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THE EUROPEAN UNION CRISIS MANAGEMENT MODEL[1]

O MODELO DE GESTÃO DE CRISES DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

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Abstract

Europe has a variety of instruments at its disposal to manage current or emerging crisis. This ability to intervene is one of the main characteristics and advantages of the European Union's current crisis management model. Deploying the civil and military instruments simultaneously, however, presents major challenges in terms of coordination, and this has been one of the main shortcomings of the model.

This research analyses the current EU Crisis Management model, focusing on its architecture and decision-making processes, planning and conduct of missions, and crisis management operations. To achieve our research objectives, we opted for a rigorous qualitative methodology based on bibliographical and documentary analysis combined with interviews with several experts in the field.

The analysis shows that changes to the European model are needed, specifically at the level of planning and conduct structures and funding principles, but also in the establishment of doctrine and training for the different instruments, regardless of their nature. These measures will strengthen civil-military coordination, which is seen as fundamental to making the European Union's response to the various threats more effective.

Keywords: Crisis Management, European Union, civilian-military coordination.

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Resumo

A União Europeia possui uma diversidade de instrumentos que pode usar na gestão de uma crise, atual ou emergente. Esta capacidade de intervenção confere ao atual modelo de gestão de crises da União uma das suas principais características e vantagens. A utilização simultânea desses instrumentos, civis e militares, acarreta, porém, grandes desafios ao nível da coordenação, elemento que é visto como um dos principais inconvenientes do próprio modelo.

O presente estudo faz uma análise ao atual modelo de gestão de Crises da União Europeia, centrado na sua arquitetura e nos processos de decisão, de planeamento e de condução das missões e operações de gestão de crises. Para concretizar os nossos objetivos de investigação, recorremos a uma estratégia de investigação qualitativa, baseada numa análise bibliográfica e documental. Tendo as reflexões sido reforçadas através de entrevistas semiestruturadas realizadas a diversos peritos nesta matéria.

A análise efetuada permitiu concluir que são necessárias alterações ao modelo europeu, não apenas, nas estruturas de planeamento, de condução e nos princípios de financiamento, mas também, no estabelecimento de doutrina e formação a aplicar nos diferentes instrumentos, independentemente da sua natureza. Estas medidas permitem reforçar a coordenação civil-militar, condição fundamental para tornar mais eficaz a resposta da União Europeia a uma crise, atual ou emergente.

Palavras-chave: *Gestão de Crises, União Europeia, coordenação civil-militar.*

Introduction

From its inception, the European Union (EU) project has been linked to the issues of (in)security in the European area through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)[2]. Despite decades of international instability and the constant threat of conflict, the lack of political consensus has hampered progress in the creation of instruments for the establishment of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, in 1999, the situation changed as a result of the wars in the Balkans and of the perception by European countries of the risks of a possible cross-border contagion and, above all, of its inability to deal with the conflict (Silva, 2010; Câmara, 2016).

The first political declarations of the mid-1990s, which came mainly from Paris and London, revealed the intention of endowing the EU with Crisis Management (CM) intervention

[2] Given the importance of coal and steel in World War II, on 9 May 1950, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed that Franco-German coal and steel production be placed under the umbrella of a common High Authority, which would be open to membership applications by other European nations. Based on control of these two raw materials, the Treaty establishing the ECSC was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951, bringing together Italy and the BENELUX countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) in addition to France and the Federal Republic of Germany) (Fernandes, 2011, p.110).

capabilities. The terrorist attacks on American soil in 2001, and in Madrid and London (2004 and 2005, respectively) decisively marked the European vision of security, and since then crises abroad are viewed as influencing European security, a phenomenon described by Trauner (2011) and Brandão (2015a) as the domestic and foreign interdependence of security.

The EU has made major structural changes in order to respond more effectively to crises and conflicts in areas of the globe where it has interests, thereby linking the security instruments with those of foreign policy. Since 1 January 2003, when the EU launched its first civilian police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and up to October 2016, more than 35 missions and operations were launched on three continents.

Despite the progress made in various treaties, it was with the Lisbon Treaty, adopted in 2007, that the EU CM became autonomous through the creation of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which granted more resources to the CSDP, increasing its coherence (Scherer, 2015, p.44). This Service brings together the main civil and military CM support structures, and, in addition to providing policy advice, is in charge of the planning and conduct of the various missions and operations. The new Treaty established for the first time as an objective of the Union's external action to "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security" (Article 21) (EU, 2007).

According to Solana (2009) and Ashton (2014), the EU's ability to use all the different instruments at its disposal is the main feature of the European CM model and is reflected in its Comprehensive Approach (CA)[3], which brings together all the EU's civil and military instruments in a coherent and complementary manner (Langlois and Capstack, 2014, p.9). The coordination of these instruments in terms of planning and conduct is one of the great challenges of the model, which has the main advantage of promoting a rapprochement between civil and military institutions.

It was with this in mind that we endeavoured to carry out this work, which has the EU CM model, and its advantages and shortcomings, as its object of study. Thus, the overall objective of this paper is to propose measures to strengthen coordination between civilian and military instruments of crisis management by proposing ways of improving that coordination. To that end, we defined the following specific objectives (SO):

- SO 1: to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the EU CM model;
- SO 2: to introduce measures to strengthen civil-military coordination during the EU's CM missions and operations.

