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NATO'S POSSIBLE EVOLUTION  
CONSIDERING THE FUTURE  
EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE

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## NATO'S POSSIBLE EVOLUTION CONSIDERING THE FUTURE EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE (\*)

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I am grateful for the invitation to speak before the Instituto da Defesa Nacional and for the margin of liberty which the suggested title of my presentation leaves me. It is an invitation to be speculative and I gladly seize the opportunity to speak without the normal constraints of office. Indeed, I am proposing to convey a largely personal perspective.

NATO cannot be static. As an Organisation whose task it is to produce security for its member countries, it must react swiftly and with great sensitivity to changing security environments. Over the last few years the premises of European security have changed fundamentally and dramatically. The Atlantic Alliance has undergone a transformation of corresponding dimension. It is still transforming in a way that is a drastic departure from the more static years of the Cold War period. NATO's conceptual response to change evolved in 1989 and 1990, and the high-level communiques and declarations of that period are the guideposts of this change. The London Summit Declaration of July 1990 in particular epitomises the transformation of the Alliance. This document, perhaps more than others from recent years, outlines the Alliance's response to a period of tremendous opportunities which nevertheless still holds accompanying risks. Furthermore, the London Declaration demonstrates that the Alliance has taken on with considerable enthusiasm the task of not only reacting, but shaping actively with the combined weight of its membership and force the changed environment. NATO is adjusting to new security conditions, but also it has contributed in a major way to the changes in Europe and it will continue to do so.

One of the primary challenges and chances NATO faces is to shape the future European political architecture as an important part of the Continent's transformation. While structures crumble in the East of the Con-

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continent, the tremendous stability Western institution — and before all, the Atlantic Alliance — have instilled into the Western half of the Continent must now be strengthened, and their effect be made instrumental for stabilisation of the entire Continent. Pragmatic architectural and institutional reactions to change are not enough, however. A far-sighted conceptual approach is needed. We are facing a unique historical situation constellation that in which the process of transforming the Alliance coincides with the new dynamism of the movement towards European integration and the emergence of a common West European political and security policy. This is truly a historical opportunity to participate in the long-term shaping of the transatlantic relationship, the solidity of our security and defence, and, at the same time, European political union. The further transformation of the Alliance and the emergence of the united Europe must be tackled in unison.

I will revert to this central theme of my presentation further on, but before doing so I find it necessary to illuminate the political and security background of NATO's evolving roles and functions. Such a critical inquiry seems to be particularly pertinent at the present time, when we are witnessing challenging events that in part unexpectedly becloud the clear sky of a more optimistic world view which has come so much to the fore during the last several years.

1989 and 1990 have been years of tremendous hope and achievement, profoundly changing the perceptions of Europeans and Americans alike about the future of Europe, about their security requirements, and about the way in which the governance of our Continent could be secured for a long and happy future period. This general perception is now going through a period of shock. No doubt, we are witnessing a gruesome test of our most cherished assumptions about the future, by history. The recent political events in the Soviet Union, the sobering political and economic difficulties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the conflict in the Gulf with its spectre of new threats, and new global problems and instabilities, suddenly loom over us as major threats to a Europe whole and free, reviving the memories of less amenable periods and seemingly putting a question-mark behind a good many of NATO's newly defined policies. As such, should we put the NATO machinery in reverse? Have we been

unduly optimistic, perhaps even reckless? Should we alter the course, or are its long-term directions correct?

Let me perform three mental steps to reply to these queries, in an effort to probe the solidity of the ground on which new European architectures are being built:

- First, I would like to conceptualise about the political changes on the Continent, exploring the long-term sustainability of the trend set in motion in the last few years.
- Second, I would like to pinpoint the essential transformations undergone so far by NATO.
- Third, I would like to pit the current harsh tests of history against this emerging Alliance and its underlying assumptions in order to assess future opportunities and risks.

The pivotal event of post-war European history is the collapse of the Soviet empire with all its manifestations, — its social and economic system, its ideology, and its quest for world power. The Soviet Union has undertaken a strategic retreat from its forward-placed bastion in the heart of Europe, and has allowed the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to emancipate themselves from Soviet hegemony and to adopt autonomous democratic systems, in essence eliminating the WTO and COMECON. Germany is united and has recentred the whole of Europe, allowing the Continent to find once again its cultural and historic unity. The Soviet Union has relinquished most of its power ambitions around its periphery and in the Third World. Redefining its long-term interests, the Soviet Union has replaced a policy of destabilisation at world scale by a quest for stability, confrontation by co-operation, and the exercise of hegemonial power based on reckless overarmament by a far-reaching redimensioning of its military instrument through arms control, and unilateral reductions and withdrawals.

