RUSSIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE


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The period, when under the impact of «New Thinking» in Mikhail Gorbachev’s and Edvard Shevardnadze’s Soviet Union, then after the succession of the «communist» USSR by «democratic» Russia, many in the West, also some in Russia, believed that the earlier antagonism between the two blocs in Europe had been replaced by a new era of peace and cooperation between independent states and free societies, proved short-lived. At that time a minority even concluded that the Transatlantic Alliance had lost its purpose and, therefore, following the example of the Warsaw Pact, should be dissolved as well. The majority thought, less radically, in terms of preserving this healthy alliance for future dangers; but certainly the Western alliance should undergo serious transformation, enabling it to engage in true partnership with Russia (¹).

Since 1993 it has become increasingly clear that these assumptions and visions were at least premature. On the one hand, both NATO and the transatlantic partners in the US and in Europe found it hard to redefine their common purposes in a new world, suddenly deprived of evident frontlines and challenges, and to reorganize their relation. On the other hand, Russia’s domestic transformation into a pluralist democracy and a functioning market economy turned out to be an extremely difficult task, threatened by mounting contradictions and failures. As a consequence, Russian society became disillusioned with transformation, whereas the political elites, including President Boris Yeltsin and foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev, began to look for compensation in the field of foreign relations. Here they hoped to regain for Russia the status of a «great world power» to be respected

(¹) Cf. Sergey Blagovolin, «On foreign and military policy of Russia», Svobodnaya Mysl’, no. 18 (December 1992), pp. 3, 9/10. Different, though, from most of his colleagues, the author is decidedly optimistic that this is a realistic perspective.
not only by the other post-Soviet successor states in the so-called «near abroad», but also in the «far abroad» by the US and Western Europe.

From here we gain the general actual background required to understand and to analyse Russia's present and future attitude to the transatlantic alliance. This attitude is characterized by a basic ambiguity: Russia attempts to avoid a new isolation and to gain a legitimate equal role in shaping developments in the entire European continent. Yet, at the same time, Russian policy demands the outside world's recognition of a «traditional special sphere of influence», comprising unequivocally the other eleven members of the «Commonwealth of Independent States» [CIS], but probably also, not withstanding the recent withdrawal of Russian troops, the three Baltic states, and potentially even adjacent parts of the former Warsaw Pact area. Since the eastern half of Poland had been incorporated for more than a century into the tsarist Russian empire until 1918, Poles wondered where those «traditional» spheres are located.

This example reminds us that in evaluating Russian policy it is not sufficient to scrutinize present official enunciations and elite debates. At the outset we have to recall some the traditional roots of Russia’s attitude to the Western alliance and to reveal equally ambiguous elements in the heritage of the past.

THE HERITAGE OF THE PAST

1. PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS

Soviet leaders used to emphasize, as the greatest achievement of their foreign policy, the fact that US president Richard Nixon, in May 1972, by signing the SALT-I Treaty and a separate agreement on the fundamentals of Soviet-American relations, had recognized the strategic parity of the USSR and confirmed the ascendance of the first socialist state to the status of a super-power with equal authority in world affairs (1). How much this

(1) At the same time, Soviet ideologists struggling with ruptures within the «world communist movement», tried to rebut Chinese insinuations, that the US and the USSR were forming a conspiracy of the super-powers against the aspirations of the «third» world. Therefore, they maintained, parity and equality with the US by no means were to be confuted with a harmony of goals.
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equal status had corresponded also to a desire of broader strata in Soviet society, which shared their leaders' triumph over the proof that their sufferings in «building socialism» had not been in vain and could no longer discarded as an historic error committed by a backward country, ironically, became visible only after the end of Soviet communism: Now it was fashionable to show unabashed admiration for everything American by queuing for Mac Donald's hamburgers, and to display accompanying hopes by wearing baseball-caps and T-shirts with both the American and the Soviet flags. And yet, the Western visitor could discover a deep-seated ambivalence in conversations with Russian friends mooding over the question: Will the rest of the world, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, continue to respect us? Likewise, the visitor was struck with the permanent tendency among his Russian hosts to evaluate perspectives of partnerships, whether in business, science, or in the arts, primarily with Americans, before considering Western partners elsewhere.

On the level of foreign policy, such sentiments are reflected in frequent references to Russia still being a «big» or even a «super»-power, contained in official statements as well as in the writings of Russian analysts and journalists alike. While more thoughtful authors recently had to admit that US policy might be less inclined to treat Russia as an equal, they still profess a preference for the US as a special partner ('). The alternative to view Western Europe as a more adequate partner for Russia's contemporary needs and potential, is found only rarely (')


(') See for example, Viktor Kuvaldin, «We and the West: new collision — Where do we concur, and where do we differ?», Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 July 1994, p. 2 (in Russian).
2. AMBIVALENT VIEWS OF U.S. ROLE IN EUROPE

The political significance of such differences may be gauged from recalling again the early 1970's. These were the years when Western Europe's integration proved earlier Soviet predictions of the EEC's preordained failure wrong. Soviet decision-makers, therefore, felt sufficient reason to ask themselves whether established propaganda, adhorting the West Europeans to «shed the fetters of US hegemony», might meet acceptance in Western Europe's capitals and result in the emergence of a new dynamic power center which would attract and fascinate the neighbors in the Soviet orbit of Central Eastern Europe. However, only a few Soviet authors dared to suggest running such a risk in order to weaken US positions. The mainstream followed the Politbureau's line which had concluded that «Big Twoism» with the other super-power was, after all, the safer road (1).

