CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY — BUILDING MEASURES IN EASTERN EUROPE

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INTRODUCTION (*)

Talks on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) opened in Vienna on March 9, 1989 under the umbrella of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Inaugurating these negotiations was a direct consequence of the Third CSCE Follow-Up Conference in Vienna that had adopted, only two months earlier (January 15, 1989) a Final Document that included provisions for further CSBM discussions. As one of numerous «interesessional activities» of CSCE, the CSBM talks are mandated to «... expand the results already achieved at the Stockholm Conference with the aim of elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence and security-building measures... to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe».

The Stockholm Accord of September 22, 1986 among the 35 CSCE states had greatly pushed forward the ideas of prior notification of exercises, and of their observation and limited air and ground challenge inspections without the right of refusal. Such principles, applied in Stockholm to a limited extent, are meant to be widened in Vienna.

CSBMs have been seen as means by which to enhance the openness and predictability of military activities. A comprehensive exchange of troop and weapons deployment data to enhance transparency, lower thresholds for exercises to be observed and inspected, and heightened contacts and communication were among NATO's initial goals at the outset of talks in early 1989 (1).

(*) The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Jennone Walker, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

(1) These goals were originally stated in the communiqué that was issued following NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels on December 8-9, 1988. See NATO Press Communiqué M-3 (88) 75, «Conventional Arms Control: Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session at NATO Headquarters, Brussels (8th-9th December 1988)». More recently, these aims were outlined in the U. S. Department of State’s Fact Sheet (March 1990), entitled «US-Soviet Relations: Arms Control Negotiations».
As the revolutionary changes within Eastern Europe proceeded in 1989-90, however, the kind and extent of CSBMs required for security in the new configuration of Europe have affected proposals and negotiations. In this brief discussion, I review the positions taken by Warsaw Pact members in the first year of the CSBM talks, highlight the «case» for an expanded notion of CSBMs suggested by the uncertain politico-military environment of Eastern Europe, and consider several of the principal CSBM ideas thus far aired by countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

CAUTION TO SELF-INTEREST IN NSWP CSBM POSITIONS

In the first three rounds of CSBM talks, the NATO states tabled a number of specific proposals, while members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO or Warsaw Pact) were reluctant to go beyond proposing constraints on the frequency, size duration and proximity of military exercises. The sides readily cooperated, however, in planning a 3-week (January 16-February 5, 1990) «Military Doctrine Seminar» held in Vienna. That seminar involved all 35 states engaged in the CSBM negotiations. This event built on 1989 initiatives from many of the 35 to enhance openness and stress reassurance concerning peaceful intentions. Specific topics at the first of such seminars included the «posture and structure of armed forces, military activities and training, budget and planning» (\(^1\)).

Positive results were achieved through such a meeting, although the WTO members (especially Poland) stressed throughout their concern that NATO's doctrines — e. g., Follow-on-Forces-Attack («FOFA») — were, in fact, oriented towards offense. Among WTO members, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were particularly active leading up to and during the Military Doctrine Seminar, and they found themselves with Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) states in arguing for regularizing meetings of the Seminar.

Behavior of the seven Warsaw Pact members, however, had begun to exhibit autonomy in 1989 as communist party governments fell. A considerable degree of diversity had long existed within the WTO, of course (\(^2\)).

\(^1\) Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Vienna Fax, January 12, 1990, p. 2.
Yet, all six non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states began to exhibit both their new-found sovereignty and their newly discovered insecurity. The recognition dawned on each new government that principal external threat was very often emanating from their WTO allies. Bulgaria might be the exception to such a rule, with Turkey being perceived as a primary threat. Nevertheless, the intra-WTO tensions are significant and potentially volatile.