These crucial Soviet events, not gainsaid by recent developments, must, however, be seen as part of a larger world transformation. It is the economic and technological interdependence of a shrinking world and the international economic system created by the West that have demonstrated the futility and lack competitiveness of centrally administered, highly ideologised economic systems, and that have brought the Soviet Union to its demise. There

is a growing perception worldwide that a quest for power of hegemonial proportions cannot be based uniquely on military power. Economic and technological imperatives lead to more open systems, emphasising free individual and collective choices, and thus increasingly to democracy and political reform. There is a changing perception on the part of people everywhere about war and peace, and about the use of military power that, along with the prohibitive long-term cost, has doomed the Soviet quest for hegemony through a system that has been spending roughly 25 per cent of its collective revenue on weapons and military activities.

These are large-scale transformations of the state system and of the way in which power is exercised. In this huge reconfiguration of the post-war world certain trends seem to be well established, arguably resisting fundamental reversal or undoing: that state power in order to endure needs to be based increasingly on economic and technological predominance rather than the accumulation of weapons; that interdependence as the primary prerequisite for mutual progress will require more co-operative policies rather than confrontation; that great power wars are counter-productive, and that betting on military prowess alone will be self-defeating in terms of power gain; and that democracy and free choice, as they are linked to prosperity and value optimisation, will be even less repressible than in the past.

These insights, no doubt, have been at the base of NATO's new profession of faith in favour of a co-operative system of European politics and security, as it has emerged over the last two or three years, based on age-old teachings of NATO — not least the Harmel principle — and accompanying evolution of European politics.

NATO's reaction, its move towards «a transformed Alliance», as particularly evidenced in the London Summit Declaration, can be conveniently captured under 3 headings: a new Europe, a new defence, a new overriding concept of security.

As the erstwhile dividing lines in Europe are fading away, the Continent gains a new consciousness of its cultural and historical unity. The East-West dichotomy loses its meaning as the gigantic array of military forces, formerly stacked against both sides of a military demarcation line, disappears. Indeed, the new Europe can no longer be conceptualised in terms of an East-West antagonism. European politics of our time do not

continue to aim at a *modus vivendi* between East and West, but at constructing new partnerships and relations between all countries of a Continent that is now seen as one geographical entity. In this vein, the Alliance has gone on the record, in the Joint Declaration of the 22 members of NATO and of the erstwhile Warsaw Treaty which states that both groups will no longer consider themselves to be adversaries. In this regard, NATO has established diplomatic relations with all countries of the Warsaw Treaty, and the lively diplomatic traffic that has set in does not only enable fruitful exchanges of views, but is also increasingly leading to new co-operative projects and an infinite variety of contacts, political, military and economic, that foreshadow a totally new relationship between the various components of the Continent. The Paris Charter and the institutionalisation of the CSCE, along the lines NATO nations have advocated and pioneered, epitomises the new Europe as it grows together.

Re-thinking defence, the Alliance has taken stock of the radical alteration of the security environment in which it operates. With the strategic retreat of the Soviet armies from the heart of Europe and the establishment of parity levels of all major weapon systems — exactly those that had conferred an unlimited invasion capability to Warsaw Pact Troops in the past — the threat under which the Alliance has laboured for many decades has now in large measure gone away, and it is the assessment of NATO's Military Authorities that an all-out war on the NATO area by the Soviet Union, now without its former allies, is neither plausible nor in real terms militarily feasible. Judging by the purely military capabilities that will survive the recent arms control agreements, even partial conventional threats to the Allies are considerably reduced. Options implying concentrations of forces in one Soviet TVD — in breach of the Vienna CFE agreement —, with holding operations in other theatres, might theoretically permit either a deep penetration on one axis, or more shallow penetrations on several axes. But even then, the Soviet Union would not be able to generate and bring forward the follow-on forces necessary to achieve the deep strategic objectives postulated in previous threat assessments. The strategic retreat from the centre of Europe, the political determination of the newly revived democracies in Central Europe, the increasing emancipation of the Republics, and the declining levels of social integration and general infrastructure throughout the country — prerequisites for any major form of modern

warfare — combine to degrade the former threat. In sum, there are still non-negligible possibilities for limited action on the flanks and perhaps at isolated axes along the central region. The Soviet Union — and perhaps even Russia itself — will continue to remain the most potent military power in Europe. But the need to maintain defence at its former levels, geared to instant combat readiness, belongs to the past. A radical re-thinking of defence is required and the Alliance's integrated force structure and strategy will change fundamentally, fielding smaller and restructured active forces. These will, however, be highly mobile and versatile and steps will be taken to regenerate force strengths from the lower levels in accordance with available response time should a new threat from the Soviet side ever emerge. NATO is quickly turning into an Alliance that finds that can do without a specific, predetermined enemy and without a defined threat, shifting the emphasis of its defence from instant combat readiness to the prudent provision against future unspecified risks. NATO's new strategy, as it is presently elaborated, will incorporate these novel insights.

