THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE GENEVA US/SOViete TALKS ON NUCLEAR DEFENCE AND SPACE WEAPONS
INRODUCTION

First of all, I should like to thank the «Instituto da Defesa Nacional» for giving me the opportunity to visit this magnificent city of Lisbon. It is an honour and a pleasure for me to address this distinguished and knowledgable audience on two major ongoing arms control negotiations, namely the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and the Geneva US/Soviet Talks on Nuclear Defence and Space Arms.

Before addressing the specifics of these negotiations, I should like to make a few general remarks on the relationship between arms control and the Alliance's security policy whose fundamental objective is to ensure a lasting peace in freedom and to protect the independence of NATO members. In the pursuit of this goal, NATO is firmly committed to achieving arms control agreements which enhance stability and improve the prospects for crisis management and the prevention of war. Such agreements are to establish a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level of arms. Agreements, which are to achieve these objectives, must be based on certain essential criteria:

— First, they must be militarily significant: declaratory measures which do nothing to reduce arsenals, limit their build-up or improve confidence are inadequate to generate security and stability.

— Second, arms control agreements must also be balanced and equitable: this means they must take into due account the legitimate security interests of all parties concerned and must not in any way diminish security.

— And, third, arms control agreements must be verifiable. They affect vital security interests and can therefore not be based on trust alone. The parties to an agreement must therefore be able to

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ensure full compliance with its provisions. Due to the fundamental differences between the open Western and the closed Eastern societies and the resulting difference of degree of insight into military postures and activities, verification is of crucial importance. Reluctance on the part of the East to permit effective verification creates serious impediments in a number of ongoing arms control negotiations.

I hope that is has become clear from these remarks that arms control and disarmament are essential elements of the Alliance's security policy and not an alternative to it.

The Stockholm CDE

Let me now turn to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The concept underlying this Conference is not an entirely new one: confidence-building measures have existed as long as nations have distrusted each other. A vast amount of statecraft and diplomatic energy is being devoted to avoiding the use of force. Yet, there remain elements of chance, of suspicion and of error which could lead to the conflict that no one wants. This has given rise to the idea that international negotiations and agreements should deal especially with the problem of preventing wars which might result from misunderstanding, miscalculation or accidents. Confidence-building and risk-reducing efforts deal primarily with the operations of military forces, not their capabilities. They are designed to complement not to replace traditional arms control which is directed at limiting and reducing military potentials. CBMs should oblige nations to act in a way which would serve to eliminate the causes of tension and reduce the dangers of misunderstanding. A régime of CBMs should contain specific obligations requiring proofs of peaceful intent of military operations which could be perceived by others to be threatening. Since CSBMs cannot prevent acts of willful aggression, it is essential to provide for verification to guard against deception.

The post World War II period offers examples of such CBMs. Best known are perhaps the «hot line» agreements which the United States,
France and the UK have concluded with the Soviet Union. They establish a direct communication link which would help to defuse dangerous incidents or developments. Another example is the 1972 US/Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement which defines rules of behaviour for American and Soviet naval forces operating in proximity to each other in the high seas. This has led to a marked decrease in dangerous naval encounters.

In Europe today, there exists the greatest concentration of military forces in the world. Governments must therefore work to reduce military force levels. This is the objective of the MBFR negotiations. But it is equally important to prevent that a situation could arise in Europe in which misperceptions or misjudgements lead to crisis or conflict.

The Stockholm Conference, with its 35 participating countries (33 European states plus US and Canada) has been assigned the task of extending the concept of confidence-building to a wide range of military activities throughout Europe. The Conference is an integral part of the CSCE process which is to enhance security and develop cooperation, thus helping to ease the divisions between nations in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which encompasses political, economic and humanitarian concerns also contains a document on CBMs. It requires to announce major military manoeuvres exceeding 25,000 troops, 21 days in advance and to exchange observers on a voluntary basis. This was a modest first step providing valuable experience for further-reaching efforts in the area of confidence-building.

