The Symbiosis of Culture and Innovation in Tourism

Volume 6 | Número 1 | Março 2016

Volume 6 | Number 1 | March 2016

Volumen 6 | Número 1 | Marzo 2016

www.isce-turismo.com

ISSN: 2183-0800
1930S SUNNY COAST & THE SPANISH MARKET: A BLAST FROM THE PAST

Cristina Carvalho
Escola Superior de Hotelaria e Turismo do Estoril


**Resumo:** Este estudo empírico baseia-se no doutoramento da autora, visando resgatar das Areias do Tempo o espírito do destino em análise, através de dados recolhidos em periódicos dos anos 30 e em abordagens actuais ao nível da História Política, da Guerra, do Turismo e do Lazer. Em 1910 o micro-clima cascalense levaria o casal Figueiredo aos Estorís e, em 1914, o empresário investiria num projecto que visava erguer de raiz a primeira estância internacional em Portugal. O plano concretizou-se, mesmo quando a República cedeu lugar às ditaduras militar e civil, pois como Hall defende, regimes autoritários não repelem turistas. O Estoril foi então galvanizado pela Lei do Jogo, cedo atraindo poderosos e derrubados, na maioria britânicos e espanhóis, como Gibbons redigiu em 1936. Esta recordação começa com um sumário do delicado contexto ibérico entre 1910 e 1939, para depois referir a Costa do Sol como palco oficioso da Guerra Civil de Espanha, visto desde 1931 ali se refugiarem personagens como o General Sanjurjo. Tais visitantes eram mimados por um Vice-Consulado (Cascais), um hotel gerido por galegos (Monte Estoril), uma panóplia de deleites de lazer (Estoril) e a Rádio Club de Parede. O apoio da Costa do Sol a Franco cedo conduziu a rumores que afastou turistas, por isso se abordarão ainda as estratégias empregues para os suplantar. Terminaremos com menção à realidade actual de equipamentos e da fraca memória histórica, cujo resgate devido permitirá criar nova oferta cultural no destino ‘Cascais’ coevo para este nicho de mercado vizinho.

**Palavras-Chaves:** Década de 1930, Estoril, Guerra Civil de Espanha, Costa do Sol, Turismo.

**Abstract:** This empirical study is based on the author’s PhD thesis. It aims at rescuing from the Sands of Time the spirit of the destination under analysis, basing itself on the data collected from 1930s newspapers, besides contemporary approaches to that decade in the fields of Political History, War, Tourism, and Leisure. In 1910 the Figueiredos were led to...
Estoris due to the microclimate, and by 1914 the entrepreneur invested on a local project meant to erect Portugal’s 1st international resort built from scratch. The plan was accomplished even after the Republican regime made way for the military and civilian dictatorships, for as Hall defends authoritarian regimes do not repel tourists. Estoril was then propelled by the Gambling Law and, as Gibbons wrote in 1936, it soon attracted the mighty and the fallen, mainly of British and Spanish origins. This recollection begins with a summary of the delicate Iberian context between 1910 and 1939, and then refers the Sunny Coast as the unofficial stage of the Spanish Civil War, for since 1931 characters like General Sanjurjo settled as refugees. These visitors were pampered thanks to a Vice-Consulate (Cascais), a hotel managed by Galician partners (Monte Estoril), a multitude of leisure delights (Estoril), and Parede’s Radio Club. The Sunny Coast’s support to Franco soon led to rumours that drove tourists away, hence the reference to the strategies applied to overcome them. One shall finish by mentioning the current reality of equipments and the weak historic memory, whose proper recovery might allow to create a new cultural offer linked to the contemporary ‘Cascais’ destination for this neighbouring niche market.

Keywords: 1930s, Estoril, Spanish Civil War, Sunny Coast, Tourism.

Introduction

Following a Swiss doctor’s advice, in 1910 Fausto Figueiredo moved to Monte Estoril due to his wife’s health. An entrepreneur and a well-travelled man he soon devised a plan to erect Portugal’s 1st international resort built from scratch across a coastal pinewood. On the 20th May 1914 Figueiredo presented the project Estoril – Estação Maritima, Climatica, Thermal e Sportiva to government, defending Tourism as a social practice of polite nations and a breath of fresh air for the budgets of states like Monaco, besides the attractions the resort was to offer. From 1929 onwards Estoril became a playground for the world’s leisured-classes with an array of inaugurations including the Golf course, the Palace Hotel, the arrival of a Sud-Express carriage to the site, yet the ace up the resort’s sleeve was legal Gambling. No wonder that in 1936 John Gibbons published a guide describing appeals, seasons and niche markets: the British in the winter and the Spanish in the summertime.

