

# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE – A TOOL OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE<sup>1</sup>

## *AS INFORMAÇÕES MILITARES – UM INSTRUMENTO DE SEGURANÇA E DEFESA NACIONAL*

**Carlos Miguel Coelho Rosa Marques da Silva**

Infantry Major in the Portuguese Army  
Degree in Military Science  
Lecturer in the Army Education Area (IUM)  
Integrated Researcher at the IUM Research and Development Centre  
1449-027 Lisbon  
silva.cmcrm@ium.pt

**Fernando Oliveira Ribeiro**

Infantry Major in the Portuguese Army  
Master in Military Science  
Lecturer in the Crises and Armed Conflicts Area (IUM)  
Integrated Researcher at the IUM Research and Development Centre  
1449-027 Lisbon  
ribeiro.fco@ium.pt

### **Abstract**

In a global society marked by unpredictable, multifaceted, and transnational threats, there is an urgent need for mechanisms that enable the delivery of efficient and timely advice to policy makers. Strategic Intelligence has a crucial role in mitigating these threats, as well as in meeting the national goals and defending the national interests. Considering the national and international calls for restraint and optimization of human and material resources, the bureaucracy inherent to the state apparatus poses the greatest challenge to interagency efficiency. This paper examines the role of Military Intelligence in National Security and Defence and recommends measures to improve its efficiency. To that end, the study used deductive reasoning and a qualitative research strategy based on documentary and content analysis and on interviews with experts and managers of various civilian and military agencies. The data collected revealed that Military Intelligence plays a key role in supporting political decision making. The study identifies gaps in the system and recommends measures to improve the efficiency of the national intelligence system by establishing symbiotic linkages among Intelligence Services.

**Keywords:** Military Intelligence, National Security, National Defence, Intelligence Service.

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## **Resumo**

*Numa sociedade global marcada por uma ameaça imprevisível, multifacetada e transnacional, urge criar mecanismos que permitam desenvolver eficientemente, um aconselhamento flexível e oportuno aos decisores políticos. Assim, assumem as Informações Estratégicas, um papel fundamental na mitigação desta ameaça, na persecução dos desígnios e salvaguarda dos interesses nacionais. Atendendo à conjuntura internacional e nacional, de contenção e otimização de recursos humanos e materiais disponíveis, assume a burocracia inerente ao aparelho estatal, o grande desafio à eficiência entre os diferentes organismos. Num contexto militar, e tendo este trabalho, como objeto de estudo, as Informações Militares, importa avaliar o contributo destas para a Segurança e Defesa Nacional e recomendar formas de melhorar a sua eficiência. Para atingir este desiderato, efetuou-se uma investigação com base num raciocínio dedutivo, assente numa estratégia qualitativa, através de uma análise documental e de conteúdo, com recurso a entrevistas a especialistas e chefias dos serviços civis e militares. Os dados recolhidos, permitiram concluir que as Informações Militares têm um papel importante no apoio à decisão política, identificar lacunas no sistema, e inferir um conjunto de recomendações, que, através de uma simbiótica relação entre os Serviços de Informações, poderão tornar o próprio Sistema Nacional de Informações mais eficiente.*

**Palavras-chave:** *Informações Militares, Segurança Nacional, Defesa Nacional, Serviço de Informações.*

## **Introduction**

Keegan (2003, p.5) states that Intelligence does not equal truth, nor does it guarantee the right decision. Nevertheless, in contemporary societies, Intelligence is seen as “a crucial aspect of democracy and an essential tool to support political decision making” (Gomes, 2018), and the organizations that provide it are considered “vital tools of National Security (NS)” (Morgado, 2018).

Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 19/2013 approved the National Defence Strategic Concept (CEDN), a document that outlines the State’s national strategy. The document emphasises the importance of Strategic Intelligence (SI), defining it as “a vital strategic tool used by the State to support political decision making, especially in matters concerning Security and Defence” (CEDN, 2013, p.8).

In a globalised and “unpredictable post-Cold War society, threats are no longer clearly defined, but have become diffuse, polymorphic, and anonymous” (Escorrega, 2009). In this context, Intelligence plays an important role in reducing uncertainty, and Intelligence Services (ISs) are critical “instruments for identifying and assessing threats and opportunities in volatile and complex scenarios” (CEDN, 2013, pp.2-8). In addition to defining the fundamental aspects of the State’s global strategy to achieve the goals set by the National Security and

Defence (NSD) policy, the CEDN also highlights the active role that the Armed Forces (AAFF) are required to play in a collective defence (CEDN, 2013, pp.1-10).

In his inaugural address as head of the AAFF, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMGFA) Admiral Silva Ribeiro confirmed the timeliness and relevance of this issue as he stressed the need to “broaden our cooperation with the Security Forces and Services [by creating] operational linkages” between the Military Intelligence and Security Centre (CISMIL) and the Portuguese Intelligence System (SIRP) (Freire, 2018).

This study covers the aspects of Military Intelligence (MI) that directly relate to NSD. The internal (Security Intelligence Service (SIS)) and external (Strategic Defence Intelligence Service (SIED)) dimensions covered in the framework legislation for the SIRP meant that the analysis had to be restricted in terms of content. Therefore, the study was delimited to the foreign policy role of MI. In terms of space, the study examines the relationship between the CISMIL, a Military Intelligence Body (MIB) under the Armed Forces General Staff (EMGFA), and the SIED.

The study analysed documents from open sources to provide a framework for the Portuguese National Intelligence System (NIS). Therefore, only unclassified information was used.

The study’s General Objective (GO) is to assess the role of MI in NSD and to recommend measures to improve its efficiency. To that end, it was assumed that Intelligence in general and specifically MI affects NSD. With this assumption in mind, the research framed MI within the context of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM) by analysing the underlying legal framework, organization, objectives, and linkages. The assumption was based on the three pillars that generally define an IS: (i) the *Organization* as a structure that facilitates knowledge; (ii) *Knowledge* as a decisionmaking tool; (iii) *Activities* as a process that is integrated into State activity, as illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1 – Military Intelligence Structure

Source: Menezes (2012, p.11).