The third conceptual transformation NATO is undergoing concerns the way it looks at security.

In the Cold War period, under the immediate impression of an overwhelming military threat coming from the East, NATO's approach to security had necessarily become uni-dimensional; the single, overriding, dominant threat forced the Allies to muster its strength solely against one variant of danger.

Under the more benign current circumstances of a largely reduced threat we can discard this somewhat impoverished view and ask ourselves the broader, more long-term questions of what security is about in essence, and how it can best and most reliably be fostered. In this thinking process that leads towards a more multi-dimensional security concept there is from the onset a higher emphasis on the political dimensions of security. Realising anew that the political constitution and societal development of a nation have much to do with its inclination to be menacing, or, conversely, to tend towards co-operative, peaceful behaviour, the Allies have thrown their collective political weight behind the political reforms in Central and Eastern Europe in order to bring about a war-free and threat-free environment along the East-West axis.

Security is also seen as less antagonistic. Instead of conceptualising in terms of forces pitted against each other, the insight grows that diverse national interests can in large measure effectively be co-ordinated through co-operative behaviour, avoiding the negative imaging and corresponding arms escalation that characterised the Cold War period. Under the emerging new East-West relationship, the co-operative dimension of security may never entirely be able to replace the traits of an adversarial relationship, but it can help to make it increasingly more amenable and benign.

Finally, and this needs hardly to be stressed at the present time, there is a growing awareness that security cannot be geographically compartmentalised within the confines of the erstwhile East-West framework, but that there are broader risks and conflict potentials which translate into new important contingencies for all Allies and which will place the Alliance before new security responsibilities.

Thus, a new multi-dimensional concept of security emerges that is of course not the private property of NATO's in-house thinkers. It is simultaneously broadly reflected in popular perceptions and academic literature and is in line with the new challenges that characterise the world security picture.

Under this broader security thinking the Allies will pursue policies that will increasingly use political instruments, confidence-building, arms control and the careful implementation of new arms control regimes through verification, military contacts and the building of new European political structures, as tools of their security policy, along with their traditional military panoply.

The determining parameter of European security — though at considerably lower levels of relevance — will for the foreseeable time be the Soviet Union. Hence, the maintenance of military security and the prudent provision for the regeneration of an adequate level of forces in case of a re-emergence of a major military threat will remain a primary Alliance task; even though less prominent in the future, it continue to be indispensable.

The security assignment of the decades to come is, however, not only the prudent counter-balancing of residual Soviet military power. In the future, the Alliance will have to focus more strongly on the new insta-

bilities and risks, both in the Eastern half of the Continent and in a larger geographical framework.

In the face of the danger of fragmentation in these parts of Europe, where established multi-ethnic societies break down and are being reconfigured, the Allies need to contribute to new ethnic equilibria and the realisation of self-determination. They need to cope with the overspill of internal unrest, and must harness prudently the latent conflict potentials that exist, lest they explode into actual hostilities. These new security tasks can no longer be approached in terms of traditional threat images and techniques of conflict solution through military combat.

Thinking merely in categories of antagonistic struggle and use of force does not contribute adequately to meeting emerging new challenges.

The security policy of the future must thus be a novel mix of political and economic strategies, along with the military. The focus of NATO's defence accordingly shifts in considerable measure to tasks of crisis prevention and crisis management, dealing with new problems and requiring new solutions.

Acute crises in Central and Eastern Europe, even through they may involve the use of force only within national contexts, without an immediate danger of international conflict, would not leave the Alliance indifferent, as they would occur in a Europe that rapidly grows together. Yet, on the other hand, there is no built-in logic that would imply the war-like use of Allied or European forces.

Through a broad spectrum of co-operative activities and measures to contain crises, military forces will nevertheless have a role to play by providing reassurance, by contributing to de-escalation of conflicts, by preventing spillover effects and the acute breakout of major hostile action. In sum, there emerges a new role of the military in peace and crisis, and for the purpose of graduated crisis response, that will also shape the new strategy.

The co-operative dimension of security and the techniques of mastery of crisis through the stabilising peace-time use of the military factor must indeed be considered an integral part of a broader new Alliance strategy that corresponds to the likely spectrum of future crises and conflicts. With such an outlook the Alliance would move from the traditional task of staving off immediate war to the ideal of a protected peace, in which

a Europe released from the rigorous bondage of hostile blocks can be durably managed. I would submit that such a view of military tasks and strategy would also benefit the Alliance well in the interest of the plausibility and public acceptance of its tasks.