This article is divided into 5 sections. After this introduction, a summary of the early-20th century Iberian context (1910-1939) is provided. The next chapter recalls the 1930s Sunny Coast as backdrop for the Spanish Civil War, while the following focuses on strategies applied to overcome rumours. Conclusion and sources of research complete this empirical study based on the author’s PhD thesis. The theoretical reflection is based on the data collected from 1930s newspapers and contemporary approaches on the decade in the fields of Political History, War, Tourism, and Leisure.
The Early-20th century Iberian Context (1910-1939)

The diplomatic relations between Portugal and Spain have always been fickle, alternating between suspicion and friendship, and in the early-20th century witnessed Portugal’s transition into a Republic in 1910, while Spain sustained its Crown. Lisbon’s lack of visibility and the German craving over its African colonies explained the need for the young Republic to join the 1st World War on Britain’s side. By 1919 King Alfonso XIII’s Spain changed its discourse towards cooperation, while the deposed Manuel II of Portugal warned Spain’s claws lurked in the shadows (Gomez, 1997). In 1923 General Primo de Rivera’s Coup d’État settled a dictatorship and harmony ensued, leading to the 1929 State visit of President Óscar Carmona. When in 1930 Rivera fell the same happened to mutual respect. April 1931 marked Alfonso XIII’s abdication and Manuel Azaña’s election as leader of a Republican-Socialist coalition, sending opponents to exile in Portugal while Spain attracted those who rejected Lisbon’s dictatorships (Serrão & Marques, 1990). The perception of an upcoming Coup organised by mavericks exiled in Paris, Madrid and Galicia justified President Carmona’s 1931 request to the Spanish government that Portuguese rebels should live more than 100 km away from the borderline (Wheeler, 1986).

The rise to power of leftist ideals under Spain’s II Republic in 1931 set a divergence between both regimes. The lack of understanding was reinforced after the August 1931 attack to Portugal’s embassy in Madrid, and the discovery of smuggled weaponry sent to Spain’s embassy in Lisbon in 1932 (Gomez, 1997). In 1932 monarchists engaged on a failed Coup in Seville, but men like General Sanjurjo were arrested (Diário de Lisboa, 11 Aug 1932). As an act of good will on the 11th February 1933 the Spanish Institute was inaugurated in Lisbon after Ambassador Juan José Rocha’s efforts of conciliation (Idem, 8 Feb 1933). Meanwhile, November 1933’s elections witnessed the rise of the right thus opening the lines of communication, especially when Alcalá Zamora helped Salazar to ascertain Azaña’s involvement in conspiracies (Diário de Noticias, 11 Nov 1937). By the end of the year the Iberian countries were to sign commercial and political treaties (Gomez, 1997). With the right dominating Spain in January 1934 an amnesty was granted to Seville’s plotters and many chose Portugal to live in. In June 1935 several were the intellectuals invited by the Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional (the Portuguese Propaganda organism) led by António Ferro to attend Lisbon’s festivities, and among them were Miguel de Unamuno and the Marquis of Quintanar, who visited Sanjurjo in Monte and were lodged in Estoril. By the end of 1935, Armindo Monteiro, Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Madrid proving the new diplomatic stage. In January 1936 Quintanar wrote a letter from Villa Contreiras (rented in Monte) to Ferro’s wife (poet Fernanda de Castro) requesting her assistance to organise a tour to Alcobaça and Batalha for friends that needed 6 to 8 cars. He also reminded her on how important for Estoril this visit would be considering the State’s co-ownership since 1934 (PT/FAQ/AF/001/0363/00012).

