exhibitions to be held at the Geological Museum and the Medeiros and Almeida House-Museum, Lisbon, as well as a collective exhibition at Paço Imperial, Rio de Janeiro (2018).

Eduarda Neves

Degree in Philosophy and PhD in Aesthetics. Assistant Professor, ESAP. Principal Investigator at CEEA – Art and Critical Studies Research Group, since 2013. Independent Curator. Her research and curatorial activity crosses the fields of art, philosophy and politics. Conceived the following projects: "A Few Reasons For A Non-Dismissive Art" (2014–2015) and "Correspondences" (2016–17), presented in Portugal, Spain, Germany and Malta, with the support of DGARTES / Portuguese Ministry of Culture. Curator

of element EARTH in the exhibition project "Quatro Elementos / Four Elements", Galeria Municipal, Porto (2017). Recent curatorial projects: "Fault Line" (Casa dos Crivos / Convento de S. Francisco) and "A alguns passos como se estivesse muito longe", Encontros da Imagem, Braga and Porto (2017); "A.A.R.", Espaço Mira (Porto) and "Hors-Série", in EX14 (Dresden), Izolyatsia (Kiev), KUB (Leipzig), Centercourt (Munich), LLLLLL (Vienna), Folie Sandrin and Villa Belleville (Paris), in 2018. Last book published: "O Auto-Retrato. Fotografia e Subjectivação" [Self-Portrait. Photography and Subjectivation]. Lisbon: Ed. Palimpsesto | CEEA, 2016 [short listed at the PEN CLUB prize, in the Essay category, 2017]. Preparing the book "Bestiários. Ensaios sobre Arte Contemporânea" [Bestiaries. Essays on Contemporary Art]. She is currently director of ESAP – Oporto Art School.

João Tabarra

Studied photography at Ar.Co – Center for Art and Visual Communication. He currently lives and works in Lisbon. He began exhibiting regularly in the late 1980s and consolidated a path with relevant national and international exhibition projects, both individually and collectively. He is represented in prestigious institutional and private collections, in Portugal and abroad. He continues to develop and present his work in parallel with numerous requests for conferences, debates and master classes at internationally acknowledged Institutions. He is professor of Moving Image at the Media Arts Department of HGK – Karlsruhe University of Arts and Design, Karlsruhe, Germany.

Marcus Steinweg

Born in 1971, he lives and works as a philosopher and artist in Berlin. Professor at the Karlsruhe Art Academy. Books recently

published: "Behauptungsphilosophie" (Berlin: Merve 2006); "Duras", with Rosemarie Trockel (Berlin: Merve: 2008); "Politik des Subjekts" (Zurich/Berlin: Diaphanes, 2009); "Aporien der Liebe" (Berlin: Merve, 2010); "Kunst und Philosophie / Art and Philosophy" (Cologne: Walter König, 2012); "Philosophie der Überstürzung" (Berlin: Merve, 2013); "Evidenzterror" (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2015); "Gramsci Theater" (Berlin: Merve, 2016); "Splitter" (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2016); "Subjekt und Wahrheit" (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2018). Some of his books are published in English by MIT Press.

Miguel Gonçalves

He was born in 1978 in Porto. In 1996 he joined the Sciences Faculty of the Oporto University, in the Astronomy degree, taking part in numerous sessions to disseminate this area of knowledge. In 1997 he was invited for National Coordinator of *The Planetary Society*, the world's largest non-governmental space agency. In 2005 he joined the Almedina group where he was a bookseller, event and product manager. In 2010 he worked in the communication, commercial and publishing departments of a Portuguese publisher, leaving his position in October 2012. He signed a column in the journal *i* dedicated to space exploration for two years. He coordinated and presented a radio programme on books (Rádio Clube do Porto). Since October 2011, he coordinates and presents "A Última Fronteira" in the "Bom Dia Portugal" TV programme, at RTP, and he is also a commentator of "Jornal 2", at RTP2. He is a chronicler of "JN História" magazine.