## 1. Conceptual Framework

### 1.1. Military Intelligence

In Portuguese, the term *Informações* corresponds to the English *Intelligence*, which means deep, complete, and comprehensive knowledge. It can also be defined as a “set of activities that seek to explore and exploit news for the benefit of a state” (Cardoso, 2004). The term *Informações* is conceptually dynamic and prone to different interpretations, therefore, this paper will use the term *Intelligence* as the translation for *Informações*.

According to Serra (2002, p.8), in military contexts, the process to determine the targets of MI is initiated at the political level with the identification of the country's objectives and the obstacles posed by any states, forces, or actors that compete with or oppose those interests. Once identified, their activities, mindset, intentions, systems of forces, and combat capabilities are analysed. Thus, the targets of MI are any actual or potential military threats to a political unit, and the nature of those threats is constantly changing.

For Gomez (2005, p.93), the aim of MI is to support political decision makers in achieving a country's ultimate goal, that of preventing war, and, if necessary and if all other options have been exhausted, to provide a military capability that can be used to defend national sovereignty. However, Andriole (1984, p.176) believes that the focus of MI is “all aspects of a State's military power in wartime and peacetime, including: size of forces, equipment, preparedness, battle orders, doctrine, infrastructures, command and control structures, organization, and any other aspects of a military capability”.

In this study, MI is understood as the systematic process of collecting, processing, analysing, and disseminating a decision support product to meet previously defined needs, which may or may not have been identified by decision makers, and which are of interest to the military.

Doctrinally, Intelligence is divided into three distinct levels according to function: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. The study will focus only on Military Strategic Intelligence (MSI) because, as provided for in the CEDN, this is the only type that directly relates to NSD. Sherman Kent (1965, p.2) defines SI as the knowledge that a state must possess regarding other states, on which the national policy is based at the highest level, stating that this *knowledge* is crucial for national sovereignty. Therefore, the difference between MI, SI, and MSI lies not only in the body to which they provide decision support, but in also the depth and complexity of the analysis.

Nevertheless, all definitions point to the same direction, that is, that MSI can be used to complement all aspects of political decision associated with the various components and multiple uses of the military apparatus, including how they relate to the other instruments of power that affect the operational environment.

### 1.2. National Security

The conceptual confusion between Security and Defence tends to “hinder cooperation between the State's security agencies and increase competition for resources and

protagonism, which could call into question the strategic actions taken to combat threats, particularly transnational ones” (Ribeiro, 2011, p.14). From a holistic perspective, defence can be seen as “an activity that is both external and internal, civilian and military, state and nonstate, collective and individual, the aim of which is to guarantee NS” (Vieira, 2014, p.275).

The ambiguity and complexity of the concept of Security make any definition far from consensual. From a strategic perspective, the concept of Security can be best defined as “a perception and/or feeling, in which the multiple freedoms of action, wills, and forces of a given society are in dialectic discourse, providing a strategic social logic that allows that society to face a hostile third party (a threat) and the risks of the strategic environment” (Nogueira, 2005, pp.77-78).

Therefore, it is apparent that Portugal does not have an official NS concept, with the exception of a mention in the legal framework of the CEDN, which describes it as a condition to be attained. The National Defence Institute (IDN) approaches NS from a holistic perspective, as:

[...] the condition in which a Nation can survive in a permanent state of peace and freedom while guaranteeing its sovereignty, independence, and cohesion; the integrity of its territory; the collective protection of its people, goods, and spiritual values; the normal functioning of the State; the political freedom action of its sovereign bodies; and the full functioning of democratic institutions.” Although it is a “comprehensive” definition, it does not directly mention threats.

Carvalho (2009, p.1)

For his part, Viana (2003, p.12) defines NS as:

[...] the relative guarantee provided by the State to the nation it governs that it will, at any given time, take political, economic, social, cultural, diplomatic, psychological, environmental, and military action to achieve or sustain the national goals in spite of actual or potential conflicts, pressures, or hostility.

The above definitions show that the concept of NS aligns the fundamental principles of the State’s general strategy, prioritising the nation’s resources and organizational capabilities to pursue the goals outlined in the NS policy.

### 1.3. National Defence

Given that the conceptual scope of NS encompasses a nation’s external and internal dimensions, this concept must be differentiated from that of National Defence (ND). Thus, ND refers to “all activities that support NS, that is, Security is a goal and Defence is the activity carried out to achieve that goal” (Carvalho, 2009, p.1). In comparison, the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (Assembleia da República, 2005, pp.1-3) defines it as “the activities carried out by the State in all areas that will allow it to assert itself within the international community [...] to ensure peace, prevent international conflict, and defend the integrity of the national territory”.

For Silva Ribeiro (2009, p.59), “ND refers to actions taken, that is, to concrete measures and attitudes”. Therefore, NS is the state in which society is not the target of any threats, of whatever origin, and in which there are no obstacles to its development. Cabral Couto (1987) defines a threat as any event or action that results from a conscious effort to prevent an objective from being achieved, generally causing material or moral harm. However, the threats that must be mitigated to achieve this sense of security have become increasingly diffuse, unpredictable, and transnational (CEDN, 2013). According to the CEDN, improving SI is crucial to face these threats to the national interests and to allow the country to realise its strategic potential (CEDN, 2013, p.5). Thus, ND is the action and NS is the result. Due to the broad scope of the various existing concepts of NSD, the IDN’s definition was adopted as the conceptual basis for this work.