In order to conduct this investigation in a logical sequence, we divided our paper into six main chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. Thus, in the first chapter, the operational concepts of our object of study will be adopted through a review of the literature, which will

[3] For Wendling (2010, p.27), CM implies the search for a methodology that enables the establishment of common principles and collaborative processes in the areas of policy, diplomacy, security, economy, development, rule-of-law, and human rights to achieve a common objective both within and outside the EU.

explore the works of various authors who studied the origins and evolution of the EU CSDP and the European Security Strategy. In the second chapter, the research methodology and the analysis model used in this investigation will be introduced. In the third chapter, we will describe the EU CM model, focusing on its institutions and structures, as well as its processes regarding decision making, planning, and conduct of missions and operations. In the next two chapters, we will list the advantages and shortcomings of the current CM model. To do so, we relied not only on various bibliographic sources, but also on the contributions of the personalities we interviewed, all of whom have vast experience in planning and conducting CM operations and missions. To conclude our investigation, in the sixth and final chapters we will present the measures that we believe are essential to strengthen the coordination between the EU civilian and military instruments.

Given the importance and topicality of this issue, this research may prove especially relevant to deepen the state-of-the-art, not only because it provides us with an "x-ray" of sorts, but mainly due to the contributions presented, from which measures were drawn up to strengthen civil-military coordination and improve the functioning of the EU CM model.

1. A historical perspective of the european project

1.1. The Europe of Security and Defence

With the end of World War II, cooperation in matters of security and defence became one of the most pressing issues for Western European states. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, there were a number of attempts to reorganise the European defence, many of which failed, such as the European Defence Community (EDC) established in 1954 and, later, the Fouchet Plan (1961). There have been various disputes between major European powers, especially France and the United Kingdom, whose different views on the issue resulted in the European defence being entrusted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for several years, and, in a secondary capacity, to the Western European Union (WEU) (Silva, 2011; Koutrakos, 2013).

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent reconfiguration of the international order, combined with the crisis that erupted in the Balkans, gave new meaning to the issues of European security and their role in external action, which led to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, establishing the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy defined, for the first time, objectives for strengthening the security of the Union and its Member States, which included the formulation of a common defence policy.

At the time, the threat of large-scale conflict had declined significantly in relation to the Cold War period, but there was a resurgence of local conflicts that presented real threats to European security, and the preparation and execution of decisions and actions was entrusted to the WEU through the "Petersberg Tasks", which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in CM, including peacemaking tasks (Gomes, 2010, p.123). A few years later, in the aftermath of the former Yugoslavia War in Amsterdam

(1997), the EU approved a new revision of its founding treaty, which led to changes in security and defence through the creation of the posts of Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit to advise the Council on CFSP matters (Pedra, 2010, p. 57).

After much resistance by the United Kingdom to the development of a European defence, in 1998, in the French city of Saint Malo, the country reversed its policy, joining France in defending the progressive reinforcement of EU military structures and capabilities (Brandão, 2015b). The EU's incapacity to intervene in conflict management in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, and the risks of the conflict spreading into Europe awakened Europe to the urgency of establishing a strategy for security and defence (UK Ministry of Defence, 2014, p.5). At that time, the two countries expressed their willingness to strengthen the role of the Council in Europe's decisions and instruments of international projection by establishing an autonomous capability supported by credible military forces, empowered to make the decision to use them in response to international crises (Shake, Bloch, Lainé and Grant, 1999; Kammel, 2015, p.106).

With the Cologne European Council (3 and 4 June 1999) Europe opened a dialogue on matters relating to its own security and defence, and the Member States laid the foundations for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Silva, 2011), whose objectives and requirements would be implemented at the Helsinki European Council (10 and 11 December 1999), where it was decided that military forces (of up to 50,000 - 60,000 persons) would be made available to deploy within 60 days to fulfil the Petersberg tasks (Pflimlin, 2006). These targets were outlined under the title Helsinki Headline Goal. In addition, new political and military bodies and structures were created under the Council, which allowed the Union to establish the policy orientation and strategic direction it required. This included the creation of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Military Committee (EUMC), and a military staff that became known as the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) (Rehrl and Glume, 2015, p.15).

In addition to these military instruments, the EU also laid the foundations for the development of non-military crisis management using civilian means and resources at the European Council of Santa Maria da Feira (19 and 20 June 2000) (Silva, 2011; Pereira, 2009; Hermenegildo, 2017, p.240). In addition to the creation of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom), the Council defined priority areas for the objectives of the civilian aspects of CM, with particular focus on civilian police capabilities. The Member States voluntarily agreed to provide 5,000 police officers for international missions in the context of conflict prevention and CM operations, and to identify and deploy up to 1,000 police officers at a maximum 30-day readiness (Saraiva, 2010).