In the 1990's Russia's foreign policy makers have to come to grips with a comparable constellation: In Europe they see the European Union intensifying («deepenings») its integration, despite the intervening challenge to «broaden» its membership to include former EFTA countries and some of the former COMECON members. In the US they discern a new administration, bent on reducing the American profile in Europe, while torn between supporting president Yeltsin as the best hope for continued reforms and discussing ways to counter Russian «neo-imperialism» by «neo-containment».

Different, though, from the 1970's this time a third factor enters the picture. United Germany seems to intrigue the fantasy of Russia thinkers trying to sort out, what role this country — after overcoming the short-term economic burden of raising the new provinces of the former «German Democratic Republic» to an equal living standard with the western parts of the FRG — might play in Europe: Will it lead the EU to an even stronger alliance with the US? Or will it guide the EU to an independent super-power position? Or will Germany's weight and dynamism turn out irreconcilable with the EU's coherence, and thus revive for Russia somewhat forgotten older constellations: the option of a special German-

-Russian relationship, or, conversely, the danger of Germany expanding eastwards, excluding Russia from Europe?

Obviously, given the more complex equation to be solved, Moscow has no complete answer, yet. While the German option may simply be too fresh and also too fraught with historical ballast to evoke a clear-cut response, most authors tend to dismiss it or view it with concern (9). The old school of «germanisty» in the Soviet foreign policy establishment has lost its influence, anyway, and successors still will have to grow. The years of East-West détente, instead, have produced a generation of actors and experts, who continue to pay central attention to the US. Among them we find wide-spread apprehension with a possible tougher attitude of the US (10). But this is balanced by expectations that US engagement in Europe will hedge against unpleasant surprises (9). This position is likely to be adopted by the political leadership as well. At the same time, one should not exclude recurrent attempts to challenge that position by stressing the divergence of Russian and American interests, while suggesting instead increased chances for cooperation with Western Europe (9).

3. FROM IDEOLOGICAL TO GEOPOLITICAL SCHEMES

A third element of continuity may appear less obvious. However, by comparing Soviet literature on foreign policy with recent Russian debates, a striking similarity is surfacing: The previous thinking and interpreting


(9) See Aleksei Bogaturov et alii, «Washington and the post-Soviet states», SSHA, no. 1 (January 1994), p. 44 (in Russian); Arbatov, Russia’s Foreign Policy... (n.3), p. 34.

of world affairs used to explain them by invoking standard textbook formulas of communist ideology, postulating the «global class struggle». This method freed from weighing the arguments and, especially, from discussing unorthodox approaches, since these formulas were described as unquestionable «objective laws» (obschchie zakonomernosti) of development. Now after these textbooks went into the dustbins, we find, instead, something like a substitute tool in the frequent references by Russian authors, when they draw on supposedly equally indisputable «laws of geopolitics». A favorite role among the pertinent laws is accorded to various forms of a dangerous «vacuum», resulting from Russia's insufficient resolve or capacity to maintain its external influence. Where earlier the danger was described in terms of hostile «capitalist imperialism», waiting to exploit such weakness by filling the «vacua», at present the vacated areas are allegedly threatened by the influx of a variety of inimical forces, like Islamic fundamentalists, resurgent China, and also superior Western alliances (10).

Of course, one cannot overlook the contrast between the geopolitical situation of the US, shielding that country from foreign aggression by surrounding oceans, and Russia's geographic disadvantage of being open to external invaders throughout its history. Naturally, such a history leaves its impact in Russian perceptions of the surrounding world. Nevertheless, the inherent contemporary problem with this kind of reasoning rests with a lacking readiness to differentiate between a variety of possible developments to take a closer look at the intentions of those «hostile» forces, and, consequently, to search for ways to harmonize the legitimate interests of all parties concerned. Below we will return to this aspect in the specific context of Russia's vehement objection to NATO's eastward extension.

SEEKING RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

1. FROM «ROMANTIC» TO «REALIST» FOREIGN POLICY?

Foreign policy debates in Russia, both in the parliament and among experts almost from Russia's start in the new role as primary successor into the ambivalent Soviet heritage, centered around alleged neglect of Russia's national interests by foreign minister Kozyrev and his presidential mentor. The opponents claimed that the foreign minister held naive, «romantic» convictions, according to which the surrounding world, whether in the «near abroad» or in «far abroad», was ready to respect and honor Russia's return into the community of democratic nations. Yet, as these critics continued, reality showed a much darker picture, because the other post-Soviet successor states disregarded Russia's legitimate rights and tried to secure for themselves only the assets in the Soviet heritage, rejecting, however, common responsibilities. To make matters even worse, as Kozyrev's adversaries declared, the other heirs' nationalism subjected 25 millions of Russians living in the «near abroad» to discrimination and will force them, unless Russia extends its protection, to leave their homes and their jobs for an uncertain future in Russia proper. At the same time, so the advocates of «realism» maintained, the US and the other Western states, including even Germany, despite that country's billions of «aid», were not interested, not withstanding their verbal assurances, to welcome Russia in the community of «mankind's shared values» (obshche-chelovecheskie tsennosti). Rather, so the argument went, the West was relieved, that a dangerous competitor had disappeared, and did not wish to see him replaced by a new, potentially even more healthy rival (11).