To help diffuse such within-region dangers, and to reduce the level of potential conflict, East Europeans have endorsed ideas for CSBMs that apply to the entire ATTU area or to East-Central and Southeastern Europe specifically. Many of these ideas are little more than restatements of Western positions. For example, «the first instance of a joint proposal co-sponsored by a member of NATO and the Warsaw Pact» was a December, 1989 Franco-Hungarian idea for enlarged contacts and access, which the West has been urging from the outset (4). Further, at the Military Doctrine Seminar, Hungarians, Poles and Czechoslovaks spoke of the need for media scrutiny and public control—notions that the West has long accepted as a given in a more secure Europe. At other times in 1990, East European CSBM negotiators (or foreign ministries) have again raised some old Warsaw Pact arguments, singly or as part of larger packages. Advance notifications and observation of naval and air force exercises is one such re-cycled CSBM idea.

But the NSWP states have made genuinely new initiatives. The content of East European proposals has, one should note, not departed from the very general WTO CSBM outlines issued on October 28, 1988 that is, before communist regimes were ousted (5). In that Pact document, mention was made of three principale directions for CSBMs:

1) «Constraining Measures», focused on limiting the size, number, duration, location and frequency of exercises, banning the largest maneuvers, and lowering readiness;

2) «New CSBMs», emphasizing the extension of prior notification to air and naval forces, the expansion of all CSBMs in the entire ATTU area and adjoining seas, oceans and air space, a freeze on military budgets, and creation of threat reduction centers;

3) and «measures to increase the openness and predictability of military activities», by which the Pact meant data exchange, fuller observation, communication and personnel visits.

Some breaks began to occur as Hungarians and Czechoslovaks endorsed Swedish ideas — opposed by the URSS — for notifying and observing command and staff exercises (¹). This is a proposal unlikely to be adopted prior to the CSCE Summit because of its controversial nature. Verification would necessitate deep penetration into a country's war-fighting preparations and anything less, because «command post exercises... are not very visible...» could not be adequately verified (²). Yet, the movement of NSWP countries away from both intra-Pact cohesion and the USSR's positions during the Fifth Round of CSBM negotiations (early 1990) was very significant.

After the Fifth Round established four CSBM Working Groups to speed (it was hoped) agreements prior to the CSCE Summit, the self-interests of East-Central and Southeast European states, regardless of alliance membership have become dominant factors. Each of the Groups, chaired by a NNA state, offers different advantages and varying dilemmas for the states no longer under Soviet suzerainty.

A few examples underscore these variations. One Working Group concerning information exchange and verification is chaired by Austria. Within NATO or the WTO, antagonisms certainly exist that may lessen substantially the desire to provide data or to allow inspections. Enmity between Greeks and Turks, Bulgarians and Turks, and other bilateral disputes, will not be easily surmounted. Similarly, Sweden heads the Working Group devoted to observation and notification of exercises. The Poles have exhibited, as have the Bulgarians and Romanians, less interest in command and staff observations, penetrating as that would the war-fighting strategies and unit tactics more than would observations of large-scale exercises.

Correspondingly, reactions to a NATO proposal for an annual exchange of «detailed data on... military budget[s]» for the next year, with other

¹) Conversations with military attaches of NSWP states in Washington, D. C. during July-August, 1990 exhibited views about the need for observations of command/staff exercises and differences between, for example, Bulgaria and Hungary regarding the Hungarian proposal — discussed below — for Zones of National Confidence.

²) Interview with Ambassador Marcsea, Arms Control Today (May, 1990).
states having the right to question the submitting government on details — has received better response from Czechoslovakia and Hungary than anywhere else in the Pact.

By mid-May, as the Sixth Round ended, more NATO CSBM proposals were tabled, pushing the confidence-building envelope further in a couple important directions. Under one proposal, data about a nation's intended enhancements of force structures and mobility would be readily available.

A second notion tabled by NATO would build a conflict management role into CSBMs and details how a state may use the CSCE process to ask for clarification if non-notified out of garrison activity «of a militarily significant nature» is begun by another country.

