Security Sector Reform: A New State-citizen Partnership

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Resumo
A Reforma do Setor da Segurança: Uma Nova Relação Estado-indivíduo

Os autores procuram identificar aspetos comuns às diferentes doutrinas no âmbito da Reforma do Setor da Segurança, descrevem de modo genérico o caso-estudo da missão da União Europeia para a Reforma do Setor da Segurança na Guiné-Bissau e traçam as linhas de força da política portuguesa em matéria de cooperação externa. O texto apresentado evidencia uma continuidade representada pela centralidade das necessidades de segurança do indivíduo, como destinatário último deste tipo de processos de transformação.

Abstract
The authors attempt to identify the Security Sector Reform common doctrinal aspects. They also describe the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Mission and the major Portuguese instruments of policy related to external cooperation. The essay envisages drawing the reader’s attention to the individual security needs, which should be kept as the main focus of every SSR processes.
Do We Have a Security Sector Reform (SSR) Common Doctrine?

“The establishment of effective partnerships will be vital... to SSR processes”.
UN Security Council (2008: IX, 17)

Yes indeed. SSR is a new way of organizing an old idea – a new way to empower the old State. In fact, when Edward Reilly Stettinius in 1945 reported to US Government on the San Francisco Conference, he recognized that from that moment onwards two new battles would be fought: security, which he meant to be understood as freedom from fear, and the battle for common development (US Government Printing Office, 1945). Moreover, he emphasized that both battles were to be waged successfully and concurrently. This relation between security and development is the SSR’s current doctrine cornerstone. Later in 1994, the Hu-
of State Clare Short referred to SSR to emphasize the idea of associating development and security in a conflict prevention perspective. Again, in the year 2000 the documentation produced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also acknowledged the strong link between security and development. Furthermore, the United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000) and the Brahimi Report openly linked conflict prevention and transition to peace with human security and social development (Brahimi, 2000: 6).

After this initial phase and between 2005 and 2006 the European Union (EU) and the OECD drafted a set of documentation establishing the doctrinal basis of SSR. Generally, the doctrine acknowledged the relation between security and development focused on the human dimension. In addition, the European Commission drafted a document in 2006, called “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament” in which the following has been mentioned: “... Security... it focuses on human security - freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 4). Furthermore, analyzing in general terms the documentation produced by the UE, OECD, and United Nations we might say that the doctrine paid attention to SSR goals, concepts, principles, characteristics and actors. Moreover, in 2008 and 2011 the United Nations established two pillars of SSR doctrine by releasing two very important documents: the General Assembly comprehensive review of the whole issue of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (UN Security Council, 2008) – the role of United Nations in supporting security sector reform, and the Statement by the President of the Security Council on 12 October 2011 entitled “maintenance of international peace and security”.

This set of doctrinal comprehensive references is summarized in the following roster. Therefore, and despite the fact that doctrine cannot be labeled as “common”, we might conclude that the essence of SSR doctrinal references are shared among the key international organizations. In addition, and taking into account the human dimension of SSR, our vision drifts from moving away from the traditional State security to focus exclusively on human security. In fact, SSR pays a high level of attention to the human component of State security, moving from a closed and traditional approach towards a comprehensive construction of security.

1 “(…) 34. Summary of key recommendations on preventive action: (a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to “all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and Civil Society Organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion; (…)”.

Security HR and development are interdependent (UN Security Council, 2008: 3)

Key component of the “human security” agenda (OECD/DAC, 2004: 3)

Support to SSR in partner countries is one of the core areas for EU action identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Council of the European Union, 2005: 4)

Outsiders frequently underestimate the complexity and long-term nature of SSR (OECD/DAC, 2004: 62)

Needs to be long-term and be based on strong national ownership (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 1; Council of the European Union 2005: 11)

Explicitly for SSR or integrated into policies for related issues such as conflict prevention (OECD/DAC, 2004: 65)

… In longer-term post conflict peace building and reconstruction processes (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 6) … SSR can be a useful instrument to prevent conflicts (Council of the European Union 2005: 8)

Accessible and responsive to all and broad rule of law framework (UN Security Council, 2008: 4 e 2011: 2) - holistic & coherent (UN Security Council, 2008: 2) … beyond the traditional military elements (UN Security Council, 2008: 6) … it includes State and non-State actors (UN Security Council, 2008: 6)

Holistic and principle-based Approach (OECD/DAC, 2004: 61)