This concludes my nutshell overview of the Transformed Alliance. I see the NATO of the future perform a stabilising role in a more co-operative, more benign, yet not risk-free world and European environment. Under the generally promising auspices of a relative devaluation of the military factor, the Alliance will be compelled to maintain its military base-load, yet take on additional political tasks. As a provider of reassurance, it will play an active role in the management of peace, while fostering change in the direction of new levels of stability in a Europe whole and free, and a new European security equation.

Are these basic new options invalidated by what I earlier called the harsh tests of history? Is the transformed Alliance in a position to meet the new challenges that now so glaringly present themselves in the limelight of daily media coverage? Let us examine them one by one.

In the new Central and Eastern European democracies the euphoria of liberation has been replaced by a more sober insight into the requirements of reform and the partial destabilisation of the economic and political process which it necessarily entails. The «Spring time of nations», of which Sir Michael Howard has spoken, is over and nations have discovered the tremendous long-term damage of decades of communist government to their production apparatus, their infrastructure and the minds of those whose natural instincts have been forcibly suppressed. They realise the tragic heritage of Marxist rule and recognise the herculean nature of bringing about overall systemic change. There is no wonder that the dimensions of this endeavour often stifle initiative and enthusiasm. Political expectations and economic feasibility diverge, prosperity, seemingly in reach, turns into a Fata Morgana. Disappointments and impatience grow in many quarters. There is a loss of perspective. While the timetables for the fulfilment of hopes become blurred, reversals of political achievements and instability beckon. There is a real danger that long-term wealth differentials in Europe will revive old tension — internal and in the mutual relationship of states — and imperil frontiers that in the past had been arbitrarily cut.

The potential for crisis and conflict that grows from the sobering state of these reforming systems cannot be underestimated. Added to the inadequacies of the reform process, there is the explosive effect of a new quest for self-determination in multinational societies — specifically in the Soviet Union — with the danger that insular mentalities and tribal instincts become the determinants for policy making. Along with growing wealth differentials a fragmentation of the European map threatens, posing the question of the very manageability and governance of Europe.

Concern is in order, but these calamities also harbour the promise of more fundamental economic restructuring, the opportunity for creative and active policies. If the transition is painful and disruptive, there is also the prospect of deep-reaching renewal and a new beginning. For the West, for NATO and West European economic entities, there is only one policy choice to make: to heighten support for the reforms, and to proceed with ever more intensive co-operation. In a time of difficult transition, the perception of belonging to a new, undivided Europe is crucial. Demonstrations of solidarity are vital. Thus the new critical phase, which Central and Eastern Europe traverse, indeed provides a test for Allied nations but also provides an impetus to persevere. These crises can be mastered, even though longer timeframes may be required.

In the Soviet Union, which provides an even graver test, recent events reveal an intense power struggle. With the Union leadership trying to shore up the hollow power of the Centre vis-à-vis sprawling quests for autonomy, leadership patterns have swung back, and there is greater reliance on old power structures that still demonstrate a high degree of inertia vis-à-vis reform. The new assertiveness of the military and the accompanying slow-down in arms control and military reform are of particular concern as tanks in Lithuania earlier this year conjure up the evil spirits of the past. Information is being curtailed, signs of civil life are once again emerging and before the background of economic chaos and the collapse of infrastructure and supply patterns the leadership is returning to an administrative command system which makes the orderly progress of some vital reforms increasingly doubtful.

The current situation in the Soviet Union has a potential for large-scale civil unrest, and the temporary or more permanent return to authoritarian rule cannot be excluded, even though its patent purpose may be

to consolidate an otherwise extremely unstable domestic situation, threatened by disintegration, and to consolidate reform and smoothen its course. History is not linear and the open-ended political development in the Soviet Union is beyond our powers of prediction. Moderate attempts, in line with the human rights obligations of Helsinki and the imperatives of the Paris Charter, to establish law and order and to guarantee the state monopoly of the use of force would be legitimate, but remain extremely difficult to control, especially in a period of expected further economic decline, perhaps of dramatic proportions.

Several aspects need to guide our judgement of this new phase of Soviet developments. In the first place, it deserves to be noted that Soviet foreign policy has so far been mildly affected by the new tendencies. In spite of the recent difficulties with implementing the Vienna arms control agreements, the Soviet leadership emphasises its continued co-operative attitude: in the exercise of its diplomatic relationship with NATO; in the moves towards ratification of important East-West treaties, including the 2+4 package concerning Germany; and in its overall behaviour in the Gulf crisis and vis-à-vis the UN. Where one could accuse the Soviet Union to have waived on its Gulf policy one could explain its behaviour as a legitimate exploitation of its margin of political manoeuvre, legitimate for a world power which can hardly afford to be seen as merely hanging on to US coat tails. The military threat emanating from the Soviet Union—or, to phrase it more correctly—the residual military risk has not objectively risen despite the new assertiveness of the military; and processes of military restructuring and budgetary build-down and conversion have, for all we know, been continued.