At the Belgrade CSCE follow-up meeting (1977-78), the western countries proposed improvements of those original CBMs but no decision on substance was taken. At a further follow-up meeting held in Madrid (1981-83) it was agreed to convene the Stockholm Conference on the basis of a precisely worded mandate. According to this mandate the Stockholm Conference should negotiate and adopt a set of mutually complementary confidence and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. They should be militarily significant, politically binding, adequately verifiable and cover the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The CSBMs which the authors of the Madrid mandate had in mind go well beyond the CBMs of the Helsinki Final Act. This is illustrated in a general way by the introduction of the concept «security-building».
Following a preparatory meeting in Helsinki, the Stockholm Conference opened on 17 January 1984 and is now entering its 3rd year.

During the first year (1984) members of the three main groups, e.g. The Atlantic Alliance, the Warsaw Pact and the Neutral and Non-aligned Countries submitted proposals pointing out their respective approaches. Substantial differences became evident between the Western and Eastern concepts. The West is working for more openness and calculability of military behaviour in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe. The members of the Alliance have been the first to propose a set of concrete, mutually reinforcing confidence and security-building measures containing the elements of information, annual forecasts, notification, observation, verification and communication.

The East is mainly seeking declaratory measures containing statements of intent which would not change the real military situation. The first document tabled by the East contained the following proposal: A Treaty on renunciation of force, no first use of nuclear arms, a freeze on military budgets, nuclear and chemical weapon free zones in Europe and some limited CSBMs.

The basic approach by the neutral and non-aligned countries is very similar to that of the West.

Shortly before the end of 1984, the Conference agreed on a working structure. Two Working Groups were established, one (B) is to deal with the proposals or notification and observation of out of garrison activities, and the other (A) with all other proposals. This arrangement has greatly contributed to intensifying discussions which were more issue-oriented in 1985.

During the past year, a number of additional papers were presented, many of them elaborating on previous proposals.

The Allied countries contributed 6 working papers, one for each of their proposed measures which explain in detail their respective objectives.

Measure 1: *Exchange of information about the organization and location of military forces of all 35 participating countries at the beginning of each calendar year.*

This measure is to provide an actual basis upon which other
CSBMs, especially the notification of military activities, must depend.

Measure 2: *An exchange of annual forecasts of military exercises planned for the coming year.*
This would provide a basis for establishing a pattern of normal military activities for each of the 35 participating states and make military activities more predictable over a longer period. Deviations from the routine military behaviour could lead to the request for explanations by other participating states.

Measure 3: *A more detailed notification of specific military activities 45 days in advance:*
This is the center-piece of the Western CSBMs package. Compared with the Helsinki Accords, it provides for substantial improvements: by focusing on military units (e.g. army divisions). It seeks to enhance the verifiability of notifications; the threshold for notification is lowered from 25,000 to 6,000 troops, advance notice is extended from 21 to 45 days, and in addition to manoeuvres, activities such as alerts, mobilization and amphibious activities are included (out of garrison concept). This measure seeks to increase predictability in military activities and reduce the risk of crisis resulting from the misinterpretation of the purpose of military activities.

Measure 4: *Mandatory invitations of observers to all notifiable military activities:*
This would establish a mechanism for the participating states to regularly assure themselves that military activities are routine and non-threatening.

Measure 5: *Provision of means for verifying compliance with the obligations agreed at the Conference:*
As national technical means alone cannot ensure effective verification, this measure also provides for on site inspections. As most participating countries do not dispose of NTMs, they
can thus make sure that provisions of agreements are complied with.

Measure 6: *Communications*:

This measure seeks to improve means of communication to assist in the implementation of agreed measures and to help resolve differences between the participating states.

The Allies are convinced that the adoption of such concrete CSBMs would substantially contribute to render a surprise attack more difficult, make miscalculations less likely enhance military stability and diffuse incipient crises.

Largely in reply to the initiatives by NATO countries, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries have also introduced 6 working documents: a *Draft Treaty on Non-use of Force*; a *limitation of military manoeuvres* to 40,000 troops; on *notification of major manoeuvres* of land, naval and air forces; and of *major military movements and transfers in and out the zone of application*. Most of these proposals aim at interfering with normal peacetime military activities of NATO while presenting no problem for the Warsaw Pact. They also seek to include independent naval and air activities which are not covered by the mandate.

