THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT ON SMART POWER

O PAPEL DO INSTRUMENTO MILITAR NO SMART POWER

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Abstract

Military power coupled with coercion and deterrence is the oldest form of power. However, despite its coercive use having decreased over the years, it is still an important resource because it generates security. But with the phenomenon of globalisation and the technological, scientific and informational developments came new transnational threats, especially terrorism and cyberterrorism, the resolution of which requires a holistic approach known as Smart Power. Smart Power requires a strong military instrument but also relies on diplomacy and institutions, enabling the delineation of integrated, effective strategies. The concept was developed by the US, and was reflected in the Alliance's new strategic concept in the paradigm shift in the employment of the military instrument from command to cooperation, as its involvement in Peace Support Operations and humanitarian operations demonstrates. This was the beginning of military diplomacy, which challenges the idea that military resources are solely an instrument of war, although they are still used as a deterrent. Thus, the concept of Smart Power is being absorbed by the military, concealing the latter's coercive power and simultaneously providing support to intangible assets, which shows the changing role of Military Power in the International System.

Resumo

O poder militar, associado à coerção e dissuasão, é a forma mais antiga de poder e apesar do seu emprego ter diminuído face ao passado, continua a ser um importante recurso, pois a sua existência gera segurança. Com a globalização e no decurso da evolução tecnológica, científica e informacional surgiram novas ameaças transnacionais das quais se destaca o terrorismo e o ciberterrorismo, cuja resolução implica uma abordagem holística, designada de Smart Power *que utiliza um forte instrumento militar, mas também investe na diplomacia e instituições, possibilitando a delineação de estratégias integradas e eficazes. Este conceito, desenvolvido pelos estadunidenses, foi refletido no novo conceito estratégico da Aliança através da mudança de paradigma do exercício do instrumento militar de comando para cooperação, evidente nas* Peace Support Operations *e nas operações humanitárias. Surge a diplomacia militar que altera a visão deste recurso como um mero instrumento de guerra, não obstante a permanência da sua presença dissuasora. Assim, o conceito de* Smart Power *está a ser absorvido pelo instrumento militar, mascarando o seu poder coercivo e servindo, simultaneamente, de apoio a outros recursos intangíveis, demonstrando a alteração do papel do instrumento militar no Sistema Internacional.*

Palavras-chave: *Instrumento militar, hard power, soft power, smart power, diplomacia militar.*

Introduction

Power is a core concept in International Relations (IR), which Moreira (1996, p.18) defines as the set of relationships between bodies who do not recognise a higher political power, even if they are not state actors, plus the direct relationships between bodies that formally answer to autonomous political powers. According to Nye (2002a, p.38), the IS comprises a set of elements (actors), both state and non-state, that are internationally related.

For Nye (2004), power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others for a specific purpose or objective. Hard Power is associated with coercion and deterrence and relies on the application of tangible resources, such as military forces, economic capacity or natural resources. In contrast, Soft Power, a concept introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990, deals with the exercise of power by means other than violence and force. It relies instead on persuasion and attraction, generating cooperative behaviour. This type of power uses intangible resources such as culture, ideology or institutions (Nye, 2004).

Hard Power may have played a crucial role in the recent past, as we saw in the World Wars (WW), and defined the structure of the IS today as a form of global hegemony, but the lessons learned in the interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in power becoming more Soft (Borges, 2015).

Along with the lessons learned in the past, globalisation was also relevant to the paradigm shift that occurred in the type of power that is now being employed. This phenomenon, combined with

technological and scientific developments, has encouraged the emergence of new transnational threats[1], facilitated the evolution of interests, and diversified the actors who influence the IS as non-state and individual actors appeared (Griffiths and Callaghan, 2002). On the other hand, the absence of government bodies caused by the fall of some regimes resulted in the emergence of terrorist groups with ethnic, cultural or religious ideologies and whose transnational nature threatens the stability of the IS and requires the coordination of the joint diplomatic efforts of several States (Nye, 2011b). For Nye (2011b), Smart Power is of particular relevance when dealing with transnational threats, as it combines the resources of both Hard and Soft Power.

Thus, the key to success, as well as the challenge we will face in the future, lies in understanding the context and selecting the appropriate instruments of power, both tangible and intangible, in a Smart combination.

Although there may have been a shift in the type of power that is employed, large sums continue being invested in the development of military technology and in weaponry and equipment for the armed forces.

The relevance of analysing how the military instrument, and, consequently, the armed forces, are adjusting to the new paradigm that emerged from the lessons learned and the adjustments required by an entirely new induced reality (globalisation), as well as by an imposed reality, terrorism and Irregular Warfare emerged from our familiarity and affinity with this instrument of power and from the fact that not much work has been published in this area of knowledge in Portugal. According to NATO (2015, p.2-T-5), terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. Smith (2008, p. 26) defines an irregular force as one that operates outside the state, in contrast to regular forces, which are employed to serve a specific political purpose. According to Gaiolas (2010), Irregular Warfare and Conventional Warfare differ in their forms of approximation/engagement and in the strategy they use to achieve objectives. While Conventional Warfare can be described as the 'comprehensive set of military operations conducted against an adversary by traditional military forces or by other governmental security forces, with the exception of actions involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons', which occur between state actors, Irregular Warfare is a 'violent confrontation between the state and a non-state body in order to influence the relevant population, or to garner legitimacy from that population (...) usually through an indirect or asymmetric approach to the conflict. This definition includes terrorism and insurgency[2] (Gaiolas, 2010, p.33).

