

European Union Strategic Transport Agency

Intervenção de França

Resumo

O *Helsinki Headline Goal* está previsto ser alcançado em 2003. Qual o ponto de vista dos países do C4 sobre a organização que deve estabelecer-se para o levantamento das forças militares previstas? Deve ser criado um transporte combinado marítimo e terrestre? Qual será a influência desta iniciativa relativamente aos países da margem Sul do Mediterrâneo?

Abstract

It is foreseen that the Helsinki Headline Goal will be achieved in 2003. What is the perception of C4 countries about the organisation that might be set up for a military force to be established? Must a combined and land transport be created? Which could be the influence of this initiative over the Southern Mediterranean Countries?

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European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) has emerged from the framework of the European Union. In order to be able to fulfil all Petersberg tasks in response to international crisis, the states of EU agreed in Helsinki in December 1999 a set of capabilities and means to fulfil those tasks and the first military organizations (Military Committee and EU staff) have been set up in the beginning of year 2001, accordingly to Nice summit decisions.

The main objective is to develop an autonomous decision capability and, when NATO itself is not engaged, to engage and control military operations under EU responsibility in response to crisis where European interests would or would not be affected. Therefore, it has been decided to equip Europe with a capability to deploy a force of 60.000 troops and their equipments, in a 60 days period, self-sustained during one year.

This deployment capability is a key element of the implementation of a credible military European intervention force. It must be taken as obvious that none of the EU nations has, at present, this capability. It comes under the strategic transport field, that is to say the long distance transport of those forces and equipments of various sizes that need to be deployed in area at various times. Two main transport means are particularly adapted to this need: air transport and maritime transport.

1. Inventory of european needs in strategic transport

The Helsinki Headlines Goal Catalogue, approved by foreign ministers in November 2000, also studies the question of strategic transport by learning the lessons from recent operations.

In order to estimate the necessary assets, various assumptions have been made for the different crisis scenarios that are envisaged: peace making using force, conflict prevention, humanitarian aid or population withdrawals. We will focus on the case that requires the biggest amount of assets, the one of separating waring factions by force (peace making). The accepted hypothesis is to deploy at 4000 kilometres up to 80% of land forces equipments by maritime transport and 20% by air - note that only 5 to 10% of the equipments have been carried by air during the most recent crisis. Time to unload has been estimated at one day for a ship and one to three hours for a cargo aircraft depending upon its size.

For a force of 60.000 troops equipped with a 30 days of operations autonomy, studies show the need to carry a total of 300 linear kilometres and 15 000 containers by sea and

40 000 tons of general freight by air in less than a month, the first month being essentially dedicated to the preparation of forces, the planning of deployments and the writing of operations orders and rules of engagements.

Another point may be taken into account is the ability of the transport assets, both air and maritime, to participate on their way back to the eventual evacuation of refugees from the crisis area.

1.1. Air transport needs

The studies led in a EU perspective must take into account the most demanding of the Petersberg's tasks, the "separation of warring factions using force"; we will consider this for air transport.

For that type of deployment two different tasks are required.

First, the deployments of the air combat forces on airbases located in a friendly country close to the area of operations. At the same time, it is necessary to deploy and receive up to 20% of the equipments of land forces carried by air, once the area of deployments has been secured. This represents 50 000 linear meters and it will not take more than 5 weeks in order to achieve with the 60 days goal.

Second, depending upon the type of operation to be conducted, the major part of the 60 000 soldiers will have to be carried by air because, usually, the civilian cargo ships don't have facilities to accommodate personals and ferries don't have the capabilities to carry people on such a long distance.

In those conditions, the overall daily traffic flow would rise to 14 heavy carriers, 60 tactical type aircraft such as C160/C130 and 10 passenger aircraft. For a deployment at 4000 kilometres it is necessary to dispose of a fleet available during 5 weeks and composed of 10 passenger carriers, 20 heavy cargo-lifters and 120 tactical aircraft.

In addition to the air transport capabilities, as part of the overall needs, the air refuelling assets may help the deployments of the air combat assets as well as support the early phases of the air operations.

Finally, one must keep in mind that the very short notice delays (around 5 days) to deploy the air combat forces will necessitate to dispose of an important amount of air carriers available within 2 or 3 days. It must also be taken into account that carrying 60 000 soldiers with equipments by air would seem not credible and the solution would mainly rest under the chartering of ships and heavy cargo and passengers aircraft to transport them. This is going to be the key point for the deployment of the EU force, in

particular during the intermediate phase before the put into service of the future European transport aircraft, the A400M.

1.2. Maritime Transport Needs

Upon the same assumptions, the HGTF (headline goal task force) of European Union has begun, spring 2001, a study to evaluate the maritime transport needs with the help of a software application used for NATO deployments.