For both of these, the USSR has responded with caution, and less than full endorsement. Again, the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians were among the first to endorse this NATO idea. The Soviet «goslow» view has been supported most by Bulgaria, and somewhat by Poland and Romania in the latest round. These countries have countered with a number of arguments, including that naval and air activities ought to be a party of any CSBM accord if there is to be a comprehensive enhancement of Stockholm.

Compromises, offered by both NNA states and by smaller members of both NATO and the Pact, will be effected, bowing for now to the reluctance of the U. S. and USSR. A modest 1990 CSBM enhancement will, then, include some greater data exchanges on budgets, an implementation review meeting each year, and better communications and more contacts. To these, all NSWP countries will agree, although their enthusiasm is a function of their own security perception and threat assessments. A «summit worthy agreement» is variously defined among NSWP states, and is understood through the prism of each state's self-interest.

**EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CASE FOR FUTURE CSBMs**

CFE I will not, of course, ensure numerical parity among geographic neighbors in East-Central and Southeastern Europe. Given the alliance to alliance nature of these talks, large regional and subregional imbalances will remain or grow, particularly if new bilateral alliances or ententes emerge against a perceived common enemy. Even if there were numerical parity, however, stability and security are not necessary consequences.
Stabilizing measures that limit or prohibit *activities* by national military forces (maneuvers, deployments, mobilization, training, supplying), and thereby clarify, reveal and reassure about other state’s intentions are needed (*)

Clarifying intentions is of paramount importance in East-Central and Southeastern Europe. These are regions of numerous bilateral and intrastate disputes or conflicts that may be harbingers of far larger confrontations. Where there used to be constraints on nationalism due to Soviet hegemony, there is now a far larger opportunity for the voices of irredentism, ethnic rivalries and national interests.

Areas of real and potential conflict include:

— The German-Polish border, where disputes concerning ownership of property in Poland once held by German citizens and the two states’ conflicting claims about rights in the Baltic are both likely to recur notwithstanding the German Parliament’s reassurances about the Oder-Neisse frontier;

— Poland versus Byelorussia, the Ukraine and/or Lithuania concerning the Eastern border of Poland (since the end of World War II at the Bug River), about which nationalists on both sides argue fiercely;

— Hungary versus Romania regarding the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and that region in general as a territorial issue going back to the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 and before;

— Albanians versus Serbs concerning Albanians in Kosovo and Serbian treatment of them there, with Serbian leader Milosevic relying on the anti-Albanian sentiment as a key component of his popular appeal;

— Bulgaria versus Yugoslavia over Macedonia, with Bulgarians suspicious of Macedonia nationalism and Serbian sponsorship of it, resurgent in 1990 as the organization called «Ilinden»;

— Greece versus Yugoslavia over Macedonia, with Greece denying the existence of a Macedonian identity, and border tensions high due to influx of people from the Yugoslav «Macedonian» republic;
— The Soviet Union versus Romania over Moldavia, with the ethnic Romanian population of the Moldavian SSR demanding cultural and political autonomy, and the unity of Moldavia with Romania being sought by nationalist advocates on both sides of the border while Moscow's approach has been to deny that abrupt reunification can take place;
— Bulgaria versus Turkey concerning the Turkish minority within Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian perception of Turkish interference and threats;
— Bulgaria versus Romania concerning Dobrudja, a territory on the Black Sea coast divided between Romania and Bulgaria which Bulgaria claims entirely for itself, and concerning cross — Danubian pollution and ancillary issues (?)

There is, then, an ample number of disputes, some having the requisite volatility to denote an existing security threat in East-Central or Southeastern Europe. To these we should add the longstanding animosity between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean, and a variety of other smaller issues that, while not severe, damage relations among countries (e.g., the argument between Hungary and Czechoslovakia about payment for the huge Danubian dam project that has now been canceled).