Salazar’s mistrust towards Madrid and the 1385 in Aljubarrota Battle lurked at the dictator’s mind, and the situation got worse with the Popular Front’s February 1936’s
elections victory. It meant Azaña was back, sending Sánchez-Albornoz as Ambassador, since Gil Robles’ CEDA (Spanish Confederation of the rightist parties) was beaten by a coalition of Republicans, Socialists and Communists. During the 1<sup>st</sup> meeting between the Portuguese dictator and Spain’s new representative, the latter was warned for his country not to meddle in Portugal’s domestic affairs and its internationally acknowledged independence (Gomez, 1997). As the weeks went by the friction between states and the games involving Sanjurjo, Quintanar and Salazar explain Lisbon’s unofficial support to any attempt aiming at reverting Spain back to the rightist ideals. Salazar even informed the director of the State Police (Agostinho Lourenço) to let Quintanar know the regime would not allow military runways to be used, but private one were not the authorities’ concern (Vicente, 2003). Between February and July 1936 Portugal hosted Madrid’s opponents plotting the July uprising (CML, 1996), and in May generals Cavalcanti and Pérez met in Estoril representatives of the German and Italian governments to debate the future (Abreu, 1998). Spain’s turmoil was reported in Portugal’s newspapers that stated the destruction caused since the left reached power. As one reads: “Foram mortas 51 pessoas e incendiados 16 igrejas, 11 conventos, 29 centros políticos, 10 sédes de jornais, 21 armazéns de víveres, muitas casas particulares, cafés e teatros” (O Século, 19 March 1936, 1).

On the 13<sup>th</sup> July Calvo Sotelo, leader of the Monarchist Party, was shot and although the Communists were blamed for the murder, it was mostly likely perpetrated by the Falange, after Rivera’s orders, as a trigger to the Alzamiento (Brasillach & Bardèche, 1939). Sotelo’s widow and children soon settled in the Estoril area (Diário de Notícias, 19 July 1936). Three days later, when interviewed Sanjurjo declined rumours of an impending plot (Idem, 16 July 1936), but on the 20<sup>th</sup> July it were news on his demise in Quinta da Marinha’s private runway that filled headlines. Captain Juan Antonio Ansaldo was the pilot sent by Mola to transport him to Burgos, where he was to lead a battalion towards Madrid. Ansaldo survived after jumping off the falling aircraft, while the General’s death was witnessed by family and friends who went to bid him farewell (Diário da Manhã, 21 July 1936). Among them was Quintanar with whom Sanjurjo even settled a lunch in the La Peña restaurant, in Madrid, in the forthcoming days (Diário de Notícias, 21 July 1936). While Artiles (1970) criticised the speed with which the investigation was conducted and the lack of an autopsy, Pena (2009) wrote about the involvement of the Spanish State Police in the tragedy.

With the respects being paid in Estoril’s mother church, the temple was crowded, and Nobel awarded Saramago mocked the 50,000 refugees then announced by the Press did not bring only white clothes, as a reference to the blue and black shirts of Spanish and Italian fascists present at the destination. As the author (1984/2011) refers, the Falangistas “só não esperavam que tivessem de mostrar tudo à luz do dia por tão dolorosos motivos” (523-524). The Alzamiento went ahead under the leadership of generals Mola (in the north) and Queipo de Llano (in the south), and in August Captain Moniz made a call-to-arms on an anti-Communist rally in Campo Pequeno to defend Portugal and convince volunteers to fight on the Nationalists’ side. Soon, paramilitary organisations (Legião and Mocidade portuguesas) emerged to prepare men and youngsters alike; as Rosas (1998) recalls, Salazar perceived the role played by the belligerence for the survival of his regime, and soon “O
Governo português empenha-se a fundo e assumidamente no apoio a Franco em todos os planos” (22).