The key factors revealed to be the following: size and composition of the force, available assets, position of the theatre of operations and ports unloading capabilities. Several hypotheses have been studied and the results are similar to those of a consultants office engaged by French government: it requires 160 ships' round trips to carry the whole of the equipments.

To achieve the 60 days goal, assuming that the first unloading will not occur before one month after the decision, in the best case, has been taken, will lead to use about 80 ships that will make two round trips each. Hence, it is obvious that we will face difficulties to charter so many roll-on /roll-off (RoRo) in such a short period.

At last, these studies show that the assumptions that have been upon the unloading capabilities of the destination ports, i.e. 4 ships a day, are inadequate. It appears it would be necessary to unload more than 150 ships in a month, i.e. 5 to 6 ships every day, and handle 1800 containers a day. Such capabilities rarely exist in the areas of potential crisis.

In order to secure the area, military ships must be allowed to land the first echelon in a lightly equipped port and to equip a port with the basic unloading equipments (special cranes for containers for example). Very soon, Europe will have 20 ships of this type (LPH, LPD and ALSL¹) available in case of a commitment; they have been proposed by the host nations in the frame of the Helsinki global objective. In addition, some commercial ships will have to be adapted to the transport of military heavy loads and unloading under difficult conditions.

According to the great amount of assets needed for the deployment of the equipments combined with the 60 000 troops force in less than 2 months, the chartering of civilian means from the international market is essential because of the above mentioned fact that no European country has the ability to deploy its own elements of such a force.

¹ LPD : Landing Platform Dock ; LPH : Landing Platform Helicopter ; ALSL : Alternative Landing Ship Logistic

2. Coordination structures

2.1. *Air transport*

The need of coordination in air transport rose several years ago, especially in the scope of the bilateral French and German cooperation for those two nations equipped with the same aircraft C160 / Transall. A cooperation agreement was signed between the two nations.

Second the European Air Group, created in a French and English framework and now cooperation structure for the Air Forces of seven European countries has been concerned with air transport for a few years. In this context, a airlift coordination cell (EACC) composed of 15 officers has been created and settled on the Eindhoven airbase in the Netherlands. It has got its IOC (Initial Operational Capability) on 28th February 2002 and its mission is to contribute in the coordination and efficient use of airlift assets and air-refuelling assets of those countries members of the EAG. That decision, which constitutes a major and key element of the European military cooperation, contributes to improve the overall capability of European Union in order to fulfil HG.

The arrival of A400M will give the opportunity to thoroughly go into European cooperation, not only in the scope of use but also for all the aspects of logistic support, training, procedures, A computer program for use during peace time has already been implemented (it is called ATARES: Air Transport, Air Refuelling and other Exchange of Services): this program has already allowed to save money by preventing chartering 8 aircraft and to share 70 air-refuelling hours during the first two months of its implementation.

Furthermore, the EU military committee, well advised of the lacks in the field of airlift after the HGTF studies, has requested the resumption of the negotiations with Ukraine about the chartering of heavy air lifters such as the Antonov 124. The aim is to establish an agreement in order to define the types, quantities and delays before disposal of the selected aircraft.

Finally, it is necessary to organize and put in place structures to coordinate the European use of the air transport means in case of a crisis.

2.2. *Maritime transport*

In order to optimise chartering, it is necessary to create a European coordination cell. This cell would be in charge of monitoring a database of all maritime units able to be engaged and register the information according to their characteristics and their current

area of operations. It will be essential to know the geographical position of these ships on a permanent basis. On the premises surveys will allow to accurately know the specific capabilities of military equipments shipping and monitor their availability.

During crisis management, this cell will have to be able to use a software application that optimise the use of the various ships by gathering as far as possible at each departure port the transports of all European nations. It has been noticed that the present principle upon which each nation must ensure the deployment of its own troops led to a very poor optimisation of the assets.

This organization would have the ability to propose the modifications of some of the existing commercial ships to adapt them to the transport of heavy equipments and to the unloading in badly equipped ports: reinforcement of the decks and the ramps, fixing points for heavy military equipments, articulated non axial ramps, lateral doors and ramps, etc... As for example, some French ferries have been modified soon after constructing thanks to defence budget funds. Other solution, adopted by the UK, consists in a dual program, both civilian and military, in order to design and acquire ships meeting the requirements.

Finally, in the scope of national regulations, it is necessary to get a priority use of ships such as RoRo the chartering of which is becoming very difficult. Financial compensations, added to the cost of chartering, should be negotiated in advance to compensate for the loss of the ongoing contracts and the nations should be able to engage themselves to use those selected companies during peace time if they accept to deliver their assets in a very short notice delay during crisis management.