There is thus no reason at this time to indulge in gloom and doom scenarios. Indeed, there may be a long-term basis for relative optimism.

- Fundamental elements of the Perestroika process have become irreversible, as has the Soviet strategic retreat from Central and Eastern Europe. A policy of repression could throw the country into a long-drawn period of civil strife, but it could not suppress the ongoing emancipation of the Soviet Republics and of democratic movements.
- The fundamental redefinition of vital Soviet long-term interests in favour of international co-operation cannot be undone, lest the

Soviet Union would consciously wish to sink into a morass of administrative incompetence and perhaps into an irretrievable decline of its technological prowess and infrastructure.

- The implementation of these vital interests in favour of co-operation cannot be partial. The Soviet Union has already been drawn into an overriding framework of all-European rules of conduct. Partial violation will make this whole edifice of political and economic co-operation collapse. The Soviet leadership must know that the co-operative policies on which the future performance of the entire system depends are predicated upon its compliance with this code of conduct. Its benefits will not accrue if violence, infringement of human rights, new manifestations of military ambitions and the abandonment of real reform become the principal tenets of attempts at internal restructuring. In the longer term perspective, a fortiori, at a time of unprecedented permeability of frontiers through modern means of communication, a sterile ideology has lost its credibility and can no longer justify the exercise of raw power.

The crucial fact is that Soviet and Western interests in the maintenance of co-operation coincide and will continue to do so. Neither side has a choice and both must endeavour to bring about the increasing integration of the Soviet Union in Europe, preventing and overcoming temptations to self-isolation which would mean a fall into the bottomless pit of poverty and loss of technological prowess. The West has the unique chance to shape and influence Soviet policies. It can invoke the phenomenon of world-wide interdependence as well as commitments the Soviet Union has undertaken. It can also hold out the fruits of its more performing economic and social system as a reward for ongoing and hopefully successful reform.

There is thus no reason and no way for Allied countries to deviate from the basic orientation of policy. Vigilance, especially in the military field, and a continued outstretched hand of co-operation and friendship will need to guide our future policies with conviction and clarity of objective.

A third disconcerting test to the newly established orientations of the Alliance results from the current Gulf crisis, — not perhaps from the unique military features of the conflict, initiated by a monstrosity and quite singularly overarmed medium power, but from the whole range of new con-

tingencies which the Allies are likely to face around the Southern periphery of its territory, and more generally in the countries of the Third World. Indeed, it is important to see both the unique features of the current Middle East conflict and the newly emerging conflict potentials which underly the conflict and which are increasingly revealed as it unfolds, heralding the crisis spectrum that is likely to characterise the onset of the 21st century.

President Bush is right in saying that the unprecedented unity of the larger community of states that have combined their forces to combat aggression has made the war a test for the emergence of a new, more harmonious world order characterised by the increasing futility of great power war, by growing interdependence of states, by a new respect for the tenets of the Charter of the United Nations and for the UN instruments of conflict settlement and peace keeping, and by extension of a new paradigm of co-operation to the larger world community. The catch word of the «new world order» captures this partly real, partly still utopian world model which is powerful enough to enlist a global effort. Yet, this new paradigm of international affairs obviously contrasts with the conflict potentials that rear their ugly head beyond the Gulf war: ethnic and religious strife, increasing wealth differentials, environmental and climatological change and the huge migrations which may be set in motion by poverty and inadequate economic policies. The spectre of the huge cities of the Third World in which ethnic and religious conflicts, poverty and hopelessness combine into an explosive cocktail, awakening new aggressiveness throughout whole nations cannot be dismissed by any realistic observer. The new world order and the threat of world disorder are locked in a dialectic struggle. New military technologies with long-range effects and economic interdependence both bring home to the Allied countries the fragility and vulnerability of an environment in which the removal of the Soviet military threat has only partly contributed to making the world a safer place.

NATO countries cannot close their eyes to these new conflict potentials. A broader security concept must take into account these new contingencies. The Allies will increasingly have to learn to broaden their vision and to countenance a new risk that drives at the core security of Allied countries in a way that different from the traditional threat, but not less menacing to long-term survival.

