NATO, ITS NEW STRATEGY, AND THE US-PORTUGUESE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

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Thank you very much General Cabral Couto, General Loureiro dos Santos, my good friend Admiral Narciso Duro, Ambassador Briggs, other distinguished Ambassadors and very distinguished guests, fellow military officers and members of this Institute.

First of all let me apologize to you for coming into this beautiful country and speaking in my language and not yours. It's one of my inadequacies, and I hope you will bear with me.

It is indeed a distinct pleasure for me to return to Lisbon on a special occasion, one in which we celebrate 25 years of service by the IBERLANT command, commanded by Admiral Duro under our NATO Alliance. I also welcome this particular opportunity to address the distinguished membership of the National Defense Institute.

I believe that in a world that is undergoing historic and revolutionary transformation, it is important that we who are committed to the defense responsibilities of our various nations continuously explore and discuss the important critical issues of the Western Alliance and our individual national needs.

Here at the National Defense Institute, you are afforded this opportunity to research and analyze these critical security issues. Rare indeed, in my experience, is the opportunity to do this, devoid of the routine distractions that preclude our professions from spending as much time as these issues deserve.

I envy you that luxury and I hope that my transatlantic views on maritime issues, affecting our NATO alliance and a few comments on the U.S.-Portuguese bilateral defense relationship may be relevant to your study and understanding of the change going on around us.

It was this month, forty years ago, that the Foreign Ministers of our Nato member states met here, in Lisbon, to finalize the ground rules of a new alliance called NATO. As you can imagine, that agreement did not come easily. But the architects of the basic structural and organizational foundation of our alliance did an exceptional job. Of all the multinational defense alliances entered into since World War II, today only NATO remains viable and relevant to the world around us.

In my judgment, this continuity is a result of the NATO alliance having been formed and built upon the principles of mutual cooperation, mutual reinforcement, and mutual respect and friendship. Today, NATO stands out as a mature, credible, defensive alliance of sovereign nations whose purpose remains to foster institutions of democratic process, dialogue and cooperation which will lead to growth and stability, while at the same time providing the deterrence for any possible security threat to our member nations. And we do this through a combined military strength of our individual nations. Never in this century has the world experienced such a period of rapid and unpredictable change. The Eastern Europe countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the republics of the former Soviet Union are undergoing massive, political, social and economic transformations. It is reassuring that on every continent we see if not the triumph, the emergence of democratic principles, principles that increase the voice of the people and concern for human rights. We see change that offers a hope for a new world, a new world order that brings with it the hope of peace. But we also have amongst us today great instability, and great potential for miscalculations and conflicting interests that could affect our security.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of democratic governments that are representatives of the voice of the people, in my judgement was achieved by the constancy of the Western Alliance commitment to mutual security and defense of our national values.

I hope that you in this audience take a special feeling of warmth and pride in your contribution to that accomplishment. For over forty-two years, this alliance has born the cost of freedom and has served as a beacon for those who sought political freedom, human rights and more economic opportunities.

Today, we are witnessing the positive results of our vigilance and our commitment. I would say to you that while we should applaud the end of the cold war and the emergence of these democratic principles, we must
remain alert to the great instabilities created by these transformations of the rapidly changing world scene.

We see today the new Commonwealth of Independent States, formerly the Soviet Union, together with the Baltic states and the Eastern Europeans struggling with massive internal failures, and in many of the emergent democracies there are factors working against the success of this democratic process. Democratic traditions are weak and in some countries they are non-existent. The basic fact is that the inability to distribute goods or provide the basics of shelter, food, jobs and health care for their people are providing hard tests for these nations.

We have seen Yugoslavia degenerate into civil war, emerging with new republics but at great cost to their people and their life style. There is a widespread concern, in many of our nations, that this same trauma approaching civil war could occur among many of the former Soviet republics that are more heavily armed. And we certainly need only to look at the face of the shocked and disillusioned Russian shoppers and the headlines of our papers, people that are experiencing the first wave of price increases, to realize that the ultimate success of democracy in Russia and any of these emerging nations cannot be taken for granted and will take our best help and effort.

It is in this environment that I see the continued vitality and relevance of our NATO alliance. I give NATO good grades for its responsiveness to the pace of change that has exceeded everyone's imagination in the last two to three years. In the last year alone, our alliance — with a degree of urgency that took countless meetings, dozens of document drafts and an unparalleled degree of cooperation — has agreed and endorsed at the Rome summit a new strategic concept. This was followed weeks later by the publishing of a new military strategy, one that was implemented through the military committee.