Disputes, tensions and confrontations along the planes noted above are more dangerous and more likely to precipitate violence because Eastern Europe is without the mediating influence of multilateral treaty organizations. Driven only by the visceral issues of peoples and borders, not by strategic goals of an alliance, individual nation-states will find it difficult to resist the power of nationalism. This is not to say that Leonid Brezhnev's image of the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of enforce constraints on sovereignty was preferable. Rather, there must be a clear understanding that Central and Eastern Europe have inherited new insecurities as they have regained sove-

reignty—and that these insecurities are not benign for Europe as a whole. That the Warsaw Pact’s potential for surprise attack is past can be applauded. As the Pact has unraveled, however, we find a discomfiting scene of rivalries and disputes, and little in the way of a collective security mechanism to constrain perceptions of threat.

The decisive turn towards a national vision of security has been evident empirically in the mix of multilateral (two or more states in alliance), bilateral, or purely national ground-force exercises among WTO members. As required by the 1986 Stockholm Accord, CSCE states must give prior notification 42 days in advance of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks. By 1989, notifiable national exercises (twenty-three) were twice as frequent as bilateral maneuvers (eleven), and almost eight times as frequent as multinational exercises (three). By comparison, during the 1961-69 period, multinational exercises were three times as numerous as bilateral maneuvers, and six times as frequent as national exercises. From 1970 through 1979, multilateral training among WTO armies was only 1.67 times the number of bilateral exercises, with the number of single-country maneuvers still small by comparison \(^{(10)}\). That Warsaw Pact military cooperation, and the notion of coalitional warfare have thus been replaced by a much more national military strategy in the late 1980s seems corroborated by these data.

**CSBM INITIATIVES FROM NSWP STATES**

Because of tensions evident in region from the Baltic to the Bosporus, and the absence of multinational frameworks to determine war-fighting strategies, the new governments of Eastern Europe have shown interest in measures that establish national thresholds. Because of new complexities in the security picture of East-Central and Southeastern Europe, emphasis is being given to

accords that apply to the potential use of force by any one state against another. Strictly speaking, of course, such limits lie outside existing definitions of CSBMs. Yet, the blurring of lines between CFE and CSBM talks, and the need to unite them in the next phase of European security negotiations, is seen by NSWP states as axiomatic of the political transformation of the continent.

Enhancing security of NSWP states will not be achieved merely by reducing the size, armaments and deployments of standing forces. Further safeguards — CSBMs that would make transparent the intention to mobilize reserve and cadre formations, or to retrieve weapons, ammunition and equipment from storage — become even more necessary when active-duty militaries are at low levels. It is at low levels when national mobilization capacities become very dangerous (11). Where tangible bilateral disputes exist that could motivate one state to resort to intimidation or armed attack against another, national thresholds for everything that could facilitate a rapid recreation of threatening force levels, coupled with inspection regimes to assure neighbors of compliance, are necessary.

Thus far, however, proposals concerning national thresholds from NSWP states have not provided the specifics that would lend themselves to productive negotiations. New governments installed after elections in the first half of 1990 have uniformly expressed interest in furthering CSBMs (12), but only the Hungarians have begun to spell out ways in which ceilings for the readiness or disposition of military assets could be verified. The Hungarians have been willing, for example, to experiment with «open skies» verification involving Canadian flights over Hungarian territory. Canadian Chief of Staff John de Chastelain was in Budapest in July, 1990 to explore with Hungarian Chief of Staff Laszlo Borsits means by which to implement airborne verification of other states' military equipment.

The Hungarian delegation to CSCE/CSBM negotiations in Vienna and the Hungarian military have also been active in considering specific ways

(12) For example, the new Romanian Foreign Minister, Adrian Nastase’s address to the Geneva Disarmament Conference spoke of the need for a «... multiplication and diversification of confidence and security building measures ...», but provided no details. ROMPRES dispatch, August 3, 1990, as reprinted in FBIS-EEU 90-151 (August 6, 1990), p. 44.
in which, in a follow-on to a CFE accord, the states of East-Central and Southeastern Europe might enhance their security vis-a-vis each other. In Vienna, a number of ongoing bilateral discussions have been initiated by the Hungarians concerning locations and amounts of equipment and weaponry that would have to be inspected its neighbors. (13).