Holistic process, strengthening security for all citizens (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 1; Council of the European Union 2005: 11) … it focuses on human security… putting the security of citizens at the centre and thus complementing State security (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 4)

Regional frameworks are the foundations of bilateral SSR efforts (UN Security Council, 2011: 2)

Adopt a regional perspective (OECD/DAC, 2004: 50)

Nationally/regionally owned reform processes (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 7) … national ownership and partnership (Council of the European Union 2005: 4)

Goal: the enhancement of effective and accountable security (UN Security Council, 2008: 6)

…Reforms should seek to address issues relating both to the operational capacity of security bodies (effectiveness) and how they are governed (accountability), (OECD/DAC, 2004: 58)

… Objective is to contribute explicitly to the strengthening of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the efficient use of public resources (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 6).
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which takes into account, besides the sovereign needs, new desires to accomplish the same old goal: to maintain peace and security outside and within the State.

Moreover, United States doctrine moves in the same direction by stating that SSR is a relatively new discipline in the context of peace and stability operations, whether these operations are United Nations-led or otherwise managed and supported. The same doctrine also acknowledges that there is no single way to conduct SSR. Furthermore, it sees SSR as an attempt to build capacities within the intricate network of institutional instruments that can positively affect safety and the rule of law. The reforms in such context aim to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to the needs of the public (Meharg, 2010: 1-3).

Generally speaking, SSR doctrine moves towards a new State-citizen effective partnership, based on mutual needs, implementing a State bilateral tailored-service provider concept and enforcing a mutual goal of steady development.

Why and What to Reform?

"Security matters".
Paul D. Williams (2008)

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) is foremost a smart approach to future violent conflicts. It is necessary to conduct reform because “development without security is not possible”, and “security without development is only temporary” (Benn, 2004: 4). On the one hand insecurity prevents development and protracts the cycle of poverty. On the other hand security leverages development and empowers its own instruments by reducing the deep, underlying causes of insecurity. The aim of any Security Sector Reform is to identify balanced solutions to protect the State monopoly of violence, after due consideration of the shift in the nature of conflicts. The key aspect of a successful SSR is to move from a security concept based on the “threat between States” to a new approach, complementary to the previous one, based on “individual needs for safety”. Kalevi Holsti (1996, p. 15) uses the formula security between States and within States which, nowadays, should be placed side-by-side with the formula used by Stephen E. Sachs (2003, p: 5) military tasks and nonmilitary tasks, involving State actors and non State actors (DCAF/ISSAT, 2011: 4).

The Security Sector Reform is seen as a long-term process (UN Security Council, 2011: 1) concerning all the security-related institutions, which bear the legal right of using force. Moreover, it engages State and non-State actors, united to build a security system capable of being effective and accountable. Therefore, it ought to reform security and justice sectors in an integrated manner, establishing a balanced, effective and accountable system. Security and justice sectors are
interdependent and mutually supportive. To reform one sector without the other might lead to a general failure of the whole SSR process. Consequently, SSR has to be conducted in a way that links security and justice State providers, security and justice non-State providers, security and justice State oversight institutions and security and justice non-State oversight bodies in a balanced manner.

Cognizant that no single model of security sector reform should be taken as a golden rule to be applied and enforced, the United National General Assembly Report A/62/659 (UN Security Council, 2008: 6) on the role of United Nations in supporting SSR, points out five golden features common to every SSR (bold added):

- **A legal and/or constitutional framework** providing for the legitimate and accountable use of force in accordance with universally accepted human rights norms and standards, including sanctioning mechanisms for the use of force and setting out the roles and responsibilities of different actors;

- An **institutionalized system of governance and management**: mechanisms for the direction and oversight of security provided by authorities and institutions, including systems for financial management and review as well as the protection of human rights;

- **Capacities**: structures, personnel, equipment and resources to provide effective security;

- **Mechanisms for interaction** among security actors: establishing transparent modalities for coordination and cooperation among different actors, based on their respective constitutional/legal roles and responsibilities;