At the Nice Council (7, 8, and 9 December 2000), the EU declared it was prepared to absorb the tasks assigned to the WEU, also expressing the desire to develop the ability to mobilise a wide range of civil and military means and instruments with the capacity to carry out CM and conflict prevention operations within the framework of the Petersberg tasks defined in the

Treaty on the European Union, namely: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in CM, including peacemaking tasks. Despite their commitment to NATO on defence matters, the European leaders also wished to develop their own security and defence policies (Silva, 2011; Brandão, 2015b) (Silva, 2011; Brandão, 2015b).

As a result of the attacks of September 11 and the subsequent changes in the international security environment, which were mainly motivated by the terrorist threat, the European countries called for the development of (common) security and defence policies. During 2001, under the banner of the Swedish and Belgian presidencies, the gaps in the resources made available by the Member States and the capabilities required to comply with the Helsinki Headline Goals were identified, and a plan was approved to address those gaps - the "European Capabilities Action Plan" (ECAP) (Council of European Union, 2001).

In order to bridge most of those gaps, on 17 March 2003 the EU and NATO prepared a package of permanent agreements (known as the "Berlin Plus" agreements), clarifying three fundamental aspects: access by the EU to NATO planning capabilities; EU-NATO command relations in EU-led military operations (using NATO assets); and the type of NATO resources and capabilities available for use by the EU, and under what conditions (Howorth, 2011; Silva, 2011; Nunes, 2012).

However, the Treaty of Lisbon brought major changes to the EU's architecture, the most important of which were the abolishment of the pillar structure, and, in the context of external action and the CSDP, the creation of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also holds the post of Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), and the establishment of the EEAS. Decisions in the context of external action must now be approved by a qualified majority [Article 31 (3) of the EU Treaty (EUT)], with the exception of decisions with military or defence implications (Article 31 (4) of the revised EUT), which still require unanimity (Pereira, 2009, p.239). The changes to the Security and Defence Policy went even deeper, beginning with the title of the policy: the ESDP gave way to the CSDP, with the new Treaty broadening the range of EU activities in third countries, and the addition to the Petersberg tasks of disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention tasks, and post-conflict stabilization tasks (Pirozzi, 2015, p.35).

1.2. The EU Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy published for the first time in 2003 not only serves as a framework for the EU's external action but also, and essentially, for the CSDP. The document refers to Europe's level of ambition in CM, which is to establish itself as a global actor with access to a wide range of instruments that allow it to influence the course of international relations. According to Gaddis (2009, cited in Biscop, 2011, p.1), this will entail connecting the means available to the desired ends.

The progresses made in the security strategy mainly aimed to guarantee the protection of the European area through external security actions, accompanying the evolution and

sophistication of the new threats, which, as we are told, are no longer local or regional but global, since "distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand" (EU, 2003, p.6). In her analysis of the new wars, Kaldor (2007, pp. 1-2) identified a new type of organised violence that developed in the African and European continents, which the author believes is a result of globalisation, and which she defined as low intensity conflicts that involve transnational connections, making it difficult to distinguish between the internal and the external.

In 2008, the Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative of the EU issued a report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy 2003, which featured an updated list of threats to the European area. In February 2010, during the Spanish half-year EU Presidency, the Council supplemented the 2003 strategy, geared towards external action, with the adoption of the internal security strategy. The artificial (in our opinion) separation between the external strategy of 2003 and the internal strategy of 2010, combined with the profound changes in the security environment, may have been, as Drent, Landman and Zandee (2016) argue, the basis for the new formulation of the EU strategy, through the adoption in 2016 of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, which we will refer to from now on simply as the EU Global Strategy.

In the introductory note to the document, Federica Mogherini stresses that, among other aspects, the Global Strategy deals with both military and anti-terrorist capabilities and peacebuilding and the resilience of States and societies within and around Europe (UE, 2016). In addition to referring to the EU's (global) interdependencies on matters of security, the document also highlights the distinctiveness of today's threats, which, as Scherer (2015, p.43) points out, are much more diffuse, unpredictable, and difficult to contain than in the past.

2. Methodology

Bearing in mind the facts under analysis and the branch of social sciences which frames our object of study, our empirical approach will be essentially qualitative. With regard to the classification of information sources, we relied on both general and specific bibliographic information on the EU CM model, largely published by the organisation itself, as well as on a series of interviews.

Interviews were conducted with five officers with proven experience and knowledge of the subject at hand: the Head of the EUSEC Congo mission from 2012-2013, Major General Cameira Martins; the current Head of the Portuguese Military Representation to NATO and the EU Military Committee - Brussels, Vice Admiral Silvestre Correia; the Assistant of the Portuguese Military Representation to NATO and the EU Military Committee for the area of Operations, Exercises, and Cooperation, which he accumulates with duties in the Concepts and Capabilities area, from 2011-2014, Coronel Carlos Ribeiro; the Staff Officer of the Concepts and Capacities Directorate of the EUMC from 2009-2012, Colonel Rui Ferreira; and the current EU Military Staff Concepts and Capabilities Director Brigadier General Heinz Krieb.