## 2. Methodological Reflections

The study used a qualitative research strategy with deductive reasoning. This involved identifying topics that could be explored by collecting data from interviews with recognised experts with operational responsibilities in the field of Intelligence, and by analysing the legal and doctrinal framework documentation. A crosssectional research design was used to analyse and explain the object of study (IUM, 2016, p.35).

Figure 2 shows the methods used in the three research phases and the data collection techniques and analysis model for each phase.




Figure 2 – Methodological process

Several studies and sources were analysed in the review. Among these, special emphasis was given to the applicable legislation and the national doctrine, as well as to scientific articles, papers, monographs, and works of relevance to the research topic.

The analytical phase involved building the analysis model around a theoretical framework inspired by the three pillars described above: *Organization, Knowledge, and Activities*.

The indicators that helped identify the factors that contribute to the efficiency of the IS, and especially of MI, are based on the concepts of *Cooperation, Collaboration, Communication, Coordination, Competition, and Integration*, which have been adapted from Costa et al. (2014). This phase consisted of two distinct stages wherein: (i) the literature review was continued and five semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals holding relevant theoretical and practical expertise, which served to construct the dimensions that would allow us to transpose the perceptions regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of SI to a concept that could be used and deployed; and (ii) content analysis was carried out on two types of interviews. The first type consisted of “analysis interviews” with individuals who hold positions within the NIS, and served to frame the strategic, strategic military and political environment, to determine how respondents perceive it, and to discover how to use their experience to operationalize existing linkages vis-à-vis the current legal framework. The second type were “perception interviews” that served to assess how those linkages may be further explored, both in the current scenario and from a perspective of ideal efficiency. A content analysis was carried out using coded response segments taken from the interviews. The analysis presented in the following chapters is based on those segments.

Having identified existing gaps in the links between the CISMIL and the SIED, and based on the above process, concrete measures were recommended to improve the SIM. Those measures are presented in the conclusions chapter.

### **3. Legal framework of the Portuguese Intelligence System**

The CEDN of 2013 outlines the policy guidelines and sets the strategic direction for NSD. The document emphasises that combatting an increasingly diffuse and covert threat will require optimised SI so that it can be used to uphold and defend the national interests. This confirms that IS are a vital tool to achieve the condition described as NS, and that there is a need to rebalance resources, integration, and cooperation among civilian and military institutions, both national and foreign. Therefore, these services play a key role in addressing the current threats and risks. The Portuguese legal system has issued several laws to regulate the activity of the NIS.

The National Defence Law establishes cooperation procedures between the AAFP and security providers in the fight against transnational threats and attacks. Furthermore, the Basic Law on the Organization of the Armed Forces (LOBOFA) tasks the CEMGFA with coordinating between the political strategic and strategic operational level. The latter is responsible for providing MSI to political decision makers and is a member of the Superior Intelligence Council (CSI). The legislation that governs the organization of the MIA stresses the duty to collaborate

in and contribute to situation assessment and strategic assessment by establishing bilateral and multilateral links with Intelligence Bodies (IB) and services both within the international organizations of which Portugal is a member and with other national ISs.

The Framework Law of the Portuguese Intelligence System (LQSIRP) is the legal document that defines the organization and duties of the SIRP. Although the SIM is not formally legislated or integrated into the SIRP structures, it is mentioned in the applicable law. Thus, the SIM is responsible for producing intelligence that can be used to ensure national and international Security and for creating intelligence-sharing channels with the other ISs.

Because the interpretation of a law can depend on how the analysis is conducted, our interpretation is depicted in the scheme provided below (Figure 3). The black and white areas represent facts drawn from the applicable documents and the grey area represents our interpretation. This study focuses on the grey area (the area where the SIED and the MIA intersect), which the legislation leaves open to interpretation regarding the role of the AAF in obtaining MSI. This is even more relevant in light of the fact that the CEMGFA is a member of the CSI, a body that provides support to political decision makers.




Figure 3 – Intersection of the legal framework regulating the SIED and the CISMIL (MIA)

It was **concluded** that several legal documents outline the responsibilities of the CISMIL in achieving the condition described as NS by producing military intelligence that can be used to support decision making in the pursuit and defence of the national interests.

In conclusion, six links between the SIED and the CISMIL were identified in the legislation:

- (i) the presence of the CEMGFA at the CSI;
- (ii) the interventions of the Council for the Oversight of the Portuguese Intelligence System (CFSIRP), which regulates the activity of the ISs;
- (iii) the participation of the head of the MIA in the SIRP's Advisory Council (CCSIRP);
- (iv) the functional links between the various MIA departments and the other ISs of the SIRP;

- (v) the duty of collaboration and cooperation, pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 of the Organic Law issued by the Secretary General of the SIRP (SGSIRP), the SIS, and the SIED;
- (vi) Article 3 of the LQSIRP.

#### **4. The National Intelligence System and the role of the Military Intelligence Service**

##### **4.1. The Portuguese Intelligence System**

The analysis carried out in this phase focused on the question most currently asked in civilian, military, academic, and operational forums, on which opinions are divided: is the CISMIL integrated into the NIS?

According to Dias (Borges, 2005, p.17), a system is a:

[...] set of specialized structures with well-defined tasks and duties, operating in accordance with legally established principles to achieve a common goal through the creation of operational level mechanisms for effective cooperation and coordination, in addition to measures to coordinate the highest levels of government – political decision makers.

From the perspective of management, a system is a structure formed by an interconnected set of elements (components, bodies, factors, members, parts, etc.) that is organized around a purpose.

The two structures that operate within the NIS – SIED and CISMIL – ultimately aim to provide defence and military SI to political decision makers. As stated above, the SIRP Secretary General is directly responsible for carrying out the decisions of the Prime Minister (PM) and the deliberations of the legally mandated oversight bodies, specifically the CF SIRP and the SIRP Data Supervisory Board (CFDSIRP) (Governo de Portugal, 2014a). The law also charges these bodies with supervising the CISMIL, which suggests that the legislator views and frames the MIA as similar to the other SIRP services.