Last autumn, the neutral and non-aligned countries also produced a detailed position paper which, on the whole, is much closer to the Western than to the Eastern concept. This is in particular true for notification and observation modalities and annual forecasts. In other areas such as constraints there are certain differences.

All major proposals are now on the negotiating table. During the last round which ended on 20 December, 5 NNA coordinators were nominated for various subjects (*Austria*: NUF; *Switzerland*: information, verification, communication, constraints and annual calendars; *Sweden*: notification; *Finland*: observation). This provides the organizational basis for the transition to the drafting process which may start early this year.

In the wake of the Geneva Summit, the *atmosphere* at Stockholm has improved but the East has not yet made any real concessions. The Soviet Union is pressing for a reaffirmation of the non-use of force principle but does no longer insist on most of its declaratory proposals. On information and verification the Soviet position is very rigid. Flexibi-
lity on annual forecasts, notification and observation is made conditional on the inclusion of independent naval and air activities which are not covered by the mandate. This demand is unacceptable to the West.

The West has declared its readiness to reaffirm the non-use of force principle if it is given effect and expression by concrete CSBMs. The Western CSBMs proposal is not a take-it-or-leave-it position, nor is it the outer limit of what a concluding document could be. But a merely cosmetic improvement of the Helsinki Accords would be clearly insufficient.

There is a reasonable chance for a substantive concluding document. But there are also formidable negotiating obstacles still ahead, and we must realistically be prepared for difficult negotiations in the upcoming drafting phase.

In view of the CSCE follow-up meeting, which will open on 4th November 1986 in Vienna, the Stockholm Conference will suspend its work on 19th September. Until then there will be 4 more negotiating rounds, the next one starting on 28th January. Time is therefore running short.

The Vienna meeting will review the results of the Stockholm Conference together with other CSCE activities such as the Ottawa Forum on Human Rights, the Budapest Cultural Forum or the Bern Meeting on Human Contacts which will take place next month. If the Stockholm Conference cannot complete its work on a concluding document by September, it is up to the Vienna meeting to decide in the continuation of the Conference.

US/Geneva Talks on Nuclear, Defence and Space Weapons

The resumption of the bilateral US/Soviet Arms Control Talks was perhaps the most important development in the area of arms control in 1985. After more than one year of suspension of the talks, the Soviet Union dropped its precondition that US intermediate range nuclear systems deployed in Europe must be withdrawn before the talks could resume. The Soviets finally recognized that the Western governments were not prepared to allow them a monopoly on this class of weapons and they went back to the negotiating table which they should never have left. This was a success for the solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance which had made it clear all along that INF deployments would continue
until a negotiating result was achieved which permitted their halt, reversal or complete elimination.

The objectives of the Geneva negotiations were set out in a joint statement of 8th January, 1985 as follows:

— to work out effective agreements aimed at limiting and reducing strategic and intermediate nuclear forces;
— to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on earth;
— to strengthen strategic stability;
— and as a long-term objective, to work for a complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Compared with the previous negotiations on strategic and LRINF forces, which took place from 1981-85, a third subject was added, that of defence and space weapons. It was agreed that all these subjects should be considered and resolved in «their interrelationship».

The US holds the view that this interrelationship has two aspects: On the one hand, the number of strategic defence systems depends on the number and nature of offensive systems. On the other hand, an affective strategic defense provides an incentive to reduce offensive nuclear systems. The Soviet Union interprets this relationship in a different way: It insists that the US abandon their SDI research programme before limitations and reductions of strategic and LRINF systems can be achieved. This view is not shared by the West which believes, on the contrary, that partial agreements could pave the way to a comprehensive solution.

There have been three negotiating rounds in 1985. In the first round, a working structure was agreed — which provices for three negotiating groups — one for each subject: START, LRINF and Defence and Space Weapons. They normally meet once a week. Plenary meetings with the complete delegations are convened on an ad hoc basis.