And simultaneously, the major NATO commanders, myself, Admiral Slater and General Jack Galvin, working with our staffs, have developed new force concepts and associated force structures. At the same time, we undertook efforts to revise the readiness and availability, make them relevant to today's world. And we have embarked on a comprehensive command structure review which will change and downgrade and reduce the size of that structure. I think anyone would say that it is an amazingly productive and successful year for NATO.
Today we look at a changing world even in my area of responsibility. We are not focusing on the battle of the Atlantic, we are looking at an overarching maritime force structure that has been adjusted to support this recently approved new NATO strategy. We are reaffirming within the Alliance our commitment to a common defense, where an attack on one is an attack on all.

The new strategy validates NATO's role as a defensive alliance. We have no objectives on anyone else's territory. Our primary objective is to maintain a credible deterrence to conventional and nuclear threats, to our individual and collective security. As much progress as we have made, we still live in a nuclear world.

In this regard, we have also committed that the linkage between Europe and North America remains essential to this defense alliance. We also have acknowledged that we, in the alliance, welcome a stronger European defense identity, referred to by some as the «European pillar».

This will entail multinational integrated force structures — and hopefully it will include more clearly defined arrangements for complementarity between the emerging European economic communities, with security identity being identified to the Western European Union and our alliance. The challenge is to accomplish this within alliance objectives, while maintaining the viability of the North American linkage.

Within these broad objectives, NATO will continue to seek improved cooperation and increased dialogue to achieve a whole and free Europe. We will seek peaceful solutions to world problems and we will seek additional progress in the area of arms reductions. While contributing to stable, peaceful conditions, NATO must keep its guard up against the proliferation of high technology weapons of mass destruction. Not only nuclear weapons but chemical and biological. We must maintain a credible capacity to regenerate conventional and if needed nuclear forces sufficient to deter and defeat any coalition which might seek to challenge our security.

For the short and mid-term, in my judgement, crisis response will increase in relevancy and focus within NATO's governing body. To be responsive to this environment, the three major NATO commanders have generated a maritime forces working group to develop a series of force structures, which represent graduated response levels in this new world environment. These broad structures have been agreed upon by all of the NATO major commanders and I characterize them as reaction main defense and augmen-
tation forces. They also harmonize with the new force structures being generated by Allied Command Europe, under General Galvin's leadership.

I think it is important to examine a number of the facts which govern both the design of these future maritime forces and their implementation. It provides a variety of force levels built on the strength of all our collective nations and it is required that these forces be able to respond across the spectrum of peacetime presence and surveillance, crisis, and hopefully to deter, but if required to respond, to conflict.

In doing this, NATO requires sufficient force levels to react to a crisis in one part of the alliance, while maintaining adequate presence and response capabilities to security in all areas of alliance interest. That simply means that from a maritime perspective our interests in our area of operations go from the Bering Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, from the Western coast of Portugal to the East coast of North America.

These alliance maritime forces, while primarily regionally based, must be able to deploy in NATO areas wherever the situation requires, and training must demonstrate and exercise this capability. And through this process we will demonstrate the inter-operability of NATO task groups, task forces and expanded task forces. We must have a robust exercise program, including routine training in the environmentally demanding North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea, and certainly the approach to Gibraltar as represented by Iberlant's area command.

Greater reliance will be placed on sea lift, associated with build-up and resupply of forces required to respond to crisis management and any major threat. Over 90% of the massive amount of goods that were supporting the UN initiative in the Persian Gulf went by sea.

And this portends a continuing requirement for maritime forces to surveil and protect those sea lines of communications. The «shopping menu» approach, inherent in the new maritime force structure, will allow timely response with multinational maritime forces to go to a crisis area with the right mix of military capabilities. It will also allow additional forces, in direct or indirect support, to support associated tasks. These tasks include providing surveillance in monitoring the approach to a crisis area, and to protect the sea lines of communications.

That was done, for NATO interest, during in an out-of-area involvement in the Persian Gulf. Throughout the Mediterranean we were providing — with
NATO forces — surveillance and presence. Should someone have decided to execute what we did not take as an idle threat from Saddam Hussein, that terrorism would be expanded throughout our area of interest.

Terrorism is something we cannot ignore and we do not accept, and our forces were ready to respond. Luckily we did not have to. We also need forces to escort and protect the sea lift and the logistic support for the shipping that is vital to this concept.