We relied on the concept of military instrument, the object of this research, as the resource of tangible and measurable power constituted by the armed forces (Pallaver, 2011), to define our general objective of ascertaining whether the role of the military instrument in the IS has

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[1] We have decided to use the term 'transnational' rather than 'international' since they refer to different concepts, according to Nye and Keohane, cited in Pereira (2016), depending on whether or not they involve non-governmental actors. International interactions occur between states, or are controlled by them, while in transnational interactions at least one actor is neither a government nor an intergovernmental organization.

[2] 'A set of political and military activities to gain control of a territory, or part of a territory, using irregular military forces and illegal political organizations' (Gaiolas, 2010, p.33).

changed, and what is the nature of that change. Thus, the specific objectives of this research are: (I) to analyse whether the military instrument has become less relevant over time; (Ii) to ascertain whether the future of power is Smart Power; and (iii) to discover which strategy will be used to integrate the military instrument into Smart Power.

Our methodological approach was divided into three distinct phases (exploratory, analytical and conclusive) and was based on hypothetical-deductive reasoning based on preliminary readings on the subject. Subsequently, we consolidated the theoretical framework, after which the problem was identified by posing a question: In what way has the role of the military instrument in the IS changed? The method used to achieve the objectives defined was qualitative analysis of the reference documentation. It is worth noting that ideological and conceptual constraints arose from the fact that much of the literature analysed is related to the current north-American ideology of IR. The main justification for this notional corset is not only the relevance of the United States of America to the IS, and thus the country's global influence even in matters of military doctrine, but also the fact that the creator of the structural concepts under study, Soft and Smart Power, is American neo-liberal Joseph Nye.

With these principles in mind, we considered it essential to first elaborate a conceptual description of power and its instruments and present a classification according to the behaviour that its use elicits according to Nye's ideology. Subsequently, in the second chapter, we will assess whether the objectives have been achieved, but first we will ascertain whether the relevance of the military instrument decreased in relation to the past. Next, we will attempt to discover if the future of power is Smart Power, and, finally, if the military instrument is being integrated into Smart Power as a way of sustaining and lending credibility to the other instruments of power. Finally, we will elaborate our main conclusions.

1. Power

a. Theory of Power

Power is a core concept in IR, especially for the Realists who are advocates of Power Politics, a field that has been extensively studied and explored (Mattern, 2009, p.691). Joseph Nye (2011a, p.9) states that Power is difficult to define or measure, but easy to experience. The difficulty in defining power has led to the emergence of several concepts, but two factors are transversal, means and ways.

For Nye (2004, p. 1) power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others for a specific purpose or objective. This capacity to influence can be achieved in three ways: through inducements (carrots), coercion (sticks) or attraction/persuasion. However, according to Nye (2011a, p.12), for the use of power to be effective, two important variables must be defined: who one intends to influence and which instrument of power to use.

For Pallaver (2011, p.56), instruments of power can be classified as material (they are also called tangible or constant) and immaterial (also known as intangible or variable) resources. This classification, which stems from the nature of this type of resource and from how it is employed, is presented in Figure 1. Tangible resources are objective and concrete, and are therefore more

easily measurable, while intangible resources are more subjective and are characterized by their complexity, diffusion and by being difficult to measure.

Tangible:

Military power, economic capacity, natural resources

INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

Intangible:

Moral, national character, policies and quality of diplomacy

Figure 1 – Instruments of Power
Source: (Pallaver, 2011, p.56).

However, owning and using resources of power may not be an effective way to achieve objectives. Thus, it is worth noting that power is relative, as its employment depends on when and where it will be used and on the relationship between the actors. Thus, power conversion is a fundamental concept and can be described, according to Nye (2002a, p. 71), as 'the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behaviour of others'. For Castro (2012, p.179), potential power therefore means the possibility of using, or threatening to use the resources of power and force as instruments of persuasion or coercion, whereas real power consists in the effective use of resources of force or violence to enforce disciplined obedience to gain control, command, and trigger a change in behaviour in another international actor.

History holds a few crystal-clear examples of the relativity of power, one of which was, according to Nye (2004, p.3), the Vietnam War. The conflict became infamous for the asymmetry between Vietnam and the US, as the latter had access to more resources and was, according to a realist rationale, more powerful. However, they were eventually defeated. Another example of this was the US' inability to prevent and deter the September 11 attacks (2001).

That is, greater effective power does not mean greater resources of power, and lies instead in the most effective conversion strategies. Therefore, what we mean when we speak of power relativity is that power can vary according to context, and that context can be defined by: who and where, which define how, when, and what the best instruments are, always bearing in mind the intended objectives.

b. Types of Power

Given that there are several taxonomies of power, we have decided to use in this study the one proposed by Joseph Nye (2004), who separates power according to its application as: Hard Power, Soft Power and Smart Power.

Hard Power is a result of anarchy in the IS when states do not recognize any supra-state entities and international order is imposed by wars and competition for power (Pallaver, 2011), the latter being the use of military force (Nye, 2011a, p.19). According to Pallaver (2011, p.81), this type of power is the ability to change the behaviour of an actor as one wishes by using military and economic resources of power (tangible or objective resources) to exercise command power by resorting to stimuli (inducements) or to threats (coercion). Thus, as shown in Table I, military power is the use of the military instrument as a resource of power (Nye, 2004, p.31) associated with coercion, deterrence or protection (Hard Power). Coercion is related to the threat of force, or its effective use, especially physical force. Inducement can be described as the act or effect of getting someone to act a certain way. Both can be applied at various levels of intensity. Inducement is related to the economic superiority of A over B and can be either negative (imposition of economic sanctions) or positive (payments).