The three negotiating groups deal with the following subjects:

The Group on Strategic Arms Reduction (START) deals with intercontinental range (over 5,500 kms) offensive nuclear forces. They include land-based **ICBMs**, submarine-based missiles, strategic bombers including air-launched missiles (ALCM) and sea-based cruise missiles.

In order to reduce the risk of first strike against the land-based nuclear potentials — which is the most vulnerable element of the strategic
triad—the US attaches high priority to substantial reductions of heavy ICBMs carrying multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).

During the first two rounds, the US negotiators explained their concept aimed at deep balanced and verifiable reductions designed to enhance strategic stability.

They proposed:

— a reduction of the number of ballistic missiles by about 1/3 to 5,000 warheads for the US and the Soviet Union;
— a limitation of heavy bombers to 400 and a limitation of the numbers of ALCMs on bombers;
— a limitation of the number of multiple warheads to no more than 10 on ICBMs and 14 on SLBMs;
— and a limitation of the destructive power by reduction of the ballistic missile throwweight.

This would have meant reductions well below the SALT II limits.

In view of the existing asymmetries of the strategic potentials with the Soviet Union having about 3 times the number of warheads on land-based ICBMs and the US having a similar advantage on SLBMs, the US declared its readiness to «trade off» greater Soviet reductions in ICBMs by corresponding deeper cuts in the American strategic bombers. The US concept is that, in the longer run, the emphasis in the strategic arsenals should shift from crisis sensitive ICBMs to SLBMs which are less vulnerable and therefore can better contribute to strategic stability.

The Soviet Union, in the first two rounds, limited itself to propose a freeze on the mutual strategic potentials which would have contractualized the Soviet advantages gained through its massive strategic modernization programme of the 70 ies.

The Group on Long-range Intermediate Nuclear Forces deals with the reduction and limitation of land-based LRINF (e.g. missiles and cruise missiles) and LRINF aircraft. Furthermore, a solution must be
sought to prevent that an LRINF agreement is undercut by tactical missiles (SRINF). I am referring to the so called «counter measures» in the form of deployment of Soviet SS-21, 22 and 23 missiles against Western Europe.

In the talks the US reaffirmed its preference for a complete mutual elimination of all land-based LRINF. If this was not acceptable to the Soviet Union, the US could also envisage an interim agreement reducing the warheads on LRINF to the lowest level acceptable to the Soviet Union. The US also pointed out that, within equal global ceilings, it would not off-set the total Soviet SS-20 potential by US deployments in Europe.

The Soviet Union, in turn, argued for a freeze on US LRINF in exchange for a halt in its so called counter measures. Such a moratorium would have contractualized a Soviet advantage of 8 to 1 and was consequently rejected by the US.

The Group on Defence and Space Weapons is mainly concerned with the future relationship of offensive and defensive weapons with a view to strengthening strategic stability. This is not a completely new theme if one thinks of the efforts undertaken by the SALT I Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty which together should have provided the basis for deep reductions in offensive nuclear systems—a hope which unfortunately has not come true.

Another task of this Group is to achieve an agreement providing efficient protection against anti-satellite systems (ASAT), as satellites through reconnaissance and communication do contribute to global strategic stability. In this context, it must, however, be taken into consideration that the Soviet Union has an operational ASAT system while the US system is still in the testing phase.

In the talks so far the US has explained the concept underlying its SDI programme and offered to explore together with the Soviet Union the possible contribution which defensive systems could make to enhance strategic stability, but the US has also expressed concern about Soviet activities which tend to undercut the ABM Treaty, and it has referred in particular to the Krasnoyarsk radar which constitutes a violation of this Treaty.

The Soviet Union insisted on a moratorium for defence and what it called «space strike weapons» including research, development and
deployment of such systems. The US declined this proposal on the grounds that:

— the Soviet Union already has an operationl ABM system which would not be affected by a moratorium;
— research is not verifiable and is therefore permitted under the ABM Treaty;

On balance, not very much progress was made during the early phases of the negotiations due to the intransigent position adopted by the Soviet Union which compared with the negotiations in 1983 had even hardened its position on several issues.