These reproaches and recriminations lasted well into the following year, when Kozyrev and Yeltsin adopted a tougher language and took to more assertive actions in dealing with the «near abroad», this time giving rise to Western apprehensions of «neo-imperialist» tendencies in Russia’s foreign policy. However, it is important to note that Kozyrev himself already in February 1992 not only had criticized Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in almost identical terms for their «romantic» foreign policy based on a «rosy» view of reality. He also announced during that occasion a consequent policy of promoting and safe-guarding Russia’s national interests (12). Understandably, though, it would have been difficult to confront the smaller members of the CIS with massive Russian pressure right after the foundation of the «Commonwealth» on December 21, 1991. Somehow, therefore, the outside observer gets the impression that the entire debate with its strong invectives had less to do with substance and more with competition for influence in Moscow.

In the meantime, but long before on December 12, 1993, the electoral success of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy threatened the Western world out of its complacency, Kozyrev and Yeltsin began to outdistance their critics (13) with postulates for Russia’s big power status and with admonitions addressed at the West to respect Russian interests as those of an equal partner (14). Thus the West could have been prepared for Russia’s strong reaction in early 1994 to NATO’s bombing missions in Bosnia (15), even if these missions had been authorized by the UN Security Council with Russia

(12) Kozyrev developed his ideas at the Foreign Ministry’s conference mentioned above, DVMIDRF (n.11), pp. 33-36.
(13) An indirect admission of this fact can be seen in the second report of the SVOP group (cf. note (11)) «Strategy for Russia (2)», Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 May 1994, p. 4/5 (in Russian), where its authors declared in their introduction that they were motivated by «ever more signs suggesting that the pendulum of... Russian politics is swinging towards a policy which is potentially more dangerous than the one conducted in 1991-1992».
(15) Cf. Deputy foreign minister Vitaliy Churkin in an interview with Literaturnaya Gazeta, no. 11 (16 March 1994), p. 14 (in Russian); Andrei Kozyrev’s article in IHT (n.3); Sergey Shakhray the prominent leader of the «Party for Russian Unity and Agreement» [PRES], according to the Russian newspaper Rossiyskie Vesti, 13 April 1994, p. 1, qualified NATO’s bombing of the Serbian positions at Gorazde as «a slap in the face for Russia’s prestige».
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going along. The ensuing Russian demand to be admitted with equal rights to the deliberations of the G-7, merely serves as an additional illustration of the change.

And yet, we may wonder, whether we should see this as a change to «realism» based on evident legitimate interests. At any rate, the mass of statements insisting on Russia’s right to take part in every decision on developments in former Yugoslavia contrasts with the absence of any attempt to explain, which vital Russian interests are affected in that area. Neither the permanent references to traditional bonds of friendship with the orthodox brother-Slavcs in Serbia, nor the argument that Russian society feels strongly about any neglect of the Serbians’ cause, carry convincing force. Therefore, the new «realism» might be more of a device to detract attention from real problems at home.

2. RUSSIA AS PEACEMAKER AND INTEGRATOR IN THE CIS

By now, it is common wisdom that the disappearance of the former Soviet communist arsenal of repression has unleashed the forces of nationalism and chauvinism throughout post-Soviet space. Equally true is the West’s obvious reluctance to engage in post-Soviet conflicts in the CIS with more than diplomacy. Hence, Russia’s tendency to assume the functions of peace-making by peace-enforcement can hardly be criticized as being «imperialist» in principle. Justified objections can only be raised against certain circumstances and conditions created by Moscow in advance or during and after carrying out its peace-enforcing missions (16). Attempts to organize together with other CIS members «collective» security structures (17), have merely demonstrated that even there, where — as in Tadzhikistan and in South Ossetia — Russian forces were joined by contingents from other post-Soviet successor states, the «allies» role was negligible.

(16) The CSCE, thus far, has only developed rules for peace-keeping mandates. Therefore, Moscow’s expectations to receive the CSCE’s mandate for Russian peace-making in the CIS, must be turned down a limine for legal reasons. However, parallel Russian requests addressed to the UN will certainly cause some questioning of Russia’s peace-making practices.

The dominant role of Russia in the CIS is even more pronounced in the field of economic relations. Initial euphoria with independence in the new states and the hopes of their societies to reach welfare and Western support more directly on their own initiative, have already been reversed by the realization that almost (18) all of these states depend on Russian subsidies. And it does not make much difference, whether their leaders, as in Kyrgyzstan, were seriously engaged in political and economic reform, or whether they paid merely lip service to transformation or did not even pretend to change more than the façades. For Russia this seems to open the path to voluntary reunion and re-integration, including increased leverage to protect the Russians in the «near abroad» (19). Advocates of a more assertive Russian policy, thus, might feel vindicated.