However, it is sometimes necessary to use an indirect approach, also known as the second face of Power (Nye, 2004, p.5). IS actors may be attracted to the values, culture or prosperity of another actor and follow their lead. This type of power, introduced by Nye in 1990, is known as Soft Power (Nye, 2011a, p.19), which is the ability to affect others with the purpose of achieving a desired outcome through attraction and by setting the agenda (Table I).

Table I - Government Resources and Policies for Hard and Soft Power

	Behaviors	**Primary Currencies**	**Government Policies**
Military Power (Hard Power)	Coercion Dissuasion Protection	Threats Force	Coercive Diplomacy War Alliance
Economic Power (Hard Power)	Inducement Coercion	Payments Sanctions	Aid Bribes Sanctions
Soft Power	Attraction Agenda Setting	Values Culture Policies Institutions	Public Diplomacy Bilateral And Multilateral Diplomacyl

<u>Source</u>: adapted from Nye (2004, p.31)

To summarise, Soft Power relies on the ability to shape the preferences of others without resorting to the use of force, threats, payments or sanctions, garnering legitimacy and emerging in different contexts and at different levels of intensity.

In 2003, Nye (2011a, p.20) put forward the concept of Smart Power to demonstrate that Soft Power alone is not effective when dealing with foreign policy. For Armitage and Nye (2007, p. 5), Smart Power is neither Hard nor Soft, but rather the ability to combine the capabilities of each type of power and turn them into effective strategies. This approach not only requires a strong military instrument but also invests in diplomacy, alliances and institutions.

Armitage and Nye state that one of the main functions of Smart Power (2007) is to promote global good. Thus, the institutional framework in which Smart Power operates is essential and, moreover, it cannot be exercised alone, as it requires alliances and partnerships (Pallaver, 2011, p.106). For Nye (2011a, p.20), Smart Power is highly dependent on the ability to convert power, underlining that this is only effective by gaining a holistic knowledge of all types of power and of their advantages and disadvantages as they combine in different contexts. Epistemologically it is an intelligent and ingenious type of power, but one that is also pondered and analytic.

2. The role of the military instrument in Smart Power

a. Historical use of the military instrument

Historically, looking at the main resources of States over the last five centuries, presented in Table, we can see that the major instruments of power are not static. However, of all the instruments listed, one remains virtually unchanged - the military instrument, whether in the form of an army, navy or military forces/alliances.

Smith (2008, p.51) argues that 'Our understanding of military forces, military operations and wars stems from the nineteenth century, when the paradigm of interstate industrial war was forged' and that the Napoleonic Wars were the starting point of that change, which was catalysed by several other war events, such as the American Civil War, the Wars of German Unification and the two WWs.

The world that emerged out of WWII was bipolar (US - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)), and the threat of atomic power created the perception that industrial war would destroy the very purpose of war, that is, the State, the people and the government (Smith, 2008, p. 190). However, the need for deterrence, which was the preferred behaviour during the Cold War (CW), was based on the latent threat of global war involving nuclear weapons and quickly stifled industrial war along with the possible use of military power. The two great powers had similar military and political strength, which resulted in a balance that lasted for nearly fifty years (Huff, 2010).

Therefore, this symmetry of power meant it was necessary to look to other instruments that could grant countries an advantage. The US used its military power to dissuade the USSR, but also used Soft Power (Armitage and Nye, 2007, p.9) when it presented Europe and the USSR with the financial aid programme known as the Marshall Plan. The Plan was twofold, as it

Table II - Leading States and major power resources

Period	Leading State	Major Resources
Sixteenth century	Spain	Gold bullion, colonial trade, mercenary armies, dynastic ties
Seventieth century	Netherlands	Trade, capital markets, navy
Eighteenth century	France	Population, rural industry, public administration, army
Nineteenth century	Britain	Industry, political cohesion, finance and credit, navy, liberal norms, island location (easy to defend)
Twentieth century	United States	Economic scale, scientific and technical leadership, universalistic culture, military forces and alliances, liberal international regimes, hub of transnational communications and information technology

Source: (*Nye*, 2002a, p.73)

offered aid in the reconstruction of Europe and attempted to conquer 'hearts and minds' in the USSR. This act of goodwill by the USA was accepted by the European allies but rejected by the Soviets. Huff (2010, p.4) argues that the Marshall Plan was an early application of Soft Power and vital non-military resources in the US policies to contain the USSR.

Nevertheless, the focus on military power (intrinsic to Realism) remained during the CW, but as the century advanced it became clear that a paradigm shift was taking place. Idealism emerged and shifted the focus of IR from Hard Power to Soft Power. The end of the CW, the spread of democracy, the promotion of mutual assistance and the common good, the increase of globalisation and subsequent interdependence marked by the flow of information meant that the resources that could be used as instruments of power became more diverse, more flexible and more sensitive (Nye, 2002a and Huff, 2010). Under the Clinton administration, the United States, a global military power, cut back on defence spending in a world that was now unipolar. But the attacks of 11 September revealed the weaknesses in this hegemonic world power and forced it to reverse its national security and defence policies, thus bringing Hard Power into the equation again, specifically military power. Between 2001 and 2009, US military operations increased in number and scale, as evidenced in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 (Fornam, n.d.), during the administration of President George W. Bush. The Bush administration's Global War on Terror (GWoT) favoured the use of military power and even acted unilaterally when it went to war in Iraq without the consent of the United Nations (UN). This illegitimate action hurt the reputation of the US and negatively affected

the country's image abroad (Quirk, 2010), mainly because it refused to respect the rules of International Law and relied on the unilateral use of force. The election of a new US President brought with it a paradigm shift with regard to type of power, as the Obama administration distanced itself from its predecessor, turning to a neo-liberal vision that relied more on Soft and Smart Power. The US national security strategy for 2015 was proof of this, as Obama continued to champion the need for military superiority to address multiple threats despite continuing to reduce military intervention in global conflict resolution, favouring Smart Power (Borges, 2015).