Nuno Ramalho

Born in Portugal in 1975. He holds a BFA in Sculpture from the Fine Arts School of the Oporto University (1999), a master's degree in New Genres from the San Francisco Art Institute (2008), and in 2011

he began his doctorate research in art at Goldsmiths College, London, expected to be concluded at the Fine Arts School of the Oporto University in 2019. Since 1999 he has been developing his work in the field of visual arts, individually and in collaboration with other artists, in areas such as drawing, installation, sculpture, performance, sound, video and curatorial practices. He has held 17 solo exhibitions, 5 of which in collaboration with fellow artists, and participated in more than 60 group shows in Portugal, Brazil, Spain, the United States, Norway, the United Kingdom, Russia and Germany. He was the curator of 7 exhibitions, and since 2016 he is the programmer of the Portuguese video art project "Playlist", with 23 shows already produced and presented. Together with Isabel Ribeiro and Susana Chiocca, he was responsible for the "Human Resources" program, a series of talks dedicated to the public presentation and discussion of works and creation processes by artists. His work is represented in institutional collections such as CAV – Visual Arts Centre or the Serralves Foundation, as well as in several private collections. In 2002 he was an artist-in-residence at Triangle France, Marseille, and in 2004 he was one of the nominees for the EDP Young Artists award. Between 2006 and 2008 he received a Fulbright / FCC Scholarship, and the Louise Woods Memorial Scholarship. He was also a fellow of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation between 2011 and 2015. From 2000 to 2005 he collaborated with the education department of the Serralves Museum. He was responsible for the Drawing I and Drawing II workshops at the António Ferreira Gomes Cultural Institute between 2003 and 2005. He lives and works in Oporto and is represented by Graça Brandão gallery, Lisbon.

Nuno Vieira

Nuno Vieira – Born in Porto. Artist. Degree in Visual Arts – Photography at ESAP,

Oporto Art School. Collaborates with Estelita Mendonça, K L A R and Reality Studio. He has published works on national and international platforms such as: *Prinçipal*, *Coeval*, *SIN Zine*, *Under Pressure* and *U-mag*. Currently lives and works from the city Porto. Participated in the collective exhibition "Projectos_Processos_Propriedades", Espaço MIRA, 2017.

Orazio Irrera

Lecturer at the University Paris 8 Philosophy Department. Programme Director of the Collège International de Philosophie. Co-director of the *material foucaultiani* magazine. Research areas: political philosophy, contemporary philosophy, postcolonial and decolonial studies, subaltern epistemologies, ideology theories. He is editor and author of a vast work, which can be accessed at www.philosophie.univ-paris8.fr/spip.php?article1216

Sérgio Leitão

Advanced Visual Arts Program and PhD (FBAPv/UVIGO); Degree in Fine Arts (ESAP); Independent Visual Arts Program (Maumaus); Gasthof Program (Stadelschule); Sculpture / Photography (Ar.Co) and Videoart (CAM_Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation) programs. Exhibitions (selection): "Atomok Kódexe", Vasarely Museum (Budapest); "Gli Oratori_The Speakers", GAA & ECC Foundations (Leiden & Amsterdam) / Palazzo Bembo (Venice); "The Metro-nome or Backwards Translation", Landscape Formation One (Fribourg); "Lieux de la folie ordinaire", Villa Belleville (Paris); "www_von einbahnstraße zur freiheitsallee", LLLLLL (Vienna); "Dynamo", Centercourt (Munich); "In Girum III _ the beginnings, the diversions, the fallout and the promise", Planetarium (Porto); "Szenario für einem sitzenden mann + Fünf