- **Culture of service**: promoting unity, integrity, discipline, impartiality and respect for human rights among security actors and shaping the manner in which they carry out their duties.
SSR is about making the State safe for people to feel secure. When we questioned what should be reformed, we certainly meant institutions, processes, practices, interactions, governance, effectiveness, capacities, sustainability, participation, legal and financial instruments, trust, and confidence. However, without an individual attitude of buying into a culture of service, in which the common good is perceived as the quintessential goal of the State, SSR would hardly flourish. SSR is an opportunity to transform an entire State sector to meet the needs and expectations of national citizens, beginning with the external exercise of sovereignty to address also the internal roots of insecurity, in order to pursue human, economic and social development. SSR is not about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), it is not about small arms and light weapons control (SALW Control), it is not about the fight against impunity and corruption, it is not about transitional justice, it is not about donors and projects, nor is it about the struggle against gender-based violence. These are important cross-cutting issues that might be used as entry points. In fact, SSR concerns the building of a new State system capable of providing good governance, division of powers, rule of law, checks and balances, human rights’ protection and economic development. We cannot ignore that SSR impacts on State power relations and privileges. As mentioned on the Africa Briefing Report, (Observatoire de l’Afrique, 2008: 3) “…further difficulty arises from the sensitivity of the security sector. DDR and SSR both touch the key governing functions of the State that are very closely linked to its sovereignty”. Nevertheless, SSR is not a standalone process, in that it is absolutely fundamental to understand that together with the national driving force to reform the process must be perceived by regional partners as a remarkable contribution to conflict prevention and supported accordingly.

How to Reform?

“It is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly, than do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way and our time is short”.

T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1926)

We reform by discovering the real security feelings of the people but also bearing in mind that “effective SSR enables a State to build its capacity to provide security and justice” (Meharg, 2010: 8). It often seems that an SSR process is expected to be brought from the outside as a “magic entity” to fix all the nation’s evils. Consequently, SSR has a propensity to be seen as an external body, coming to the nation to pay all the bills and to solve all the problems, by superseding a status quo with another status quo. In reality, a successful SSR is expected to be designed, managed and implemented by local actors, rather than external actors (Nathan,
Furthermore, by local actors we do not understand the local government alone, but all relevant stakeholders, the individuals that will profit from the new security environment and the so-called spoilers. SSR is a transformation process led by local people to fulfill the needs of common people. Otherwise it is likely to be unsuccessful or to fall short.

How to reform implies the establishment a system capable of improving the general well-being, and at the same time it is intended to be held accountable. All in all, a successful SSR process has to deliver the following complementary features: good governance, effectiveness and accountability.

- **Good Governance** – describes the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). The term governance can apply to corporate, international, national, local governance or to the interactions between other sectors of society (United Nations Social and Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific). According to the United Nations good governance is consensus oriented, participatory, following the rule of law, effective and efficient, accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive.

- **Effectiveness** – it refers to improving the provision of security and justice services in order to enhance the overall well-being of the State and its people (DCAF/ISSAT, 2011: 9). In simple terms, to produce the intent or expected result. It includes qualified training, balanced provision of equipments, improvement of management skills, development of new organization solutions and enhancing cooperation mechanisms.

- **Accountability** – envisages the adherence of security actors to domestic law and international binding law either through a distributive or a retributive justice. It provides the necessary checks to ensure lawful behaviors and sanctions to unlawful actions. Accountability might be provided both formally (Internal and external) and informally. The importance of the ability to hold individuals accountable has been emphasized by Jean-Marie Gueheno, former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations (2010) by the following quoting: “If one does not address issues of accountability and chains of command and how the security forces are located within the broader apparatus of the State, SSR is just training people to be more efficient at killing others.”

The SSR needs to be holistic. The interconnected nature of the various components of the security and justice sector, together with the so called cross-cutting

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3 Disponível em http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp
issues, and the number and nature of the actors involved, calls for a holistic SSR approach. To be holistic doesn’t imply doing everything at the same time. On the contrary, it entails strategic level planning capable of identifying the key objectives, the core activities, and the right level of actors’ involvement and coordination. It further requires a well-built ability to delight donors in order to bring them to the comprehensiveness of the enterprise, without turning down their proposals, ideas and their huge potential to make a difference.

**Why EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Stands as a Token?**

“Security is survival-plus”.

Ken Booth (2007)

It does stand as a token because it had been strictly planned as such. In fact, under the initiative of the rotating Presidency of the European Union held by Portugal in the second half of 2007, the European Union Mission on Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) was implemented in the first quarter of 2008, under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

This civil European Union Mission answered in this way to an official petition for support, formulated by the then President Nino Vieira whose objective was to support the Guinea-Bissau authorities in the complex application process of the fundamental document *Strategies for the Reform of Security Sector in Guinea-Bissau*. This document had been drafted by one of the national teams, advised by British experts and, approved in the National Assembly, on 23 January 2008. In this document they competed, simultaneously, plans of action and the implementation of the sector strategies. Besides this objective, the mission also had the purpose of creating the necessary conditions for promoting assistance to third countries and international and regional organizations in terms of the ambitious projects in the security, defense and justice areas.