And as everyone knows in today's warfare, the mine is a very cheap equalizer: it's easy to make and it's easy to deploy. We need adequate and sufficient anti-mine measures to protect the shores of our own nations and the interest of our alliance. We also must be able to maintain proficiency in submarine warfare — that which goes on under the sea — and anti-air warfare. You cannot prevail in modern warfare without air superiority. We must be able to do this not only at the scene of the action but in the choke points: Gibraltar is a choke point, passing the straits of Sicily is a choke point and even the Baltics are choke points.

And choke points can be made depending on your area interest. Certainly the Suez Canal is a choke point. These rapid reaction forces will be supplemented by main defense forces, designed to supplement and provide sustainability when a crisis is escalated to a point that a potential for hostilities exist, or we need prolonged sustainment of these reaction forces to maintain the pressure below that of violence. These forces should be in sufficient numbers and capabilities to contain be crisis and prevent hostilities.

As with reaction forces, main defense forces will require additional units to specific are tasking. I share these things because all of our nations are looking at a reduction of forces and it's going to take more and more coordination and consultation to make sure that we emphasize the strengths and not duplicate our strengths but fill the holes where we have some shortcomings.

Finally, the maritime augmentation forces are comprised by balance of alliance naval forces — we call them reserve forces in my country — forces that can be maintained at a lower state of availability and readiness, but that are there to respond if the crisis in the world environment is turning to its major confrontation.

I want to share with you this morning, that as a major naval commander, it was simpler to define the old concept of employing maritime forces, or any force for that matter. A concept of employment which had a very well-
defined threat, we knew who enemy was, we knew where his base land was. To defend against it was not easy but it was straightforward.

We now find ourselves in a much more difficult, although favorable position of having no identifiable major threat to this alliance's collective security. Now the challenge is to define a concept of operations, designed to protect the peace and respond to potential security risks which will be multifaceted and multidirectional in nature.

And finally, we must retain the capability to successfully defend the alliance against the potential of a major attack by new coalitions using war-fighting capabilities that exist today. The concept of operations that I'm talking about envisions two graduated corps of multinational forces that will react as reaction forces in times of crisis.

They are standing naval forces which we call Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, long and loyally participated in by the Portuguese naval forces, and the recently created Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean. In times of crisis, these can be built up simply by adding cruisers, aircraft carriers and so forth with the shopping menu approach available to apply to the crisis.

These forces have regional titles to them: Atlantic and Mediterranean. They will be based there for reasons of convenience of command and control. But they must be able to operate in all areas of water relevant to this alliance. And they also will be able to be supplemented by national units representing the individual national security climates of the alliance but available also to the alliance in times of crisis.

Now, these two forces may also be supplemented by the main defense forces which then would be either directed North or South, depending on where the crisis is going. And augmentation forces mentioned earlier would be held in reserve.

This concept of operations allows you more flexibility and allows you to develop an over-arching, non-threat specific framework. We are not pointing towards any specific enemy. We are taking out the reference... there is no Soviet Union and we don't refer to the Russians, we are not training against the Russians, we are training against military capabilities that exist today in case they end up in the hands of someone who chooses to threaten us.

Activation of these multinational maritime forces could be requested by a major NATO commander, an individual NATO nation, or the NATO military committee. The importance in the strength of our alliance is that
the application and approval for the use of any these forces must be approved by the North Atlantic Council.

And The North Atlantic Council, as you know, is a Council of 16 nations that operates through consensus. So wonderful, and yet is a complex operation. And the voice of Portugal or the voice of Iceland who has no defenses are the same as the voices of Spain or France, UK or the United States. That's the strength of this great Alliance.

Adequate logistic support is something that we must pay more attention to. It will be crucial to the successful implementation of new maritime forces. The concept, as well as the application. Remember the objective of this alliance is to deter conflict. If you are going to deter conflict, you have to be able to convince people that you mean what you say if your security interests are threatened. That means that we have to pay more attention not only to sea lift, but to the logistic support of oil supplies. The Alliance needs more emphasis on oilers, what we call the gas stations to the fleet. We need a commitment to float as well as to shore forward base logistics, specifically to be able to do ship and aircraft repairs overseas. You have a wonderful facility here in Portugal, one of the top leading technological capabilities that I have seen in the world, in OGMA. We need to be able to manufacture repair and spare parts and make ship repairs if we are to put meat into the substance of this concept.