It was not until early October, shortly before the Geneva Summit, that the Soviet Union advanced counter proposals which finally specified the Soviet negotiating position.

The key element of the Soviet counter proposals is a call for 50 per cent reductions in «strategic» nuclear delivery vehicles. The other main elements of the Soviet proposals are:

— a ceiling of 6,000 on the total number of so-called nuclear charges with no more than 60 per cent of these charges on any component of the strategic triad. This would limit the permitted ICBM re-entry vehicles (RVs) to 3,600.
— a ban on all «long-range» (e.g. more than 600 kms) cruise missiles including ALCMs SLCMs and GLCMs;
— a ban on all «new» nuclear delivery systems defining «new» as those systems which have not yet been tested of an agreed date.

The Soviet proposal on LRINF contains the following elements:

— the removal of Pershing II;
— interim deployment of 100-120 US ground launcher cruise missiles in Europe. USSR would retain 650 LRINF, since it asserts the right to compensate for British and French systems. If Britain and France increased their number, more SS-20s could be deployed or US GLCMs must be withdrawn. (The number of UK and F warheads is put at 530. It is not clear how this figure was reached).
— there would be a freeze on the number of SS-20 in Asia on the condition that no change takes place in the strategic situation there.

— On defence and strategic weapons, the Soviet proposal calls for a moratorium on all aspects of space defence and a ban on ASAT systems. The Soviets reaffirm the linkage which holds progress in the negotiations on nuclear arms hostage to the abandonment of the SDI research programme by the US. Although the Soviets hinted that an interim INF agreement might be envisaged, the linkage has not been formally dropped.

The fact that the Soviet Union has finally specified its position and envisages, for the first time, substantial reductions in Soviet forces is a positive development in the negotiations which was generally welcomed by the West. If one looks, however, beyond the spectacular call for 50 per cent reductions, at the fine print of the proposal, its shortcomings are evident. Let me point out just a few major flaws:

The Soviet definition of strategic systems would include, on the US side, LRINF missile launchers in Europe, dual capable US aircraft in Europe and dual capable aircraft on 15 US aircraft carriers.

While thus more than 1100 such US systems would be subject to reduction, more than 2000 comparable Soviet systems would not be limited. The US would thus be left with the choice of a marked inferiority in the strategic triad or one-sided reductions in the field of nuclear and conventional intermediate-range capabilities. The latter would mean reducing or limiting US support for its Allies.

Furthermore, the proposed ban on new types of nuclear delivery vehicles would preclude the US Trident D5, planned light mobile ICBM called «Midgetman» and the Advanced Technology Bomber while permitting the Soviets to deploy its SS-25 ICBM and the Black Jack heavy bomber, systems which have already been tested.

On LRINF, the USSR continues to insist on compensation for third country systems which is unacceptable to the West. The Soviet proposal implies only slight reductions of SS-20s in Europe and leaves the SS-20 potential in Asia unconstrained although a substantial part of it also constitutes a threat to Europe. This would lead to a Soviet superiority in this category of weapons of more than 10 to 1.
These and other shortcomings lead to the conclusion that the Soviet proposal is one-sided and self-serving. Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviets have accepted the principle of deep reductions is a welcome development if equitably applied. The positive elements of the proposal should be explored in order to work on them. This is what the United States did when it presented, only a few weeks later, a new proposal of its own. Its main elements are:

Strategic and Defense Forces

— reductions to a limit of 4500 on reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs and SLBMs, about 50 per cent below current levels;
— reductions to a limit of 3,000 RRVs carried by ICBMs, about 50 per cent below the current Soviet level and roughly halfway between the earlier US proposal for a limit of 2,500 and the limit of 3,600 proposed by the Soviet;
— a 50 per cent reduction in the highest overall ballistic missile throwweight to put a constraint on heavy destabilizing ICBMs (USSR: 11.9 mill pounds — US: 4.4 mill pounds);
— contingent upon acceptance on RV and throwweight limits, the US would accept a limit of 1,500 ALCMs on heavy bombers which would be 50 per cent below planned US deployments;
— reductions in strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) to a limit of 1,250 to 1,450 about 50 per cent below the current higher Soviet level;
— contingent upon acceptance of this limit, the US would agree to further reduce the proposed limits on heavy strategic bombers from 400 to 350;
— furthermore, a ban on all new heavy ICBMs and, because of difficulties in verification, on all mobile ICBMs.