But on closer inspection, they would have to admit that re-integration contains the danger of detracting Russia from real reforms, and of getting entangled into the webs of established channels for the flow of subsidies into uncompetitive relicts of Soviet economy and for the stabilization of power possessed by former communist apparatchiks, brandishing new national flags and symbols. Seen this way, those in Russia who are concerned with constructing a solid basis for Russia’s future place in the world, either reject any re-integration and demand prior domestic transformation in their country as well as in other CIS states, before one can think of following the successful example of post-war integration in Western Europe (20). Others try to find a compromise between conflicting options and

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(18) Turkmenistan might be able, even without any reforms, to market its huge natural gas reserves to foreign customers paying in hard currency. But until now, Ashkhabad had to learn several times that Moscow finds ways to limit such competition in the world market.

(19) The frequent use of the term «near abroad» in this analysis should not be interpreted as an approval by this author. On the contrary, the term tends to blur the distinction between those post-Soviet states which are united in the CIS, and the three Baltic countries, thus suggesting that Russia still views the latter’s independence as inferior compared with the sovereign states of the «far abroad». Hence, it needs to be replaced by something like «new abroad», which, in fact, gradually is gaining acceptance in Russian official documents.

demands by suggesting the «enlightened egotism» of selective bilateralism and «leadership instead of direct control» as the best available ways to serve Russia’s short-term and long-term interests in post-Soviet space ("21").

3. CLAIMS TO EXTENDED «SPHERES OF INTEREST»

Kozyrev’s ("22") and Yeltsin’s closing ranks with other proponents of an allegedly sober, hard-nosed policy by pursuing national interests and securing an undisputed sphere of influence around Russia, corresponds merely superficially to a concept to guide Russia to its legitimate place in the world. As Russian commentators have pointed out, particularly counter-productive are attempts to preempt by such a policy a growing strength of a coalition for the restoration of the Soviet Union, formed between outright nationalists and the ardent defenders of the Soviet system’s superior virtues. Because this will only direct the distrust and resistance of the outside world from Zhirinovskiy or similar extremists to the center Russian policy-making ("23"). Moreover, hopes to use a more assertive foreign policy to counter mounting frustration in Russian society and to unite it behind the government, misunderstand the reasons leading to the strengthening of the anti-democratic forces in the elections of December 1993. Russian voters were not interested in Zhirinovskiy’s crazy designs to restore Russia’s glory ("24"). They were simply fed up with the incompetence of the refor-

("21") Cf. the second SVOP-report (n.13), sections 3.6 and 3.7.

("22") On rather tough remarks, reportedly made by the foreign minister at a conference of his ministry, see «Kozyrev — for military presence in the states of the neighborhood», Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 January 1994, p. 1. These remarks caused considerable concern, especially among the Baltic neighbors.

("23") See Aleksey Pushkov, «Kozyrev started a game on foreign turf», Moskovskie Novosti, no. 4 (23-30 January 1994), p. A13 (in Russian); the same author, however, defended president Yeltsin’s request to be admitted to the G-7 summit in Naples in July 1994; cf. his article: «Yeltsin in Naples: Guest or participant?» Moskovskie Novosti, no. 27 (3-10 July 1994), p. 5 (in Russian); for a noteworthy criticism of Russia’s policy in ex-Yugoslavia, see Pavel Kandel’, «The Bosnian wheel: By pacifying the Serbs Moscow loses the trust of its Westerns partners», Segodnya, 5 August 1994, p. 3 (in Russian).

("24") Cf. the critical assessment of official opinions by Maksim Sokolov, «Slavology and balkanistics in the Russian leadership», Kommersant, no. 6 (22 February 1994), p. 7 (in Russian); see also the presentation of opinion research results by Igor’ Klyamkin, «Integration starts from “below”», Delo, no 30 (July 1994, p. 1/2 (in Russian).
mers, which brought material improvement and exciting business opportunities for a minority, while the majority is concerned with decreasing social and job security, and in particular, with the unprecedented rise of crime and corruption (\(^2\)). A veteran Western observer of the international scene, therefore, concluded after listening at a conference abroad to Russians arguing for the equal treatment of their country, that the Russian speakers apparently were driven more by emotions than by a clear definition of their interests (\(^2\)).

4. WRONG PRIORITIES

Reviewing the Russian debates on foreign policy in general, and on Russia’s role in the world in particular, gives reasons for a fundamental concern. Because this debate is premature. It detracts, consciously or unconsciously, from the tasks of domestic transformation. And to make the matter more serious still, in turning to the realm of foreign relations, Russia has hardly any instruments to play a role, except military power. That, however, reminds us of the Soviet Union which, after the original «internationalist» revolutionary appeal had exhausted itself, relied almost exclusively on its impressive military capacities. Here it does not matter, whether the rest of the world overestimated those capabilities. The decisive point is, that the Soviet Union’s super-power status lacked the civil foundation, which enables the US to win allies and adherents by relying on a superior economy and, no less important, on the global fascination with the «American way of life». If Russia re-enters the steep road to super-power status without these additional prerequisites, it will not only fail to gain lasting influence. It will eventually share the fate of the Soviet Union,

\(^{(2)}\) Clearly these dark sides of Russian reforms have been inadequately reflected in Western journalists' accounts or in statements by leading politicians. Because even if their authors are able to leave the comfortable, but isolating hotels, conference rooms, or negotiation tables in Moscow, where they can only meet the successful «new Russians», in order to familiarize themselves with real life in Russia, they, usually, still were eager to portray president Yeltsin and his team as partners deserving Western trust and support.

which collapsed because the Soviet leaders were unable to build their external power projection on solid internal fundamentals (21).