In spite of having signed the Non-Intervention Agreement alongside Britain and France, Salazar played a wild card with the veiled support granted in material, logistic and broadcasting terms. On the latter one considers Rádio Club Português, the radio station founded by Moniz in 1928, whose 1934 Modernist headquarters were designed by architects Tertuliano and Vasco Lacerda Marques. RCP was a beacon of resistance for speeches against Communism (Cancela d’Abreu’s Cinco Minutos Anti-Comunistas) and for the plotters (Robles, Quintanar, and Queipo de Llhano) who sent support to the warfronts (Diário da Manhã, 23 Aug 1936). Even the Portuguese press engaged on a campaign against Madrid, and França (2010) writes it defended “a Espanha espanhola contra a Espanha moscovita” (104). Due to this assistance in 1937 Lisbon woke up twice to the sound of bombings. As Rosas (2005) states, “Os ataques bombistas contra as instalações dos aparelhos de propaganda, policiais e militares do Estado Novo mais envolvidos no apoio à rebelião franquista precederam de pouco o atentado contra Salazar” (100). What was assumed as an easy Coup spread like wildfire; within the early months of combat its architects were to die (Sotelo, Sanjurjo, Mola, and Rivera), hence the leadership of General Francisco Franco de Bahamonde, who came from Morocco to command it. Britain and France firstly convinced other states not to interfere; fearing the growing German and Italian control over Spain (and Europe), Britain did its best to keep Portugal out of the conflict, as a means to preserve London’s geostrategic position in continental affairs and the access to Gibraltar. By May 1938 with the fate of the War nearly sealed Lisbon acknowledged Burgos’s government’s legitimacy, but fearing Hitler’s predominance over Franco a Treaty of Friendship and mutual neutrality was sealed in March 1939. Dacosta (1997/2009) refers the regime’s cunning streak when writing that “Salazar revelou-se de um maquiavelismo diplomático notável” (70). As historian Kay (1970) recalls,

It was because of Portugal’s sympathy for General Franco’s Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War that critics abroad began to attach the Fascist label to the Portuguese regime… Life, however, in the peninsula has never been open to quite such a simplified reading (86).

**The 1930s Sunny Coast as backdrop of the Spanish Civil War**

The settlement of Spain’s II Republic in 1931 forced monarchists and conservatives to seek exile in Lisbon, Cascais and Estoril (CML, 1996), and this preference derived from promotional strategies devised since 1929 when Barcelona and Seville hosted exhibitions and the Conselho Nacional de Turismo was founded to manage Portugal’s promotion abroad. After the January 1934 amnesty Portugal hosted a new wave of refugees, like General Sanjurjo. The Marquis of Riff claimed the choice due to its peaceful atmosphere (A Voz, 28 April 1934), and in April 1934 he and his family docked in Alcântara, where refugees and the Press awaited. The group included the film producer Tobis Portuguesa
that recorded scenes later exhibited in the Estoril Casino (Idem, 3 May 1934). Sanjurjo checked in Miramar Hotel, the only 1st-class unit in Monte, whose owners were Spanish who also managed the Boaventura inn; he later rented Villa Leocádia (Diário de Notícias, 16 July 1936). The months ahead were of pure bliss with a visit to Oporto’s Colonial Exhibition and his son’s Justo’s marriage in Estoril’s church, in August (O Século, 8 July 1934; A Voz, 5 Aug 1934). By 1934 there were references to a Vice-consulate of Spain in Cascais; as newspapers reminded, since 1931 the Cascais-Estoril territorial axis hosted refugees, besides visiting relatives who arrived in the summertime. On the latter, an article was published on the positive effects both flows implied across Portugal’s economy (Diário de Lisboa, 12 Sept 1934). However, in theoretical terms one must tell refugees from tourists as the World Tourism Organisation stated in 1991, when claiming visitors may be divided into day-trippers and tourists depending on the length of their stay, while tourism statistics do not count on refugees, immigrants, and passengers in transit (OMT, 2001).

The Estoril resort’s managers perceived the presence of the Spanish elite as an opportunity to seize profit through a programme of events set for this niche market’s satisfaction. Consulting newspapers published between 1934 and 1939 the overall perception is that summer was the high season, but all-year-round events were organised to pamper them. One may recall the parading of Andalucian costumes and the musical performance of the group Sol de España in the pinewood close to the Casino in August 1935 (O Século, 29 Aug 1935), or the Jaime Planas’ orchestra on 1936’s Shrove Tuesday (Diário de Lisboa, 20 Feb 1936). The exiled ladies organised events whose profits reverted to local charities (Cascais’ Almshouse), or working institutions (Estoril’s Oficinas de São José) (Anjos, 2012). Even amateur football matches were arranged with players using Estoril’s sports field; unlike what happened in official terms (for in Spain football was a professional activity), on both matches victory fell on the hosting country’s side (O Estoril, 9 May 1936; Idem, 31 May 1936).