3. What organization for the european strategic transport?

In the mid term, the optimisation of the numerous assets to engage will benefit more from the allocation of all these assets from the start of the crisis rather than into the creation of an integrated command structure that will own them on a permanent basis.

The EAG initiative is then to be continued on a extended context with those countries which have the strategic transport capabilities or which are engaged in the acquisition of such assets (A400M). In light of this enlargement, the exit of the EACC from the EAG authority is then possible. We will then have to solve the question of the new chain of command of this European cell responsible to prepare, as soon as peace time, the coordination of the air transport and air refuelling and to contribute to interoperability of equipments and procedures.

It does not seem appropriate at this stage to envisage the creation of a European air transport integrated command that will gather all the assets of the contributing nations. Indeed, those assets would effectively participate in the deployment of an European force but would also have to cope with national tasks in peace time. Upon these occasions their use would raise difficulties if they were subordinate to a European agency. This constitutes the part of sovereignty that each state will like to keep. This question could be debated again in the event of an evolution of the ESDP towards other missions outside the Petersberg's spectrum.

The idea of a sealift coordination cell - SCC - as suggested above has already been forwarded by a initiative by France and Netherlands during the Helsinki summit, for it would allow to optimise the maritime transport resources such as the EACC does for the air transport.

The gathering of these two cells, EACC and SCC, in a same location would increase their mutual work while they would operate in order to meet their own objectives. They would merge in the scope of the essential use for ESDP purposes and it would be envisaged under responsibility of the EU military staff. This agency, gathering both air and maritime cells and which could be called EUSTA (European Union Strategic Transport Agency), would be assigned to:

- collect resources, both military and civilian;
- collect, maintain and update a database of ports and airports;
- plan the deployment phases;
- charter the civilian assets and build up the procedures and agreements during peace time;
- coordinate and control the transport phases to and from the crisis area;
- participate in the definition of the future transport assets.

4. Implications on the confidence building measures

Such an organization, which will be created in the framework of the Petersberg tasks as part of the ESDP, would not be a worrying subject for the South Mediterranean basin countries according to the confidence building measures. At least it would allow any other non-EU nation to become a contributing nation. In any case, this initiative should be preceded by an explanation on the subject given to these countries.

Conclusion

Strategic mobility is the key factor in the achievement of the European Union overall capability to realize the Petersberg tasks. European countries haven't enough military assets to carry out this kind of mission in a sixty days delay; it is then considered necessary the use of both military and civilian means.

In the continuity of the capabilities improvement conference, held in November 2001, which has underlined the lacks in strategic mobility and in national programs to fulfil all the requirements, the EU members have to cooperate in developing and financing the future strategic transport assets.

For that purpose it is necessary to establish a permanent agency (E.U.S.T.A.) composed of two cells, an airlift coordination cell and a maritime coordination cell. This agency should be integrated in the E.U. staff structure.

ANNEX
EUROPEAN TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES

1. Air transport capabilities

	C 160	C 130	C 17	A 400 M (a)
BELGIUM		11		7
FRANCE	66	14		50
GERMANY	84			73
ITALY		22		
LUXEMBOURG				1
NORWAY				
POLAND				
PORTUGAL				3
SPAIN		9		27
SWEDEN		4		
UNITED KINGDOM		55	4	25

Note (a): number of aircraft announced in the agreement signed in June 2001; deliveries to begin in 2007

2. Maritime transport capabilities

Military assets

BELGIUM/ LUXEMBOURG	✓ 1 project of an ALSL Rotterdam/Galicia type
FRANCE	✓ 2 ALSL 8500 T ✓ 2 ALSL 12000 T ✓ 2 ALSL in project (20 000 T each - 8 helos NH 90 type) in replacement of those of 8500 T in 2004
GERMANY	✓ 4 polyvalent logistic support 702 type (2 in service and 2 more in 2008)
ITALY	✓ 3 ALSL San Giorgio type - 7665 T
NETHERLANDS	✓ 2 ALSL Rotterdam/Galicia type - 13000 T (1 of which in 2007)
SPAIN	✓ 2 ALSL Rotterdam/Galicia type - 13000 T ✓ 1 former american troops carrier - 16800 T
UNITED KINGDOM	✓ 1 LPH Ocean type - 21600 T - 12 medium helos ✓ 1 LPD Albion type (2002-2003) - 16980 T - 3 helos EH 101 type ✓ 4 ALSL in project - 16000 T

LPH: Landing Platform Helicopter / LPD: Landing Platform Dock / ALSL: Alternative Landing Ship Logistic

Civilian assets

NETHERLANDS	✓ financial participation in 6 Roll On - Roll Off with U.K.
UNITED KINGDOM	In the scope of the Royal Auxiliary Fleet ✓ 3 RoRo of 24000 T ✓ 6 RoRo in project - 24000 T / 2600 linear meters