The arrival of the first advanced team in Bissau on 14 April 2008 allowed the declaration of the mission’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on 8 June 2008, beginning like this a phase that would last for 12 months. This period was later extended for another 16 months. The mission was composed of 22 international members. Among them was administrative, advisory and 19 local hired staff. The reform’s landmark centered not only on the plans but also the legal framework prepared by Guinea’s Government in close coordination with the key institutions of Guinea-Bissau. Moreover, it covered the following areas: armed forces, security forces, police, marine and border control.

The mission establishment was considered an important political victory and an enormous support for the SSR process, strongly backed by Portugal, Spain and
France, with the assistance of the European Commission. Despite this initial leverage, the most skeptical sectors drew the attention of the international community to the slowness and weakness of the results obtained, recognizing great difficulties in carrying out such a mission. Nevertheless, unpredictability and harsh conditions are the two major characteristics of the political scene in Guinea-Bissau and the EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau has to learn how to find its ways within this framework. This scenario had been confirmed by the incidents that took place on 1 April 2010, in which Admiral Zamora Induta was overthrown as Chief Head of Defense (CHOD) and was replaced by Admiral Bubo N’Chuto. Admiral Bubo N’Chuto self proclaimed himself the new Guinea’s CHOD, despite his having sought refuge in the facilities of the United Nations in Bissau since 28 December 2009.

The new phase of the European Union’s Mission faced a certain degree of political reservation when on 13 April 2010 the Head of Mission, General Juan Esteban Verástegui, before the Political and Security Committee (PSC), accentuated the uncertainty of the situation and the future of the security sector reform mission, empowering the positions against the establishment of the mission. In spite of this the European Union approved an extension of the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Mission for four months, in a reduced format, in order to give time to the Guinea-Bissau authorities to find a solution.

By the end of June 2010, taking the International Community by surprise, General Indjai was named the new Guinea’s CHOD replacing Admiral Zamora Induta. Shortly after that, mid-August, the European Union closed down the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau. The closure of the mission was disseminated to the public in a short press release, in which the European Union referred to the political situation and praised the efforts and the achievements of the reforms, namely: the National Guard and Police legal bodies, and the review of the military and justice code of law.

The Security Sector Reform should be perceived as a voluntary action, accepted by the State to be reformed, while aware of the huge implications on society as a whole. In fact SSR impacts on power distribution and personal privileges. Furthermore, SSR largely depends upon the restructuring plan process. Within this framework, the consent to the presence of external actors, namely non-State organizations, international organizations, and States, enforces the principle of “local ownership”, especially because the relations between all of them at bilateral and multilateral level are defined or at least framed by the rules of the hosting State. Consequently, it is crucial to adapt the SSR processes to the hosting State, taking into account the political situation, the culture and the people, bearing in mind that SSR impacts on the State pillars and that the risk of collapse is real.

The abovementioned strategic document Strategies for the Reform of Security Sector in Guinea-Bissau organized the key bodies of the SSR process as follows:
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Chart 3 – Guinea-Bissau Institutional Reform Framework

- **Leading Level** – Inter-ministerial Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, gathering all ministers with reform responsibilities;
- **Execution Level** – Steering Committee, chaired by the Minister of Defense and composed of the representatives of the defense, safety, and justice sectors, former combatants, technicians, and other international community representatives. Among these representatives one should underline the presence of the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau head of mission.
- **Technical Level** – Technical Coordination Committee later designated the Steering Committee Secretariat, where all the sectors involved in the process are represented. This level gathers local technicians, experts and consultants of European Union mission. It was planned that they would work in many different areas in a coordinated manner under the general guidance of the hosting authorities.

Within this framework, the EU SSR mission plan of operations included the following objectives:
- To assist and to advise the local authorities in the setting up of conditions for implementing the SSR national strategy, including downsizing and reorganizing the armed forces and the police;
- To support the creation of the legal framework to reform the State institutions;
- Execute the project design as a pre-condition of the potential donors’ involvement.
In reality, the SSR was about to reorganize the new armed forces based on the total amount of 3,340 military staff in order to achieve two major goals: on the one hand to reduce the costs through recruitment with 70% of the total strength, and on the other hand to demilitarize the capital of the country, where 90% of the military were stationed.