Hungary is, of course, particularly concerned about Romania and vice versa. From Budapest, it is worrisome to see the renewal of the reactionary element of Romania politics in «Vatra Romaneasca» (Romanian Hearth) from which denunciations of «Magyar plots» to «change the borders established by the Treaty of Trianon» are frequent. (14). Even moderate Romanian newspapers are carrying provocative articles denouncing an alleged history of Hungarian duplicity, and warning against entrusting Romanian security to the «good intentions» of Hungarians who «... never observed any agreement, convention or treaty» (15).

The new Hungarian Defense Minister, Lajos Fur, has recognized the volatility of such an environment. With Romanian Defense Minister Victor Stanculescu's approval, officers of the two armies have met quietly at border locations to reduce tensions, and to exchange information concerning the disposition of their forces in the vicinity of their lengthy frontier (16). This exchange, of course, is purely ad hoc, and does not establish the basis for bilateral CSBM because no agreement for regular meetings has been suggested. Neither do these encounters presage a later regional agreement on national thresholds. Nevertheless, the defense establishments of these two potential

(13) Austrian officers at the National Defense Academy, for example, told me in May, 1990 of discussions with counterparts in the Hungarian armed forces concerning the difficulties of inspection. Hungarian CSCE negotiators, also in April and May, 1990, spoke of their ongoing efforts to meet with other delegations on a one-to-one basis to consider the technical aspects of ensuring national thresholds for transportation assets, stored weapons and other equipment that could ease mobilization.

(14) The Hungarian press picks up any Vatra commentary, whether made in Romania or elsewhere. See, for example, the Budapest Domestic Radio report of July 31, 1990 translated in FBIS-EEU 90-148 (August 1, 1990), p. 55 as «Vatra Politician Claims Transylvania Coveted».

(15) See Dimineata (July 21, 1990), p. 4.

(16) I was informed of these contacts by Romanian officials in Bucharest in late April and early May, 1990. My informants, however, could not provide to me specific dates or locations of face to face talks between Hungarian and Romanian military officers, except to say that the meetings were at border locations, were ongoing, and involved high-ranking active-duty military officers.
belligerents are not anxious to confront one another, and have inaugurated a limited, and non-publicized bilateral information exchange. This endeavor may have avoided heightened military tensions, particularly in March and April, 1990 when ethnic unrest was causing fatalities in Transylvania, and when emigration from Romania was reaching very high levels.

A second CSBM arena that may develop further due to initiatives from NSWP states, are «zones of national confidence» (ZNCs) in which there would be drastic reductions of border forces and a ban on the conduct of maneuvers of any kind.

The Hungarians, once again, have been in the forefront of this effort. In November, 1989, Hungary acted as host for a meeting of states in the so-called Alpe-Adria region, i.e. Hungary, Italy, Austria and Yugoslavia. The then-Foreign Minister of Hungary, Gyula Horn, proposed a ZNC with several specific attributes:

1) the mutual withdrawal of all offensive military forces fifty kilometers from common frontiers, within which only border guards and defensive equipment would be allowed;
2) the exchange of information on the size and location of forces within that zone;
3) the limitation of the size and frequency of exercises throughout the territory of the four states, and the constraint of each country's capacity to mobilize forces (through unspecified steps);
4) the invitation of observers to all military exercises and the regular inspection of the ZNC's.

The Hungarian proposal went nowhere at that November, 1989 meeting. Italy issued a flat «no» to the idea, Austria said that it had no offensive arms in the 50 kilometer zone, and Yugoslavia said that it would cost too much to implement the Hungarian ideas.