And the NATO maritime training cycle needs to be modified to reflect training requirements of the envisioned multinational forces. I would envision that they would be stretched over a longer period of time, and so that the NATO expanded task force — which is multiple carrier operations — would take place every three years, every 36 months. Operations with carrier task forces, NATO carrier task forces, every eighteen months and then the more normal task group of six to seven ships would take place on an annual basis. This is not done to be generated towards any threat; it is done because of the need to practice interoperability, communications, to make sure your radars interact and don't interfere with one another. And the recognition that all our armed forces are young armed forces, that there is great turnover, so that what you practice three years from now is done with different people and, in many cases, different ships. Only by that commitment do you have a credible force.
Similarly, we must be willing to practice command force exercises and live training exercises that interact between the military and the civilian leadership who are going to be making the decisions, and have to understand more about the concept that I am talking about. We have to understand the tactics as well as the doctrine that support our alliance. We must not just exercise for exercise’s sake. While the future cannot be predicted, NATO must accept and adopt to the realities of what has happened. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union as we know it is permanent. Our military requirement to maintain a balance against the residual soviet, now-russian threat, is of less urgency. As each day passes we continue to see the disintegration of the forces of our former adversary and we are reaching out with sincere friendship. One thing is certain: the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union will not reconstitute. Russia and the Confederation of Independent States bring different force structures and different coalitions to bear on the issue. It is our challenge within this alliance and our friendship of nations to make that a successful transition and welcome them into the community of productive free nations.

No one however, can safely predict how this will turn out. The instability in the world and potential for regional conflict remain high and they are not going to lessen in the next five to ten years. It is still a dangerous world out there. Some people in my country and the Congress — I will be testifying before our Senate Armed Forces Committee when I go back the States early next week — are asking the question, because of the desire to put their funds in other areas that desperately need funds also: why do we need so many armed forces? They are asking us to justify our existence. I don’t feel that is necessary at all. All you have to do is read the daily newspapers. Today, as I speak, there are thirty-five open conflicts being fought around the world. Ten nations have confirmed stockpiles of chemical-biological weapons and the means to deliver them. Ten to fifteen nations possess, or are approaching the possession, of nuclear weapon capability, and thirty-two nations currently possess ballistic missiles that could carry these weapons of mass destruction two of these are in the underdeveloped nations category and they cannot be categorized as friendly to Western industrial nations or the interest of world peace. That is why we must remember that the first primary responsibility of a free society is to defend that freedom.

The newest and most pressing concern is that the nuclear technology expertise of the former Soviet Union could very possibly fall into the hands
of the highest bidder able to purchase these materials and services. And so I would share with you today that no one should have to wonder what the relevance of NATO is. I do not see a kindler, gentler world out there. Rather, I see a world that continues to validate the need for credible collective defense forces, collective security alliances, and NATO is at the head of that class.

We need NATO to protect our collective interest in a world that is increasingly unstable. Therefore, the crisis response capability of this alliance is important; what we do with that capability is a choice of decision and responsibility for our civilian leadership. But I would argue that military preparedness to deliver trained credible forces to a crisis must be addressed by this alliance with a sense of urgency. The new strategy that we envisioned just two years ago, we envisioned it evolving over a period, and we were talking about 1995 and beyond. And yet, as we all know, it is here now. It is a strategy of today. From the perspective of my professional responsibilities, it is a luxury to know your enemy, to study his tactics and train to take advantage of his weaknesses. We did this and we did this well vis-à-vis the Soviets for over forty-one years. Now the challenge is to train to capabilities and be ready to deter unknown adversaries. This is a much more difficult challenge. It takes a lot more commitment to keep that resolve.

There is a great deal of work to do, particularly on the maritime side where my interest lies. There is still much of a tendency, in my experience among naval officers, to assume that we have always been operating with multinational forces, we have always operating in the sea, and that the sea never changes. So what is new? If you have that opinion and you are wearing a naval uniform, you have got the wrong opinion. There is an urgent need for us to define new concepts that are relevant to this strategy that I have been talking about, and responsive to crisis-management issues. There is an urgent need to make our civilian leadership aware of what the true flexibility and mobility of naval forces are. We must move on and implement the forces that bring about this concept and we must be able to provide credible forces to bear on any particular problem that our civilian leadership chooses to exercise.

We, as the major NATO commanders, need to identify the holes that exist in our planning to date, and fill those holes. In my judgement, this should focus on three primary areas: first and foremost is the applicability of new
command and control arrangements. This is a difficult one because NATO is a political alliance and we do a lot of strange things, politically, to stroke each other's egos. But I want to tell you as a military commander that the test of command and control is on the battle field. And it must be simple and uncomplicated, and it must serve the battlefield commander's interests and not the interests of egos. And so we must put more focus on this and we must ensure that it works.