From the police sector point of view the objective was to gather 9 different police bodies belonging to 5 different ministries, into only 3 forces: National Guard, Civilian Police and Criminal Investigation Services. The State intelligence services were left out of this process by the host nation.

In terms of the justice sector the European Union settled on a working program with the judiciary, managed by the European Commission, which would be focused on the area of fiscal control of national borders and on the improvement of performance among the judiciary services. Both border control and judiciary services were under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. Thus, the justice reform in Guinea-Bissau was seen as a pilot experience within the scope of the European Security and Defense Policy, by the use of a comprehensive approach to crises, using different tools that would all contribute to the same ultimate goal.

Additionally, the preparation and implementation of the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Mission is other important aspect to be underlined. Thus, the main features to be emphasized are as follows:

- The fact-finding pre-deployment missions should gather information in order to draw rigorous knowledge of the situation. Furthermore, they should be provided with enough time to develop and adjust the concept of operations to the reality of the country. This type of mission is crucial to assist the establishment of the objectives adapted to the level of ambition and to the mandate’s term;
- It is of utmost importance to set up a public information dissemination plan and to implement it with high priority. The communication plan should address the pre-deployment phase, the initial stage and the mission execution phase, carefully selecting the main massages to be released in each phase, bearing in mind the local social context.
- The establishment of the mission’s manpower in number and expertise requirements should be tailored to the goals and objectives of each phase.
- The fact-finding pre-deployment missions should evaluate the synchronism between the host nation political calendar and the European Union institutional and political constraints. Based on this study the pre-deployment missions are in position to assess the impact on the total length of the future mission.
- The fact-finding pre-deployment missions should also assess the ability of the host nation to take the lead of the process in order to assess the implica-
tion of the SSR process on the principle of “local ownership”. This assessment allows the adaptation of the key goals in terms of the effectiveness and time-frame of the future mission.

- An SSR process is structural and it needs to be implemented over a long period of time. It is, however, desirable to establish a link between short-term actions in the context of a crisis management procedure. Nevertheless, this linkage should be perceived as a line of continuity, in the long-term to avoid the “temporary syndrome” that will have an impact on the perceptions of the population. The same idea applies to the projects linked to the termination of the mission.

- The fact-finding pre-deployment missions should also establish an exit strategy that doesn’t commit the international organizations and contributing States for too long. This exit strategy should preserve the idea of full support of the SSR process by the international community.

Finally, the EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau showed again the importance of understanding that in the context of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) the crisis management concept calls for a holistic approach over long periods. Consequently, it is hard to image SSR successful processes associated with short term mandates. Learning form the EU SSR Mission, we see SSR as a political and strategic process, driven by the host nation, and in which the external presence should only reinforce the national capacities (not only State capacities, but also local and civil capacities) to implement the process of change.

The European Union possesses the capacity to manage crises through a combined resource of instruments of a diplomatic, economic, and military nature, and support to development, according to the circumstances and guided by a common identified strategy. In this context, the European Union stands as a token holding a unique ability to use all the instruments of the so called “smart power” working with State and non-State actors, and comprehensively supporting the elements of a State reform. For that reason, the European Union still possesses a remarkable capacity to support the SSR process in Guinea-Bissau.
Does Portugal Share the Current SSR International Views?

“...Portugal has been actively participating and integrating in several activities. Among these activities we should point out the relevance of SSR and DDR processes, as measures of post conflict stabilization and reconstruction”.

Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 73/2009: 5606

The current political views, the existing legal framework, and cooperation in the field are the supporting grounds to mention Portugal as an SSR concept builder. The political program of the XIX Constitutional Government of Portugal, in the area of foreign policy, development and national defense, has established the need “to pay special attention to the exercise of the United Nations mandate in Security Council, reinforcing the image of the country as a State committed to international peace and to international conflicts’ resolution”. This political document further mentions that the international importance of a State becomes more and more dependent on its capacity and, above all, on its ability to actively contribute to the maintenance of peace and international security, acting at multilateral level. This statement is based on the fact that Portugal understands security in a broad context and that because of this it is ready to act and share the burden of protecting common interests.