But the notion of ZNCs has not died quickly. On July 31, 1990, a two-day Adria-Danube conference was convened in Venice. This group of five nation-states — Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Italy — has been labeled the «Pentagonale». Regional cooperation of this kind does not necessarily mean movement on CSBMs and, indeed, much of the Venice discussion was devoted to economic cooperation, environmental concerns and
the furtherance of parliamentary democracy and human rights (17). Nevertheless, the group’s final communique spoke of its aims in terms of contributing to security and stability in the region within the CSCE context. Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, responding to questions about the results of the Venice meeting, emphasized the Pentagonale’s potential for mediating disputes through the role of intermediaries (18). Mention of a Carpathian-Tisza regional association was also made by Jeszenszky, implying thoughts in Budapest about an eastward-looking ZNC (19).

Zones of National Confidence are in many ways an outgrowth of an extensive academic literature on non-offensive defense and structural defensiveness that has developed considerably in the last decade. The visions of analysts such as Albrecht von Muller, Horst Afheldt and Lutz Unterseher have been widely discussed and criticized elsewhere, and need not be reviewed here (20). Inherent to most of the images of security without offensive arms, however, are zones along frontiers from which armored forces (and other «offensive» weapons) would be removed. Within such zones, in more radical proposals, one would find «technically advanced defense armament systems» manned by few personnel and largely immobile. Less radical visions suggest these «nets» coupled with residual mobile and active armored reserves in central areas that could isolate and defeat any forces that tried to break through the frontier zones.

Since the mid 1980s, Hungarian scholars were particularly enamored with these visions of European defense, and contributed often to international conferences where such ideas have been laborated (21). Hungarian communist

(17) A Czechoslovak summary of the Pentagonal Group’s meeting was contained in the Czech newspaper Hospodarske Noviny (August 2, 1990), pages 1 and 8.
(18) See the transcript of this August 5, 1990 interview on Budapest Television as translated in FBIS-EEU 90-151 (August 6, 1990), p. 31.
(19) Jeszenszky’s interview with Budapest Domestic Service on July 31, 1990 is carried in FBIS-EEU 90-148 (August 1, 1990), p. 34.
(21) The Hungarians have been a principal supporter of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. Examples of their thinking on structural defensiveness can be found in «Background Materials on Structural Defensiveness», 36th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs (Budapest, September 1-6, 1986).
party politicians, sensing their tenuous hold on power and the antipathy of
the public towards military alliances, picked up on the idea of structural
defensiveness and began to include such a concept in the regime's security
policy (22). Similarly, the July, 1987 «Jaruzelski Plan» for European secu-
ritv placed considerable emphasis on structural defensiveness. Soviet analysts
have also been vocal in advocating defensive military doctrines that cite the
same literature (23). These views continue to resonate in NSWP positions
on CSBMs, particularly insofar as there is interest in making ZNCs a test-bed
for non-offensive defense.

From Czechoslovakia, other CSBM ideas have been promoted. West
German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher had proposed on January 31,
1990 the creation of a «European Conflict Center» as one of ten institutions
to implement the CSCE process (24). The Czechoslovak position, first raised
in the Havel government's April «Memorandum on European Security
Commission», suggest an organ of that name that would serve in many capa-
cities, including

«Forestalling threats to European peace and security, the rise of
exacerbated situations, disputes, military incidents and conflicts and
recommending as well as offering means of settlement...»

More intriguing in the April Memorandum, perhaps, is the Czechoslovaks' 
suggestion for a «Military Committee» subordinated to such a pan-European
organization. By mid-1990, Czechoslovaks have begun to talk about «escalation
control forces», which we might understand to mean peacekeeping forces,
under the control of the Military Committee. There is thus far no clear
genesis of such forces, except through the vague process of contributions of
lightly armed units form CSCE member states. How decisions would be
made to commit such forces to a particular locale, e. g., to take up positions

(22) On December 10, 1986, Gyula Horn, the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Hungary, spoke to an international conference on security policy in Florence, Italy.
At that meeting, he argued for a Europe in which «sufficient security» served as the policy
guideline for each state and for «discarding offensive weapons from the system». See Nepsza-
badsag (December 11, 1986).