RUSSIA AND NATO

1. WHY RUSSIA CANNOT BECOME A MEMBER

One would have to search hard to find among the responsible representatives of the Transatlantic alliance somebody willing to advocate NATO's extension to include Russia. But Russian mainstream opinions, independent of more liberal or more centrist convictions, do not really differ from this (23). In particular, those Russian authors, who view NATO not so much as a relic of the Cold War and, therefore, do not call for its dissolution, nourish no hopes to join the Western alliance. They admit openly that such an extension would simply mean an overextension, making it impossible for NATO to assume any meaningful responsibility. De facto, it would mean the end of NATO (24). Hence Russian decision-makers and their advisors will have to decide, if they «can't join it», whether they should «beat it» or seek some mutually beneficial partnership (25).

2. NATO'S EASTWARD EXTENSION: A THREAT FOR RUSSIA?

The well-known recent controversies over the urgent requests by Poland and other East Central European states caused an equally well documented wave of protests from Russia. For the context of the present

(21) Similar concerns are expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev's aide, Anatoliy Chernyaev, «The Kozyrev doctrine is a provocation», Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 April 1994, p. 14 (in German).
(23) Blagovolin, (n. 28), p. 28.
(24) Blagovolin, On foreign and military policy... (n. 1), p. 9.
analysis we should focus on that part of the Russian counter-arguments, which provide for an insight into the apprehensions still associated with NATO in Russian minds.

Some influential authors stress the danger of Russia's «isolation» resulting from NATO's extension (41). As Jerzy Milewski, president Lech Walesa's closest top aid in defense and security matters, mused (42), it is not so easy to imagine such a huge powerful country being isolated. But probably that concern rests on scenarios, where Western interest and support for Russia's transformation will gradually decrease to a minimum, ultimately abandoning the reformers to their fate. Yet, it seems that such an undeniable danger is connected with many other aspects of the general relationship between Russia and the West. Hence, the argument does not carry a specific weight in the debate on NATO's extension.

Another argument, offered frequently with particular emphasis, reveals, indeed to a surprising degree, how much Western self-understanding of the alliance still differs from Russian perceptions. Russian authors, apparently, seem convinced that by pointing to the loss of 1500 kilometers between Moscow and the eastern border of NATO's original territory (43), they have come up already with an irrefutable argument. The implicit assumption, which seemingly does not require any further discussion, is strikingly simple: Once NATO's weapons and men are closer to Moscow, the increased danger for Moscow is obvious and Russia is forced to take additional expensive measures to deter the would-be aggressors (44). Alas, we are right back into the eternal debates, familiar also in the West: Should prudent defense policy be dominated exclusively by «capabilities» and «worst case» scenarios? Or does a «realistic» assessment call for the inclusion of «intentions» into the overall balance as well? Russian responsible officials

(41) Cf. in particular Sergey Karaganov, Deputy director of the Moscow based Institute of Europe, Member of the Presidential Council and Co-chairman of the SVOP-group (cf. n.11), «Extension of NATO leads to the isolation of Russia», Moskovskie Novosti, no. 38 (19 September 1993), p. A7 (in Russian).
(42) «Poland's way into NATO — Threat or chance?» Polska Zbrojna, 25-27 February 1994 (in Polish).
(43) Cf. Arbatov. Three angles... (n.6); the report of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR] (n.6); Viktor Litovkin, «33 pages of arguments 'for'», Izvestiya, 24 May 1994, p. 4 (in Russian). The article reports extensively on a study produced by the Russian Center for Problems of National Security and International Relations under the chairmanship of Sergey Rogov, where the arguments around «Partnership for Peace» are analyzed.
(44) This economic element figures prominently in the SVR-report (n.6).
and experts demonstrate, that they, despite all the talk about an end of the East-West-conflict, prefer to «play it safe» and to rely on the «laws of geopolitics» and «objective» capabilities which can be measured and counted.

Russian speakers retort by asking their Western or East Central European interlocutors: «Why do you need extension anyway? And against whom? Doesn't this show that you yourselves don't believe in peace with Russia and distrust us? So why are you so surprised that our society in Russia is deeply worried with NATO coming closer and, therefore, will not tolerate, it silently? If our government proves unable to prevent NATO's extension, the Russian people will support extremist forces!»

Apart from the questionable value — as already discussed above (p. 9/10) — of such references to alleged Russian public opinion, this Russian counter-argument, may be inadvertently, admits a rather significant fact: democratic virtues, as tolerance and the readiness for fair bargaining and compromise between conflicting interests, are still underdeveloped in Russia. Hence, there are reasons to be concerned with potential «intentions» of future Russian leaders. However, at this juncture we should concede that — contrary to fears expressed, for example, in Poland — scenarios which start with a «red-brown» leadership in the Kremlin bent on expanding Russian rule to Eastern Central Europe is far-fetched. Because such a leadership would be occupied sufficiently with restoring its rule over post-Soviet space. What is more, it would lack the domestic allies, Stalin had in 1944/45 in the countries liberated from German occupation (35).