At the same time, the different quality of these new contingencies must be carefully analysed. The sudden overwhelming military onslaught on NATO territory no longer appears to be the likely challenge but a more subtle collision with security interests through crisis and instability. The means to cope with the newly emerging risk spectrum will, therefore, lie both in the political and military field. Politically, in a crisis prevention mode, it will be increasingly important to attack regional root causes of tension, to provide a credible response to Islamic aspirations, to dispel the new phenomena of diffusion of power to smaller states which gain over-proportionate leverage through the acquisition of certain dangerous weapons. In crisis prevention and crisis management, military forces with rapid reaction characteristics will play a role in terms of carefully dosed signals and regional deterrence, a new approach to arms transfer into regions of tensions and strife, a new approach to the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons will also need to be part of this analysis.

The traditional designation of security threats from outside the traditional East-West scenario has been the magic word «out-of-area», referring to the limited range of cases in which the mutual assistance clause of the NATO Treaty can be invoked. Indeed, under Articles V and VI of the Treaty collective military action on an obligatory level by the Alliance as such is limited to the case of armed attack against an Allied country or the defined sea area around Allied territory. The new contingencies may not necessarily involve a full-scale obligation for collective assistance, but will challenge the much broader notion of Allied security (Art. IV of the Treaty).

The huge post-crisis task of the Allies is to take stock of the new risk spectrum and of NATO's abilities to make its infrastructural, logistical and intelligence assets available for crisis management vis-à-vis the new contingencies. We will have to assess the need for specific rapid reaction forces for use by national or combined Allied action. This process of analysis and assessment of future needs has only just commenced. But it already deserves to be noted that throughout the Gulf crisis the Allies have closely consulted and have collectively protected Turkey from potential attack, thus acknowledging that NATO mechanisms and assets cannot only be invoked vis-à-vis the traditional threat but equally against threats from outside the East-West spectrum. NATO has not been a party to the Gulf conflict and war, but its assets and crisis management procedures have been used to a large degree. Solidarity

and political consultation have been provided in an unprecedented measure. Without Allied forces that were available under integrated command and training, and without their long-learned habit of interacting on the basis of common NATO procedures, the whole operation would not have been possible.

Whatever the dialectic relationship of world disorder and an emerging new world order, trends towards a more co-operative world management will gain increasing momentum. Here again, the basic new approach of Alliance policies fits in well with emerging security needs, much as they remain to be defined in detail.

The conclusion of this part of my presentation thus is clearly that there are major challenges before us. They appeal to our collective determination and ingenuity and they must be considered cues for earnest analysis and effort. But the tests can and will be met. On NATO's voyage to the future, the switches have been correctly thrown the formative period of 1989/90. The task is now to make sure that the course is kept, and that costly detours are avoided.

Let me now turn to the final portion of my presentation: NATO and the emerging European architecture. I have demonstrated how a wider, more political concept of security reposes on the stabilising effect of institutions, and the way in which they allow states to interact peacefully, intensely, and according to well-regulated procedures. Reordering the Continent through appropriate structures is to endow it with a new fabric of security and stability.

The first task in this respect is to extend the beneficial effects and stability gains which Western Europe has derived from the freely agreed structures that have taken hold since the Second World War. They have successfully cropped past excesses of sovereignty, smoothened the transition to modern statehood and efficient economies. NATO especially has created stability and reassurance, keeping the peace even under the most adverse circumstances, and enabling the increasing integration of the Western half of the Continent.

The task is now to maintain and amplify these achievements, to preserve the existing structures, but also to cater to new partners on a Continent that grows together under the auspices of openness and freedom. In this vein the concepts of a new European architecture and of a specific European security architecture fuse into a common, and overriding task.

Last December, NATO's Foreign Ministers agreed to a first conceptual outline of such an architecture. In their Communiqué of 18th December they established a vision of a *framework of interlocking institutions* in which the interests of all European states, with their partial overlap and partial divergence, can be fully accommodated. These institutions are to function on the basis of their own specificity, but also to complement one another, in a process of co-operation and mutual support. This *multi-dimensional approach* implies in the first instance, the rejection of any institutional monopolies. The idea of one overriding, all-encompassing pan-European security organisation in which existing security Alliances — NATO and the remnants the WTO — would graciously fuse, while esthetically pleasing to some, is thus discarded as futile and impractical. NATO proposes instead simultaneous support for several components, including the CSCE and the institutions of an emerging European security identity, with operational ties and synergistic effects between them.

By stipulating that no European state's interests must be left unattended to in such a composite architecture, NATO's Ministers have also endorsed the principle of non-marginalisation of any state in security matters, as an attribute of a Europe whole and free.

The lynch pin of the envisioned architecture, however, is NATO's own role. It is to contribute its unique stabilising influence to the functioning of the system. «Our Alliance», the December Statement reads, «will provide an essential underpinning to this architecture, guaranteeing the transatlantic dimension of security, providing effective defence for all the Allies, and contributing to an environment of stability in which democratic institutions can be firmly rooted».