(23) See, for example, a Kokoshin and V. Larionov, «Kurskaya vitvav svetie sovremennoi
oboronyitelynoi doktrini», Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodniye Otosheniya (1987-88),
pp. 32-40.

(24) See «German Unity Within the European Framework», Speech by Foreign Minister
Hans Dietrich Genscher at the Conference of the Tutzing Protestant Academy, published in
Statements and Speeches, Volume XIII, No 2 (February 6, 1990).
on the Turkish-Bulgarian border to separate forces of the two states, is also unclear.

Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry is fully committed to the notion of an elaborate pan-European security system, articulated by Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier in early April just after the publication of the above-mentioned Memorandum (25). Inherent to this system would be both diplomatic means by which to contain conflict, and auxiliary military cooperation. Thus far, the Czechoslovaks have not formalized the idea of having «Europeanized» units that would be deployed in the field to prevent the escalation of conflict by interposing themselves between potential or actual combatants. It is nevertheless clear from their April Memorandum, and from subsequent discussions outside formal Vienna CSCE/CSBM negotiations, that they foresee a new security structure having a military commission that confronts incidents and conflicts between armed forces of two or more states. This can extend well beyond making military activities predictive and open; it may imply the establishment of on-site military observers to monitor a truce, a ceasefire, or a situation judged to be so tense that hostilities are imminent.

CSBMs AND THE FUTURE OF EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY

Because the Baltic to Bosporus corridor is suffused with issues of peoples and borders, neither CFE I nor any subsequent arms control agreement that reduces levels of manpower and weaponry of standing forces, or withdraws them from Central Europe, will obviate security uncertainties. Indeed, absent a number of important CSBMs, lower levels may tend to push leaders into mobilization more quickly, thereby raising the risk of escalation - a scenario I have referred to elsewhere as «high-tech 1914» (26). Hungary and Czechoslovakia have been at the forefront of developing and airing new Ideas for Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) security structures and accompanying CSBMs. Romania’s new leaders have been far too occupied with domestic turmoil

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to offer anything more than verbal endorsements of CSCE, and Bulgaria remains reluctant to stray too far from Moscow, while exploring much closer relations with Greece (with which Bulgaria shares two adversaries — Turks and Macedonians) (17).

Poland’s approach, seeing German reunification the most likely threat to the integrity of the existing Polish frontiers, has been to advocate larger pan-European security structures while avoiding any rapid decoupling from the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski has expressed the desire to «... create the means to prevent conflicts or... if that is not possible... to settle them» (28). But the Polish position has yet to offer the more substantive suggestions of Hungarian or Czechoslovak policy-makers.

National ceilings for forces and equipment (and ways to verify these), zones of national confidence (ZNCs) along borders, and perhaps «escalation control forces» deployable to trouble-spots throughout the region have been the principal avenues for NSWP (especially Hungarian and Czechoslovak) CSBM innovation. In addition, there has been a willingness to adhere to earlier WTO pronouncements about the need for prior notification and observation of naval and air exercises.

Of these, national thresholds will necessarily be part of the next stage in European arms control — with a new set of negotiations, combining CFE II and further CSBMs, will have to undertake. ZNCs will require ongoing bilateral and, perhaps, regional discussions (e. g., within the «Pentagonale» group or others); uniform standards for such zones throughout the ATTU region would be untenable. Escalation control forces — peacekeeping units — seem furthest from implementation. An institutionalization of a new security architecture, with all of its operational rules in place, would be a prerequisite for any security instrument involving the deployment of troops or observers in a conflictual situation.

Notwithstanding these limitations on any new CSBMs applied to the region of NSWP states, there is an earnest reassessment underway in each of the six states that were active members of the WTO. Sovereign but not
necessarily secure, there is a casting about among NSWP states for new ways by which to reassure themselves that implicit threats do not escalate into imminent dangers. CSBM's will increasingly be a route for enhancing their security, and we can expect more ideas, and heightened advocacy for transparency of and limitations on military activities by these erstwhile Soviet allies.

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