finger hat die hand, Galerie KUB (Leipzig); "САД РОЗГАЛУЖЕНИХ СТЕЖОК", Izolyatsia (Kiev); "Tempo, Tempo, Stoppzeit! Kleines Szenario für ein Kraftwerk", EX14 (Dresden); "La vie au grand air", Espaço Mira (Porto); "Fault Line", Encontros da Imagem (Braga); "Quatro Elementos", Galeria Municipal (Porto); "Synonymy Scope [III_IV]", Cent Quatre / Jacobs (Paris); "Repertorio Ornamentale [Il-Belt] / Paradise Now", Malta Contemporary Art (La Valletta); "Wie Sich Das Von Westfalen Unterscheidet / Synonymie-Bereich II", Rosalux (Berlin); "Beyond Parallel Park", Sala X (Pontevedra); "Time And Time Again [II]", Galeria NovaOgiva (Óbidos); "Il faut que vous soyez prêt a partir", Museu de Faro (Faro); "Synonymy Scope / La diplopie discernante", Galeria Escudeiros (Beja); "Como isto é diferente da Vestefália", Museu das Comunicações (Lisbon); "Tomorrow is Another Fine Day", Casa das Artes (Porto); "In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni", CAAA Centre for Art and Architecture Affairs (Guimarães); "Gasthof", in the context of "Manifesta", org. Stadelschule (Frankfurt), Landproject (Chiang Mai), Protoacademy (Edinburgh), Institute For Contemporary Art (Moscow), Kulturni Centar (Belgrade), Manifesta Foundation (Amsterdam). Exhibitions 2019–21: Notgalerie (Vienna), Detroit (Stockholm), Galerie Oü (Marseille), in the context of next "Manifesta", among other projects in Athens, Bilbao, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Cork, Karlsruhe, Lisbon, Porto, Sicily, Valencia and Vigo. Selected for the portuguese representation at CPLP Biennial. Internacional FCT Grant for art studies, dir. Alberto Ruiz de Samaniego (2009–13). SHUTTLE Grant for the exhibition "Gli Oratori _ The Speakers", Venice (2019).

Thiago Rocha Pitta

Lives and works in São Paulo, Brazil. He was the winner of the awards Marcantonio Vilaça, Brazil (2005) and Open Your Mind,

Switzerland (2009). In 2011 he was one of the finalists of the EFG Bank Award & ArtNexus Acquisition Award Nomination. In 2014 he participated in the artistic residence program Circulating AiR, organized by Stiftelsen 3,14, Norway. He presented individual exhibitions at the Pampulha Art Museum, Belo Horizonte, Brazil (2002); Arts Initiative Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan (2008); Meyer Riegger, Karlsruhe, Germany (2009); Parque Lage, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2010); Projecto Solo, ARCO, Madrid, Spain (2011); Banco do Brasil Cultural Center, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2011); Andersen's Contemporary, Copenhagen, Denmark (2012); Igreja Santa Maria Incononata and Gluck50 Gallery, both in Milan, Italy (2013); Galeria Millan, São Paulo, Brazil (2014) and Marianne Boesky Gallery, New York, USA (2017), among others. Major collective exhibitions at Fondation Cartier pour L'art Contemporain, Paris, France (2005); PS1-MoMa, New York, USA (2006); Banco do Brasil Cultural Center, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2008); Galería Fundación / Colección Jumex, Mexico City, Mexico (2009); Migros Museum Für Gegenwartskunst, Zurich, Switzerland (2011); Hara Museum of Contemporary Art, Tokyo, Japan (2012); Künstlerhaus Bethanien, Berlin, Germany (2012); Sorø Kunstmuseum, Sorø, Denmark (2013); Museu de Arte Moderna do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2013); Museu de Arte Moderna de S. Paulo, Brazil (2016) and Moco – Montpellier Contemporain, Montpellier, France (2018). He participated in the 5th and 9th editions of the Mercosul Biennial, Porto Alegre, Brazil (2005 / 2013) and the 30th São Paulo Biennial, Brazil (2012). His works include the following public collections: MoMA PS1, New York, USA; Maison Européene de la Photographie, Paris, France; Hara Museum, Tokyo, Japan; Patricia Pelphs of Cisneros, New York, USA; Colección Jumex, Mexico City, among others.

Colophon

Title

Without Imago Mundi,
A Random Diversion Instead

Texts

Carlos Vidal, Daniel Folha,
Daniela Angelucci, Eduarda Neves,
Marcus Steinweg, Miguel Gonçalves
and Orazio Irrera.

Artists

Alexandra Costa, Ana Guimarães,
Celeste Cerqueira, Daniel Moreira, João
Tabarra, Nuno Ramalho, Nuno Vieira,
Rita Castro Neves, Sérgio Leitão, Thiago
Rocha Pitta and Tiago Veloso Dias.

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