Intermediate nuclear forces

The US continues to prefer the total elimination of this whole category of weapons. As an interim step toward this goal the United States proposes:
— a limit of 140 LRINF launchers in Europe (which corresponds to the number deployed at the end of 1985) in return for reductions of SS-20 launchers within range of Europe to the same number;
— proportional reductions of SS-20 launchers in Asia (outside range of Europe);
— constraints on short-range INF;

Defence and Space Arms

The US made it clear that it will pursue the SDI research permitted by and in full compliance with the ABM Treaty.

The US also proposed an «open laboratories» arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other’s strategic defence research programmes and provide opportunities for visiting associated research facilities and laboratories.

Verification and Compliance

Against the background of strong concerns about Soviet violations of existing arms control arrangements, especially the SALT and ABM Treaties, the US stressed the need for effective verification and strict compliance.

This comprehensive US offer builds on previous US proposals and positive elements of the Soviet counter proposal. It tries to pave the way for serious negotiations.

The subject matter of the Nuclear Defence and Space Talks also figured prominently in the discussions between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Geneva Summit. The two sides agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations and also underscored the principle of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms of the two sides and the idea of an interim INF agreement.

However, despite the results at the Summit, there are still major differences between the two sides. Prominent examples include the question of what should be counted in the 50 per cent reductions of each side. In this area, the Soviets have reverted to a position which they put
forward and then abandoned in both SALT I and II. On intermediate nuclear forces the Soviet demand for compensation for British and French systems, which would secure unilateral advantages for the USSR, remains a key obstacle. On the strategic defence issue the Soviets insist on an unverifiable ban on US SDI research while leaving open to pursue analogous Soviet research. The URSS also maintains a rigid linkage between its demand to abandon SDI and progress on nuclear arms.

Despite these major differences, which continue to exist in all three areas of negotiations, there is now a chance to define common ground in an improved atmosphere of East-West relations. I hope that it has become clear from what I have said before that the subjects dealt with in Geneva are formidable complex and progress will neither be quick nor easy to achieve. On 16th January, negotiations will resume in Geneva. Only time will tell whether the Soviets are ready for a process of fair give and take.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude on a more general note. We do not know today whether 1985, with the resumption of the negotiations in Geneva and the Summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, will mark the beginning of a lasting turn for the better. All chances are that we will see more active negotiations in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna. The best signal we can give to the Soviet Union at the beginning of this year is that we will energetically explore all opportunities which may now be opened up, but that we will not do so at the expense of our security interests.

The Soviet leadership views disarmament in more than one dimension and seeks to influence the outcome not only at the negotiating table itself but also tries to exploit differences within the Alliance and to create pressure for concessions through attempts to influence public and I have no doubt that the Soviet Union will continue this double strategy, and we will get nowhere if we do not hold out for agreements which are both equitable and verifiable.
The strength of the Western position in all these negotiations depends on the political support in Allied countries. Close consultations among the Allies are indispensable for the cohesion of the Alliance. Last year, this process of consultations has been very successful. In addition to the regular meetings within the arms control co-ordinating mechanisms, there have been 9 meetings of the Council with Secretary Shultz, Ambassador Nitze and the Heads of the US negotiating team in Geneva. There have also been 7 meetings of the Special Consultative Group where the consultations on the LRINF negotiations take place. It is essential that these consultations are continued to the fullest possible extent.

The Atlantic Alliance has safely passed through a difficult period of East-West relations. It has done so by adhering to the mainline of a policy which makes clear its determination to maintain defences and at the same time work for disarmament and a more constructive relationship with the East. If the Allies stick to this policy, there is no reason why we should not look to the future with confidence.

Guenther Seibert