ARMAMENT CONTROL
IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN USA POLITICS

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INTRODUCTION

I appreciate the opportunity to speak before this distinguished group. As you know, I arrived only recently in Portugal. But in Lisbon one soon learns of the Instituto da Defesa Nacional and of its important role in the study of international politico-military affairs and the advanced training of Portugal’s leadership. It is thus an honor and a pleasure for me to be with you today to discuss American foreign policy.

The topic is immense and complex, and our time together is limited. Under the circumstances, an attempt to provide a broad and all-encompassing description of U.S. policies abroad would run the risk of superficiality. Therefore, I think it best first to sketch out some basic considerations concerning American foreign policy and the world environment in which it operates. I would then like to illustrate by focusing on one area where many of these considerations come together in an issue central both to U.S. foreign and defense policy and to world security. I refer to arms control policy.

Upon concluding my prepared remarks, I would welcome your questions and the opportunity to discuss these themes with you at greater length.

FUNDAMENTAL TENETs FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

As a nation, America can never be indifferent to her own security or that of her friends and allies. As a free society whose national identity is based on its democratic form of government, neither can the United States and its people be indifferent to the fate of liberty and human rights.
elsewhere. Indeed, there is a connection between these two preoccupations: history demonstrates that totalitarian states and their leaders are far less prone to embark upon aggression and expansionist adventures when faced with democratic governments armed with the will and the means to defend their societies.

The concerns I noted have given rise to two fundamental objectives of American foreign policy during this century. First, the United States has sought actively to help shape a world hospitable to basic values of human rights and freedom, and to political democracy as the best guardian of those values. This does not mean holding up America or the West as a model to be copied in every detail; much less does it mean an attempt to impose our political or social system on others. But it does mean an effort to contribute to an environment in which moral and political values founded on respect for the dignity of the individual and the consent of the governed can grow and flourish.

Neither personal freedom nor democracy can survive under the rule of an aggressor state or its local surrogates, whose first objective must always be to maintain internal control by limiting public expression and strengthening the authority of the state at the expense of the individual. Still less can freedom be preserved in the case of an outside power which seeks to consolidate its control over others by imposing a totalitarian political and social system modelled on its own.

Thus, in American foreign policy democratic objectives are linked to and have mutually reinforced a second, eminently political aim: the United States has sought to contribute towards secure and peaceful inter-state relations free of the use of armed coercion. In particular, it has acted to impede attempts by the principal totalitarian powers of our epoch — first the Axis powers, later the Soviet Union — to carry out territorial expansion thus causing dramatic and threatening shifts in the world balance of power.

Citing this as evidence, some have termed the United States a status quo power, seeking to preserve the privileged position it occupied at the conclusion of World War II. The characterization is erroneous, if not also disingenuous, for my country has sought to prevent the spread of oppressive totalitarian political systems, in particular when imposed on nations or manipulated by outside force. But the more fundamental essence of U.S.
foreign policy is the advocacy of peaceful change and development, for which America has been a principal agent in the modern world. To cite but a few examples, it was the Marshall plan in Europe and American assistance to Japan which catalyzed the postwar recovery of those regions and their rise as centers of world economic power. The U.S. also led in the advocacy of liberal trade policies and the construction of multilateral institutions which permitted huge increases in world commerce during the last three decades and which have underpinned a major share of current prosperity. In the Third World, the U.S. supported the political emergence of the developing countries as independent states and—by trade loans, and concessionary assistance—has consistently been one of the world's leading external contributors to their continued progress. Finally, to cite but one more example, American technology and culture have made a profound impact on the world and the way people live their daily lives.

THE CURRENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

If much has changed for the better since the Second World War, particularly in economic and social terms, the global political environment within which American foreign policy operates remains unaltered in one fundamental respect: world power, though shared by many more groups and states than existed before, remains largely concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere and partitioned between two groupings: the Western democracies freely linked together in NATO and several Pacific Ocean alliance systems—all involving the United States; and the Eastern totalitarian countries, which are compulsorily bound together in the Warsaw Pact under the control of the Soviet Union. Western nations seek to preserve their democratic systems and national independence while participating in and contributing to a pluralistic, peacefully envolving world order. The Soviet Bloc, whether from doctrinal impulse, imperial ambition, or both, seeks to expand its sphere of political control and does not shrink from the use or the threat of armed force to achieve that end. Like it or not, intellectually fashionable or not, the struggle between these two systems remains the root geo-political and ethical reality of our time. That reality is sometimes muted. Places like Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia or El
Salvador seem remote to many West Europeans and Americans, and the clash of armies has happily not been heard for nearly forty years in Europe where the two alliance systems meet. Nonetheless, the reality is there. Indeed it has become ever more acute with the dramatic expansion of Soviet military power over the past 15 to 20 years.

