U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SECURITY OF EUROPE

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I welcome this opportunity to speak to you, continuing a tradition followed by several of my predecessors. I look forward to it as an opportunity to exchange impressions — for you to learn about the US perspective from me, but also for me to learn more from you about the Portuguese perspective on some very important issues.

The key concept that I hope you will carry away from this discussion is this:

_The US commitment to NATO and to the security of Europe remains unshakable._

I stress this because in recent weeks I have read and heard various commentaries raising the question whether this longstanding tenet of American foreign policy still holds. Of course it is clear that the security structures in Europe need to be updated because of the end of the Cold War and because of the demonstrated inadequacy of the current security structure to respond to the new challenges we face today. But the recent commentaries address, not the need for updating, but more fundamental questions of the US purpose and commitment. European confidence has been shaken by differences with the US over Bosnia, and by questions about the impact of the Republican victory in the US Midterm Elections.

The basic fact is that Europe and America need each other. American security and prosperity depend on a stable and prosperous Europe; an unstable Europe would be disastrous for my country economically and, as amply proved in two World Wars, would be costly in other ways as well. Europe, in turn, continues to need an American anchor for its security structures.
"But", you may say, "What about the American relationship with Asia, or its interest in expanding trade in Latin America?"

The United States is a global power with interests in many parts of the world. Asia and Latin America present enormous opportunities for trade and investment, and not only for Americans. We also have major security interests in both Asia and Latin America.

But let me repeat once more for clarity.

America's security and prosperity depend on a stable and prosperous Europe.

Naturally there will be differences between allies, all the more so now that Europe has been freed from the overshadowing fear of Soviet aggression. We are an Alliance of democracies, and we have overcome disagreements in the past. And as Secretary Christopher has said, "the crisis in Bosnia is about Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia. It does not diminish NATO's irreplaceable role as the key to European Security. There is no disagreement among us on this point". The common interests are too fundamental, the habits and structures of cooperation too ingrained, to be overthrown so easily.

"But", you may say, "The Ambassador represents the Clinton Administration. The Republicans who have taken over Capitol Hill may have different ideas."

I cannot pretend that nothing has changed in Washington. There has, in fact, been a significant shift of power. But it is also easy to exaggerate the effects.

In many areas of foreign policy, the changes will be small for two central reasons: One is that the Constitution gives the President a special measure of control over foreign policy, and two is that on the fundamental issues there is a shared perception of the national interest that crosses party lines.

The changes will be greatest in those areas where the Constitution gives the Congress the most power: Those involving money. US foreign aid is in for a very rough ride. US contributions for UN peacekeeping and other multilateral activities are other areas that will be closely examined by a skeptical Congress.
But I would caution you to question some of the more alarmist predictions coming out of Washington. It is wise to recall three truths about US politics and foreign policy:

— Radical-sounding candidates usually tone down their demands once they have real decisionmaking power;
— Committee Chairmen have some power to delay and obstruct, but they also understand that to effect real change they need to build consensus;
— The Republican Party, like the Democratic Party, is a coalition containing many different viewpoints.

In many areas there will be much less change, either because less money is involved or because there is a basic consensus on fundamental American interests. I would argue that European security is one of the latter. There will be a lot of posturing, arguments about whether NATO should do more in this or that crisis, whether it should expand sooner rather than later, and yes, about burdensharing. But none of this alters the basic fact that Europe and America need each other.

Let me recall for you some of our ideas about how to proceed from here in order to protect Europe's stability and prosperity. We are operating on two major assumptions:

— First, that democratic forms of government and free market economies are essential to guaranteeing peace and prosperity;
— Second, that the collapse of Cold War structures has left important parts of the continent feeling the need for institutional anchors.

We have a multi-pronged strategy for filling this void. The three main elements of that strategy are:

— First, we believe that existing structures of proven value, such as NATO and the EU, should gradually extend their coverage Eastward;
— Second, we believe that the CSCE (now OSCE) should be further strengthened to prevent and manage problems outside the purview of NATO and the EU;
— Finally, we believe we must work closely with Russia, in NATO and the OSCE as well as in other fora, both to reassure it and to include it in efforts to assure European security.