Such a broad framework needs, of course, to be fleshed out by concrete steps and more detailed enunciations of principle. Roles must be assigned, and co-operation must be organised.

I will briefly explore the future relations of NATO with the CSCE, the West European institutions, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.

With regard to the CSCE, all Allies are determined to allow it, in its newly institutionalised form, to fully develop. A strengthened CSCE, NATO Ministers have stated, can encourage a new quality in the security relations of all CSCE states, in particular through its new high-level consultation mechanisms and its Conflict Prevention Centre.

There are many in which member states, but perhaps also NATO as an institution, can provide tangible support for the new CSCE in its formative phase; by way of example, in the interest of heightened transparency throughout Europe, NATO could establish a data link with the CPC designed to facilitate its task in arms control verification and confidence-building.

Whatever the hoped-for progress and increasing effectiveness of the CSCE — it tends at present to be viewed with a new degree of sober realism by all concerned. There is now a growing awareness that the CSCE will take a long time to mature, and that the large and diverse number of participating states, its consensus procedures, the absence of any tools of power and enforcement mechanisms will prevent it from playing in the near future the role of a true collective security system in Europe, as soon as fair weather turns to crisis.

This awareness, mixed with obvious regret, has become most acute in the Central European democracies which, only a short while ago, had been the eloquent advocates of a pan-European security structure based on the CSCE. Speaking recently, President Havel recommended a closer relationship of the CSR with NATO, which he called «the only functioning, democratic security structure on the Continent today». At the same time, he reiterated his support for the CSCE, in a sober appreciation of its merits and potential: «We are not giving up the idea of the CSCE process. But it appears we cannot *dream* of the future only». Havel's counterparts in Poland, Hungary or Romania have made similar statements.

All Allies — the US, Canada and Turkey included, to name just some erstwhile doubters — have now clearly opted for a European security and defense component to be incorporated in NATO, in support of the historic logic of the incipient political integration of Europe that results from the post-war process in Western Europe, and in order to adjust and rebalance the transatlantic relationship. The emergence of this European component is a necessary correlate to Europe's new role and responsibilities. But the Allies also agree that this European development, notwithstanding its autonomy and own dynamics, must be firmly anchored in, and compatible with, NATO. Mutual strengthening, not fragmentation is the order of the day.

The obvious difficulty lies in the different time scales. NATO exists — and changes, in building on a successful past; but a European security manifestation is only just in the making —, in the framework of the IGC of the 12, in a new discourse on the future of the WEU, in public attempts at defining

the role of the European members of the Alliance not members of the Community — and of other European countries — vis-à-vis the EC, and vis-à-vis the new security edifice.

The challenge thus is to guarantee the compatibility of structures of the future that are now only dimly visible, and may not even emerge in a linear movement, safe from reversals, or easy to foretell in their dynamics.

The Gulf crisis and the differences in European responses, highlighted by barely compatible national initiatives and positions, may have retarded European efforts at settling on a long-term model of European defence and a distinct European role within NATO. But it may also prove to be catalytic, in that it clearly demonstrates the need for a coherent concept, and especially for an answer to the question *who* is going to make up the European defence dimension. These matters will fall in place over time, but it is important that the framework conditions for progress be clearly outlined and generally understood.

NATO is open, and ready to adapt. Command structures, roles and procedures of the Alliance can be adjusted to the requirements of a European pillar within NATO with relative ease. But there are a limited number of *essentials* that need to be respected.

The first one of these is the functioning of the integrated military system. Lower standing forces and increased reliance on command and infrastructural features heighten the need for Allied integration. In moving towards a lighter military structure, NATO will integrate more, not less. Multinational units will increasingly provide the basis for the legitimacy of defence in the eyes of the public, — both for European nations and for the US. Integration expresses solidarity, and assures the ready availability of defence in time of crisis and renewed threat. It is the indispensable basis for the Alliance's stability. If its texture were to be loosened, or to unravel, Europe's security would fall prey to a *renationalisation* of defence policies, with the ensuing risks and unpredictabilities so characteristic of Europe's past.

A second essential is the undiminished maintenance of the transatlantic link, a necessity hardly to be emphasised before this audience, but of even greater significance, as a means of geostrategic balance, in a more interdependent world, yet in the face of a less predictable European East. The presence of US and Canadian forces that epitomise the larger geographical solidarity of the Alliance, will continue to be — as in the past decades — the catalyst for a harmonious interaction of the European States themselves, attenuating

their persistent differences on the road to higher unity. At its roots, such US presence follows the imperatives of America's self-interest as a world power; yet, it needs to be carefully fostered in the vital interest of the Europeans. Multinational units that include US forces, and keep them in plausible military roles on the Continent, as well as diverse stationing patterns, covering many Allied countries, are required to underpin the Atlantic dimension, and must not be sacrificed in order to accommodate the as yet undefined tendencies towards the establishment of European forces.