**SOVIET MILITARY EXPANSION**

That build-up is unprecedented in peacetime history. It occurred despite a decline in overall U.S. defense efforts throughout most of the decade of the 1970s. And it took place on each of the three basic levels of military power:

— Soviet conventional forces, which after the West’s post-war demobilization always exceeded Western armies in sheer numbers, have shown continued increases in both quantity and quality. Some 30 divisions have been added to Soviet ground forces since 1967, and special attention has been given to upgrading and expanding offensive armor units. Air forces have been expanded and modernized with emphasis on fighter aircraft and on medium-range bombers suitable for an offensive air campaign in Europe. The surface navy has been transformed from a coastal patrol force into a powerful, open-ocean navy including aircraft carriers and numbering more than 360 major combatants and amphibious ships.

— In intermediate nuclear forces, particularly of longer-range, the Soviets have attained clear superiority. Thanks to deployment of the «SS-20», the number of Soviet medium-range missile warheads targeted on Europe has grown swiftly over the past five years to a number exceeding 1000. For its part, the NATO Alliance withdrew medium range missiles from Europe 20 years ago and will not possess comparable systems until the deployment of «Pershing II» and «cruise missiles» pursuant to NATO’s 1979 decision. The disparity in intermediate nuclear forces becomes even greater when one takes into account the major imbalance favoring the Soviet Bloc in nuclear-capable offensive aircraft assigned to Europe.
In strategic nuclear forces, the US consciously permitted the Soviets to attain overall parity over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s. Yet despite having attained basic equality, the Soviets have continued to augment their strategic forces. The USSR has built over 200 modern «Backfire» bombers and is building 30 more per year. The newest U.S. «B-52» bomber was built more than 20 years ago. The USSR has put to sea 60 new ballistic missile submarines in the last 15 years. Until 1981, the U.S. had not commissioned a single such submarine in that same period. During the last decade the Soviets have introduced entirely new generations of both sea-borne and land-based strategic ballistic missiles comprising at least seven distinct missile types. The U.S. has introduced one. Overall, the average age of Soviet strategic weapons systems is five years.

In summary, for the last two decades the so-called arms race has borne closer resemblance to a solitary sprint on the part of one of the superpowers. The resulting unfavorable trends in the military balance of powers, if allowed to continue, would not fail to bring with them serious political consequences for global security and the West in particular. Indeed, the first warning symptoms are already apparent in the Third World. The Soviet military build-up has given them a greater ability to project power on a global scale, and the improvement in their overall military position vis-a-vis the U.S. and the West generally has given them greater confidence and willingness to commit that power and their proxies in foreign adventures. The results are to be seen in Angola and Ethiopia; in Cambodia; in El Salvador; and, most obviously, in Afghanistan.

Still more serious, however, is that both the momentum and the offensive character of the Soviet build-up, if unchecked, threaten to undermine the central structure of deterrence which has guaranteed the peace in Europe and North America for nearly 40 years, while at the same time providing Western states sufficient confidence in their own strength to resist any Soviet attempts at political coercion.

The loss of that confidence, for lack of a credible military deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviets, would inevitably have a major impact on the calculations
of leaders on both sides and would render Western states vulnerable and tempting targets for the exercise of Soviet political hegemony.

It is in the context of efforts by the East and West respectively to erode or to maintain deterrence and an overall military balance that the fundamental East-West competition has never been more acute or dangerous.

**TWO PILLARS OF WESTERN DEFENSE POLICY**

Within this environment, the U.S. and its NATO allies in recent years have defined and pursued a defense policy based on two basic pillars: the bolstering of Western military forces; and the effort to seek equitable arms control agreements which produce a more stable military balance at lower levels of armament. These two elements—a strengthened defense and arms control initiatives—are neither contradictory nor even alternative paths to the same end. Rather, both are seen and emphasized by the U.S. as mutually interdependent and indispensable means of enhancing peace and security. Let me illustrate that interdependence.