The measuring instrument used was the semi-structured interview; six questions were prepared on the following topics: the main advantages of the European Union's CM model; the major shortcomings/limitations of the model; the suitability of separating the civil and military planning processes; the suitability of the current EEAS Command and Control structure in cases where a civilian mission and an EU military operation are deployed simultaneously in the same theatre; the need for a single coordinating body for the various EU instruments on the ground (civilian and military), and which body could play this role; the identification of potential changes to the current structure of the European External Action Service with a view to strengthening the link between the various departments (civilian and military) and the relationship between them.

As in Fachada (2015), the methodology of content analysis was based on the identification of a priori categories that were pre-established according to the theoretical framework advanced by Whitman and Wolff (2012), specifically: instruments and institutions, structures, and the EU funding model.

3. EU Crisis Management in the post-Treaty of Lisbon era

3.1. The institutional architecture

Within the scope of CM, the EU institutional framework assigns responsibilities to the European Commission[4], the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union, also known as the Council of Ministers or simply the Council. However, most CM-related decisions are made by the Council in a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, which can be joined by Ministers of other areas, especially Defence Ministers.

The Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the EU Member States, *Comité des Représentants Permanents* (COREPER)[5], was set up to provide permanent support to the Council's policy decisions on EU CM missions and operations. The PSC (set up, as mentioned above, at the 1999 Helsinki European Council), is responsible for initiating and developing all aspects of the CSDP, also exercising political control and strategic direction in EU-led operations and missions, which is formed by the Member States' permanent ambassadors to the EU (Guedes and Elias, 2010).

One of the main innovations of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of the EEAS, headed by the also newly-created HR/VP, which describes, in Coelmont's words (2012, p.3) "the general principles about how the EU should respond to international events: preventively; holistically, using all instruments at its disposal".

[4] Within the scope of crisis management, the European Commission brings to the discussion the policy areas under its mandate, such as humanitarian aid, development activities, and sanctions regulation. The Commission manages the annual budget for the CFSP, with the exception of expenditure related to EU military operations, which we will address more fully in the last chapter.

[5] The COREPER is the Council's main preparatory body. It ensures the consistency of EU policies through two formations, COREPER I and II, which hold weekly meetings, with COREPER II being responsible for preparing the work of four Council configurations: Economic and Financial Affairs; Foreign Affairs; General Affairs and Justice; and Internal Affairs.

The strategic planning of CM missions and operations is done at the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). Created in 2009, this department integrates civilian and military elements that support policy-level decision making on the development of concepts and capabilities for CM (Langlois and Capstack, 2014, p.25). For Stevens (2011, pp. 34-35), the idea behind the creation of the CMPD was to rationalise and reinforce the strategic planning structures and to ensure a better synergy between military and civilian means, as well as coherence and efficiency in each of the stages of the CM process, from the beginning of a crisis, to the selection of military response options, to the conception of an operation or mission until it is deployed on the ground.

The operational planning and conduct of civilian and military missions is carried out, respectively, by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and by the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). The headquarters of the CPCC is the Operational Headquarters (OHQ), and the director of the CPCC is responsible for strategic planning and for the conduct of all civilian crisis management missions (Drent and Zandee, 2010, p.35). As for military missions, the newly-created MPCC, established in Council Decision 6881/17 of 6 March, performs the same tasks as the CPCC and is currently in charge of conducting EU military training missions in Somalia, Central Africa, and Mali.

The EUMS director general also acts as director of the MPCC, and it is in this capacity that he exercises command and control over the military missions under the CSDP. According to a Council Decision, this new structure will allow field mission commanders to focus on the specific activities of their mission, with enhanced support from Brussels (Council of European Union, 2017b). In addition to its conduct role, the EUMS also provides expert support to decision making to the EEAS in military matters and in the strategic planning of operations.

In order to coordinate the instruments, the recently approved diploma also includes the Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC), which liaises between the MPCC and CPCC missions at the operational conduct level. The new JSCC includes structures that were previously under the military components (EUMS), for example, the Operations Centre (Watchkeeping) and the civilian CPCC specialists centre. The MPCC and CPCC staffs are expected to hold meetings between the military and civilian structures to coordinate the daily operations. Despite this important development, which is only expected to be fully implemented in 2018, not only does the new structure not provide facilities to house all members in a common space, it specifies that the members remain administratively under the authority of the MPCC/EUMS and the CPCC, and that each structure has a separate chain of command (Council of European Union, 2017a, p.11).

The EEAS also includes the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), a body responsible for early warning and situational awareness, keeping the HR/VP, the decision-making bodies of the EU, and the Member States updated by monitoring and assessing international events, focusing on the most sensitive geographic areas, on instances of terrorism, and on other global threats (Sami, 2014; Gonçalves, 2014).

After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which defined the new structure, the EEAS also integrated the EU Special Representatives (EUSR), who answer to the HR/VP and who are responsible for EU policy making in areas of interest to Europe or in crisis and post-conflict areas where the EU intervenes within the framework of the CSDP (Missiroli, 2016). The EU's external policy and security activities are further strengthened by its 140 delegations, which are spread across a large part of the world's regions, with the respective heads of delegations (ambassadors) working in the field to coordinate between the various EU stakeholders, including the CSDP missions and intelligence on various conflicts (Pirozzi, 2015; Rehrl and Glume, 2015; Scherer, 2015, p.44).