The globalised world and the rapid flow of information and resources allowed new threats to gain easy access to weaponry and sources of funding. Terrorist groups have emerged that threaten the stability of the IS, many of which are transnational, which are ethnically, religiously and culturally radical. Terrorism is diffuse, dissimulated and non-militarized, and does not recognize borders, which means it is difficult to combat it by resorting to conventional warfare. But according to Nye (2010), most of current conflicts are of that nature; of the 226 most significant armed conflicts between 1945 and 2002, less than half occurred between States and armed groups in the 1950s. Since the 1990s until the present day, the latter have become the dominant form of conflict. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2016a) there are currently 40 armed conflicts across the world.

Failed states create another type of recent threat, largely due to the absence of a legitimate governing authority, or to a government's lack of ability to effectively control its territory, or because the fall of the former autocracy has left a power vacuum. At that point, insurgent groups emerge that engage in illegal political activities and resort to irregular military forces to gain control of part or all of a territory (Gaiolas, 2010, p.33-34). In these cases, military power cannot be effective, as the War of Afghanistan and Iraq showed.

The advent of new information and communication technologies (ICTs), Nye argues (2010), has added more fuel to the 'fire' of terrorism; cyberterrorism is easily accessible virtually anywhere in the world and is capable of, at the very least, threatening to cause enormous physical destruction, without needing to resort to physical force and without being detected. Nye (2010) also states that military theorists believe we are in the presence of the fourth generation of warfare, which targets the enemy's society and politics and focuses less on firepower and military tactics than its predecessors. Smith (2008, p. 14) considers this to be a new era of conflict, one which has left industrial war behind and is now a war amongst the people which is marked by the alignment of political and military developments.

Even though the exercise of military power by States as conceptualised in this paper is becoming less and less likely, the military instrument continues to be relevant and therefore investment is still being made in the sector, with the US still occupying the first place in the world investment ranking (Figure 2), as reported by Nye (2010).

Top 15 Defence Budgets 2015† US$bn

Figure 2 – Top 15 (out of 123) countries that spend the most on defence

Source: (IISS, 2016b).

For Nye (2010), the military instrument remains important because it sustains and structures IR. Military power, combined with norms and institutions, imposes the minimum degree of order in the IS, even if only through its deterrent effect. As Smith (2008, p. 435) points out, 'The military achieve their deterrent effect because they represent a credible threat'. Although military power is sometimes covert and goes mostly unnoticed, it provides security, and proves to be necessary only when it becomes scarce (Nye, 2010).

In short, the military instrument is not only still needed, it is now more evolved due to the advances in technology and science, which have provided it with a new types of weaponry that are more deadly and devastating but also more precise and integrated, mainly thanks to ICTs, which have improved Command, Control, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. On the other hand, this ease of communication and information combined with social changes and global phenomena has increased the political and community costs of using military power. Popular support to use of the military instrument requires moral justification; therefore, it is no longer only used like the military power of the past, but rather as the provider of stability, protection and assistance. It is increasingly used in a mixed strategy of coercion and attraction to generate command and co-optation behaviours. Even military doctrine is changing, as garnering the support of the population, eroding support to insurgents as well as assisting in physical and social State-building have become the main objectives of the new type of conflict, to the detriment of the former vision centred on defeating the adversary .

For Nye (2010), the role of the military instrument in structuring IR is expected to last well into the 21st century, and, although it will not be used the same way as in the nineteenth-century, it will continue to be crucial for the IS. Smith (2008, p.13) concurs with this idea when he states that given the numerous scenarios that constitute threats to the IS, military force remains part of the solution, or even the whole solution, although it was not originally intended or designed for that purpose.

We have found that the military instrument has always been, and still is, a critical power resource, but its coercive use has decreased in comparison to the past. In fact, the preponderance of the military instrument has not faded because several conflicts continue to erupt today, but its use in the international arena has become more flexible, eliciting different types of behaviour, from command to co-optation.

b. Smart Power

The world has been witnessing a globalization process that has accelerated and intensified mechanisms, processes and activities that allegedly promote interdependence and political and economic integration. This interdependence and integration between actors in the IS can be both beneficial and harmful, depending on how it is exploited.

For Griffiths and Callaghan (2002), globalisation is a revolutionary transnational concept that involves the deterritorialisation of social, political, economic, and cultural life, which is related to accepting the world as a single place. Travelling the world without ever being out of reach is now a simple and fast endeavour, and instant virtual travel is even easier. In addition to human flows, economic flows, information flows, and asset transactions have also become more accessible and swifter. But globalization has encouraged other changes. One of them was the dissemination of cultures from different countries, which were thus contaminated and had their differences blurred. The other has resulted in a global awareness of various issues, such as terrorism, cyberterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), migrant control, energy insecurity, global financial instability, climate change and pandemics, creating a new type of threats which are defined by their transnationality (Borges, 2016). For Nye (2011b), the distribution of power in transnational relations, which is characterised by the type of threats described above, is chaotic and results in the IS's diffuse structure.

The most noteworthy of these threats is terrorism because it is a current issue with a high degree of exposure in the media. The dominance of this type of threat is now clearly visible, as the attacks in Paris (2015) and, more recently, in Belgium (2016) demonstrate. But, as Pires (2012) reasserts, this type of conflict is not new; it already existed in the twentieth-century in practically every continent (the Middle East, Spain, Northern Ireland, among others). According to Nye (2004, p.21-22), there were two main factors involved in this exponential increase, the developments in science and technology and the change in the motives and organization of armed groups, which were duly supported and prompted by the phenomenon of globalisation.