In the absence of a clear Western determination to correct military imbalances by increased defense efforts if necessary, the Soviet Bloc would have little reason or incentive to negotiate arms reductions or limitations which might diminish their unilateral advantages. This is not merely a logical deduction, but a historically demonstrable fact. Indeed, it is illustrated by the very origins of both the strategic and intermediate nuclear force talks. In 1969 the Soviets did not wish to negotiate limitations on either antiballistic missile or strategic offensive systems. It was only after the U.S. Congress approved funds for a U.S. antiballistic missile program that the Soviet Union agreed to enter the SALT negotiations, now known as START. Similarly, in regard to intermediate nuclear forces and in particular to longer-range missiles, the Soviet Union after initiating «SS-20» deployments refused all Western proposals to negotiate an arms control agreement covering such systems. In 1979, NATO decided to respond to Soviet deployments by moving towards deployment of comparable systems while continuing to seek arms control talks. The Soviets responded to the renewed offer of talks by refusing to negotiate unless the NATO deployment decision were reversed in advance. It was only when NATO governments rejected such blackmail and demonstrated their determination to deploy «Pershing» and
«cruise missiles» in the absence of a negotiated arms control solution, that the Soviets agreed to come to the bargaining table at all.

If credible defense efforts are a prerequisite to equitable arms control agreements, it is equally the case that lasting security is ultimately dependent upon progress in arms control:

— The size and continued growth of nuclear arsenals is the product, not the root cause of political differences and tensions between the alliance systems, but it also contributes to those tensions.

— In the modern world, competitive defense efforts are characterized by technological innovation, the possibility of dramatic scientific advances in weaponry which cannot be immediately countered, and thus the possibility of sudden if temporary shifts in the military equilibrium. Arms control, by decelerating or even reversing the pace of arms competition, can also serve to bring greater predictability and thus greater safety to the military balance and thus greater stability to relations between states.

— Finally, arms control efforts offer the most direct means of affecting not only the sheer size, but the character of the arsenals on either side, in a way which enhances security and mutual deterrence by diminishing those elements in the arsenal of one state which especially threaten the ability of the other side to respond to attack. This takes on particular relevance to the START negotiations, given Soviet efforts in the context of their build-up to neutralize the retaliatory potential of American strategic forces.

Following close consultations, the Western nations—either the U.S. or the NATO allies as a group—during the past year have taken major and constructive initiatives across the entire range of arms control, to include three principal fora where negotiations are currently taking place. I would like to describe the principal initiatives, and in so doing to review the background and current state-of-play of the negotiations themselves. This entails a focus on three areas: conventional forces in Europe, as dealt with by the MBFR talks in Vienna; intermediate nuclear forces, now under negotiation between the U.S. and USSR in Geneva; and the START talks on strategic nuclear forces, also taking place in Geneva.
MBFR

The negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, now in their tenth year, take place against the background of Eastern superiority in conventional forces and manpower. In the region of Central Europe covered by the talks, the Warsaw Pact has deployed 57 divisions and approximately 960,000 ground troops, compared to NATO's 25 divisions and 790,000 men—a difference of 170,000. That disparity is a major destabilizing factor in the military situation. Its elimination, by reducing the capability for sudden aggression, would lessen tensions and the risk of war in Europe. The primary Western objective in MBFR thus has been to seek reductions on both sides which lead to an equal overall ceiling on each side’s military manpower. The ceiling proposed is for 700,000 ground personnel and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined—a reduction of 90,000 by NATO and 260,000 by the Warsaw Pact.

Last July, the West took a major step by tabling a draft treaty which incorporates a new, comprehensive NATO proposal designed to give new momentum to the negotiations. This is the first time that a Western proposal in MBFR negotiations has been tabled in the form of a draft treaty. Doing so underscores Western seriousness in pursuing these talks. Moreover, the Western proposal responds to a major Eastern desire: that all Western participants, not just the U.S., commit themselves legally from the start to undertake the troop reductions needed to meet a lowered overall ceiling. The East had been concerned that some participants in the negotiations would make only symbolic reductions. The Western proposal goes a long way towards meeting that concern, and thus towards, resolving one of the three major outstanding issues in MBFR.

It now falls to the East to respond appropriately. Achievement of an agreement depends heavily upon Eastern willingness to come to terms with the remaining two issues. The first, and most important, is the issue of data. Western intelligence points clearly to an Eastern superiority of 170,000 men in Central Europe. The East, which was unwilling even to present manpower figures during the first three years of the negotiations, has since insisted that approximate parity in manpower already exists. NATO has full confidence in Western figures and since July 1981 has had on the table several proposals and procedures to resolve the discrepancy—proposals
based in part on suggestions the East itself has made in the course of discussions. Thus far, the Eastern response has not been forthcoming. Obviously, until the East is prepared to address the matter seriously and agreement can be reached on existing manpower levels, there is no basis for agreement on the size of the reduction on each side needed to achieve the parity which both sides have accepted in principle.