Despite the changes in the laws regulating the SIRP, there are consistent references to the notions of collaboration and cooperation, as well as to the CSI and the CC SIRP as vital tools for coordinating the different services.

Therefore, a system must bring together its constituent parts to in favour of a common goal, in this case, to inform political decision making. The SIRP's primary function is to inform the Executive's decision making (the PM informs the President of the Republic (PR), directly or through the SG SIRP, when applicable). The SIM is charged with informing the CEMGFA and with providing support to the decisions that will be submitted to the Ministry of National Defence for approval (and to the PR, when applicable). Thus, it is clear that both bodies answer to the Executive (directly to the PM, in the case of the SIRP, or through the MND, in the case of the EMGFA), that they are granted a seat in the CSI and the CC SIRP (Figure 4), and that they are both subject to oversight by the CFD SIRP and the CF SIRP, respectively. At this point, the arguments that explain the role of the CISMIL in the NIS have been presented.




Figure 4 – NIS organisational chart

Source: Santos (2012) and Governo de Portugal (2014a).

## 4.2. Military Intelligence Service

### 4.2.1. Organization

According to Morgan (1996, p.24), management theories view an organization as a tool or an instrument. Moreover, Silva (2013, p.43) notes that organizations have four main constituent elements: people, division of labour, boundaries of action, and objectives.

For Kent (1965, p.166), *Intelligence* refers to an organization of individuals who collect *knowledge* from qualified experts, who possess or are able to obtain information about current problems in foreign policy strategy and use it to produce useful intelligence.


Intelligence as an organization refers to the functional structures whose primary mission is to gather information and produce knowledge. In other words, according to Gonçalves (2014, p.5), they are “organizations that search for covert data, process that information, and use it to produce knowledge or intelligence”.

The CISMIL is the Military Intelligence agency tasked with producing MSI. That is, the CISMIL is the strategic military and operational body responsible for producing the Intelligence needed to accomplish the missions of the AAF and ensure Military Security (Assembleia da República, 2014).

This agency is also responsible for systematic research, analysis, and processing of news and for disseminating and archiving the intelligence produced (Governo de Portugal, 2014b). However, as Morgado (2018) points out, the specific features of the military organization with regards to personnel management hinder the development of intelligence activities, especially due to the constant turnover of personnel in Intelligence positions. Nascimento (2018) confirms this, stating that the lack of personnel and the AAF’s turnover policy is a

limiting factor, considering the technical expertise and experience required of Intelligence personnel.

It should be noted that a strong and effective SIM would improve the NIS as a whole. Based on this rationale, to increase the efficiency of MI and eventually link it to the SIED will require “improving the linkages within the AAFP intelligence community”. This is the focus of “the current efforts of the CISMIL, which aim to liaise with the Joint Military Operations Command (CCOM) and the branches to streamline and redefine the cooperation, collaboration, coordination, and communication processes” (Nascimento, 2018). Figure 5 shows the CISMIL’s organizational structure, through which it accomplishes its tasks and duties.




**Figure 5 – CISMIL organizational chart**

Source: Governo de Portugal (2014b).

#### 4.2.2. Knowledge

The word *knowledge* has been mentioned several times throughout this study; therefore, the next section will endeavour to define it. *Knowledge* is stored intelligence that originates in experiences or learning (a posteriori), consolidated through introspection (a priori). From a more holistic perspective, it is the possession of multiple interconnected data that, in isolation, are of lesser qualitative value.

Intelligence as a product refers to the result of the knowledge production process, whose target customers are decision makers at various levels (Figure 6). Thus, as Gonçalves (2008, p.4) notes, “Intelligence is Knowledge”.



**Figure 6 – Relationship between data, information, and intelligence**

*Source:* Waltz (2003), EME (2008), and Rêgo (2018).

*Data* refers to individual observations and primitive or primary lower level measurements and messages transmitted by a sensor or drawn from any other type of source (human, mechanical, or electronic). *Information* or news refers to organized sets of data in which the data elements have been contextualised for subsequent research and analysis (NATO, 2012). Finally, *intelligence* is information that has been analysed, understood, and correlated to already existing intelligence, observed in the light of previous experiences (Waltz, 2003, p.3).

Knowledge is acquired through systemic and structured processing of news to identify relevant content, discover covert or missing content, and process content that is deemed necessary. This process is called the Intelligence Production Cycle (IPC) (EME, 2008).

In this study, the classification provided by Santos (2012) was used to identify the different approaches to the phases or stages that constitute the IPC. Table 1 summarises the doctrines of national and foreign military organizations, as well as of respected scholars in the field. While the importance of the IPC is widely accepted, the phases that constitute it and the role that decision makers play in the cycle are not. Thus, “the IPC model has garnered some criticism, especially regarding the lack of communication between ISs and decision makers, and in particular between collection and analysis” (Menezes, 2012, p.19).


REFERENCES					
PORTUGUESE ARMY	NATO	Goldman	U.S. National Intelligence	Lowenthal	Waltz
Research Direction	Direction	Need for updated intelligence	Planning and Direction	Identification of Requirements	Planning and Direction
Collection	Collection	Creation and Collection	Collection	Collection	Collection
Processing	Processing	Processing	Processing and exploitation	Processing and exploitation	Processing
Dissemination	Dissemination	Dissemination	Analysis and Production	Analysis and Production	Analysis and Production
		Utilization	Dissemination	Dissemination	Dissemination
		Storage		Consumption	
		Delivery	Evaluation	Feedback	

**Table 1 – IPC phases**

Source: Waltz (2003), Santos (2012), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2014).