Secondly, we must ensure the adequacy of the required forces to execute the tasks assigned, and thirdly, we must train, we must exercise, to make sure that if you ever need the application of force we arrive with ready capable forces, able to accomplish the mission you assign. We still need to do low-level flights; we still need to do complex landings in an amphibious environment; we still need to do integrated air operations if we're going to be successful.

The new strategy includes maintenance of smaller more flexible and mobile forces. It sounds simple, but "the devil is in the detail". The long-term commitment of NATO to maintain crisis response forces for our stability is essential to our survival as free nations.

Let me make one more point on training exercises. We are going out to do an exercise in just two weeks up in Norway. Some people ask: "why are you doing it?" We are not training against Russian capabilities, we are training for the interoperability, the complexity of communicating with nations from all of our alliance and the complexity of integrating air support, sea support, and amphibious forces ashore. We are working with the reserve forces of Norway, Netherlands, U. S., Denmark, and all of the forces of our maritime forces. That is why in the Persian Gulf, no matter how the forces got there — they got there in response of the United Nations — but when they got there it was the training provided by this alliance that allowed them to be so successful. We must not forget that.

Finally, I want to share with you one last thought and that is that with increased emphasis on regional instability and crisis management, the bi-lateral defense agreements that evolve out of our wonderful NATO associations are equally important. The United States and Portugal are charter members of NATO and they are charter members of this close mutual friendship. The US and Portugal, over a long period of time, have shared bilateral usage agreements concerning the Portuguese air facilities at Lajes. The strategic importance of Lajes in supporting resupply and logistic support from the
United States and North America should be obvious in the concept and the context of the new strategy I talked about.

We value the longstanding joint usage agreements. Agreements that are based on the good will and the friendship between our people and the leaders of our two nations. Our two nations today are in the process of renegotiating the defense and cooperation agreements that enable us joint usage. I personally look forward to advancing this beneficial bilateral relationship.

In the process we must adapt to the realities of the changed environment that I have been talking about today. We are talking about an environment of decreasing defense budgets, decreasing forces, changing applications. We will have smaller defense forces, and we must be more effective in sharing our individual and collective defense contributions to the total benefit of this alliance and our individual needs, as I have been talking about. It is a complex and difficult issue. There is a strong feeling by many in the United States that it is time to spend less on defense and seek more mature relationships vis-a-vis mutual benefits, shared by overseas partners.

One thing is sure: the United States is reducing 30% of our forces and that includes our people, our equipment and our supporting overhead. Every base in the United States and overseas will share the impact of this reduction. There is going to be less presence — some people call that the peace dividend. I'm not so quick to call it a peace dividend, but it is a fact of reality.

And this means that there are going to be fewer jobs to support the presence that we have had for the last 42 years. This is one of the realities of the peace dividend. It's difficult, it's hard to do no matter where you are. There are eight shipyards that support my Navy. For the funding that we have got, if you take 30% — and I have to have a quality force at the end that it is smaller — we have to shut down two shipyards. Now, I want to tell you, when you shut down the Philadelphia navy shipyard it costs eight thousand jobs. And eight thousand jobs is a lot of jobs, and that's direct jobs, that is not talking about the supporting industries that feed and care and fill out the other needs. So this type of negotiation is going on throughout the United States, and it's going on throughout Europe. We are out of the Philippines and the progress is difficult.

What I've been talking about is a higher level of importance. That is the challenge of free societies. To redirect the amount of effort that you put into
defense, if you are lucky enough to put it where it belongs, and there is not
one in this audience that wouldn't rather be improving other things. My
country certainly has tremendous needs to improve the quality of live for
our poor, our education, our health care, our environment. And we have to
be able to make the transition and not hang on to a job, because when the
need for a job goes away we have to be able to redirect.

My commitment, and my plea is that we understand these issues, and
we do it in a manner that is not divisive to the fundamental strength of our
alliance which is the commitment and similarity of our friendship and our
freedom and our heritage. It is a very, very important issue and it is a very
complex one and it affects the lives of local and even national politics. And it
does get emotional. But I can tell you that it is best done in an open dialogue,
with open planning and seeking better understanding with all concerned.