And yet, the Russian discourse on the issue of NATO's extension reveals an additional problem: Russian top politicians as well as other speakers betray a clear lack of «empathy», i. e. the ability to put themselves into the shoes of their smaller neighbors and to try to imagine, how a Pole, an Estonian, an Ukrainian, or an Azeri will react to Russian words and actions. As long as they can remember, Russian leaders always felt that they alone had the right to decide what was good for the smaller nations, too. While that attitude did not preclude, as many Russians emphasize nowadays correctly, Russian sacrifices for the material and

(35) These considerations have led this author to address a Polish audience and to argue for the priority of EU membership for the four Visegrád countries, cf. Christoph Royen, «The extension of EU and NATO and the Coalescence of Europe», Polska w Europie, no. 13 (January 1994), pp. 77-85 (in Polish).
cultural development of smaller neighbors, such benevolence and magnanimity still depended on Moscow’s discretion. Maybe, Andrey Kozyrev was not even aware of this psychological aspect, when he suggested to a Polish audience, that their security needs could be dealt with through common guarantees by Russia and the West (38).

Therefore, reading in Tallinn or in Warsaw the contents of the new Russian Military doctrine, adopted early in November 1993, according to which «the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of states bordering on the Russian Federation» is regarded as a «factor furthering the escalation [pererastanie] from a military danger to a direct military threat for the Russian Federation», unless Russia has given its prior consent in the UN Security Council or «some other regional organ of collective security» — is something different from reading the same text in Moscow. From here it is not too far to an even more unequivocal case of self-serving arguments in the Russian debate on NATO extension, where Russian spokesmen do not hesitate to explain their opposition by adducing the interests of Russian arms manufacturers threatened by a definite loss of the former Warsaw Pact markets, once this area is incorporated into the Western alliance (37). Finally, insinuations that behind NATO’s extension one should keep an attentive eye on Germany’s potential interests (38), were met, at least in Poland, with vivid recollections of that German bugaboo’s earlier function in cementing Polish-Soviet friendship.

In summing up this review, we cannot but to conclude that the Russian contribution to the debate has failed to make a threat, emanating from NATO’s eastward extension plausible. Rather, these contributions themselves re-enforce uneasy feelings among Russia’s neighbors and partners, how deeply rooted some elements of «old thinking» still are among that country’s political elites (39).

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(38) Cf. Krzysztof Mrozwicz, «Hard is soft», Polityka, no. 10 (5 March 1994), p. 18 (in Polish). The author reports from a Polish-Russian conference in Kraków, attended by foreign ministers Kozyrev and Olechowski. See also Vyseslav Nikonoy (n.10).

(37) Cf. Karaganov, Extension of NATO... (n.31).

(39) Cf. Arbato, Tree angles... (n.6); the SVR-report (n.6).

(39) Blagovolin, Is there... (n.28) shares this assessment. For an unexpected reflection along similar lines in the Russian Armed Forces’ daily, see Ponomarev (n.28). The author suggests that Russian distrustful reactions to the WEU’s decision to accord «associated partnership» to nine East Central European states, including the three Baltic countries, will be taken in those countries as a confirmation of their own fears of Russia.
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3. NACC AND PfP: «PLACEBOS» OR BUILDING BLOCS?

If NATO membership for Russia is neither desired nor deemed feasible by all sides concerned, naturally the question arises, whether there are forms of cooperation below the level of alliance membership, which could serve mutually accepted interests. The «North Atlantic Cooperation Council» [NACC] owes its birth in 1991 to a previous era, when the Soviet Union had let the member-states of the Warsaw Pact choose a change of the political system, and, as a consequence, had to terminate that pact's existence. US foreign minister James Baker and his German colleague Hans-Dietrich Genscher, therefore, deemed it important to have a common organization, suitable to mediate and influence the security relations between the USSR and its former allies. However, before this idea of a «trialogue» could be tested, the Soviet Union ended its own existence. The quick decision adopted by NATO's members to offer NACC membership to the 15 heirs of the USSR, may have been unavoidable. But it could not possibly address the concerns of such a variety of members in a form satisfying everybody. East Central Europeans, obviously, felt degraded by sharing NATO's attention with, say, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan or Azerbaidzhan. But these newcomers to international relations and conferences sensed also, that their needs and worries could not adequately be understood, much less taken care of by the Transatlantic alliance. Hence, NACC suffers from its collective size and is viewed by Russians as an empty shell to be used for completely new contents under different auspices. Therefore, recently Russian spokesmen have begun to propose severing NACC's strings to NATO and to include it into their schemes for pan-European security under the authority of the CSCE.

«Partnership for Peace» [PfP] seems to draw a lesson from NACC's failure. Based on president Bill Clinton's initiative, presented in the autumn of 1993, it was supposed to avoid the collective approach and to open, instead, the individual paths lacking in NACC. However, the crux of the matter, of course, rests with the obvious fact that a purely individual approach to security problems misses the most important issues of relations between neighbors in the same area. And being aware of the East Central Europeans' pressing for NATO membership as the «real thing», the authors of PfP were forced to split the offer without openly saying so.
Thus they invented the suggestion that participation in PfP would amount to a test on the resolve and capability to engage in meaningful military cooperation as a precondition for eventual NATO membership. Yet, at the same time, the fathers of PfP could not and did not wish to hide the different nature of such a contest. For some candidates it was meant as a serious preparatory stage for eventual acceptance into the Transatlantic alliance. For others, first of all for Russia, but also for the Central Asian and the Transcaucasian CIS members, that perspective was foreclosed.