First, the change in the motives of terrorist groups is characterised by the renunciation of political ideologies in favour of religious ideologies which promise rewards 'in the next world'. The changes in organization consisted in the transition from a quasi-military structure to one that is more dispersed and diffuse, with one leader being quickly replaced by another. Second, the advances in technology and science have made it possible to improve the efficiency of numerous systems, such as transport, information, and energy, but it has also made them more vulnerable. Progress is democratising technology, making the instruments of mass destruction smaller and more accessible. Furthermore, the success of the information revolution has brought with it new media but it has also made them more accessible to the world's population. More effective and immediate command and control structures and real-time information networks have emerged that have amplified the changes in the organization of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups traded a concentrated structure for a dispersed structure consisting of a network of cells scattered around the world. On the other hand, new ICTs allow terrorists to achieve their main objectives, which are to spread terror and to enlist supporters and new recruits. Thus, terrorists use two types of power: Hard Power, when using destructive means and inflicting fear, and Soft Power, by attracting new recruits with negative propaganda inspired on cultural and moral differences and on the democratic values on display in the media and in social networks (Novais, 2014).

It is precisely because these threats are transnational that the IS should not be currently analysed solely at the state level, as its challenges and actors are not contained by borders and require a holistic approach to space (Nye, 2011a). This is the reason for the relevance of Smart Power in this context (Nye, 2011b), because the approach to transnational threats depends on the creation of institutions, alliances and partnerships, not only to guarantee internationality and the blurring of borders, but also to accentuate the changes in the exercise of power from having power over others (command) to being able to do with others (cooperation). On the other hand, as Nye (2002b) argues, no country is large enough to solve the problem of global terrorism alone. Intelligent strategies must be developed in order to exert influence, and the resources of the two types of power, Hard and Soft Power, must combine in order to create Smart Power. This combination of power is the great challenge of the future, as both Hard and Soft Power have their limits and must be combined to bridge these gaps (Nye, 2001c).

For Quirk (2010), Hard Power has some flaws, such as the difficulty in finding the point of application of force and the fact that it is not sufficient to address the current spectrum of transnational threats, as the economic and social costs associated with its use are too high. According to the same author, most great powers see the use of force as jeopardising their economic objectives, as well as their attraction capacity, their credibility and, consequently, their Soft Power, and should only be considered when other diplomatic means have failed. Nevertheless, it remains useful, especially the military instrument, as we have already established. Military power is then only part of the response to new threats, and intergovernmental and inter-institutional cooperation (Nye, 2009), that is, Soft Power (Nye, 2002b), is necessary to support the well-being and survival of civil societies (Quirk, 2010). But Soft Power also has its limits, namely ambivalence, diffusion, possibility of non-observance, sensitivity, greater dependence

on power conversion strategies, as well as greater accessibility and slowness. For Nye (2004, p.15-16) the influence and cultural attraction of Soft Power are most effective between actors with similar cultures and when power is dispersed instead of concentrated, that is, it depends on the situation. For example, Nye (2002b) notes that the openness of Western culture is repulsive to Islamic extremists, which demonstrates its ambivalence and dependence on context. Another limitation is diffusion and the possibility of non-observance, because its effects are usually intangible, creating a general influence rather than producing an observable specific effect (Nye, 2004, p.16). On the other hand, Soft Power is not subject to government control because it is easy accessible, and can be wielded by state entities or by the film industry, by public figures, universities, foundations or other types of non-governmental groups.

Mention must also be made of the sensitivity of this type of power, which is related to its volatile and subjective nature. It is subjective because it depends on personal interpretation and it is volatile because it depends on the context, and sometimes unpopular decisions are made which over time prove to be the most correct. Thus, time also plays an important role in Soft Power, as it is a long-term strategy, not only because its effects are only visible over time, but also because the culture and values of a nation take time to evolve and change (Quirk, 2010).

This has led us to conclude that, given these new threats, success in IR does not depend on whose military force is victorious. According to Nye (2009), the fight against terrorism will always require a Smart Power strategy since the terrorists themselves also resort to these two resources. Defeating Islamic terrorism will only be possible if the number of extremists arrested or killed is greater than those recruited every day, and this is a role of Soft Power, both by eliciting disgust and repugnance in response to terrorist acts and by attracting the Islamic world. This is reiterated by Pires (2012, p. 48), who states that the response to terrorism must be 'holistic, comprehensive and built in cooperation with all', and must be based on 'law, diplomacy, internal and external security, the economy and development policies'.

To summarise, the limits of Soft and Hard Power mean that the best strategy is a combination of both power resources into a new type of power called Smart Power. But is this type of power new or has it just been re-conceptualised? History shows us that the origins of Smart Power pre-date Nye's conceptualization in 2003. As early as 1900, President Theodore Roosevelt noted the importance of the two types of power, writing in a letter 'Speak softly and carry a big stick; You will go far' (Coutu, 2008). Later, the CW brought with it a new type of conflict which evidenced the mixed use of power by the USA on the one hand, in the Soft Power programmes based on propaganda and televised information designed to erode communism in the eastern bloc, and on the other, in the Hard Power of its military force that served to deter and contain the Soviet threat (Huff, 2010). The fall of the Berlin Wall that marked the end of the CW was also a result of Hard and Soft Power, as Nye (2009) states: 'When the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it was destroyed not by artillery barrage but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism'.