These issues that I'm talking about are separate from base rights negotia-
tions but they tend to get entangled due to the emotions in the lives of those
involved. Even if we had no base negotiations, a 30% reduction in forces
in my country is going to go on and when you do that you have to reduce
presence and it's going to affect jobs. To combine the two is a disservice. But
the emotions will be there: I am a realist, not an idealist. I simply commit
to you the difficulty of the challenge. We need to meet this challenge and
maintain the good relationships that are the foundation of our friendship
and our alliance.

From my perspective, it is primarily the changes in the central front
of Europe and the land map of Europe that have been so dynamic in the
last two years. The fundamental mission of alliance naval forces remains
—and in fact, in my judgement, may increase. Because NATO remains an
alliance of free and independent nations, nations that depend on trade and
free access to foreign markets. And they do this by the sea lanes of the world.
Our collective nations depend for the quality of life, on freedom of the
sea. The southern flank of NATO—which you are on the gateway to
—remains an essential part of this lifeline. And, therefore, IBERLANT will
remain an essential part of this alliance. Because everything that passes through
the southern flank passes through IBERLANT waters. And therefore, the
geostrategic importance of the Atlantic in the approach to the Mediterranean
has not diminished, and will not diminish. And we must remain focused
on the training and credibility and readiness of forces assigned to IBERLANT.
In the final analysis I would say to you that the Naval forces will continue
to be among the most acceptable and versatile forms of military presence in an area of crisis management. Because they convey calculated ambiguity, calculated response. Their presence on the high seas does not violate anyone's law. They don't commit the nation to any specific act, or any course of action. There are no boundaries when you sail across the seas. The choices for the use of naval forces are varied, and they are many. In fact they are unique, because there is no permission required to ply these waters. Naval forces can stay on station as long as you need if they have those oilers I was talking about. And they also can be withdrawn on a moments notice. They are vehicles of people-to-people diplomacy. Visiting ports, I often say to my army friends it's hard to have a friendly visit by a batallion of main battle tanks. We do it all the time with our ships. And naval forces maximize NATO's options while contributing to stability and contributing to peace, contributing to friendship and understanding.

We, in the Western alliance have arrived at this significant era and world history because of the consistency of our commitment and the rightness of our cause. And our cause is freedom and our purpose and our intent is collective security of that freedom. We accept and welcome the fact that the world has changed and that the overwhelming military threat poised by the Soviet Union has disappeared. We welcome their hand of friendship, we welcome their reduction of nuclear weapons. I am pleased that by April there will be no more tactical nuclear weapons on any US ships. That's a pleasing fact for me and that's a part of the result of the commitment of this alliance.

To accomplish this, and maintain this, we need the multinational defense forces of this alliance to prove in truth that peace through strength should not be abandoned, and we should not confuse that issue.

I will close by saying that I personally agree with an observation that President Harry Truman once made. That is that “the only history that it is of no value is the history we forget”.

I thank you for this opportunity to share a few views with you this morning and will be glad to take questions if you have any at this time.

**QUESTIONS**

Q: On the command and control change that is occurring in NATO do you see any impact on our area of interest, Iberlant?

A: No, I don't see any changes in the Iberlant area at this time, although we have not formalized the major change which needs to take place, that
is we are moving from three major NATO commands, SACLANT, SACEUR AND CINCCHAN to two major NATO commands, SACEUR and SACLANT. In this process we are now trying to reach agreement, we have agreement within the Alliance on the southern command area which will remain about the same as it is today. The central command area which will be focused generally around a totally unified Germany with Denmark in that central front and then a new AFNORTHWEST command that includes Norway and the U. K., and the Baltics in the North Sea as a connecting link. So that’s the major focus that is going on, and how do you do that complex process of taking down the old CINCHAN structure and reforming it so that all of the nations feel that they are adequately represented.

What I continue to see is IBERLANT playing a major role in the transition between the Atlantic and the Southern flank, which is the Mediterranean and an increasingly important area. I am not able to predict where the future is going to go, but one thing that the future is going to entail is that Africa has got to come as a continent into a more stable environment. Hopefully it will do that in a peaceful manner but there is great potential for lots of conflict. Once again the IBERLANT waters are a focal point of transition. You can’t get to any area of the alliance with the exception of the far north without entering the IBERLANT area. So I do not see and I have no plans for a reduction of the IBERLANT significance to the Atlantic Command or as a transitory point, through Gibral­tar as an example. In fast I loock at IBERLANT as being very helphul in that process.

Q: I would like to pose the following question: In relation to the defense structures emerging in Europe, how can we articulate NATO with those defense structures, having in mind not only optimization but also rationalization regarding operational commands?