Russian leaders initially were not sure, whether the offer contained anything worthwhile for them. After some months of discussing the pros and cons, they opted for the old prescription of «if you can't beat it, join it». First they tried to exploit NATO's desire to have them on board by demanding a special role, making their PfP different from everybody else's participation and conforming to Russian aspirations to be respected as a «big» or even a «super»-power.

NATO's member governments quickly realized that to meet these Russian conditions fully would automatically reduce the value of PfP for those partners, which regarded themselves as future NATO members and were ready to do their best to meet NATO's expectations and standards. The Russians, equally aware of NATO's dilemma, showed flexibility and agreed to sign practically the same general framework agreement as all the smaller participants.

Apparently, Moscow had reached the conclusion that participation would, beyond some practical benefits, offer also the chance to keep a close watch on NATO's relations with the candidates for membership. But the overriding reason for ending the lively controversies, which had evolved around the subject of PfP in the Russian capital, had again to do — as in the case of NACC — with Russia's bigger game: the transformation of the CSCE into the central instrument to coordinate European security. Slamming the door in the face of NATO's PfP messengers would have served no purpose except satisfying those who wished to demonstrate how Russia can react to a lack of respect for its power and authority. Signing the PfP documents assured Moscow of the continued dialogue channels to promote its favorite CSCE project.
Before we can discuss this cornerstone of Russia's future relations with the Transatlantic alliance, we should take a brief look at Russia's attitude to the Western European Union (WEU). Thus far, Russian comments and analyses show a clear tendency to attribute to WEU only a marginal role. While West Europeans like to call WEU the «European pillar» of NATO, Russians seem inclined to view it more as an appendix. Conforming to those prevailing assessments, Russian speakers rejecting NATO's eastward extension, here and then dropped a little side remark that they would, of course, have no objections, if the East Central Europeans were admitted to full membership in the EU and in the WEU.

Apart from this particular aspect, one could find occasionally additional evaluations of WEU's significance. One author saw WEU's positive value in contributing to the control of potential German expansionism (40). Another group of analysts maintained negatively, that WEU's narrow focus of interests might enhance Russia's isolation and exclusion from Europa (41).

To be sure, in explaining Russia's generally relaxed view of the WEU, we should not overlook parallels in the West. After all, not only Americans, but also the majority of West European experts for many years regarded the WEU as a side alley not to be compared with the main road of NATO.

However, beneath the smooth surface of Russia's benign neglect for WEU, more recently, at several instances we could notice signals of a changing attitude. When the WEU decided in late 1993 to give an observer status to nine East Central European states, including the three Baltic countries, the echo in Moscow was mooted. Yet, when the WEU five months later, under French-German prodding, raised that status to the level of «associated partnership», suddenly critical comments and concerned inquiries emerged from the Russian foreign and defense ministries (42).

(40) Arbatov. Russia's Foreign Policy alternatives... (n.3), p. 33.
Certainly, the WEU is far from entering the headlines of the Russian press. Thus we are forced to speculate. One might dismiss, of course, the recent raising of eye-brows in Moscow as motivated exclusively by Western discussions, suggesting to the Poles and other impatient candidates for NATO membership that by entering WEU, they would gain almost the same security guarantees, due to the intensive symbiosis of WEU's and NATO's treaty obligations.

Nevertheless, we should not exclude that some Russian analysts already look ahead to the WEU review conference, planned for 1996, and see it in conjunction with the perspectives of EU integration. Such analysts would certainly register the constant discussion in the EU, how to square the circle of combining «deepening» with «broadening» the EU. But they cannot be absolutely sure about the failure of EU's ambitious plans. Hence they would have to prepare at least one scenario for the first years after the turn of the millenium, in which the EU comes closer to representing a European super-power. That in turn, would rejuvenate the old debate from Soviet years, whether it is Russia's interest to support the rise of such a second, rival power on the European continent, or whether Russia should follow the example of the late Leonid Brezhnev and opt again for «Big Twoism» with the US. Of course, as popular wisdom has it, one can never enter the same river twice. Too many intervening variables and additional factors may lead Moscow's decision-makers this time to try the other road, or to discover that the alternative to choose only between the US and Western Europe belongs to a time, when the world, anyway, was structured much more simply by basic bloc dichotomy.

5. CSCE AND REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY AS RUSSIA'S CHALLENGES OF NATO

Again, there is no need to requote the myriad of recent statements coming from Moscow, announcing Russia's preference for the CSCE as the supreme body to coordinate and to organize peace and security «between Vancouver and Vladivostok» (49). More relevant for our purpose is already

(49) As a lonely dissenting opinion, we can only quote Blagovolin, On foreign and military policy... (n.1), p. 5, who declared that CSCE was no conceivable substitute for existing structures, especially not for NATO.
the question, what role Russian policy reserves for NATO. Because almost nobody (44) in the foreign policy establishment is suggesting that the future CSCE will make NATO superfluous. Instead Western observers, earlier this year, noted with attention two modes of Russian parlance: Some statements seemed to postulate NATO’s «subordination» under the CSCE (45). Defense minister Pavel Grachev, however, during his visit to Brussels in May 1994 appeared to have set the record straight by describing CSCE’s envisaged function as «coordinating» (46).