3.2. The Crisis Management Process

The Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA), drafted at the request of the HR/VP for approval by the Council, initiates the EU CM process. The document describes the various types of crisis and assesses their impact on EU interests, values, and objectives. The document also defines potential EU lines of engagement to tackle crises in the short, medium, and long term, and lists the instruments that may be used (Missiroli, 2016 and Ribeiro, 2016).

Once a crisis has been detected, the second phase is the elaboration of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) by the CMPD, which describes the EU's political interests and provides the strategic options and objectives, both civilian and military, to respond to the crisis (Missiroli, 2016; EEAS, 2016b). After the Council approves the CMC, the PSC asks the CMPD (civilian instruments) and the EUMS (military instruments) to draw up their (strategic) response options, the Civil Strategic Option (CSO) and the Military Strategic Option (MSO). It is also at this stage that the funding terms are established, and the Council defines the costs of military operations that will be financed through the ATHENA mechanism, which covers between 10% and 15% of the total cost, the remainder being borne by the Member States who participate. The costs of civilian missions are borne entirely by the community budget (EEAS, 2013; Anghel and Perruche, 2016, p.13).

The strategic and operational levels are planned in the third phase of the CM process, where the Concept of Operation (CONOPS)[6] and the Operation Plan (OPLAN)[7] are prepared according to the sequence in Figure 1. Still with regard to planning, under specific conditions, if there is a need to commit the mission/operation in a short period of time, the Fast Track process can be triggered to initiate a rapid response to the crisis, which implies a reduction in planning products, thus only the CMC is drafted and the OPLAN approved (Dijkstra, Petrov, and Mahr, 2016, pp.20-21).

[6] The CONOPS provides the objectives to be achieved by each of the instruments (civil and military), as well as a list of capabilities that are needed for the mission or operation. After this planning product is drafted, it is submitted to the PSC for approval (Stability Unit, 2014).

[7] The Operations Plan (OPLAN) is approved by the Council, and includes the details of the conduct of the operation and the rules of engagement for the use of force (Kermanbon, 2013, p.47).



Figure 1– EU Crisis Management & Planning Process

Source: Adapted from Ribeiro (2016, p.82).

The missions and/or operations are projected and conducted in the fourth phase of the Crisis Management process. Military operations are commanded from the various EU OHQ[8], as outlined in Figure 2, and may even include NATO capabilities under the Berlin Plus agreements, whereas civilian missions are commanded from Brussels through the CPCC and the MPCC.

The final phase includes the strategic review of the mission and/or operation, which becomes the HR/VP proposal to the PSC, after which it is submitted to the Council for consideration and decision, which may involve reorientation or termination of the EU engagement.

With regard to the decision-making process, there are four different moments to consider: first, decision-making bodies from the EEAS and from the Member States decide on which CM instruments to use. Afterwards, the Council, through the PSC, makes the decisions to establish and launch a mission/operation. Finally, the Council also makes the decision to extend, refocus, or terminate a mission or operation (Rehrl and Glume, 2015a, p.27).

[8] The EU has five OHQ: two in Paris (France), one in Potsdam (Germany), one in Rome (Italy), and one in Northwood, London (United Kingdom).



Figure 2 – EEAS decision and planning structure

Source: Adapted from SEAE (2017).

3. The advantages of the EU Crisis Management Model

With regard to the Union's ability to implement the various instruments, Vimont (2014, p.36) stresses that unlike most international organisations such as NATO the crisis response options formulated by the EEAS allow the EU to act during the various phases of the conflict and in several areas of the crisis, thus achieving better results. The EU's large and diversified "toolbox" (civilian and military), with a broader response capability, was described by Solana (2009), then responsible for external action and security, as the greatest advantage of the EU CM model.

While, on the one hand, having the various instruments is itself an advantage of the model, their comprehensive integration is a distinctive factor in the EU CM approach. Drent and Zandee (2010, pp. 1-2) note that for many years, the main characteristic of the EU was that it was an exclusively civilian model, implementing mechanisms of reconciliation, cooperation, stability, and prosperity in the surrounding regions. However, in 1999, the EU's political "arsenal" was supplemented by military instruments when carrying out CM tasks outside the Union's territory. The ability to mobilise civilian instruments alongside military forces has become the specific feature of the EU's approach to conflict, and is considered one of the major strengths of the CM model.

Therefore, the main advantage of the EU CM model is its ability to mobilise the full range of instruments during the full cycle of crisis prevention, response, and recovery. Today, the EU is probably the world's most inclusive organisation in terms of instruments and capabilities (Scherer, 2015, p.45). For Barry (2012) and Kempin and Scheler (2016), the

EU has a global view of a (potential) crisis situation and acknowledges that an effective and sustainable solution can only be achieved by using all the instruments at its disposal.

The implementation of the CM model, as Bagci (2017) and Cabaço (2017) state, is based, above all, on the assumption that development supports security conditions (unlike the US model, which sees security as a condition for development). It has led the EU to offer financial assistance to the Government of Somalia and to international organisations, in particular the United Nations (UN) mission in the territory, to be used in the building of courts, police training, and the development of community security plans, bringing the amount donated by the EU since 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2017) to €286 million.