A: I think the important thing in the process is to maintain flexibility and not create redundancies of bureaucracy or command structures. That is what I interpret as the way to have transparency between, for exemple, the Western European Union and NATO.

In the last year we have used forces that are committed to this alliance in a variety of ways that have benefitted all of our countries, but that have not always responded under the NATO flag. As an example, in the Persian
Gulf, we had representatives of our NATO alliances serving in the Gulf but not under a NATO flag. They were NATO forces but they got there under, sometimes their own independent national response to a UN resolution, sometimes under a collective response to the WEU, but when they got there they interacted and were credible forces because of the NATO training that they had done. We also had NATO under NATO’s flag, as I mentioned, performing surveillance against the potential threat for terrorism throughout the Mediterranean. And certainly we sent the ACE’s mobile forces representing Belgium, Italy and Germany to protect Turkey’s interest in the Iraq crisis. We have also used forces from France and Belgium — Belgium’s forces were the same forces that are committed to NATO — when they had a crisis in Africa.

All of this is achievable if we remain flexible and understand that crisis response will have different applications from different perspectives. What is important, I think, is that we not try to duplicate the massive and yet effective infrastructures that we have committed from our nations and already exist in Brussels. We should be able to have transparency and thorough dialogue with the various leaderships to decide which is the best shopping menu to apply to a particular crisis. I also believe that it is important for our entire world security even when the magnitude of the large threat goes away that we maintain the strength of the Atlantic link between North America and Europe and NATO is the way to do that.

Q: Admiral, I am the Ambassador of Norway in Portugal and I think you gave us a brilliant outline of the challenges that are facing our Alliance, for which I want to thank you. There seems to be a, as you have said yourself very clearly, a very dramatic shift in the global security situation. (...) It seems that NATO, to an extent, will be assuming the role of policing the world in the future. And do you see, as an example, the integration of NATO in a — let’s be very optimistic — in a United Nations peacekeeping force? Thank you, sir.

A: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. First of all, I think I have a different perception of what NATO’s role is than as that of police force. I do not accept that role for NATO. I don’t think it is proper and I do not think that either NATO, nor my own country is a police force for world stability. And so I have seen no tendency within the NATO leadership that I have participated
in with great pleasure for the last two and a half years, to accept, and I think properly so, the role of world policeman or even area policeman. In fact, NATO has not accepted an out-of-area role, which I assume could then start a linkage to that concept. So I don’t believe that NATO has a role as world policeman nor should they.

What I do believe is — and I think NATO’s responsibility has to remain focused and limited to what our objectives are — that this group of sixteen nations must communicate that there is solidarity, there is commitment to collective defense for any coalition that chooses to callenge and threaten the security of this unique group of nations. And in so doing, we stand for the support of international law, we stand for human rights, we stand for governments that have the voice and ability to change those governments through the ballot box and not through the muzzle of a gun. And when those elements that do exist around the world threaten our direct security interest we will respond in unity.

Q: Admiral, I would like to pose a question regarding the Azores. In 1973, the Azores showed they were vitally important to the resupply of Israel and maintenance of the State of Israel. During the Gulf War, last year, the importance of the Azores was, perhaps, not as vital. The explanation I find lies in the time factor. While in 1973 there was a need for a very swift deployment of forces and resources — in a matter of days — now (during the Gulf War) there were months to deploy the military power to begin Desert Storm. I would like to ask you, Admiral, in your capacity as a military commander, as an American military commander, if you consider that the Azores, in case of a crisis in the Middle East or in the Mediterranean, continue as important, I would say as vital, as they were in 1973. Thank you.

A: As a military commander, I do consider that the Azores has extreme high value and strategic importance, not only to the mutual bilateral relationship between Portugal and the United States but to the interest of this alliance as we look to a multipolar, multidireccional world, because of their location and their ability to respond East and West, North and South. And now, what needs to be also factored into the situation is that nothing is ultimate, so you have to define what is essential and what is a benefit. And then, you have to define where we and the realities of the world; and so I tell my people and who we interact with, that the realities are that we are coming
down by 30 percent; the realities are that they are different from 1973. My country has spent the last 20 years seeking an association with moderate Arab states trying to modify and find avenues of solutions to a very difficult, complex situation in the Middle East. It is not easy but the chemistry and the dynamics are different in 1992 than they were in 1973. And also, the presence and deployment of forces and the capabilities of those forces are different.