The doctrines described above is in line on the first three phases: Direction, Collection, and Processing. However, they differ in the importance they give to the stages that comprise the Dissemination phase. The difference is based, on the one hand, on the fact that the origins of its underlying rationale (both organizational and academic) are not well defined, and, on the other, on the time required to study the processes under analysis, given the organizational complexity of a NIS, the objectives that must be achieved, and the dynamics and volatility of today's society. For this reason, the conditions required to identify the best model to support political decision making have not yet been met.

The evaluation and feedback provided by ISs and political decision makers are an advantage for SI in general, and specifically for MI, vis-à-vis the mutability of the environment and determining factors surrounding a decision. The CPI model described in Figure 7 is the basis for this study.



**Figure 7 – IPC Study Model**

Source: Waltz (2003), Lowenthal (2006), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2014).

The model shows that the stages *evaluate* and *feedback* are always present. Therefore, in the context under analysis, the production of MI for strategic decision making is based on the principles of Intelligence: Opportunity, Continuous Review and Systematic Exploitation<sup>2</sup>.

#### 4.2.3. Activities

In process management, “an activity is an action performed, that is, it refers to any action taken to accomplish the organizational goals, linking the activities to ‘what’ will be done” (MPE, 2013, p.13). In the context of Intelligence, an activity is the “means by which certain types of information, which are required by a given research direction, are processed, analysed, and disseminated” (Gonçalves, 2008, p.5). Thus, the CISMIL is charged with developing a set of activities to provide Intelligence to support strategic decision making and to ensure military security.

##### 4.2.3.1. Military Intelligence Cells

According to NATO (2012, p.34), a Military Intelligence Cell (MIC) is a capability provided and equipped by a nation, which produce national Intelligence within a NATO Command and can be assigned to a permanent or mobile command. MIC provide direct and timely operational Intelligence at both national and theatre level.

These cells have a flexible modular architecture and can cover some or all aspects and capabilities of a mission. The cells answer directly to the CEMGFA through the CISMIL (2017) and generally comprise the following modules:

<sup>2</sup> Principles of Intelligence (EME, 2008, pp.1-3).

- Collection and Research – Human and electronic;
- Analysis and Processing;
- Military Security, Counter-intelligence and Intelligence.

Within the scope of its missions and attributions, the CISMIL may propose the constitution of a MIC to support the National Deployed Forces (NDF) or to meet the information needs identified above (Governo de Portugal, 2014b, p.6391). Thus, the deployment of MIC to areas of national interest would allow the CISMIL to focus on researching, analysing, and processing strategic and military intelligence tailored to highlevel decision making rather than researching opensource Intelligence relevant to other instruments of power, which are covered by the SIED. This measure, in combination with effective and permanent cooperation between the CISMIL and the SIED, could improve the system's efficiency and the quality of the knowledge produced (Gomes, 2018; Vieira, 2018).

Therefore, the deployment of a MIC that integrates the various services can prove useful to obtain important information that can be used in to produce knowledge, which will ultimately inform the decision-making process.

#### 4.2.3.2. Cooperation, Liaising, and Research Activities

One the tasks legally assigned to the CISMIL is participating in periodic forums for intelligence production and sharing in NATO environments (CISMIL, 2017), namely:

- *NATO Strategic Intel Estimate*;
- *NATO Intel Warning System*;
- *NATO Military Intel Committee meetings*;
- *STANAGs meetings*;
- Bilateral Meetings (USA; ESP; FRA; NLD).

By participating in these forums, the CISMIL is able to deliver constant international situational awareness and inform political decision makers about Portugal's international commitments to NATO's cooperative security and collective defence (Nascimento, 2018).

Still with regards to its international commitments, the CISMIL structure integrates the Defence and Military Attachés Liaison Office. Attachés in this office are tasked with, among other responsibilities: supporting the Ambassador in military and defence matters; keeping the CEMGFA and the DGPDN<sup>3</sup> permanently informed; liaising with the military institutions of the host country to exchange intelligence and military cooperation between the two States (CISMIL, 2017). In light of the above, the fact that the CISMIL has access to privileged information through the forums or by liaising with the Attachés could prove an important link between the SIED and this MIA. This access to geospatial information and to classified NATO and EU terminals allows it to provide consolidated products complemented with data collected from open sources, which can be shared and / or processed through all types of linkages between the SIED and the CISMIL.

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<sup>3</sup> Directorate-General of National Defence Policy.

## 5. Efficiency analysis of the National Information System

Chiavenato (2014, p.161) believes that “organizations should be analysed from the perspective of effectiveness and efficiency”. For his part, Diniz (2009) argues that efficiency is the parsimonious and rational use of resources, whose contributions must be integrated into a service production process, and effectiveness is the degree to which a set objective is effectively achieved.

Thus, in light of this conceptual framework and bearing in mind the aim of this study, when assessing the purpose of an IS effectiveness is considered the ability to achieve objectives with the available resources, whereas efficiency is the achievement of set objectives while optimising existing resources.

### 5.1. Effectiveness

In the specific context of Intelligence, the process of mitigating and reducing uncertainty must be credible because the knowledge generated by the IS plays a key role in the decisionmaking process.

Knowledge can offer advantages over a competitor by ensuring the optimisation and profitability of the resources employed by the State to carry out its political action, as provided for in the CEDN (2013, p.33). However, this study aims to objectively measure the outputs of Intelligence. Throughout history, there have been many examples of political decisions taken without any intervention by the ISs (Menezes, 2012, p.51). We can infer from this that the decision-making process may be carried out even without the knowledge provided by the ISs.

Mintz and DeRoan (2010, pp.37-38) argue that decision makers sometimes make judgments and decisions based on past experiences and beliefs, which can lead to biased decisions, and that they can even be influenced by or external elements (Figure 8). In contrast, Vieira (2018) believes that the most important contribution to the decisionmaking process is the knowledge provided by Intelligence.




Figure 8 – Factors that influence political decision making


Source: Mintz and DeRoan (2010, p.4).