The other key issue involves verification and inspection measures to monitor compliance with an agreement. In view of the security interests at stake on all sides, we cannot rely merely on trust that the East will observe an MBFR agreement. This would be all the more foolhardy in view of the mixed Soviet record of compliance with the arms control agreements the USSR has already signed. Seismic data raise questions concerning Soviet compliance with the 1974 treaty limiting the size of underground nuclear tests. Evidence collected over the last three years in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, convincingly demonstrates Soviet violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which forbids the use of chemical and biological weapons in war, and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which prohibits the possession or use of toxin weapons. In light of this record and other factors, an unverifiable arms control agreement dealing with critical elements of both sides forces would be an invitation to disaster for the West and a likely source of mutual suspicion rather than enhanced security. Thus, in MBFR, the West has proposed seven verification measures to observe compliance and to enhance mutual confidence about the nature of each side's military activities. The East has stated its acceptance of the concept of these so-called «associated measures», but thus far has insisted on a far more modest package which is inadequate to the requirements of genuine verification. Achievement of an agreement depends upon forward movement in this area.

INF

The INF negotiations deal with a matter which goes to the heart of the Western system of deterrence as it operates in Europe.

As the Soviets achieved strategic nuclear parity with the U.S. over the 1960's, and early 1970's, immediate U.S. resort to massive nuclear retaliation against Soviet territory in the event of a conventional attack on Europe ceased to be credible. As a result, NATO adopted and has
since depended upon nuclear forces in Europe, as guided by the doctrine of flexible response, to provide a convincing link between conventional forces and the U.S. strategic deterrent which serves as the ultimate guarantor of European security. In the event NATO could not contain a Warsaw Pact offensive by conventional means, intermediate nuclear forces in Europe offer the Alliance a politically credible option of nuclear escalation to a level less than total war. INF thereby impose on the Soviets, in peacetime, major uncertainties regarding the ultimate scope of a conflict initiated in Europe, the costs involved and likelihood of Soviet success, and the possibilities of further escalation, including massive involvement by the U.S. strategic force. Those uncertainties, because they encompass within them the question of the Soviet Union's physical survival, act as a powerful deterrent to military aggression at any level in Europe.

The Soviet's essential purpose in expanding their INF force, and in particular the «SS-20», has been to acquire a superiority in intermediate nuclear forces, comprising missiles and bombers, which is so overwhelming as to undermine the political and military credibility of NATO's option to respond to a Soviet attack with INF under extreme circumstances. By thus neutralizing and severing that link in the chain of deterrence and flexible response, the Soviets seek to cast Europe's precarious conventional defense adrift from the U.S. strategic deterrent which underpins it. Given Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, such isolation would set the stage for Soviet politico-military hegemony in Western Europe. Thus, the Soviet Union's underlying politico-military strategy in connection with INF mirrors the propaganda strategy it has pursued thus far in attempting to dissuade NATO from responding with the deployment of «Pershing II» and «cruise missiles». The key in both cases is the attempt to divide the U.S. from its European allies, the better to isolate the latter in order eventually to dominate them under the guise of accommodation.

In order to sustain NATO's deterrent strategy in the face of the Soviet INF build-up, NATO ministers, following prolonged alliance consultations, agreed in December 1979 to modernize the Alliance's INF, by the deployment of 572 warheads on «Pershing II» and ground launched «cruise missiles» beginning late this year. At the same time, the Alliance proposed arms control negotiations to the USSR in an effort to pursue a solution which would reduce or eliminate the need for such deployments. As I have
described earlier, the Soviet Union agreed to such negotiations only with the greatest reluctance and after lenghty procrastination.

Since that time, Soviet positions, including the most recent elaboration by Chairman Andropov, indicate that the Soviet Union has yet to accept the principle, so basic to any arms control agreement, that limits on one side’s forces must be matched by comparable limits on those of the other. Instead, the Soviet Union persists in its demand, as before the negotiations, that the U.S. forego deployment of «cruise missiles» and «Pershing II», but allow the Soviet Union to retain a monopoly over the U.S. systems of this type. Indeed, Soviet proposals call for a reduction in U.S. nuclear-capable forces in Europe below current levels, namely in aircraft, while permitting the Soviet Union to maintain substantial forces in Europe, including a large number of «SS-20s». Neither do Soviet proposals provide any limits on Soviet systems in the Eastern USSR, despite the fact that the «SS-20» has the range to threaten Western Europe from beyond the Urals, and the mobility for rapid deployment or redeployment back to Europe in time of crisis. The sole unambiguous «concession» which the Soviets offer is the possible removal of a handful of «SS-20s», and the very gradual retirement of older missile systems such as the «SS-4» and «5», which the Soviets have said they intend to retire in any case.