The use of Smart Power is not new; both the concept of Smart Power and the new threats have become more prominent and more widespread, aggressive and diffuse thanks to the

phenomenon of globalization and technological and scientific evolution. Smart Power was conceptualized, defined, and studied as such, particularly after the failure of President George Bush's GWoT foreign policy, which prompted the creation of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) commission on Smart Power in 2006, the aim of which was to turn the USA into an attractive state by investing in the common good (Armitage and Nye, 2007, p.1). To that end, the commission outlined five critical areas of action: the forming of alliances and partnerships and the creation of institutions (including the strengthening of NATO by rethinking its strategy and enhancing peace support and humanitarian aid operations); global development; public diplomacy; economic integration; technology and innovation (developing solutions to minimise transnational threats). In 2009, when Barack Obama took over the presidency, he followed these recommendations and acknowledged that rejecting unilateralism and reliance on Hard Power is necessary to improve external relations. He used several Soft Power actions, such as: reinforcing the USA's commitment to the Geneva Convention and changing the GWoT rhetoric (Quirk, 2010) without, however, neglecting the importance of military power.

We can therefore conclude that globalisation, combined with the technological and scientific advances of the ICT revolution, brought with it not only global economy, growth and development but also created interdependence and caused threats to emerge on a transnational scale that thinks nothing of borders. These threats cannot simply be countered by using only Hard or Soft Power, but must instead combine features of both types of power into an intelligent strategy known as Smart Power, which typically relies on Soft Power resources first, that is, policy and diplomacy, and, when circumstances warrant it, it resorts to Hard Power's 'carrots and sticks'.

c. Strategy for the Integration of Military Power

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the use of military power has been decreasing as a result of growing awareness and of the existence of transnational threats. This does not mean that the military instrument will become less important, but rather it reflects its changing role in the international scenario, where a mixed strategy of power (Smart Power) is currently more widely used.

In was in this context that, following the USA's strategic shift to integrate military power into Smart Power referred to in the previous sub-chapter, the Alliance, as a major source of international military power, also adopted the concept of Smart Power, as evidenced in two separate documents (Szumowski, 2013, p.). The first mention was made in an international research project led by the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) entitled Multiple Future Project (MFP) and the second appeared in the Alliance's new strategic concept (2010).

The MFP's main objective was to conceptualise the threats that the Alliance would face in the next 20 years (until 2030) and concluded that one of the vital actions to guarantee the Alliance's security would be to develop a comprehensive approach in partnership with other international organizations, such as the UN and the European Union (EU). In order to be effective in this holistic environment, developing military capabilities alone will not suffice; better partnerships must be established and work must be done with other international organizations to improve information transparency and decision-making (ACT, 2009).

For its part, NATO's current strategic concept outlined in 2010 mentions the development of the Alliance's military capabilities in several areas, from conventional forces, to cyber defence, aerospace power, nuclear deterrence, and to combat the use of chemical and biological weapons (Hard Power). The development of Soft Power through humanitarian operations and Peace Support Operations (PSO) fosters relations and cooperation with regional and international organizations (Szumowski, 2013, p.241). Smart Power is thus presented as a way to face eight hypothetical challenges which NATO (2010) may encounter in the environment that surrounds it: (1) threat of conventional warfare, including the proliferation of long-range missiles; (2) proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD; (3) terrorism and dissemination of terrorist groups; (4) instability outside NATO's Area of Responsibility; (5) cyber-attacks against critical NATO infrastructures; (6) unstable and insecure energy and trade lines of communication; (7) the Alliance's loss of technological edge caused by the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare, etc.; (8) scarcity of resources and climate change.

This shows that all challenges except the one described in point (8) imply the use of military power as Hard Power (Szumowski, 2013, p.242). The Alliance proposes three main tasks to be performed in this environment of insecurity: Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security (NATO, 2010). This too reveals the presence of Smart Power, especially the last two tasks. The lessons learned from NATO operations, particularly in Afghanistan and in the Balkans, have underscored that the military instrument is not enough to resolve conflicts and the current threats to Euro-Atlantic and international security, showing that a holistic view of the environment (political, military and civilian), entitled 'comprehensive approach', is necessary in order to effectively manage crises. Lemos and Eugénio (201, p. 73) describe the comprehensive approach as a strategic mode of action that combines political, economic, and civilian and military instruments of communication to tackle the global task that is crisis management (falling between collective defence and cooperative security). Thus, analysis, planning and engagement in the conflict are holistic activities which draw on partnerships with other international actors to maximize coherence, efficiency and effectiveness.

This holistic knowledge of the environment had already been defined by Nye (2009) as contextual intelligence. The author states that the combination of resources into Smart Power strategies implies contextual intelligence. By contextual intelligence Nye (2009) means the ability to make an intuitive assessment that helps politicians align their tactics with their objectives, thus establishing intelligent strategies.

The basic elements of Smart Power referred to in these NATO documents are an attempt to integrate two distinct approaches, Hard and Soft, into the phenomenon of power (Szumowski, 2013, p.244). This new approach stems from the IS's current security environment, which the Alliance must deal with, especially terrorism and its diffuse dissemination, which advise the use of Soft Power's vast potential in addition to Hard Power resources.