By 1936 the Sunny Coast had Cascais, Monte, Estoril, and Parede as focal spots for the Spanish. While the Cascais-Estoril axis attracted mostly Portuguese and British visitors since the late-19th century, the sudden income of Spanish added a new nationality to the equation. In 1936 Gibbons matched seasons and markets stating that wintertime was the Briton’s favourite period, while the Iberian neighbours (and South-American travellers) cherished summertime. Sanjurjo’s demise meant a promotional lucky strike on a free-of-charge basis, if one considers the Media impact caused by the disaster, the photographs published, and the filming of resorts and funeral. Images of the crash site and funeral were edited by Cifesa, the Spanish producer that promoted El Entierro del General Sanjurjo, thus inaugurating “a produção cinematográfica franquista” (Pena, 2009, 175-176). Still in 1936 Films Patria distributed Homenaje a Portugal across Spain thanking Lisbon’s support, and the movie included images like Sanjurjo’s burial site at Estoril’s cemetery.

Leisure & War blended in September 1936, when a shooting gallery was inaugurated two steps away from the Casino to entertain and improve the aim of both Portuguese volunteers (the Viriatus) and the Spanish who came to rest in Estoril (O Século, 3 Sept 1936). English journalist Ralph Fox (1936/2006) dropped by before proceeding to Spain to
join the XV International Brigade against Fascism and wrote about Estoril’s importance for the nationalists, hence the presence of middle-aged monarchists alongside fit, tanned, young men (Falangistas) recently-arrived to rest before returning to the warfront.

With the Civil War underway Fátima became a focal sanctuary promoted by the Estado Novo to convince on the need to fight Communism, and by the refugees who sought spiritual assistance and enrolled in Estoril’s church to join a pilgrimage on the 12th August 1936, three weeks after the War broke out (Diário da Manhã, 5 Aug 1936). Léonard (1996/1998) states its basilica had been ordered in 1930 and the Spanish conflict helped reinforce its cult, since Salazar sustained Portugal was the defender of Christian civilisation against barbarity, considering Our Lady’s 1917 message: the fight against Communism was part of the Holy request. The sanctuary already attracted foreigners, as one reads on a June 1935 article mentioning 32 French tourists spent a day there, after visits to Sintra, Cascais, and Estoril (O Século, 13 June 1935).

Portugal’s mask of neutrality fell whenever the Casino offered programmes like the tea party that celebrated the 68 days of Toledo’s resistance and included the auctioning of a canvas offered by painter Jorge Colaço, as a means to provide revenue to the Nationalists’ cause (Diário de Notícias, 29 Sept 1936; O Século, 25 Oct 1936). The assistance to Franco included the gathering of foodstuffs and clothing pieces with Sanjurjo’s widow’s sponsorship. In Monte Celso Alvarez’ garage lent automobiles for the convoys (Abreu, 1996) and RCP organised many (Oliveira, 1987/1998). The support broadcasted relied on names like the Spanish Robles, the Portuguese member of Parliament Cancela D’Abreu (who owned shares of Estoril resort), besides the Spanish radio announcer Marisabel de la Torre, a.k.a. ‘Berta da Parede’. As Razola (1996) writes, RCP had

Emissores com capacidade para cobrir grande parte da Extremadura, o Norte da Andaluzia e parte significativa das duas Castela (…). A sua intervenção foi decisiva em vários momentos da guerra como, por exemplo, durante a progressão das colunas militares nacionalistas sobre Madrid ou durante o cerco ao Alcazar de Toledo (48).

Why did Salazar allow RCP’s interventionist programmes if he had signed a Non-intervention pact? Lisbon cunningly replied to its opponents that the broadcasting company was private, so the regime could not interfere. As Abreu (1996) recalls:

Enquanto o Rádio Clube Português, mercê do seu estatuto de «estação privada», representou a intervenção directa e militante no teatro das operações, no apoio inequívoco à causa nacionalista, a Emissora Nacional perfilhou a «isenção e equidistância» dos seus serviços noticiosos, atenta às posições de Salazar face à comunidade internacional (38).

Considering the Sunny Coast’s involvement from April 1934 to July 1936 one might designate the interval as a period of ‘conspiracy lurking amidst leisure practices’, while the Civil War should be dubbed as ‘managing the Coup under the sun & over beach cocktails’. The care-free life led by the Falangistas across Estoril was denounced by Ambassador Sánchez-Albornoz on a 6th August 1936 letter to Madrid: on the 2nd, he wrote, he saw four armed men in uniforms chatting over a table in Tamariz beach, and admitting the purpose
of their stay was to heal from injuries suffered at the Guadarrama front (Vicente, 2003). In April 1938 Natividad Zaro, a Nationalists nurse who chose Estoril to rest and write about, was referred in newspapers (O Século Ilustrado, 16 April 1938). But sorrow also reached the area due to casualties of young volunteers like Eduardo Bastos Vilar (the Casino director’s nephew) and Egídio Pinho Oliveira (member of Cascais’ 10th Battalion of the Legião Portuguesa).