Soviet proposals, of course, are worded to provide the surface appearance of equality. The Soviets advocate a reduction of so-called «medium range» systems in Europe to 300, with a sub-limit on missiles which just happens to equal the size of French and British deterrent forces. Upon closer examination, however, Soviet proposals prove completely one-sided:

— First, the Soviet proposal is regional not global. It envisages no restrictions on continued deployment of systems outside Europe. Given the range and mobility of the «SS-20», regional restrictions offer Europe no protection. Only global limits can do so.

— Second, the Soviets include aircraft as well as missiles in the 300 level, and they do so in a way that includes a large number of U.S. aircraft while excluding Soviet aircraft with similar or greater capabilities.

— Third, the Soviets include French and British nuclear forces, although these systems are independent and, as national strategic retaliatory forces, have a character completely different from the U.S. and Soviet systems under negotiation. No longer content with U.S.
—Soviet equality, the Soviets now have advanced a position that would make the Soviet Union as strong as all potential adversaries put together, and thus more powerful than any other single nation. This is an unacceptable recipe for hegemony.

The U.S. proposal is simple, direct, far-reaching and seeks to deal rapidly with those intermediate nuclear systems, namely land-based missiles, which are expanding most quickly in numbers and are the source of principal concern to both sides. As you know, the so-called «zero-zero» proposal made by President Reagan in November 1981, calls for elimination worldwide of all ground-launched longer-range INF missiles. The Soviets would be required to eliminate the «SS-20s», as well as the older «SS-4s» and «5s» which presumably they will be phasing out in any case in the not to distant future. The U.S. would forego deployment of the «Pershing II» and GLCM. An entire class of weapons systems would thus be eliminated from the arsenals of both sides. Neither the U.S. nor the USSR would gain the right to superiority; the «zero-zero» proposal is a fair, equitable, and serious approach, which we believe provides a reasonable basis for agreement.

Obviously, it is not a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We have made it clear throughout the negotiations that we are willing to discuss any alternative suggestions the Soviets wish to put forward, and we have done so. As I noted, however, to date the Soviets have so far shown no willingness even to accept equal restrictions on their systems, much less total elimination of this class of weaponry.

In the meantime, the USSR has directed a major propaganda campaign at West European publics — a campaign coordinated with its negotiating tactics and positions in Geneva and designed to block NATO deployments without need for any concessions by the USSR. In this, Soviet behavior remains consistent with the pattern which preceded the USSR’s reluctant entry into the talks. In the latter case, firm and clear Allied determination to proceed with deployments if an arms control agreement were not reached, proved to be both a necessary and sufficient condition to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table. Similarly, I believe that continued Allied unity on behalf of the 1979 decision offers the best prospect for Soviet movement towards a genuinely equitable arms control solution.
START

In the strategic arms reduction talks (START) in Geneva, the Reagan Administration has devised a bold, equitable, and verifiable approach designed to lower significantly the level of nuclear weapons on both sides and to lower them in a manner which enhances deterrence and stability.

From the beginning, Soviet nuclear doctrine has been fundamentally different from U.S. doctrine in that it sees nuclear conflict as merely a more destructive form of conventional war. Put another way, Soviet doctrine has always asserted the possibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war by destroying the opponent’s nuclear capability and limiting damage to the USSR. This may not show up so frequently in Soviet propaganda; but it is abundantly clear in their military textbooks, writings and maneuvers.

As a result of the strategic build-up which began in the 1960’s, the Soviet Union has now acquired a massive land-based force of large, highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Soviets have a 3 to 1 advantage over the U.S. in ICBM warheads and could target some 6000 ICBM warheads against our 1000 ICBM launchers. That force enables the Soviets to threaten the survival of the entire U.S. land based missile forces in a first-strike attack. The U.S. has no comparable land-based capability.