As Chong (2015) points out, and as we had already concluded, the paradigm for the use of the military instrument changed after 11 September. Smart strategy has been increasingly employed when power is used in IRs, not only because of the increasing complexity involved in legitimizing

international interventions but also because of the frequency of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW, as defined by the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) (2000b, G-54), are operations that cover the employment of military capabilities across the full range of military operations other than war. These operations may be employed in combination with other instruments of power. They include, for example, humanitarian aid, rehabilitation of scenarios devastated by natural or man-made disasters, arms control, peace support operations, counter-terrorism and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

For Chong (2015, p.234), MOOTW contribute to the development of society by supporting peace, civilian authorities, and by helping to rebuild failing states by providing them with the necessary tools for governance. MOOTW have aims other than coercion, and the resources employed, such as institutions, partnerships and alliances, as well as the values, cultures and ideologies conveyed by the armed forces on the ground fit more into the definition of Soft Power and are capable of attracting and provoking co-optation behaviour. These co-opting behaviours result in securing and expanding the population's adherence and, in cases of insurgency, in eroding support for insurgents while the military maintains a deterrent presence and neutralises and destroys the insurgent structures. That is to say, the military instrument is versatile and uses both force and the threat of force, and values, culture and political and social ideologies to attract the surrounding actors and prompt a specific behaviour. In short, it employs either Hard or Soft Power, and is thus a Smart Power instrument.

This idea is endorsed by Kuang (2012, p.20), who says that the resources associated with Hard Power can also be sources of Soft Power, depending on the context and on how they are used. Thus, the military instrument as a tangible Hard Power resource, depending on how it is used, can be understood as command or cooperation behaviour. However, we should not forget that not all the assets of the military instrument, such as nuclear weapons, can be used in a less threatening manner.

On the other hand, military diplomacy should not be mistaken with the macro-scale of diplomacy, which includes defence diplomacy (Lim, 2012), that is, the Soft Power of the State actor, although both serve the same purpose. For Lim (2012), while defence diplomacy is a globalised instrument of national power aimed at achieving certain objectives in the area of national security, military diplomacy is the strengthening of relations between the military and a target population. If defence diplomacy aims to achieve victory through narrative, military diplomacy turns that narrative into actions on the ground. Military diplomacy thus challenges the view of the military solely as an instrument of war. Currently, the military instrument is not only used in with a coercive effect; it can transcend threats or even combat.

In conclusion, the military instrument is being integrated into a Smart Power strategy, with preference being given to the use of Soft Power instruments such as diplomacy, alliances and institutions, and also includes the transfer of values and the transmission of culture. Hard Power can be employed when Soft Power instruments fail because phenomena such as terrorism cannot be fought simply through attraction or by setting the agenda. Thus, military power lends support and credibility to the use of the remaining instruments of power because credibility builds trust.

It can be said that the strategy of integrating the military instrument into Smart Power consists in the adoption of the concept of Smart Power by the military instrument. As Dias (2010) points out, '…the strategy goes beyond the military dimension, although it integrates it'. The military power associated with the exercise of coercion, deterrence or protection (Nye, 2004, p. 31) has become more legitimate and attractive, and is capable of undertaking other types of actions that would not be possible in their Hard Power form.

Military diplomacy conceals the Hard Power associated with the use of the military instrument (Lim, 2012), and is enacted through peace and humanitarian support operations and also through cooperation with other international institutions, which allow the military to integrate populations and gain their support, thus enhancing information gathering and eroding support for insurgents, even as the threat of military force, or its use, if necessary, remains present. This proves the importance of Hard Power, which is easily supported by the continued investment the development of military technology and armament.

In short, and to answer the research question that conceptualised the problem and guided the research, In what way has the role of the military instrument in the IS changed?, we have found that the military instrument has always been a major source of power, and is still being invested on by States. However, its use as a coercive resource (Hard Power) has decreased over the years. This decrease is mainly due to the horrors of the Great Wars and to the changes brought about by globalisation in terms of scientific, technological and informational developments, which have revealed transnational threats that require the use of Soft Power combined with old-fashioned Hard Power, in a new type of power known as Smart Power. The military instrument was then integrated into the other instruments of intangible power, supporting them while its use remained possible, even as a last resort, ending the concept of military power associated with coercion and deterrence, that is to say, Hard Power. For Sun Tzu (2006), it is always preferable to approach conflict indirectly by containing force, because the pinnacle of excellence is to win without fighting.

Conclusion

Globalization and technological and scientific advances have boosted the emergence of transnational threats, colouring the state-centrism of IR with relevant non-state and individual actors and consolidated an emerging global consciousness of WW. In view of the transformations in the IS, it is important to understand their repercussions for the role of the military instrument. Moreover, these changes are reflected in the types of power that have been exercised by the great world powers, especially over the last century.

Therefore, the concept of power in the IS was revealed to be relevant, as it is able to favourably change the attitudes or behaviours of others in order to achieve the desired objectives. Identifying the various instruments that serve as a source of power and underling its relativity on context allowed us to distinguish potential power from real or effective power. For this purpose, we have presented Joseph Nye's taxonomy of power, which separates the three types of power

(Hard, Soft and Smart Power) according to the nature of the behaviour elicited and the type of resources used. Smart Power is the most notable of these objective and subjective resources, as it is characterised by symbiosis and adapts to context, thereby helping to solve the IS's current security problems.

Thus, in our conceptualisation of the model of analysis during the exploratory phase, the military instrument was identified as the object of study, and the general objective of assessing the role of the military instrument in the IS was also outlined, which we subdivided into three specific objectives: (1) to analyse whether the military instrument has become less relevant over time; (2) to ascertain whether the future of power is Smart Power; and (3) to discover which strategy will be used to integrate the military instrument into Smart Power. These three specific objectives were converted into three sub-chapters in order to make them easier to achieve.