Important progress toward these goals has been registered in the last few months. Within NATO there is a growing consensus that the Alliance's central purposes include not just maintaining the transatlantic link and guaranteeing the security of allied states, but also underpinning the security of key countries to the East of the Alliance's existing borders and drawing Russia constructively into Europe.

In December NATO agreed to examine, within the Alliance, the «How» and «Why» of expansion, including an examination of how the Partnership for Peace can contribute to the process.

The Alliance is not discussing the «Who» or «When» in the course of this study. We aim for a process that is gradual, deliberate, and transparent, and that treats each applicant nation individually and on its own merits.

The goal, again, is enhanced stability. This is not an attempt to draw a new line of division in Europe. Neither, however, should we allow the old division of the Continent to be perpetuated, explicitly or implicitly, by allowing any country outside NATO to have a veto over another's future membership in the Alliance.

The NATO Ministerial reaffirmed the importance of the Partnership for Peace, which provides a forum for NATO cooperation with all our former adversaries in the old Soviet Empire. The United States will contribute 30 million dollars over the next year to strengthen the Joint Exercise Program of the Partnership for Peace, and President Clinton has proposed a contribution of 100 million dollars for 1996 to further the goals of the Partnership. The Partnership will help interested partners prepare for future Alliance membership, promote interoperability, increase transparency, and develop habits of cooperation. The PFP is both the best path to membership in the Alliance for those who choose to pursue it and for others their primary link to a core Western institution. Thus, the recent NAC decision only increases the importance of the Partnership.

The US will be working energetically in 1995 with the steps agreed at the December NAC. This includes particularly the NAC decision to
begin an internal Alliance study on expansion. We must handle this process in a way that builds confidence between NATO and all our PFP partners. To achieve success, we need steadiness, unity of purpose, and openness.

Like other members of the Alliance, the US places a high priority on building a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. We want this relationship to become a significant feature of post-Cold War European security arrangements. As you know Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Brussels December 1, and President Yeltsin in Budapest December 5, expressed concern that NATO enlargement could presage a new division of Europe. A week later, Vice President Gore explored the issues with President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders. He explained what the December Communique says and does not say. He found that the Russians had significantly misunderstood what the Alliance intends to do in 1995 with respect to enlargement. The Vice President clarified those points, as I have done with you. While the Russian leaders were reassured, they still harbor concerns that NATO enlargement will have negative implications for Russian security. This week in Geneva, Secretary Christopher met with Foreign Minister Kozyrev to explore issues including how NATO and Russia can most productively relate to one another in the post-Cold War world. Achieving understanding is likely to be a long-term process about which we will consult fully with your Government and our other allies.

The bottom line on NATO enlargement is to bring to Central Europe the kind of stability and security which has come to characterize the West. This will benefit everyone, members and non-members of the Alliance alike. Expansion is not aimed against anyone. It is intended to reinforce the positive trend toward integration in Europe, as well as curb any trends toward political disintegration and instability.

The Budapest Summit also made important progress in strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, now renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE. The measures agreed to will complement NATO’s efforts to build cooperative, integrated security structures for Europe. OSCE will have a more clearly defined mission and increased abilities and resources, especially in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management. This stronger OSCE
gives all states in the Euro-Atlantic Community a forum in which they can expect their security concerns to be seriously addressed.

The goal is to create a tool which can be used, as President Clinton said, «To prevent future Bosnias». Of course, the OSCE is not, nor is it intended to be, a substitute for NATO.

One example of the OSCE's expanding role is the Summit's agreement to provide OSCE Peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, once we have in place a political agreement and an appropriate UN Resolution.

Let me say a few words at this point about the Western European Union, the WEU. We were delighted at the appointment of a distinguished statesman like Ambassador Cutileiro as Secretary General of the WEU, and we also look forward to very close cooperation with Portugal in its WEU Presidency capacity during the next six Months. The United States continues to believe that the WEU can make an important and positive contribution to the emerging European Security Architecture.