The essence of the structure of mutual deterrence which has maintained peace in the nuclear age is the confidence that each side can effectively retaliate even after absorbing an attack by the other. The Soviets’ ability to destroy with a first-strike a major segment of U.S. retaliatory forces is a serious threat to the stability of deterrence. This becomes even more clear when one considers the level of resources and research which the Soviets are simultaneously devoting to the effort to neutralize the other major elements of the U.S. strategic forces, namely aircraft and ballistic missile submarines.

The U.S. proposal in START thus aims directly at reducing the risks of war by reducing the number of ballistic missiles and warheads, particularly land-based systems, to a level consistent with stable deterrence. In a first phase, the U.S. has proposed a one-third reduction in total ICBM and SLBM warheads down to 5000, with no more than half that number on land-based missiles. We also seek to cut the total number of ballistic missiles, land and sea-based, to an equal level of approximately 850 — about
half the current U.S. number. In a second phase, closely linked to the first, the U.S. will seek equal ceilings on other elements of U.S. and Soviet forces, such as missile throwweight. We exclude nothing from the START negotiations. We are prepared to agree to equal limits on number of heavy bombers on both sides, and eventually to reductions in other slow flying systems, such as «cruise missiles».

The U.S. proposal is equitable. The number of missile warheads is now approximately equal on each side, as would be the reductions required to reach lower equal ceilings. The Soviets would have to forfeit more land-based missile warheads, which are the most destabilizing systems. The U.S. would have to forfeit more submarine-based missile warheads, since these make up a larger portion of total U.S. forces. Just as important as equity, the U.S. proposal aims not merely at significant reductions, but at the kind of reductions that enhance deterrence and reduce the temptation to strike first.

The current Soviet proposal in START includes a cut of 25 percent, down to 1800, in the number of delivery systems. While we welcome this evidence of Soviet willingness to entertain the idea of some reductions, we find the level of cuts disappointingly small. Moreover, the Soviet proposal is linked to a prohibition on increases in «forward based systems» in Europe—a link to intermediate nuclear forces which we find inappropriate and unacceptable in the context of negotiations on strategic arms. The proposal is also linked to a ban on long-range «cruise missiles». This together with other elements of the Soviet proposal would prevent all U.S. force modernization while leaving Soviet programs unaffected.

Nonetheless, the negotiations in Geneva have been serious and business-like thus far. We look forward to further exploration of ideas with the Soviets, and we hope that progress can be made.

The U.S. will also seek to negotiate at Geneva with the Soviet Union a number of safeguards to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the possibility of accidental war. As outlined by President Reagan in Berlin last June, we have in mind reciprocal exchanges of information in such areas as advance notification of major military exercises that otherwise might be misinterpreted; expanded notification of ICBM and submarine missile launches and an expanded exchange of strategic forces data.
CONCLUSION

The arms control negotiations I have described, as well as others which time does not permit me to discuss, clearly manifest the basic principles which underpin U.S. arms control policy and the many proposals President Reagan has put forward:

— First, we insist henceforth on genuine arms control in the form of significant reductions in arms, not just freezing armaments at high levels or authorizing even higher levels of armaments, as occurred in previous SALT agreements.

— Second, we will seek equality and accept nothing less. We want agreements that will lead to mutual reductions down to equal levels of forces on both sides. An unequal arms control agreement, by producing or ratifying an unequal balance of forces, defeats its own purpose by encouraging coercion or aggression.

— Third, we will insist on verifiable agreements. When Western freedom and survival is at stake, and history casts doubt on Soviet respect for treaty obligations, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone.

— Finally, we see arms control not as an end in itself, but as an important means of enhancing mutual security and reducing the risk of war by building confidence, avoiding miscalculation, and tailoring forces in a manner which strengthens deterrence.

The last point is critical. In the final analysis, the state of East-West relations generally and the prospects for success in arms control in particular will depend upon which course the USSR chooses to adopt. Is it prepared to accept the concept of a balance of forces organized for mutual deterrence and intended to underpin a world order characterized by mutual restraint and peaceful competition? Or will the Soviets continue their drive to achieve military superiority in order to undermine deterrence and place themselves in a position to dictate terms to the West? Is the Soviet Union a state like the others, willing to live as a member of the society of nations, and to abide by the rule of law, or on the other hand, will it persist in the view that its mission is to lead a crusade to spread the communist faith by the sword?

Developments in the current arms control negotiations will be an important test of Soviet intentions under their new leadership and thus
an important indication of the global reality we will face during the remain-
der of this century. For now, we hope for the best, while participating ser-
iously in the arms control dialogue and at the same time ensuring the ade-
quacy of our own defenses.

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