A third essential concerns the way in which the future European defence pillar itself is constituted. If it is to support and strengthen the Alliance, all Allies must have some form of «droit de regard» over its composition. Which countries are to form it, and under what conditions are they to be recruited? Can neutral European countries form part of it, and how is neutrality and how are the underlying security obligations to be defined? From an Alliance viewpoint, the criteria for participation in a European foreign policy and defence dimension, on the move towards Political Union, must be full availability for essential security choices. It is difficult to visualise a security alliance that would lean on a pillar composed of elements, some of which could, at any time, opt out from inconvenient security choices, or refuse to join in, or co-operate with, the integrated military and decision-making structure. Of course, such criteria of availability would need to be applied dynamically, in the perspective of the Political Union of, say, the year 2000.

A major task of new European security architectures is to address the security needs of the members of the collapsing Warsaw Treaty which recently lost its military component and will at best continue as loose political consultation network, mainly designed to co-ordinate pending arms control matters. The five non-Soviet WTO countries in Central Europe, however eager to shed the moribund WTO framework, perceive their region as strategic vacuum, impressed with the size and remaining military power of the Soviet Union, and mindful of the dangerous fallout from future Soviet crises, as much as of the reminiscences of overbearing Soviet behaviour from which they have suffered in the past. Increasingly, these countries have looked for shelter in Western security organisations, aware of the fragile protection which their participation in the CSCE affords them. Membership in NATO is openly discussed as the ideal security solution.

The Central European Governments are, however, realistic enough not to understand this as a short-term possibility. Indeed, the NATO Allies see no current basis for an extension of their mutual guarantee to the Central European region, as it moves through a difficult transition. Also, pushing the Alliance's military frontiers to the East, so as to marginalise the Soviet Union, would provide a counter-productive signal to the Soviets, already sensitised by the loss of their own Alliance structures in the area.

Yet, NATO can and does alleviate the security concerns of the new Central European democracies, allowing its own stability effect to spill over to the East, as it were. NATO has suggested to these Eastern neighbours a web of multiple reassuring relations where mutual support in the CSCE, intensive political and military contacts with NATO and its member states, membership in organisations like the Council of Europe, association with EC, regional patterns of co-operation like the Pentagonale and the Visegrad agreements, new policies of armament co-operation with the West to loosen Soviet procurement ties, etc., combine to progressively integrate these countries in European patterns of co-operation that provide reassurance, heighten stability and neutralise pressures and apprehensions. As a personal thought, I would visualise the gradual development of the relations these countries have started to cultivate with NATO into a quasi-institutional relationship *sui generis* which would allow them to share some important benefits of NATO's collective work, without participating in the mutual assistance obligations and, accordingly, the integrated military structures. This could be effected by widening NATO's institutional flexibility, without a need to change the NATO Treaty. Such formulac should, of course, equally apply to all members of the WTO.

Finally, a more general look to the Soviet Union and how it should relate to the emerging European architecture. Its key role needs no further emphasis in this respect. One of the huge challenges for Europe's architects is to draw the Soviet Union in, engage it in co-operative behaviour, and to accustom it to a role of peaceful partnership. The Soviet Union, before all, must not be marginalised, and must not be allowed to fall off the rim of the European plate. Europe's task is to serve as the catalyst and integrator that gives permanence to the Atlantic connection, without losing the Soviet Union, but also without being engulfed in the gigantic problems of reconstruction and turmoil which are in store for the Soviets themselves. NATO intends to

make the most of its diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union, which it regards as a strategic connection to influence the redimensioning of Soviet military power and to recreate the relationship in terms of growing trust.

I have been long, but my topic has been vast. The bottom line of my presentation is that even in these more troubled times, the opportunities of our time outweigh the perils, and that we can continue to move ahead with considerable confidence. There is no need to go back and barricade ourselves in the mentality of the Cold War decades. Europe's security has been immeasurably improved, and holds promise for further amelioration. Building the institutional edifice a rewarding task for Europe's architects. Yet, new and multiple challenges emerge, and progress towards a new, more peaceful world order, just as much as the path towards a new Europe, will be complex and often contradictory. History is not a linear process. Security will always be important. In the future, in a generally more benign environment, it will be more sophisticated, more difficult to manage, more demanding in its dependence on public support. In such times, the North Atlantic Alliance, as the sole reliable guarantor of our security, needs strong and faithful Allies and the member countries will need a strong Alliance.

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