We intend to work closely with all WEU members to ensure that the WEU's emerging role is compatible with and complementary to that of NATO, which we continue to regard as the essential basis for European stability and security. I have already met with both Ambassador Cutileiro and Ambassador Quintela Paixão, the Director General for multilateral affairs in the Foreign Ministry, regarding the WEU Presidency. We will continue to stay in close contact.

The world has undergone historic changes over the last few years. European stability and security is no longer just a question of deterring or, more recently, of integrating countries lying to the East. As European Union leaders recognized at the Essen Summit there are important security concerns on Europe's Southern Flank as well.

We share Portugal's concern about Mediterranean stability. The best testimony to that fact is the effort that we have made over four decades to advance the cause of Middle East peace. Over the last year and a half we have seen enormous progress toward a just and lasting peace, notwithstanding the continuing difficulties.

But we are also concerned about stability in the Western Mediterranean, and appreciate the European Union's new level of attention to this issue. We have traditionally strong ties to Morocco and Tunisia, and numerous American companies have sizeable business interests in Algeria's oil and
gas industries. A triumph of extremism in Algeria would have an impact not only on our business interests there but carries the potential to upset the stability of other North African countries.

We believe that the way forward lies in political and economic reform in Algeria. We welcome the progress that Algeria has made on the economic front, but we continue to believe that economic reform must be accompanied by political reform. We urge genuine political dialogue between the Algerian government and opposition elements, including Islamist leaders who renounce terrorism.

Turning to bilateral US-Portuguese cooperation in the security sphere, let me add a word about Lajes Air Base. As you know, your government and mine have been negotiating for several years now a new Agreement on Cooperation and Defense that will regulate the US presence at Lajes as well as create a much broader basis of bilateral cooperation extending well beyond the realm of security issues. We have reached tentative agreement on all but one issue. We remain optimistic that final agreement will be reached in the not-too-distant future. Meanwhile, both countries continue to benefit from our longstanding relationship of trust and cooperation at Lajes.

The nature of our bilateral security relationship has been changing, as Portugal and the world have changed. Portugal is now a full-fledged member of the European Union. Portugal's economic take-off has coincided with the end of the Cold War and with our budget crisis, which has given us diminished resources for security assistance. We are now looking toward a new, broader and more mature relationship with Portugal, one that emphasizes cooperation across a broad range of issues rather than a narrow focus on security assistance a qui pro quo for our presence at Lajes.

The Clinton Administration came into office promising a new focus for foreign policy, in keeping with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new opportunities for an expansion of democracy and world economic growth. The three pillars of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy have remained constant, and will remains so even in the face of the new situation in Washington, because they reflect and build on the real interests and ideals of the American people.

Those three pillars are first, economic security. This pillar has been the impetus for major successes in foreign trade, including the North
American Free Trade Agreement, conclusion of the GATT, and new impulses for expanded trade in Asia and Latin America.

A second pillar is support for democracy. The recent Summit of the Americas, bringing together 34 democratically-elected leaders of the Western Hemisphere, highlighted how democracy is sweeping the world.

The third pillar is reflected in my comments today: *The preservation of peace and security*. And nothing is more pivotal for the preservation of peace around the world than the peace and security of Europe.

President Clinton reaffirmed these principles just last month, in his speech to the Democratic Leadership Conference reflecting on the recent Congressional elections. «*America must remain energetically engaged in the world*» he said, «*Not retreat from it*».

And, he added, «*The United States must maintain a strong and capable defense*. *And I would add*, that is a goal that we will work to achieve in cooperation with all of our allies in Europe.

The United States Government, and I, as the President's personal representative, are committed to working with the government of Portugal, both to enhance our important and longstanding bilateral relationship, and to solidify progress toward stability and prosperity for Europe in the post-Cold War world. I look forward to hearing your views on these important issues.

*Elizabeth Frawley Bagley*