Whether this is sufficient to dispel apprehension in NATO’s Secretariat and in the members’ capitals (47), remains to be seen. The difference between the two modes can vary between stark contrast and invisibility. The other architectural aspect has to do with Russian schemes showing both NATO and the CIS on the same level as equal subregional structures to be «coordinated» at the CSCE «top». Apart from natural instinctive reluctance in the West to see a rather dubious, hardly efficient, in fact chaos-ridden assembly of new states raised to one’s own level, the essential problem is directly connected with that basic ambiguity of Russian policy in Europe, emphasized at the outset of our analysis: Under the conditions of de facto hegemony of Russia in the CIS, Western adoption of Russia’s scheme comes close to improve Russia’s position into a de iure hegemony (48).

One of the more liberal Russian analysts (49) draws our attention to a closely related third consequence, not to be neglected: Contrary to official Russian claims, the establishment of such de iure hegemony could turn out, in case the CSCE proves less efficient in its coordinating capacity than the

(44) For an exception to this general observations, cf. Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, «Partnership in the name of NATO?» Argumenty i Fakty, no. 22 (June 1994), p. 3 (in Russian). The USSR’s last minister of defense and the first and only Chief commander of the short-lived United Armed Forces of the CIS apparently sees no function for NATO, once the CSCE has reached its full blossom.

(45) At least, that seemed to be the impression from the visit of Russia’s minister of defense, Pavel Grachev, together with president Yeltsin in Bonn; cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 May 1994, p. 1/2; Atlantic News, no. 2623 (18 May 1994), p. 1.

(46) According to an unofficial English translation.

(47) For such apprehensions cf. «Russia calls the shots: Moscow’s diplomats are outplaying the West», The Times, 27 May 1994, p. 19; Frederik Bonnard, «Is There Really Room for the Russians?» International Herald Tribune, 8 June 1994, p. 8.

(48) See Bruce Clark, «Old enemies make tricky friends», Financial Times, 9 June, p. 15.

(49) Colonel Vitaliy Portnikov, the newspaper’s military commentator, together with two other authors’ comments under the common heading: «We do not want to frighten the world», Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 June 1994, p. 3 (in Russian).
Russian blueprint designers promise at present, to initiate a new split of Europe, since Russia would be tied to its Eurasian space.

This argument serves to vindicate those in Russia who oppose CIS reintegration (see above p. 9) and criticize the West for condoning Russia's concentration on post-Soviet space. Such criticism, summed up in the dramatic resurrection of the specter of a «new Yalta» (30), this time separating the earlier beneficiary of the original Yalta split from the rest of Europe, cannot be dismissed lightly. Because it is tempting for Western politicians and societies to be relieved of any co-responsibility for the uncertain fate of post-Soviet space and its difficult heritage (31). And yet, we still have not invented a technotronic age version of a Chinese wall, so brilliantly described in that famous Russian utopian novel «We» by Evgeniy Zamyatin almost seven decades ago.

Finally, Russian designs for a transformed CSCE have to answer the fundamental question: Who is going to influence the CSCE's decision-making process? Until now, most of the pertinent descriptions and drafts include some kind of a steering organ, usually called — with minor variations — «European Security Council» (32). Predictably, in that gremium the US and Russia will be represented permanently. Some additional permanent members are recruited either from major European countries, like France, Great Britain, and Germany, or — as one author proposes (33) — a permanent seat is accorded to the EU.

As in the UN Security Council, additional members are participating for a limited period of time. A variant might bring in subregional groups with a rotating mechanism restricted to that group's members.

The decisive element hinges, of course, on the solution for the vexed dilemma between the principle of consensus, which would seem to correspond to the idea of international democracy, and the «upper class» version of the same principle, called veto power, on the one hand, or the revolutionary solution of deciding by (qualified) majority vote, on the other. Not

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(30) Zagorskiy (n.20).
(33) Arbatov (n.52).
surprisingly, Russian authors tend to regard veto rights for permanent members as evidently normal and correct. As a comfort for the «lower classes» they point to equal veto rights for «their», i.e. the Western leading powers (\textsuperscript{44}). Others just skirt the issue. (\textsuperscript{45}). But at least one Russian contribution to the debate seems to design a mechanism of decision by two-thirds majority (\textsuperscript{46}).

However, governments not only in Moscow will hardly follow that latter proposal. Thus it is likely that we will end up with another model of consensus & veto, which practically re-enforce each other. But since the CSCE is supposed to provide for peace and security by giving orders (mandates) to NATO or the CIS (or other gremia), the potential victims of aggression will just ask: How would such a supreme pan-European guarantor of security, where action can be blocked by one of the carriers of veto-power, be able to protect our country? Obviously, this leads us back to the opening remarks, since we can safely assume that Russian planners are equally aware of this elementary flaw in their concept.

The conclusion seems evident: The «great debate» on pan-European security is likely to serve as an umbrella, under which Russia attempts to organize the heritage incurred from the USSR. The members of the Transatlantic alliance will have to make their minds up, whether and how they can contribute to this task aiming to avoid another edition of the Soviet Union.

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\textsuperscript{(*)} Arbatov (n.52).
\textsuperscript{(2)} Chudakov et alii (n.41).