Notwithstanding this, Sims (cited in Menezes, 2012, p.52) states that “the rationale under which the ISs operate is gaining Intelligence advantage to obtain decision advantage”. This advantage is understood as the way to improve one’s decisions in relation to those of

competitors. Thus, the value of Intelligence lies in how relevant and timely it is for decision makers. An IS will be all the more effective if it can provide decision makers with a competitive advantage over their competitors.

Due to this study's delimitation, all references to political decision making should be taken to mean decisions made in the context of foreign policy.

According to Mintz and DeRouen, "the essence of foreign policy decisions is a decision process taken in an interactive setting and consisting of a sequence of decisions made in a specific timeframe". The authors also point out that foreign policy decision making consists of a cycle in which four components intersect (Figure 9): (i) identifying the problem; (ii) identifying alternatives; (iii) decision; and (iv) execution.



**Figure 9 – The Intelligence Production Cycle embedded in the Political Decision Making Cycle**

*Source:* Lowenthal (2006) and Menezes (2012).

The first step – *identifying the problem* – entails understanding the external and internal environment and all the capabilities, methods, or plans that can reduce the uncertainty inherent to diffuse environments. In the IPC, this step refers to the phase between the moment when a direction is set and the collection of the required information. After the decision makers have been informed and the direction established, the next step – *identifying alternatives* – involves assessing possible courses of action, which requires “making estimates, identifying assumptions, analysing and appraising a situation to create a consolidated mental image” (Menezes, 2012, p.53). In this second step, the object under analysis is continuously assessed through the symbiotic link between the decision maker and the IS.

The next step involves making a *decision* on the best course of action among several proposed alternatives. In the IPC, this phase falls between the analysis process and the dissemination of intelligence, that is, of the final product – or output – that will be provided to political decision makers. Both cycles continue beyond the *execution* step because the volatility of the environment increases the need for constant assessment and close communication between decision makers and the elements that provide support to decision making (Menezes, 2012, p.55).

The above confirms that close collaboration between decision makers and research analysts and / or intelligence agencies is a contributing factor to the effectiveness of an IS, which is in line with Herman (1996, p.212). The author states that intelligence is influenced by foreign policy, but it also has the power to influence policy. The political and technical and professional factors tend to point in the same direction, which reinforces the idea of close cooperation.

Even so, it would be reductive to restrict the concept of effectiveness to this factor. Political decision makers and State structures are characterised by a high degree of bureaucracy. The ability of an IS to adapt to a bureaucratic State, meet decision makers' needs and predict the influence of elements in the external environment, is another contributing factor that must be considered when attempting to increase effectiveness (Menezes, 2012, p.63). Bureaucratisation is especially relevant in the organization of ISs, where the work distribution is highly compartmentalised to ensure the security of processes, activities, and products (Menezes, 2012, p.66).

The complexity of the resources available to the State, which results from the idiosyncrasies of the organizations themselves, the presence of increasingly volatile and diffuse threats, and the need to provide timely intelligence to support political decision making has led to a paradigm shift from *need to know* to *need to share* (Menezes, 2012, p.68).

If the State is unable to adjust to the external environment, it runs the risk of becoming less agile and effective when pursuing its objectives. Likewise, if an IS does not adapt by creating synergies that allow it to operate within a rigid bureaucratic structure and optimise procedures, it will not be able to communicate effectively with decision makers. This could lead to redundant and contradictory information that will infringe upon principles of timeliness and relevance, which are critical factors in establishing relationships of trust between decision makers and the IS (Gomes, 2018).

As for organization, Vieira (2014, p.276) argues, in regards to the various ISs, that “the main resources to combat threats”, “especially transnational ones, operate under different Ministries. This affects the coherence and speed of responses and fosters interagency competition, which hinders or even prevents effective cooperation”.

## 5.2. Efficiency

Although the concept of bureaucracy has negative connotations associated with heavy, rigid structures, according to Chiavenato (2014), “bureaucracy is a form of human organization

that is based on rationality, that is, it serves to adjust the means to the desired objectives – ends –, ensuring that they are achieved as efficiently as possible”. With the proliferation of bureaucracies, “the narrow, limited view of the internal aspects of the organization has been expanded and replaced by a broader vision which involves the organization and its links to other organizations within a larger society” (Chiavenato, 2014, pp.254258), highlighting the need for broader institutional interconnection.

Thus, “creating mechanisms to integrate, predict, monitor, and measure the overarching effects of the actions taken is perhaps the greatest challenge for a system that integrates different security providers” (Vieira, 2014, p.280). This also holds true in the case of IS.

The central issue that emerges from the analysis of interagency links should not be limited to the internal efficiency of a single *unit*, but rather to how coordinated units can increase not only the system’s efficiency but also the reliability of the knowledge produced (Smith, 2003, p.90).

Therefore, it is necessary to analyse how the relationship between the CISMIL and the SIED can be aligned with the above theory. Based on Figures 10 and 11 and on the notions of Network Centric Warfare and Effects based Operations (Smith, 2003, p.89), the IPC was examined in regards to the relationship between the effects to be achieved in the connection between two IA and the time required to support the decision making process.

Figure 10 shows how intelligence activities are carried out in the IPC of two IA. The only differences in effects appear in the analysis phase, and are the result of the discussion and sharing of knowledge, positively influencing the final effect. The other phases of the IPC develop at a pace set by a specific Intelligence Agency and, in theory, do not lead to significant changes in the results achieved.




Figure 10 – Graphic illustrating the effects produced during the IPC

Source: Smith (2003, p.86) and Vieira (2014).

As we can see, interagency coordination is an independent variable which can, under certain circumstances, produce effects that cancel each other out – horizontal or negative (downward) line or analysis. This indicates poor or absent coordination.

In Figure 11, the result of the interaction between the two IA is obtained by overlaying the two ICPs and highlighting the impact of positive coordination on the effects achieved.