Chart 4 – Portuguese SSR Legal Framework

Therefore, to support the idea of Portugal being an SSR concept builder, two references are to be taken into consideration. Firstly, the Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 196/2005 that passed the “[A] Strategic Vision for Portuguese cooperation”. This political vision envisages the adoption of a cooperation policy as one
of the key pillars of Portuguese foreign policy. Furthermore, it establishes a balanced linkage between principles, priorities, programs and projects and leverages its multi-dimension of the institutional national contribution. It also emphasizes the goals of the Millennium Declaration reinforcing the idea of human security as the basis of all SSR processes. This political document also places the role of Portuguese cooperation in the context of a larger coalition of political willingness, represented by other States acting under similar goals. It clearly establishes the following guiding principles:

• To participate in internal stabilization processes aiming at State reconstruction and consolidation;
• To participate in the fields of the security sector, democracy, governance, rule of law, State building, and State management in order to support the host nation’s general development.

Additionally, the document refers to the concept of police security reform as a contribution to border control, administration, maintenance of public order, and the fight against crime, especially through the following actions:

• By improving the relationship between law enforcement and security services at the level of the organization, working procedures, education and training;
• By reinforcing the internal stability conditions providing support to the political and security institutions’ autonomy, security environment, and consolidation of essential values of democracy and rule of law.

The Portuguese cooperation policy envisages two fundamental scales within the actions supporting human security: protection and autonomy.

• Protection – This scale aims to support the victims of a violent conflict through an integrated use of political, military, security, humanitarian, and development instruments. In this regard, special attention should be paid to relief of the internally displaced people and refugees, by supporting the action of international organizations.
• Autonomy – This scale aims to establish the main conditions for self-sustained State action, and includes the support of DDR processes, as well as the reinforcement of the mechanisms capable of improving human security within a context of a fragile State. This scale also includes support given to the police and armed forces.

Secondly, the Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 73/2009, which passed the “National Strategy on Security and Development”, established the regular mechanisms of political and operational coordination, good practices, information sharing, and relationship with Portugal’s international partners. The main idea of this document is to ensure multi-state and multi-area planning and action in the context of fragile States. The strategy guides SSR as a comprehensive instrument,
crucial for developing States, and sees it as a major contribution to security and stabilization. The document points out the important role of Portugal as a State contributor to the adoption of the European Union Council conclusions on security and development, which took place during the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 73/2009: 5603).

Moreover, Portugal sees the level and objectives of State external action in terms of security defense framed by the use of security instruments alongside political, economic and social mechanisms. Within this framework, the active role played by the Portuguese State is grounded on the context of different international organizations, as follows:

- **United Nations (UN)** – Actively contributes to empower the organization as source peace operations and stabilization legitimacy;

- **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** – Dynamically contributes to the development of crisis management instruments to reinforce the ability of operating collectively and in the context of an increasing presence of State and non-State actors.

- **European Union (UE)** – Within the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), framework “developing military and civil capacities to participate in international crisis management, and based on a comprehensive approach, preparing the means to contribute to the maintenance of peace and international security (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 73/2009: 5605)”, as well as the participation in SSR, and DDR⁴, aiming to successfully conduct conflict stabilization.

- **Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** - Portugal chaired the OSCE Presidency in 2002 and is strongly engaged in “building bridges” through permanent dialogue and an effective/comprehensive contribution to crisis management.

- **Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP)** – Portugal is deeply engaged in development support action, language development, educational exchanges of experiences, and the exploitation of resources, the environment, gender, medical technical cooperation, justice, defense, and security advisory services.

Finally, the Portuguese Ministerial Defense Directive 2010-2013 (Despacho do Gabinete do Ministro da Defesa Nacional n.º 7769/2010), clearly points out cooperative security within the United Nations, European Union and NATO as an instrument of an enlarged concept of security. In fact, the cooperative security concept “integrated the traditional objectives of the State, sovereignty and defense of 4 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
the national territory, into a preventive philosophy, together with a global vision of the evolution of international insecurity, aiming to prevent and to limit, today’s conflicts”.

Portuguese National Defense is understood as embracing a military component and a non-military component, in an enlarged plan of interaction of all the sectors of national life, through a political multifaceted dimension, including diplomatic, economic, financial, social and cultural dimension, besides the military instrument. Portugal holds a huge historical experience, particularly in Africa in terms of conflict management, assuming multilateralism and bilateral cooperation as strong multipliers of peace.

All in all, a successful SSR should involve a collation of States in a balanced manner, led by the hosting nation during a reasonable period of time. Moreover, the reform of the security sector must be seen as the empowerment of the host nation’s institutions in the context of public service. Effectively, this empowerment only leads to success if it places the individual and its fundamental rights at the center of a joint action. These ideas are shared by the major Portuguese instruments of policy relating to external cooperation.

References


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