The EU (Figure 3) is also involved in Somalia by providing security[9] through the military operation EU NAVFOR - Atalanta, and assistance to local authorities in the development of security-related capabilities through two training missions, the EU Training Mission (EUTM)[10] and the EU Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Nestor)[11]. The three actions undertaken by the EU are thus a reflection of the EU's security strategy for the Horn of Africa, which led to a significant reduction in piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean over the last few years, as the annual figures (2008-2016) in Figure 3 show, the result of the combined efforts of the civilian and military commitments (Scherer, 2015; Langlois and Capstack, 2014).



Figure 3 – EU structure in the conduct of Crisis Management missions and operations

Source: Adapted from Statista (2017).

[9] The EU established the EU NAVFOR - Atalanta - military operation to combat piracy in Somalia. The operation's main tasks are: the protection and monitoring of ships off the coast of Somalia; the monitoring of threats to maritime activities, including inland and territorial waters; the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea; the detention of persons who have committed or have been suspected of committing acts of piracy or armed robbery; and cooperation with states working in the region to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery (European Council, 2008; 2012; Kammel, 2015).

[10] The EUTM contributes to security in Somalia as part of a broader international effort that includes the training and monitoring of the Somali Armed Forces (EEAS, 2016c).

[11] The EUCAP Nestor - Somalia mission began in 2012, its main objective being the development of the Rule of Law and the reinforcement of the country's maritime capabilities to combat piracy. The mission command is headquartered in the capital, Mogadishu, with training centres in Hargeisa, Somaliland, and Garowe Puntland (EEAS, 2016d).

In addition to piracy, EU intervention aims to combat the terrorist threat and organised crime[12] that used to thrive in Somalia, a failed state, through a combination of civilian and military missions (including maritime missions), as well as long-term capacity-building projects with the local authorities.

In addition to the application of a variety of instruments, the CM model also takes a multilevel approach to conflict by taking into account the regional, national, and global factors of a crisis (EU, 2016, p.22). The adoption of a strategic framework for regional intervention enables the EU to take action within and between countries. Through the strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, EU intervention extends to a number of countries in the region, particularly Somalia and the Sudan, aiming to avoid future conflicts that could affect Europe directly or indirectly. This strategic framework with a global and multilevel approach has also been implemented in the Sahel region and the Central African Republic (Kempin and Scheler, 2016, p.3; Blockmans and Wessel, 2009, p.20).

Thus, as Scherer (2015) points out, the full range of instruments provides the EU with a unique external capacity, through which its CM model is able to provide coherent responses, both in terms of internal security and external action. The EU approach encompasses the multiple dimensions of the conflict in all stages of the crisis cycle to bring more coherence to the overall policy framework and to identify practical ways of strengthening its prevention, stabilisation, and peacebuilding through the instruments and resources at its disposal (Lintern, 2017, p.37).

The permanent structures within the EEAS allow the EU to mobilise the various tools at its disposal (political, diplomatic, military and civilian, and development activities and humanitarian aid) through a coherent and effective strategy to achieve its security objectives (Ruiz, Doyle and Hagemann, 2014, p.15). In addition, the implementation of missions and operations on the ground has contributed to the visibility and recognition of the EU's role as a global security actor (security actorness) by actors outside the EU (Costa, Ferreira, Pereira, and Soares, 2009; Brandão, 2010).

However, as highlighted by Solana (2009), the search for balance and coordination in the employment of the different instruments (civil and military) is the greatest challenge for the EU's CM since, according to Pirozzi (2015, p. 51), civil-military coordination remains highly problematic despite the progress made in the structures within the EEAS, which aim to foster stronger linkages between the instruments. We will address this issue in more depth in the next chapter.

4. The shortcomings of the EU Crisis Management Model

As stated in the wording of the TEU (Article 42), decisions relating to the CSDP are generally made by unanimity, with some exceptions, for example, those made under the

[12] There is information linking Somali piracy to terrorism, since ransoms could be used to finance terrorism. Al-Shabaab, now an al-Qaeda affiliate, controls much of Somalia's territory (Knops, 2012, p.5).

auspices of the European Defence Agency (EDA), which require a qualified majority of the associated member states. As a result of this condition, that is, the need for consensus among all member states, the decision-making process to activate a mission and/or operation is the main shortcoming of the CM model because of the difficulties in getting Member States to make the decision to act in certain regions in crisis, in light of their arguments in their own foreign policies, as well as their interests (Ginsberg and Penksa, 2014).

On this matter, Pirozzi (2015) cites the mission in Southern Sudan as an example where the planning process was postponed for several months because some Member States, especially France, included their own foreign policy priorities in the missions in the Sahel region. The same thing happened in most missions in the Horn of Africa, especially in Somalia. The EUCAP Nestor mission was the result of years of negotiation between France and the United Kingdom during which the first country called for a military land operation and the second for a civilian mission, which resulted in a mission with civilian status on the ground being carried out by the military (Pirozzi, 2015). This interference by the Member States does not only affect the decision to activate a mission or operation, but also the strategic re-evaluation stage (the fifth stage) and the decision to withdraw that mission or operation.