Figure 11 – Graphic explaining how the combined effects are maximised by the relationship between the IPCs of two Intelligence Agencies<sup>4</sup>

Source: Smith (2003, p.86) and Vieira (2014).

Therefore, maximising the combined effects requires coordinating the various IPCs and synchronising the timings of the actions taken. The total variation of the analyses (between the two IA) will depend on the existence of coordination efforts.

It can also be inferred that increasing coordination between these IA will increase the system's contributions to the decision making process and the efficiency and value of the knowledge produced in the process.

The graphic shows that the analysis phase is the one that most influences the decisionmaking process. It is the success factor that gains the most from this interaction. The graphic also reveals that disseminating complementary products in a coordinated manner ensures more timely information is provided to decision maker. This confirms “the relevance of a Joint Intelligence Cell – a vital tool for coordinating and optimising analysis and dissemination” (Vieira, 2018).

Respondents agree on the importance of establishing linkages between the CISMIL and the SIED. Therefore, the study will examine how this interconnection of efforts can be developed (Table 2).

<sup>4</sup> This depiction of the IPC does not include assessment and feedback, as they are not relevant for the analysis of the connection between the two IS.

**Table 2 – Levels of interconnection between Intelligence Services (SIED and CISMIL)**

Link	Description
Cooperation	Agreement between the agencies regarding who does “what”. This requires a clear definition of responsibilities to avoid any “grey” areas that could hinder the acquisition of intelligence.
Collaboration	An integrative or collaborative analysis process that results in the delivery of a single product. This collaboration is conducted on a case-by-case basis to make the most of the expertise available to different organizations.
Coordination	Knowing what others will do to avoid product duplication. This involves periodic coordination meetings, but does not imply any changes to the collection effort by either party.
Communication	Knowing which products are produced by which organizations.
Competition	The actions taken by an organization to achieve its mission more successfully than “competing” organizations. In addition to accomplishing its superiorly defined mission, it the organization attempts to broaden its objectives and enter into the sphere of action of another organization.
Integration	Different organizations operating under the same Command and Control structure to meet the needs of a single agency or Research Plan.

Source: Denise (2012) and Costa et al. (2014).

Business management theories provide different approaches to establishing linkages, but those approaches are often confusing and lack the depth of analysis needed to establish the correct links to achieve a desired goal. Based on two articles on business management (Costa et al., 2014; Denise, 2012), a set of concepts was proposed for the two IA under analysis.

These concepts were correlated with the relevant legislation, organization, activities, and knowledge by reflecting on the current perceptions about the linkages between the CISMIL and the SIED and about the ideal system efficiency. A generated image<sup>5</sup> was constructed by counting word frequencies in the interviews (Figure 12). This image revealed that, in the opinion of respondents, the CISMIL and the SIED already cooperate and collaborate. However, in an ideal system these links would be coordinated, increasing the efficiency of the NIS (Figure 13). Similarly, respondents also agree on the importance of communication between ISSs. Therefore, efforts should be coordinated and sharing encouraged.

<sup>5</sup> This image is obtained using the qualitative source analysis software NVivo 11, Pro Edition.




Figure 12 – Perceptions about the existing links between the SIED and the CISMIL

Generally, all respondents agree that an effective link exists between the CISMIL and the SIED. However, they believe that there is considerable room for improvement. For Nascimento (2018), establishing links between these two services will increase the value of intelligence products, and consequently the effectiveness and efficiency of the overarching system.




Figure 13 – Perceptions about an efficient link between the SIED and the CISMIL

The values associated with the perception of efficiency show an increase of about 40% for all options, regardless of type of link, which suggests that increasing the efficiency of the system will require increasing the interaction between these two bodies.

This is in line with Vieira (2018), who considers that cooperation and coordination of research and analysis activities in space and time would result in greater system efficiency, and consequently in better and more intelligence provided to decision makers. Therefore, establishing strong linkages between the SIED and the CISMIL is crucial. This can be achieved by establishing “an effective symbiotic relationship between the two services with obvious organizational benefits in the short, medium and long term, with positive repercussions for NS” (Gomes, 2018; Morgado, 2018). Therefore, increasing the efficiency of the NIS requires

the implementation of linkages between the SIED and the CISMIL at various moments of the IPC, as this will benefit both organizations and add value to the knowledge produced.

Therefore, we were able to identify gaps in organization, activities, and knowledge, based on which recommendations were elaborated to provide a basic implementation principle that can improve the contributions of MI to NSD, respecting the initial requirement of acceptability and feasibility.

The following needs were identified:

- (i) The need to develop institutional relations and combine efforts;
- (ii) The need to define and operationalize linkages at regular intervals through the relevant Boards;
- (iii) The need to revise the policy for assigning staff to intelligence functions in the MIA, and in the AAFF in general;
- (iv) The need for knowledge and experience exchanges between the CISMIL and the SIED;
- (v) The need to share intelligence and / or information in real time;
- (vi) The need for a Research Plan that can be disseminated to the various levels of decision making, and the need to identify the various actors in the NIS;
- (vii) The need for joint and concerted action in the sharing of knowledge and in exploiting the knowledge available from military, civilian, and academic forums;
- (viii) The need to promote trust, which is essential for productive, continuous, and timely sharing.

## Conclusions

To present the findings of the analysis and critical reflection carried out in this study in a systematic way, we must now revisit the GO. The aim of this study was to determine the role of MI for NSD and to recommend ways to improve its efficiency.

The study identified the relevance of SI for the policy guidelines defined in the CEDN and examined the legal framework of the NIS with regards to the SIRP, to the military aspects that involve the EMGFA, and to the ISs as essential tools to defend and uphold the national interests. A set of laws was identified which clearly define the responsibilities of the various NIS stakeholders, revealing a “grey area” which refers to the interpretation of the laws regarding the role of the AAFF in the production of SI.