Attention must be drawn to the regular visits of Falangistas that included a trip to Estoril for refreshments and to Cascais to visit Sanjurjo’s crash site, as it happened in January 1938 (O Século, 2 Jan 1938). While this site gave rise to grieving flows one now catalogues as Dark Tourism practices, that year in Spain witnessed the promotion of the War Route of the North that offered itineraries on 33-seat buses with a specialist guide, once the war then ragged south (Idem, 7 July 1938). The so-modern (even futuristic) sense of simultaneous apprehension of historic events on the rise was used to inflate horror before the destruction caused by the Communists (yet, all troops committed atrocities). In April 1938 Franco created the National Spanish State Tourist Department led by Bolín, with the packages of the War Route of the North (and later that of the south) including three meals a day, 1st-class hotels, tips and incidentals. The Rutas Nacionales de Guerra differed from the battlefield tourist practices observed after the Great War because “this was the first time that a regime whose claim to legitimacy remained very much in question had sponsored and conducted tours before the completion of a civil war” (Holguín, 2005, 1400). The tours assembled battle sites and upscale seaside resorts’ facilities, allowing foreigners to participate despite lacking Visas, or even passports. Bolín forged Franco’s mythic notion as Spain’s Christian Saviour against Communist chaos (similar to what happened in Portugal) and the Route of the North included holy Santiago de Compostela, bordering Irún (close to Biarritz and St. Jean-de-Luz), seaside resorts like Santander and San Sebastián, and Covadonga. The latter retained its appeal as Pelayo’s headquarters during the Reconquest against the infidels (Islam) after an apparition of Our Lady to the Christian warrior, and a parallel was established with the present-day. As Holguín (2005) states, “on these tours, the Nationalists depicted the war as both a Crusade and a new Reconquista, thereby exalting a Nationalist heroism that depended on the complete humiliation of the “Red” enemy” (idem). Bolín’s strategy included Armas Gourie’s journey across Europe to promote it, and Smith (2007) recalls journalists were a target as a 2001 article by Ruiz recalled when indicating that Portuguese reporters joined the proposition.

The bright side of the Nationalists’ stay at the Sunny Coast was their economic vitality and the urban renovation it faced (Plano de Urbanização da Costa do Sol). The latter modified Cascais’ downtown and encompassed a sanitation plan (a sort of ‘Crusade’ against flies and open cess-pools). According to Anjos (2012), “Até meados dos Anos 40 o centro de Cascais sofria intenso facelift urbano ficando irreconhecível, aproximando-se a urbe dos traços que hoje lhe conhecemos” (278).
Overcoming Rumours & Burying Heroes

As Carvalho (2014) recalls,

In July 1936 Spain became the symbol of Europe’s fragile peace and dark political powerplay with the outbreak of the civil war, and Portugal’s dubious actions contributed for the criticism and rumours spread on the country’s official position and territorial integrity (282).

Despite Salazar’s official neutrality, deeds conducted to sustain Franco’s troops were referred above. As Hall (1999) mentions, “authoritarian regimes do not of themselves deter tourists; instead (...) it is political instability which drives off tourists” (83), and that was what affected the Sunny Coast from July 1936 onwards. Since 1929 Estoril became the mainspring for the promotion of a nation of natural and cultural appeals that in the early-1930s possessed a resort with updated accessibilities, facilities and services of the highest rank. The modern campaigns implemented by the local and national propaganda agencies (Sociedade de Propaganda da Costa do Sol and Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional, respectively) had been a success from the beginning, in spite of Salazar’s aversion to cosmopolitan trends. The dictator did not understand or like international tourism, but was well aware of its profit, hence the January 1934 partnership forged with the private company that built and managed the resort (Sociedade Estoril-Plage). But Salazar’s innuendo led to rumours especially after the contemplation of Portugal’s daily reality. British newspapers were on his throat by the criticism on Lisbon’s fake neutrality, leading to a crisis on visitors’ arrivals already in the 1936/1937 winter season. Portugal’s House (Casa de Portugal) in London was compelled to publish regular news and ads in the Media (Observer and Sunday Times) on the country’s peaceful atmosphere, so that tourists would not sway from its resorts (O Século, 19 Nov 1936). Some of the rumours were so creative (though revealing poor-geography awareness) that on a 1940 radio broadcast Marques Guedes (one of Estoril’s managers) recalled news of corpses related to Madrid’s siege found floating in Lisbon (O Estoril, 3 June 1940). The Sunny Coast was to face decadence if it did not react promptly, and it did in several ways:

1) publishing articles denying the rumours on political and climatic conditions;
2) promoting packages with discounts on train rides and meals in hotels;
3) insisting on the promotion of its climatic, hospitable, and affordable features;
4) renovating its urban features through a plan and a sanitation campaign;
5) betting on domestic tourism;
6) participating in Paris’ 1937 and New York’s 1939 exhibitions, and inaugurating Portugal’s House in the latter (to attract north-American clients, considering the inauguration of the Pan American flights to Lisbon in June).

Brief reference can be made to António Passaporte, a photographer who lived in Spain, and returned to Portugal after the Civil War to produce photographs and postcards of the country’s tourist attractions.

As for the burying of heroes, 1939 was a key year for the transference of Sanjurjo’s remains and for the oblivion of the Viriatus. The latter were Portuguese volunteers who had
fought under Francoist officers’ command (Oliveira, 1987/1998); on the return home their stamina was feared by the regime, as was Moniz’s charisma (Diário de Lisboa, 6 April 1939). Moniz fell from grace and the Viriatos were integrated in the regime’s paramilitary models, after a banquet served in Estoril’s Casino (Idem, 16 June 1939). In October 1939 Sanjurjo’s remains were transferred from Estoril’s cemetery to Lisbon before proceeding to Madrid (where Franco attended a service in presence of the martyr’s urn), and then to Pamplona (O Século, 17 Oct 1939; Diário de Lisboa, 20 Oct 1939). Considering how Sanjurjo’s crash site, last respects and burials were promoted through the Media, worshiped by Spanish residents and visitors, adding to it the State funeral, one resorts to Walter (2009), whose quote on modernity sums up the essence of the by-gone days. As one reads:

The modern state creates and recreates sacred ancestors, bestowing immortality on its heroes. This may occur through a state funeral, or at a later time when a changed political scene prompts the canonisation of certain figures, or even the canonisation of those previously disgraced. (...) As well as the written word, modernity has the photograph (...) [and] as Barthes (1993) observed, it is a memento mori (42).

Nowadays, it is somewhat funny to apprehend Sanjurjo’s then promoted image as one of sanctity, especially after reading Thomas’ accounts (1961/1987) on his vanity, or Artiles’ remarks (1970) on his careless manners and alcoholic appetites. But as Yuill (2003) indicates, “Victory reinforces group identity and national pride (...). However, some governments may control such messages to suit their own agendas” (106). As it had happened after the Great War, Francoist Spain should promptly return to serenity. Therefore, Sanjurjo the Martyr was revered and buried because the winner of the Coup was ready to bring prosperity to a New Spain, which was now neutral before the conflict that ravaged Europe since Poland’s invasion on the 1st September 1939. The Iberian nations agreed on a neutrality pact early that year, and it proved important to end the grim connotation over Portugal’s image. That is why Lisbon’s safety and Estoril’s high-class venues were again pampering foreigners, most of them passengers in transit to the United States of America. As d’Orléans (2011) refers,

Este novo turismo forçado pela tragédia da Segunda Guerra Mundial faz a felicidade dos investidores [da estância Estoril]. Estes refugiados, políticos, economistas, advogados, jornalistas, estão longe da imagem tradicional de um refugiado de guerra. Na realidade, estão em Portugal à espera de seguir viagem, mas enquanto isso não acontece, a palavra de ordem é diversão (64-65).