In addition to the decision-making process, the use of the military instrument in EU crisis management operations is still strongly conditioned by the difference in financing mechanisms between the civilian and military components. While civilian missions are financed in full by the Community budget, military operations are almost entirely paid for by the contributing countries, with the exception of the percentage coming from the ATHENA mechanism. This is clearly demotivating for the Member States, and the situation is aggravated by the Eurozone's current economic crisis, affecting the presence of the military instrument in operations by limiting the impact of the CA concept on the EU CM model.

This difference in funding means that Member States have been unable to commit their military instruments, which results in the EU being perceived as focusing more on the civilian instrument (Drent and Zandee, 2010), and as a fragmented, inconsistent, and ineffective actor in military crisis management, in the opinion of Ginsberg and Penksa (2014).

Its limited capabilities, or even its lack of a military instrument, condition the impact of the CA on the CM model, since the model requires a balanced combination of the two instruments (military and civil). While the military instrument alone is not sufficient for CM and stabilisation purposes, the CA is an essential component in a spectrum that should be broader. Simón (2010) and Scherer (2015) argue that without a strong and autonomous military instrument the CA is bound to fail, thus there is a clear and urgent need to combine the civilian and military instruments during the course of a crisis.

With regard to the structure of the EEAS, despite the progresses made, according to several authors, such as Mattelae (2010), Drent (2011), and Pirozzi (2013b), there are still redundancies that resulted from the creation of new structures to bridge some gaps in coordination, but which ended up clashing with the responsibilities and attributions of existing structures. Pirrozzi (2013b) gives the example of the Treaty of Lisbon, which lacks

definition regarding the establishment of a model of interaction for strategic and operational planning between the CMPD and the CPCC. This lack of planning coordination also extends to the link between the CMPD and the EUMS, where there is a duplication of tasks, especially when the military instrument is involved (Anghel and Perruche, 2016, p.19).

Differences in planning, which result in civilian and military instruments each producing their own documentation, are an obstacle to civil-military coordination, and have an impact on the conduct of missions and operations. For Mattelaer (2013, p.135), the key issue is that the CSDP is built on an isolated planning system: the pretence of comprehensive planning is largely abandoned when the CMC is approved and parallel planning systems take over. This divide grows even wider when the chains of command for civilian missions and military operations bifurcate.

Langlois and Capstack (2014) also point out the difficulties caused by the existence of different chains of command in the current structure, with impact at the Command and Control level, which begin at the planning stage. These differences result in what Walter Stevens, former CMPD director, describes as the institutional difficulties in setting up military operations, mainly due to delays in initial planning, since the military component requires the production of specific documents like the IMD (UK Parliament, 2012).

Despite the recent review and the introduction of the Fast Track procedure, Anghel and Perruche (2016) state that the planning and conduct process is still too bureaucratic, which greatly contributes to the large number of institutional actors (Council, PSC, EU delegations, CMPD, CPCC and EUMC) and preparatory documents involved (MSO/CSO, IMD, CONOPS, OPLAN, Council Decisions).

There are still few shared platforms for communication and information between civilian and military organisations, which are seen as crucial to reduce duplication and strengthen the basis for decision making in crisis situations, due to resistance by both components (military and civil) (Pawlak and Ricci, 2014, p.28). Ferreira (2017) stresses that these difficulties "reflect the internal organisation of the countries involved, who export their sensitivities and resistances to the European institutions".

This distance between civilian and military is also reflected at the level of operational conduct, and Martins (2017) points out the difficulties in the linkages between the mission he commanded and the remaining EU missions operating on the ground. Referring to the difficulties in coordination, Ioannides (2010, p.42) stresses that EU Special Representatives only lead the EU's political aspects on the ground, and do not have a supreme coordination authority over EU Force Commanders, who receive political instructions directly from the PSC. Krieb (2017) gives the example of the EU's presence with different instruments in Somalia, even suggesting that it is "indispensable to have that body on the ground [...] to coordinate EU involvement".

The above analysis reveals that coordination between civilian and military instruments at different levels is the main shortcoming of the EU CM model. Moreover, the constraints imposed by the need for a decision by unanimity and the differences in funding between

the civilian and military instruments have not only delayed EU action, but have also put constraints on CM military capabilities, leading to dysfunctional and ineffective responses. The EU has clearly given priority to civilian instruments, since is recognised externally for its civilian capabilities more than for its military instrument (Pirozzi, 2013b), to the point that Member States rarely opt for committing their military instruments under the EU flag, systematically choosing to do so through NATO or through coalitions, as Biscop (2015) points out.

5. Contributions to a civil-military rapprochement

Despite the EU's ongoing efforts to strengthen civil-military coordination, which are reflected in the creation of two new structures (the MPCC and the JSCC), the European model still requires changes in terms of funding, organisation, and processes.

With regard to funding, and in order to strengthen the participation of the military instrument in the promotion of security, we believe that greater financial solidarity on the part of the Member States is needed. The costs associated with operations will have to be financed by the EU budget, thus abandoning the "costs lie where they fall" principle. This change will lead not only to greater political will on the part of the Member States to take an active role in the CSDP, but, above all, it will help overcome the difficulties associated with the operational effectiveness of CM missions and operations as a whole.