What I do see is that we come down now without the massive threats presented by the bloc politics. We used to generate force levels and our actions based on the other side, the magnitude, and the state of intentions of that threat. Now the fact of life is that in my country we generate our responsiveness based on the budget, and so we have to take a look to where the budget is driving, because it used to be that the threat drove the budget; now the budget drives the responsiveness of our armed forces.

And so in those realities, if there is a conflict, I have to manage to the realities of my budget. As a maritime commander that has spent the majority of my time in the Pacific, three years ago I would have said to you there is no way that we could be out the Philippines, and on December 12 of this year all United States naval forces will be Philippines. Three years ago somebody would have said that was absolutely vital and essential to U. S. interests in the Pacific and that we could not do without it. That was not a true statement then; it is not a true statement now. And there is nothing that is vital in that environment that can be taken in isolation from the realities of the budget and the realities of the changing world around us.

I am particularly interested in getting, as military commander, an acceptable, mutually workable agreement. But there is nothing in the environment today that cannot be worked around, and certainly everything has to be worked within the realities of what we can afford. That is a problem in our country because we have such a tremendous deficit. We have got our Congress saying it is time we have our deficit spending under control, and the military commanders are being told to look at every avenue. This is nothing associated with the negotiations. We are looking at where we had ASW forces and if there isn’t an ASW threat there, we cannot afford to have ASW forces, and we have to reallocate those. Those types of the decisions are going on and they are very complex.
So, a short answer is, yes, they have strategic value not only for today but, I believe for tomorrow. Are they absolutely so vital that we can’t do without them? The answer is: I don’t know of anything that we cannot do without except for a credible nuclear deterrence, because we live in a nuclear threatening world and you must be able to deter that in order for your own peace and the world’s peace.

Leon A. Edney
Admiral
Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic
Commander in Chief
US Atlantic Command
Admiral Leon A. "Bud" Edney, a native of Dedham, Massachusetts, was commissioned an Ensign in 1957 following his graduation from the U. S. Naval Academy. He earned a master's degree in public administration from Harvard University in 1963.

Designated a Naval Aviator in 1958, Admiral Edney's first operational flying tours were with Air Antisubmarine Squadrons 27 and 24. Following his graduate studies at Harvard, he served a two-year tour in Washington, D. C., as a Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Research and Development. In 1965, Admiral Edney transitioned to light attack jet aircraft and was assigned to Attack Squadron 164. In 1970, Admiral Edney was assigned to the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations as the Western Hemisphere Plans Officer in the Political-Military Plans Division. He was selected as a White House Fellow in 1970 and served as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Transportation. In 1971, Admiral Edney was named Executive Officer of Attack Squadron 27 and assumed command of the squadron the following year.

Admiral Edney assumed command of Carrier Air Wing TWO embarked in the aircraft carrier USS RANGER (CV 61) in 1974. He then became the commanding officer of the fleet oiler USS PONCHATOULA (AO 148) two years later. He then served as Chief of Staff for Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group FIVE before assuming command of the aircraft carrier USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) in January 1980. Under his command, CONSTELLATION participated in RIMPAC'80 exercise with navies from the Pacific basin before deploying to the Western Pacific in April 1980. During this deployment, CONSTELLATION remained on station in the Indian Ocean for 110 straight days in support of U. S. foreign policy.

In June 1981 Admiral Edney was designated a Commodore and became the sixty-ninth Commandant of Midshipmen at the U. S. Naval Academy. In March 1984, he became Commander, Carrier Group ONE and made another deployment to the Western Pacific embarked in CONSTELLATION the following year.

Following his assignment as Commander, Carrier Group ONE, Admiral Edney served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, Director, Aviation Plans and Requirements Division; and later Director, Office of Program Appraisal for the Secretary of the Navy. In 1987, he became the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training. He assumed his present rank and the duties of Vice Chief of Naval Operations in August 1988, and as such was directly
responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for the command of the Navy’s operating forces and the administration of its shore establishment.

In May 1990, Admiral Edney assumed his present duties as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command.

Admiral Edney's personal awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Navy Distinguished Service Medal with gold star, the Legion of Merit with two gold stars, Distinguished Flying Cross with four gold stars, Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with gold star, Air Medal with gold numeral 8 and bronze numeral 30, Navy Commendation Medal with Combat V, and the Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with gold star, as well as various campaign and unit awards. During his career he has accumulated more than 5600 flight hours, flown 340 combat sorties, and made more than 1000 carrier landings.

Admiral Edney is married to the former Margon Beck of Hastings, Nebraska. They have two daughters, Merrie and Jaimie.