The relevance of MSI for NS and the legal responsibilities involved in the tasks assigned to the CISMIL allowed us to infer that the legislation governing the ISs provides the legal instruments required for the conduct of Intelligence activities by the various NIS stakeholders, and that it also defines procedures for coordinating between them.

The role of the CISMIL in the NIS was determined by analysing the agency’s organization, activities, and knowledge production capacity. The latter aspect revealed the instrumental role of the IPC in supporting the political decision making process. It was also concluded that

the tools and capabilities that the CISMIL has at its disposal constitute a strategic decision advantage. Furthermore, by working in a complementary capacity with the SIED and by establishing closer links between intelligence services and policy makers, this symbiosis, the NIS would be able to provide political decision makers with strategic advantages.

Once the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency were deconstructed, it was possible to understand the relevance of this relationship of proximity between the ISs and political decision makers by comparing the effectiveness of the IPC with that of the political decision cycle. It was also determined that a productive relationship between the CISMIL and the SIED would optimise available resources and improve the quality of the knowledge produced. The interviewees generally agreed on the importance of coordination, cooperation, and communication, as well as of the activities and knowledge provided by these two ISs. Once the ideal efficiency of an NIS was determined, it was possible to identify efficiency gaps in the organization, activities, and knowledge produced by the NIS.

Based on the analysis carried out in this work, the answer to the RQ will be combined with the study's recommendations. Therefore, the objective set at the beginning of the study, which consisted of elaborating a reflection that would lead to improvements, is achieved by identifying opportunities and challenges in existing processes in order to mitigate the identified gaps. When elaborating the following measures, the requirements of feasibility of implementation and appropriateness to the functioning of an NIS were taken into account:

- a. In terms of legislation:
  - (1) Implementing an **Institutional Protocol between the SIED and the CISMIL** to specify the degree to which their activities will be interconnected, formalizing the links provided for in the legislation regarding the articulation between the CEMGFA and the SGSIRP;
  - (2) Evaluating and / or analysing potential liaising activities or projects through the **coordination mechanisms** that already exist between the SIRP and the AAF, through the CC SIRP, on a regular or ad hoc basis;
  - (3) In view of the military expertise required and the existing **staff assignment** rules, issuing an internal dispatch from the CEMGFA defining a minimum period of five years of assignment to the **CISMIL**. This will ensure appropriate training, consolidation, and transmission of the expertise acquired.
- b. In the Organization:
  - (1) Including MI topics in the curricula of specialized training courses for AAF officers and sergeants, who will be provided basic knowledge that will be useful in any future assignments in the MIA;
  - (2) **Institutional training exchanges** (e.g. intelligence analysts, negotiation, HUMINT Operator, interrogators, etc.). Sharing techniques, tactics, and procedures that have been tested in the field, and are therefore an important organizational tool;
  - (3) **Implementing a joint Intelligence Fusion Cell** that will assist in achieving specific goals (e.g. NDF, CIM) and provide support throughout the preparation,

- mission, and withdrawal stages. This cell will familiarise military and / or civilian personnel deployed to third countries and inform them on how participate actively in the information collection process;
- (4) **Lessons Learned Forums** in which case studies and shared experiences are integrated into a concept of mutual organizational training;
  - (5) Using the CISMIL to establish links between the branches to **form a robust, cohesive, and efficient Military Information System.**
- c. With regards to Knowledge:
- (1) Creating a **common Knowledge Management Portal where all ISs** can access previously produced knowledge and issues currently under analysis, providing a permanent “library” of knowledge, the access to which would be given according to clearance and security level, preventing duplication of efforts and optimising resources;
  - (2) **Holding expert meetings** on ad hoc issues or topics to meet unanticipated intelligence needs;
  - (3) **Workshops** on relevant topics with experts within and outside the ISs. This format allows for the presence of external experts based on their expertise, published studies, or any other reasons that endow them with valuable knowledge;
  - (4) **Bilateral / Multilateral meetings** between experts with responsibilities in the same geographical areas. This format allows for sharing perceptions, conclusions, and discussions that can influence the value of the knowledge produced.
- d. With regard to Activities:
- (1) **Integrating multiagency teams**<sup>6</sup> in missions outside national territory, clearly defining their responsibilities, mandate, and functional hierarchy according to the operational framework in which they are carried out;
  - (2) **Disseminating** an objective and clear **Research Plan** through the CSI (on proposal from all participants), which will allow for synchronising the actions taken. Of course, this may already occur but be covered by State secrecy.

The above recommendations do not exhaust the analysis carried out in this investigation. The model depicted in Figure 14 shows some of the conclusions drawn throughout the study.

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<sup>6</sup> Teams formed by CISMIL and SIED personnel.




Figure 14 – Generic model depicting the links between the CISMIL and the SIED

As can be seen in the figure above, in the initial stages the strategic objectives must clearly defined by the political authority, as they will correspond to the direction of the collection efforts carried out by the ISs. The CC SIRP, represented by the SG SIRP, should streamline any “grey areas” that could lead to conflicting or redundant resources, emphasising the importance of sharing data, news, and Intelligence. The CISMIL should support strategic decision making by focusing on “how” an opposing military force may act, and the SIED on “why” an opponent would use this instrument.

In the next phase, the collection efforts should focus on optimising resources according to the priorities defined by the policy direction.

The *analysis* provides an opportunity to share information and knowledge, which can and should be harnessed in favour of a cohesive, effective, and efficient NIS. By ensuring that the previously identified steps are carried out, the final products will be of higher value due to the specific techniques used, and the resulting agreement or discussion will trigger interactions that lead to more advantageous end-products.

All the proposed measures involve an underlying factor that will determine the success of an NIS. This implicit element is the human factor. Thus, all recommendations were designed to foster interpersonal relations among all stakeholders, thereby promoting trust, which is essential for productive, continuous, and timely sharing of resources.

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