As we have seen in the previous chapters, the planning and conduct of missions and operations is still mostly done separately, and there are no linkages between military and civilian responses. The establishment of a Civil-Military Headquarters combining the current structures of the CMPD and the EUMC, as well as some structures of the CPCC and the MPCC, should be seen as a necessity, since it will contribute to rationalise the chain of command, to establish a culture of common planning through the development of a single CONOPS and OPLAN, and to strengthen civil-military coordination during and between crises.

Regarding the operational headquarters (OHQ), it will be necessary to integrate the civilian and military structures responsible for conducting the crisis management missions, since this will lead to greater coherence in the operational management of the different instruments at the local and regional level. This greater operational coherence will have to be accompanied by a common policy orientation in terms of objectives and actions. Strengthening the powers of the special representatives is therefore an essential condition for the EU to "speak with one voice", as Martins (2017) points out.

In view of the identified shortcomings, we propose the following EEAS structure, shown in Figure 4, which will consist in the construction of a Strategic Headquarter (SHQ); and of Operational-level headquarters responsible for different areas of interest in EU countries; and, finally, the integration within the structure of the special representatives (EUSR), who will be given authority at the level of the political coordination of the various instruments.



Figure 4 – Proposal of a structure for the EEAS

In addition to these changes to the structure, a civil-military rapprochement must take into account both the sharing of joint doctrinal procedures and training in those procedures. At the doctrinal level, no basis for joint action exists at this point since the EU continues to follow NATO's military planning process. The development of doctrine is therefore essential for the establishment of joint procedures, as it will lead to the creation of common language and procedures. Adequate training must be provided based on curricula designed at EU scale, with an emphasis on civil-military linkages.

This would not only facilitate the integration between instruments, but also the coordination between the capabilities of different countries, which may belong to the EU but are also culturally distinct.

Conclusions

The creation of the HR/VP and the EEAS were two of the major innovations in the EU's external action and CSDP. The establishment of this institution and its structures gives the EU CM model one of the several advantages we have identified, reflected at the political level by the decentralisation of the PSC, the body responsible for the direction and conduct of operations and missions, making it possible to fast track the decision-making procedures among Member States regarding the CSDP. The capacity to use several instruments is the greatest advantage of the CM model because it allows the EU to act in the different phases

of a crisis through the different instruments at its disposal (political, diplomatic, economic assistance, development activities and humanitarian aid, or internal security), using them to combat the threats to its security. Linking this intervention model to EU strategies will strengthen Europe's ability to guarantee security within its borders, increasing security internally by combating threats outside its borders. In addition, it also enhances the EU's external action by increasing its influence as a global player.

Despite its strengths, and above all the progress made at the structural and operational level, the model still has several shortcomings that make it bureaucratic and politically very dependent on the decisions of Member States. Although decision making has been largely decentralised in the PSC, the decision to activate a mission or operation depends on the consensus of all the Member States, limiting the EU's ability to intervene. This shortcoming is also reflected in the choice of the type of instruments to deploy in a given crisis or conflict and in the decision to terminate or continue an EU operation or mission.

With regard to the strategic planning of missions (civilian and military), the integration introduced by the CMPD does not include the planning of military operations, which is the responsibility of the military structure (EUMS). Thus, the various planning products for the missions and operations are produced separately, which does not allow for greater coordination at the operational level.

Therefore, to answer the research question, in order to improve the EU's CM capacity, changes should be made to the EU funding mechanisms for the military instrument through the application of the same model as the civilian component, that is, financing should come from the EU budget. We propose the construction of a collaborative structure that integrates the civilian and military instruments by establishing a strategic headquarters, and, at the operational level, we propose that Operational Quarters be set up. As for the special representatives of the HR/VP, there should be greater intervention at the level of coordination on the ground.

Finally, in view of cultural differences, which are often imported from the national organisations of Member States, joint doctrine and training will be required to standardise procedures, but above all to establish a common culture.

We are aware of the difficulty in changing the decision-making system for CSDP matters, which functions by consensus between the Member States, considering that this rule has always been present in the wording of the EU Treaty, however, the other measures, which refer to coordination between the instruments and strengthening the military component in the EU CM, are crucial to tackle many of the threats that Europe and the world face today. On the other hand, the proposed changes also make it possible to mitigate many of the shortcomings identified and to increase the EU's recognition as a global actor in the field of security.

Thus, this study provides a contribution to the reflection about possible and desired changes to the CM model, which, despite having several advantages that distinguish it from those of other organisations, also has several shortcomings. Due to the complexity of the

issues discussed here and the diversity and sensitivity of the different EU Member States, coupled with the rapid developments that characterise the world today, it is both relevant and important that future studies develop two lines of research in this field: the first should focus on understanding the impact of the United Kingdom's exit from the EU on the EU CM capacity; and the second should focus on the model's strengths and weaknesses in terms of the ability to coordinate with other actors, in particular with international organisations (NATO, UN and African Union) and with state and non-state actors.

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