Methodologically, the research was divided into three distinct phases: the exploratory phase, the analytical phase and the conclusive phase. In the exploratory phase, defining the conceptual model of analysis triggered a process of hypothetical-deductive reasoning and allowed us to pin down the research design, which was based on the study of the changing role of the military instrument in the IS (case study). In the analytical phase, the research hypotheses which answered the research questions were verified after the data obtained by researching the literature was collected and subjected to quantitative analysis and qualitative presentation. The sample used in the analytical phase was essentially based on neoliberal theorists who emphasize the role of Smart Power and who have categorised the different types of power presented.

Bearing in mind the analysis of the changing importance of Military Power, we carried out a historical research and found that Hard Power is the oldest form of power, and that it has been consistently present during the last five centuries, while other resources of power have varied throughout history. But WWI, which was marked by a coercive military instrument and was tainted by violence and death, sparked the need for a supra-state entity capable of leading global democracy. However, the efforts were not productive, as proved by the outbreak of WWII, with even more devastating consequences from which emerged the UN. The bi-polarity of the IS after WWII (USA-USSR), characterised by similar political and military power resources, boosted the search for other sources. A paradigm shift occurred with a change from the use of coercive and deterrent power to attractive power, the relevance of which was emphasised in the post-CW period by the hegemonic power (USA). However, the events of 11 September were a reminder the importance of the military instrument and its coercive form emerged again, along with the GWoT. The Obama administration, taking advantage of the lessons learned and in an attempt to rehabilitate the country's image that had been undermined by President Bush's policy choices changed the paradigm of power again from coercion to attraction.

On the other hand, the globalization process associated with technological and scientific evolution and with the ease of communication and access to information disseminated terrorism and cyberterrorism and contributed to increase the frequency of the irregular warfare. The new armed groups are able to control the populations of failed states that lack an effective government power. In these cases of irregular warfare, military power (Hard Power) is not

effective but nevertheless remains necessary because it contributes to stability and international security. However, the military instrument as a source of power is no longer only coercive but also attractive.

Threats, such as energy insecurity, financial instability, climate change, terrorism and cyber terrorism, characterized by their transnationality and resistance to Hard Power, require a new approach that can be achieved through Smart Power. The reason for this is that both Hard and Soft Power have limits, and the combined use of the different types of resources that support them helps fill in these gaps. Hard Power combined with coercion and inducement is not enough to address this range of threats, not only because of the high moral and economic costs of a war, but also because of the diffuse and covert nature of transnational threats. On the other hand, Soft Power is too ambivalent, too vulnerable to non-observance and too time-consuming to achieve results. We should not expect a threat like terrorism to be overcome only by values, culture and diplomacy, or through the use of international institutions.

Capacity building and the use of an intelligent strategy are therefore needed. Fighting terrorism will always require a mixed strategy: on the one hand, military power (Hard Power) to combat supporters directly, and, on the other, Soft Power to attract supporters and simultaneously erode the image and credibility of the ideologies of terrorist groups. In conclusion, these transnational threats can only be fought by creating partnerships, alliances and international institutions, even if they are military in nature, combining the two types of power, Hard and Soft Power, into what is known as Smart Power.

In the third chapter, we found that coercive military power is being converted into Smart Power strategies and that the military instrument is serving to lend support and credibility to the other instruments of power. NATO, as an essentially military international institution, adopted the concept of Smart Power, as can be seen in the new strategic concept of 2010, adopting the USA's strategy of integrating military power into Smart Power. This document not only mentions the need to develop the Alliance's military capabilities but also the need to strengthen its attractiveness, enhanced by Soft Power's humanitarian operations, PSO and cooperation with international and regional organizations.

The paradigm change in the types of power used was amplified by the events of 11 September due to the lessons learned in the wake of the attack, but also because of the increase in MOOTW. This type of military operations has a purpose beyond the use of traditional coercive force. The resources used, such as institutions, partnerships and alliances, as well as the values and culture conveyed in the interaction between the armed forces on the ground and the population are part of Soft Power and constitute the ability to win hearts and minds. This translates into public support and in the population's acceptance of the military forces, while simultaneously eroding support for insurgents/terrorists. At the same time as the military exercises Soft Power, they maintain a deterrent military presence (Hard Power) capable of neutralising eventual threats or the use of force. The military instrument is versatile and its purpose goes beyond simply combat or deterrence, as it also provides protection and humanitarian aid, and assists in the reconstruction of failed states.

In conclusion, the military instrument, which had previously been associated with coercion alone, is now being integrated into a Smart Power strategy where preference is given to the use of Soft Power instruments which support other power instruments and provide them with sustainment and credibility. Above all, the military instrument is also evolving and the coerciveness intrinsic to military power is fading.

With this in mind, we can now answer the research question: In what way has the role of the military instrument in the IS changed? We found that the military instrument has been a major source of power over the past five centuries. However, it is less used as coercion and deterrence in the present, mainly due to the high mortality rates of WWI and WWII. This marked the beginning of a shift in the use of power, which was reinforced by various watershed events, notably the CW and 11 September, which again required the coercive employment of military power and revealed it to be insufficient and inefficient, even if it was still important. This occurred because the world has been through changes brought about by globalisation and by the technology and information revolution, which have not only brought global benefits, but have also revealed the presence of transnational threats. These new challenges cannot be tackled at the state level alone, but require the creation of cross-border institutions, alliances or partnerships. They also require another type of power that is neither Hard or Soft Power, but rather the combination of their instruments in what is known as Smart Power. In this type of strategy, the military instrument supports and gives credibility to other instruments of power. But more than distancing itself from its use as coercion and deterrence, the military instrument is also changing and adopting the concept of Smart Power, disguising its coercive power with Soft Power strategies, such as humanitarian operations or PSO, without losing its ability to use force, or its threat, even if only as a last resort.

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