Conclusion

Divided into 5 sections, this article started with a brief introduction, skipping to a summary of the early-20th century Iberian context between 1910 and 1939. On the chapter entitled ‘1930s Sunny Coast as backdrop of the Spanish Civil War’, examples on the moves connected to Salazar’s regime and the leisure at the destination were provided. This topic
could be chronologically divided in two: the 1934-1936 interval related to Sanjurjo’s charismatic stay could be dubbed ‘conspiracy lurking amidst leisure practices’, while the 1936-1939 period could be entitled ‘managing the Coup under the sun & over beach cocktails’, considering the lavish comforts offered at the seaside resorts. The third topic reflected on the overcoming of rumours that affected British flows and the staining over the Sunny Coast’s reputation, besides the burying of ephemeral heroes like Sanjurjo and Botelho Moniz. The latter faced not a physical burial, but rather image obliteration.

Eight decades later, it is now quite difficult to think of Estoril as a vivid resort, but it was by then the jewel in the Portuguese crown as far as tourist practices and leisure offers were concerned. However, Palace Hotel, Tamariz beach and the Casino are still key assets to the resort’s enduring appeal. In Monte, former Miramar Hotel is now a ruined shadow of days gone by when the lodging unit chosen by Sanjurjo and other refugees knew glamour, while the Pensão Boaventura that belonged to the same owners houses the Cascais and Oeiras Chamber Orchestra (Carvalho, 2008). As for RCP, its headquarters are currently occupied by the Clube Nacional de Ginástica, but its architectural features allude to the Modernist venue of the 1930s. A (loose) mental itinerary on this article’s topic is not complete without reference to the 1961 stone cross inaugurated in Areia to evoke Sanjurjo’s plane crash (Medina, 2013).

Winter’s (2009) article Tourism, Social Memory and the Great War recalls McCannel defended that distance disrupts the emotional meaning of a venue, a site or even a memorial. As she writes, “for tourists today, it is difficult to imagine the meaning of a place or memorial in the absence of explicit information or visual evidence, and they mistake the social and historic meaning of a site, or fail to see it at all (McCannel 1999)” (613). This lack of understanding may be now perceived on a Post-modern society subdued to technological apparatuses and narratives of existence. Considering locals, day-trippers and tourists visiting Cascais, aside from the already well-promoted recollection of the Second World War’s stopovers and exiles, how many of them are aware of the Sunny Coast’s importance to Europe’s leisure and Spain’s history in the period between the wars?

The Estoril Coast Tourist Office (2014) published a report that listed Spain, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Germany as the 5 main tourist markets in 2013, with nearly half a million visitors accounted for. Much like Gibbons wrote in 1936 the trends haven’t changed when considering the leading nationalities: Spanish and British. Although the Civil War remains a traumatic event for the Spanish collective mind, perhaps the promotion of Portuguese Routes of Leisure during Wartime(s) may assist the Iberian neighbour in coming more swiftly to terms with its past. These propositions might also reinforce destinations like the (former) Sunny Coast on renovating its image supported on yesterday’s episodes, today’s tourist delights and marketing tools to formulate these alternative tours. Salazar (2010) sustains that “destinations worldwide might be adapting themselves to the standardizing trends of global tourism, but, at the same time, they have to commoditize their local distinctiveness in order to compete with other destinations” (49). On the other hand, Smith (2003/2007) focus on destination-reinvention, referring to countries like Spain, Portugal and Italy, whose urgency to revive coastal resorts should
range “from upgrading the quality of the destination, (…) the targeting of new markets, or the diversification of the tourism product (…) [to] cultural tourism” (76).

In this case, either one categorises it as Dark Tourism, Thanatourism, morbid or black-spot tourism (Stone, 2005), with the proper planning, promotion and guiding this is a feasible proposition based on Memory, Heritage and current tourist delights. The purpose of this paper was to recall how both the Sunny Coast and Estoril per se were elevated and harmed at a tourist level by the Spanish Civil War, since a lot has already been written on the political details of the timeline (as the sources of investigation applied reveal). Out of curiosity, news on Cascais’ wish to offer a palace to King Juan Carlos, who spent his youth in the Sunny Coast and recently abdicated on behalf of son Felipe IV, reinforces the need for more strategies to again pamper these visitors (Rocha, 2015).

References

A Voz – 1934.
Diário da Manhã – 1936.
Diário de Lisboa – 1932-1939.
dos Livros.
O Estoril – 1936-1940.
O Século – 1934-1939.
O Século Ilustrado – 1938.
PT/FAQ/AF/001/0363/00012, Correspondência AFC-AF, Caixa 0028, Carta de Marquês de Quintanar. Monte Estoril, 08 de Janeiro de 1936.